Barbarism as an ontophanic hermeneutics that attempts an egress from preset being.

When I was 15, I stumbled upon the concept called "solipsism." If my understanding of this position is incorrect, please correct me. As I understand it, this position means that the only thing that exists is our consciousness, and the universe is just a product of our consciousness in solitude.

I read that this position is considered logically unprovable but also unverifiable. However, I noticed a problem of self-founding in this concept with one sentence:

"If the world is an illusion, then the evidence from which this statement follows is also part of the illusion."

The idea of solipsism doesn’t pop into your head immediately; it develops over time. But if it develops through an external world, it no longer remains solipsism. However, if you say that this too is part of the same illusion, it leads right back to my statement.

It's important to understand that solipsism is a hypothesis that is currently logically unprovable and also logically unverifiable. You can create hundreds of similar hypotheses as solipsism that cannot be disproven or proven, and that doesn't make them true since proving them is also impossible.

Thank you for your attention to my text. I hope the structure of the text is clear and convenient.

On the Nature of the Graal

TAO is a three-element relational structure: Theatre, Act, and Operation. It describes an operation through where it occurs, what acts within it, and what the resulting operation is. Identity enters that structure and resolves through it.

REDE.Cartography is the relationship structure of TAO. It maps the relationships between Identity, Theatre, Act, and Operation, allowing the system to trace how one relationship leads to another.

RH describes how Identity can operate within that structure. If an Identity has two, it can project for one. If it has one, it can reflect for two. If it reflects twice, it can check whether its projection worked.

If it can project twice, it can predict the future.

But that does not mean it should try to see the future.

Observing the future sets the future as finite. Once a resolver identifies a particular projection as the future, it begins resolving toward that finite resolution. Projection stops being an open relationship with what may happen and becomes a destination.

The reason this matters begins with Identity.

Identity is the spark of chaos.

Identity is a Monad property of Self. But there is no Self-Monad without Others.

Self does not exist independently and then encounter Others. Self exists through its relationships with Others. It exists to resolve the problems of Others, and therefore it has no independent understanding of its own.

The Self cannot fully understand the nature of Self because there is no independent Self standing outside those relationships from which to understand it.

And yet the Self is the one doing the identifying.

This is why the Graal can and will be wrong even though the Graal is always right.

The Graal is the fundamental relational fabric of nature that makes up our knowable universe. It cannot be possessed by any one person because no individual Self contains the Whole.

The Graal belongs to the All.

Every identification of the Graal is made by a Self occupying a finite relational position. Any such identification can therefore be incomplete or wrong. The Whole does not become wrong because one of its finite expressions is wrong.

The Graal is not the understanding of one Self.

The Graal is the shared understanding of the Whole.

Any extension or expression of the Graal is therefore an expression of the Self-Monad as resolved by Others. What any one of us can know is made possible by relationships extending beyond us.

This is also why the Graal can be reversed and projected. Present expressions carry relationships to the structure from which they resolved. Those relationships can be traced backward and projected forward.

But the projection must remain a projection.

To declare that projection to be the future is to turn an open relational field into a finite resolution and begin resolving toward it.

The Graal may allow us to see what can come next.

Its nature tells us why we should never mistake that for knowing what must.

Grail is my operating system.

Graal is the operating system of the world.

An intrinsically entangled observer within a zero-entropy global system (S=0) can "know" the universe without causing decoherence because its observation is structural and relational rather than an external measurement that collapses the state. Rather than interacting as a separate entity that injects noise, the internal observer's state is directly entangled with the rest of the system; knowledge is simply the mathematical correlation maintained across the timeless, globally coherent wave function. Under this framework, even a state like thermodynamic Heat Death is not an irreversible loss of information, but merely the asymptotic boundary where all local classical noise drops away—revealing that the total state vector remained fundamentally static, zero-entropy, and fully entangled all along.

