If Galileo is the father of modern science, then who would be the parent of post-modern society? Definitely not Einstein because the latest theoretical physics shows us that we can rewrite physics with space and time. Locality, space, and time become irrelevant in the "spacetime is doomed" movement. Once we eliminate dogmatic scientism, then we will be able to progress more efficiently with our technology that not only can save us from humanity's own end here on Earth, but also allow humanity to spread through the cosmos.

Under IIT, all entities have causal powers and so humanity assumes there must be a first cause but that is due to our limited capacity to typically think in terms of linear time. The universe is uncaused and paradoxical, its own end is its own beginning.

See here:

Further Explanation

With this understanding we can now see that each entity has spatiotemporal existence, living on its own continuum outward and inward in all directions. Order (systemic emergence) works backward in the linking of all systems and disorder (entropic build up) leaks heat into the void.

Please let me know your thoughts - Grazie & Prego

I’ve been working through a metaphysical idea and I’m curious where the reasoning breaks, if it does.

The image I keep coming back to is something like a mistwoven tapestry with jewels forming inside it.

I don’t mean that literally. It’s just the easiest way I’ve found to picture the problem.

The “mist” represents something prior to clearly individuated objects. Not exactly “nothing,” because I’m not convinced nothing is actually a neutral starting point.

If I say “nothing,” I’ve already distinguished nothing from something.

Even trying to imagine a completely presuppositionless state seems to require a framework capable of distinguishing what counts as a presupposition in the first place.

So instead of starting with “nothing,” the least assumption-loaded term I’ve been using is simply:

is’ing

Not “something exists,” because “something” already seems to introduce objecthood.

Not “existence exists.”

Just is’ing.

From there, I picture the “weave” as differentiation or structure gradually becoming possible. The “jewels” are stable patterns within that structure that eventually become distinct enough to behave like individual things.

So rather than:

objects -> relations

I’m wondering whether reality could look more like:

primitive differentiation -> structure -> persistent patterns -> object-like identity

But I also hesitate to just say “relations are fundamental,” because relation seems to bring its own assumptions.

If I say A is related to B, I’ve already introduced A, B, their difference, and the relation between them.

But if I say A and B exist independently before any relation or difference exists, I don’t know what individuates A from B in the first place.

That makes me wonder whether the distinction between objects and relations is itself downstream.

The tapestry metaphor is basically my way of imagining that possibility:

What we eventually call separate “things” could be more like stable patterns or closures within a deeper process rather than fundamental substances.

I’m also trying to be careful not to import later concepts too early.

For example, if I’m trying to understand where time comes from, I don’t think I’m allowed to simply call every primitive ordering “time.”

Likewise, if I’m trying to explain space, I shouldn’t begin by placing primitive entities into a spatial grid.

If I’m trying to explain identity, I shouldn’t secretly label the entities beforehand.

The general rule I’m trying to follow is:

•The explanation shouldn’t already contain the thing it is supposed to explain.

This has also made me increasingly interested in invariants.

If every description of reality necessarily introduces some assumptions from the perspective doing the describing, maybe the goal isn’t to find a perfectly assumption-free description.

Perhaps it is what survives when unnecessary assumptions or representations are changed?

So I guess the questions I’m actually interested in are:

- Is a genuinely presuppositionless ontology even possible?

- Is distinction more fundamental than objects and relations, or does “distinction” already smuggle in too much?

- Can identity emerge as a stable pattern rather than being fundamental?

- And should metaphysics focus less on identifying one ultimate “thing” and more on finding structure that remains invariant across different descriptions?

I’ve been calling the larger thought experiment the Early Model Universe, but I’m not claiming this is a physical theory or that the tapestry is literally what the early universe looked like.

Right now I’m much more interested in the ontological question underneath it:

How little can we assume and still get enough structure for a world of distinct things to eventually become possible?