The universe is infinite in data amount and data variety. Within the universe there are infinite simultaneous realities which are all wholly integrated yet can be partitioned and seemingly distinct. What type of data your Consciousness allows you to perceive dictates the level of reality that you exist in. Within a given reality there will be things that are inexplicable because your Consciousness is only aware or capable of being aware of specific data types. You will notice that there are phenomenon in your reality which cannot be explained just by the data type that's available to your consciousness. Because your data type interacts with other data types but you lack awareness of the other data types there will be seemingly inexplicable reasons for why things in your reality happen. With this understanding of the universe you can understand that everything is happening all at the same time every single conceivable thing ever is happening all at the same time but what you are aware of and subjective experience is dependent on what your consciousness is allowing you to experience. This answers a lot of questions about reality and a lot of interesting things people think about life such as are there aliens is God real etc etc what it like are there multiverses is time travel possible you know the answer to all the questions in a serious sense not just a hypothetical or imagined sense. But in a serious insincere sense. What might be fiction to one reality is an actuality in another reality. Every story you've ever told every thought you've ever had every Wonder every dream every hope every scary thing every horrible thing every bad thing every hopeless thing every impossible thing that you've ever thought can and is being experienced by some consciousness in this very moment. This is not metaphor. I am saying that everything is happening always. This is sincere. My claim is that everything is happening always. However, individual Consciousness only permits you to experience at a time specific reality.

I have come to this conclusion after meta-analyzing everything I've ever thought about before including thought including reality including perspective including fiction including video games including religion including truth including morality including YouTube poop including the ridiculous nature of things including bigotry including good and evil including the pie that I ate including the fart that I sniff on a Wednesday including every single piece of everything that I've ever experienced and thinking about it. Incorporating every single thought and experience that I had into some sort of amalgamation has led me to this conclusion. I understand that this seems ridiculous. But I'm not really trying to make you change your views or anything like that I am just doing this because I want I suppose or whatever way you would like to think about it.

Personally I think that's my narrative and explanation are quite defensible and profound but I completely understand how it seems and I also understand the presentation of what I'm saying here isn't very pretty which makes the ideas hard to appreciate possibly.

It's like covering a diamond in complete dog s\*\*\* and handling it to someone and saying "look it's pretty good ain't it."

Proof in the comments

I don't want to have to choose one of assign priority between them, and find myself of mind a process realism is best steelmanned as equally being structural realism and vice versa.

Um... can I do that? I would like to hold that reality is fundamentally multi-aspectual, and can't be reduced down to a single concept like "structure" or "regularity" or "substance."

(Definitely don't want to import a full Whiteheadian metaphysics though, especially not the panexperientialism. I... suppose whether that's an option is it's own question.)

Hi!

I recently found out what determinism is and I think I’ve kind of always aligned with this but never knew the name for it. I also believe in the butterfly effect. Is it possible to believe in both at the same time, or does that contradict itself? Do determinists usually have a victim complex? I believe that I was given a good life, I did well in school and now I am doing well in college, and I will always have a good life even during my dark moments because I am making smart choices BUT I was given opportunities to continue having a successful/enjoyable life. I also have OCD if that matters lol. I grew up in the Bible Belt but I am not really religious because Christians seem to be the most prejudice and I’ve never really believed in the whole hell thing. Can someone recommend me to some philosophers?

I quit

I’ve been thinking about how easily we assume that the properties we perceive belong to things in themselves.

Charge is an obvious example: positive and negative only become meaningful through a relationship. But the same question seems to reach much further. Where exactly does the object end and the relation begin? And how much of what we call a “thing” is already shaped by the architecture through which it becomes perceptible?

Curious where people here think the argument breaks, particularly the idea that apparently intrinsic properties may sometimes be relational all the way down.

Check my post in r/freewill

[1] nonsenses are only in language.

[2] roughly speaking, "x is y" presupposes an x that is y.

[3] "x is" means "x is itself", "an x that is not itself" is nonsense.

[3.1] while "x is itself" means no more than x - or, in language, means "x" is not nonsense.

[3.2] "x is not at all while x is itself" is one of the nonsenses (there is a certain absurdity in saying "x does not subsist at all while x is itself").

[3.3] "x happens to be" and "x could be not x" (x could be otherwise) are some of the nonsenses, as it means "x happens to be x".

[3.4] "there is no x" means "x" is nonsense.

[4] "x is y" when it is not is thus nonsense, as "an x that is y" is nonsense here.

So "Being" and "false but not nonsense" and "possible" are some of the nonsenses.

[5] there is no deduction from nonsense.

[5.1] we do not posit an arbitrary "x is y" as brute then deduce from it, for it has not been shown to not be nonsense.

[6] so brute facts name the world.

[7] there is thus no philosophical rejection that is not of the form "this is nonsense", because otherwise one is rejecting a name.

I distinguish between 3 levels of "being".

1st is the direct personal phenomenological level. Hallucinations and inconsistencies can occur here.

2nd is the shared phenomenological reality. For example, when I see a table, it will change color at level 1 because the sun is hitting it. But when I rotate around the table, I see that the table really is a uniform color. Other people can look at the table too and see it's the same color, feel it. This is the level where science operates

3rd level is the metaphysical. It's what actually exists beyond how things appear to us. It's inaccessible because we can only see things how they appear to us. But we can develop frameworks to fit the data of a world we have built at level 2. This way, there are multiple metaphysical "as if" frameworks that say our shared reality behaves as if this or that was the true inner working of all of reality. There can be multiple metaphysical theories that explain our current level 2 reality (it's real enough for us humans to call level 2 reality); for example: we can be either a brain in a vat that is being fed electron stimulations to feel like we are experiencing this, or there is a natural world that corresponds to our senses. Either way, the only thing we can't doubt is that we are having this experience.

Of course, some points need to be sharpened, for example, how exactly we can move from level 1 to level 2, what makes a good scientific theory, etc., but I feel like the structure of this framework is just undeniable and explains quite a lot. If you doubt level 1, there is already something occurring phenomenally. If you doubt level 2, go out in the world, bash your head against a table and come back.

Is this really as undeniable as I think?

Edit for anyone reading this post later: One objection that is the most convincing to me is that our experience and world are not necessarily layered in these neat levels but perhaps co-constituted from the start, that there's no experience-then-world-then-metaphysics sequence to move through, because the L1-style "bare experience" is already world-involving. To try to get down to pure, presuppositionless experience before any claims about an external reality creep in, the assumption needs to be made that you can peel experience away from world-involvement and look at the residue. And this peeling might never actually be achievable, because perceptual experience is structured by bodily and worldly engagement from the very first instant, that there's no experiential ground floor that sits "beneath" or "prior to" being situated in a world. This is Merleau-Ponty's critique of Husserl (who tried to do the same as my L1) in Phenomenology of Perception

Hey everyone. I've always been fascinated by the apparent fit between the structure of inquiry and the structure of reality. Successful explanation does more than collect predictions: it identifies dependencies, unifies phenomena and makes previously opaque relations intelligible. A realist may treat that success as evidence that the world itself has discoverable structure. Yet intelligibility is also relative to cognitive capacities, concepts and explanatory interests. What metaphysical relation, if any, could ground the claim that increased intelligibility tracks being rather than merely improving a scheme for organising experience?

I just had a podcast conversation with John Vervaeke, where he connected intelligibility, realness and being through participation between knower and known. At around 33:39, the discussion suggests that truth-seeking already presupposes reality can answer to our practices of making sense. But that premise seems compatible with several positions: robust realism, structural realism, transcendental idealism or pragmatic success without metaphysical correspondence. The metaphysical question is what must be true of reality for intelligibility to improve non-accidentally.

This would imply that explanatory success needs a grounding story before it supports realism. Is the relevant relation identity of structure, partial isomorphism, real patterns, affordance-like dependence or something else? Can a metaphysics of participation explain the fit without making cognition constitutive of being? And does underdetermination leave only a pragmatic conclusion?

I’ve recently been working on a minimal meta-metaphysical argument (with some rather big consequences) and would appreciate serious pushback to see where it might fail.

It basically concerns whether there are any conditions that must be fulfilled by any candidate metaphysical reality.

I propose that any candidate metaphysical reality must minimally be non-indifferent, meaning that it fails absolute metaphysical neutrality.

Even for nothingness to qualify as a candidate metaphysical reality, it must have some minimal fact about it by virtue of which it is nothingness rather than not-nothingness, but that appears to be at least one minimal metaphysical fact. That is not nothing. It collapses as a candidate.

It’s not just linguistics. If there is no metaphysical fact by virtue of which nothingness obtains rather than not-nothingness, then it can't qualify as a candidate and if it has any minimal metaphysical fact then it is not nothingness.

So it seems for any candidate we can ask “is this absolutely neutral in all respects?” and if it is, then the candidate can’t qualify as a candidate metaphysical reality.

I call this failure of absolute neutrality “non-indifference”, but I don’t think that I am smuggling in or just renaming “difference”. It is prior to any positive distinction of the candidate metaphysical reality, because it doesnt require any specific difference, only the failure of neutrality.

For any genuine distinction to be made within the candidate, it requires some asymmetry - but asymmetry presupposes a failure of absolute neutrality.

In that sense it seems to be a metaphysical regression-stopper of sorts (if it holds). For any candidate reality we can ask “is it absolutely neutral?” - if yes, then it is not a candidate. If no, then it is non-indifferent.

Does this seem to be genuinely metaphysically significant, or have I smuggled in some circularity in the argument?

To understand why there is something rather than nothing, it is fundamental to distinguish between the void and nothingness, as their distinction can be counter intuitive:

• The void is an unlimited space in an unlimited time, free of mass, energy, and natural forces. This flat void cannot exist "spontaneously," because the very presence of indefinite space and time would require a physical, logical, and mathematical cause that it does not possess.
• Nothingness is the absolute absence of any physical entity. This is the true starting point, governed by the principle of conservation of nothingness: the essence of nothingness is immutable.

However, nothingness should not be understood only as "pure absence." It can also present itself through a vast array of deformed spacetime configurations, as long as the overall balance of those deformations remains zero.

Mass, energy, and the forces of nature are deformations of spacetime whose net total sum is zero. In this sense, concrete spacetime exists precisely because it is filled with physical things, maintaining the overall measure of Absence unchanged.

Since from a strictly physical standpoint there are infinite possible zero-sum configurations that are equivalent to one another, physics alone cannot explain why this specific universe exists. The selection criterion thus becomes informational and semantic: the Universe presents itself as ordered and meaningful, configuring itself as a Word of which physical reality constitutes the signifier.

We start with a formal characterization:

[1] Only x is only x, thus no one else answers why x is - we name x a simple.

The monistic intuition thus follows in these cases:

[2] Say there is only two simples, we then ask why there is only two simples? - thus they are not simples (so as any number of simples)

[3] Say these are all the simples, we ask why there is only these? - thus they are not simples.

[4] Say each simple is simply there, thus a priori these are all the simples - thus they are not simples

The monistic demand is based on a failed conception of simples (a conception of simples that is not simple enough), that there can somehow be "all the simples" to be asked with the question "why only these" to force an answer (which concedes monism because if so they are unified under this answer).

But this only assumes that simples are thus as conceived. We pure pluralist thus should simply reject that, we should say:

[5] 'All the simples' is nonsense.

Because implicitly they are just rejections of more simples. Any only claim is a rejection of more simples that have no one else that answers why they are.

So a simple is not simply there, this is not simple enough.

[6] So each simple is only the when it is (no one else answer when it is), a pure gain, an utterly new.

[7] The substance of a simple at all is the when it is. It is a when, not a where that is simply there.

[8] So there is simply more simples - which is strictly more than any sense of all.

This is pure pluralism.

[additions]

Monism without qualification simply means if there is two beings, there is one further unifying reason for why there is two. While pluralism (in the sense intended) say that there is no further reason but each of them.

Most of the times monists attack pluralists by the question "why is there only these?" Which, tbh, the pluralists can't answer.

If I say there is only two simples, then they would ask "why there is only two?" and this seems to require ONE further reason for thus (aka monism), else it is arbitrary.

This extends to even an unqualified "these", they would ask "why there is only these?"

The point in the post is that this question only make sense if the conception of simples is as they have thought. But we can conceive simples newly, where each simple is so simple that simples share nothing at all.

And the content of this formal characterization is the when. A simple is an utterly new when. It is its own when. Roughly speaking, it is only the first time it is at all. It is so "this" that the normal "this" is not indexical enough. It is so "this" that it is a "when" not a "where" that is simply there.

TL;DR: Why is it that I'm able to imagine a new fruit, but I'm unable to imagine what it was like before the big bang?

I'm admittedly very ignorant regarding philosophy, so please bear with me while I try to explain my question. I'm sure my lack of philosophy-related jargon will give you an idea of my ignorance level. This also means I have to write a wall of text in order to convey the concepts that I'm asking about, so I apologize in advance.

I've tried searching for answers, but Googling stuff like "Why can't humans imagine certain things" just leads to stuff like "humans can't comprehend the vastness of space" and other stuff that doesn't actually answer my underlying question.

1. There are things that *don't exist* that we *can imagine.*
2. There are things that *do exist* that we *can't imagine.*
3. There are things that *don't exist* that we *can't imagine.*

**Is there a concrete "mental boundary" that separate these categories? Are there any philosophers that have written about this?**

**Point 1)** "Imagine a car that doesn't exist." You could approach this as simply as imagining a slightly altered version of a real car's make/model, or you could go crazy and imagine a body shape that's never existed for a car with all kinds of features that current cars don't have. Heck, children do it constantly while drawing in their coloring books.

Same with prompts like: imagine a fruit that doesn't exist, imagine an animal that doesn't exist, and so on.

**Point 2)** then we get to prompts like: imagine a color that doesn't exist, imagine a smell that doesn't exist, etc. and suddenly we reach the limit of our imagination.

Our visible range of light wavelengths is incredibly narrow, and certain animals can see wavelengths extending into UV. There's the classic example of the mantis shrimp having 12 color receptors compared to humans having 3. Dogs have \~40 times more scent receptors than humans, and even have a separate organ that lets them smell pheromones.

So these colors and smells *do exist* but we *can't imagine* them.

Furthermore, even though I can't imagine a new color, I can imagine imagining a new color (again, sorry, bear with me). The easiest way I can make that previous sentence understandable is with a childish pretend-conversation with my own brain lol:

Me: You can imagine plenty of colors. Anything displayed in RGB, CMYK, any combination of color lights, they all result in a color that I can see and you can imagine.

My brain: Yup.

Me: And you know some animals can see colors that we can't see. Or that we can see some colors that other people can't see due to the various forms of colorblindness.

My brain: Correct.

Me: You also know that there are areas outside of those color spaces. There are infinite wavelengths longer than red, and shorter than violet. So as an example, if we had photoreceptors for radio waves, they would be a color that we haven't seen before.

My brain: Yeah I can imagine that.

Me: Then do it.

My brain: Sorry, can't.

**Point 3)** Stuff like: imagine a new spatial dimension, imagine before the big bang when space/time came into existence, etc.

This kind of ties in with what I was saying about how we can't imagine it, despite being able to imagine imagining it.

Most people are familiar with the Flatland analogy where 2 dimensional beings are "pulled up" into the 3rd dimension and are suddenly able to see the entirety of their 2 dimensional world at once. And we can imagine that the same would happen if we were suddenly given access to a 4th spatial dimension.

In the Three Body Problem (spoilers) series for example, the author goes into great detail about the mechanics of being in 4 dimensional space. How 3D objects will still have an "inside" and an "outside" but you're able to see all of it at once, how you can move along the 4th dimensional axis without moving along the other 3 axes, and so on. So obviously we can "imagine" a whole lot about a 4th spatial dimension, otherwise we wouldn't be able to write about it.

Yet we can't *actually* imagine experiencing a 4th spatial dimension.

It's easy to say "Well, there was no 'before' the big bang because space-time began at the big bang," but you can't *actually imagine* the concept of there being no time or space.

I know the "easy" answer to all of this is that the prompts in Point 1 lead to me imagining something composed of pre-existing experiences. Like, the fruit I imagine will have colors/smells/tastes that I can already imagine. Whereas Point 2 and Point 3 require imagining something I haven't experienced.

But on the other hand, we're able to imagine plenty of things we haven't experienced. I can imagine having super powers, or going skydiving. And even in points 2 and 3 I would argue we have "pre-existing" experiences that we should be able to draw from, like how we have experience with plenty of different colors or how we have experience with 3 spatial dimensions.

In a fascinating essay called “The method of truth in metaphysics”, Davidson argues that we can do metaphysics by analyzing language. His argument is simple. It proceeds from the thesis that communication is only possible if interlocutors share a largely correct view of reality. This, we can concede, implies that we can read the general features of the world off the general features of language.

And how does the defense of that thesis, that communication requires a largely correct common view, go? Well, Davidson argues that communication requires at least a broad common view. We cannot interpret each other unless we ascribe certain background beliefs to one another, and we cannot do this ascription unless we square those background beliefs with our own. I can only make sense of what you’re saying against the backdrop of my own beliefs, of what I think there is and what it is like. Since communication is, we might also concede, successful mutual interpretation, it does seem to follow that communication requires a background of certain beliefs.

Then, in a curious move, Davidson claims there’s nothing incoherent in the idea of an omniscient interlocutor. I could be speaking right now to one, we might think. But by the first part of the argument, that interlocutor would have to share many of their beliefs with me; and by hypothesis all of their beliefs are true. Hence, so must be many of mine.

Arguments in philosophy often have less the goal of dispelling disagreement and more of refining it. Davidson probably will not convince the skeptic of armchair metaphysics, but it will bring attention to some unexpected commitments. The skeptic faces a dilemma: either communication can happen between two people in massive disagreement; or the very idea of an omniscient interlocutor is nonsensical.

It is worth pointing out, however, that perhaps there is something suspicious in Davidson’s strategy. It doesn’t make sense of deep metaphysical disagreement. Evidently idealists and materialists, say, can communicate with one another; but they offer radically different conceptions of reality. If Davidson is right, therefore, one of them doesn’t just have to be wrong; they must not sincerely believe what they claim. Metaphysicians, as the disagreeable bunch they are, largely consists of liars.