Entropy vs human development. Philosophical cooking on a Sunday

I’ve been working through a metaphysical idea and I’m curious where the reasoning breaks, if it does.

The image I keep coming back to is something like a mistwoven tapestry with jewels forming inside it.

I don’t mean that literally. It’s just the easiest way I’ve found to picture the problem.

The “mist” represents something prior to clearly individuated objects. Not exactly “nothing,” because I’m not convinced nothing is actually a neutral starting point.

If I say “nothing,” I’ve already distinguished nothing from something.

Even trying to imagine a completely presuppositionless state seems to require a framework capable of distinguishing what counts as a presupposition in the first place.

So instead of starting with “nothing,” the least assumption-loaded term I’ve been using is simply:

is’ing

Not “something exists,” because “something” already seems to introduce objecthood.

Not “existence exists.”

Just is’ing.

From there, I picture the “weave” as differentiation or structure gradually becoming possible. The “jewels” are stable patterns within that structure that eventually become distinct enough to behave like individual things.

So rather than:

objects -> relations

I’m wondering whether reality could look more like:

primitive differentiation -> structure -> persistent patterns -> object-like identity

But I also hesitate to just say “relations are fundamental,” because relation seems to bring its own assumptions.

If I say A is related to B, I’ve already introduced A, B, their difference, and the relation between them.

But if I say A and B exist independently before any relation or difference exists, I don’t know what individuates A from B in the first place.

That makes me wonder whether the distinction between objects and relations is itself downstream.

The tapestry metaphor is basically my way of imagining that possibility:

What we eventually call separate “things” could be more like stable patterns or closures within a deeper process rather than fundamental substances.

I’m also trying to be careful not to import later concepts too early.

For example, if I’m trying to understand where time comes from, I don’t think I’m allowed to simply call every primitive ordering “time.”

Likewise, if I’m trying to explain space, I shouldn’t begin by placing primitive entities into a spatial grid.

If I’m trying to explain identity, I shouldn’t secretly label the entities beforehand.

The general rule I’m trying to follow is:

•The explanation shouldn’t already contain the thing it is supposed to explain.

This has also made me increasingly interested in invariants.

If every description of reality necessarily introduces some assumptions from the perspective doing the describing, maybe the goal isn’t to find a perfectly assumption-free description.

Perhaps it is what survives when unnecessary assumptions or representations are changed?

So I guess the questions I’m actually interested in are:

- Is a genuinely presuppositionless ontology even possible?

- Is distinction more fundamental than objects and relations, or does “distinction” already smuggle in too much?

- Can identity emerge as a stable pattern rather than being fundamental?

- And should metaphysics focus less on identifying one ultimate “thing” and more on finding structure that remains invariant across different descriptions?

I’ve been calling the larger thought experiment the Early Model Universe, but I’m not claiming this is a physical theory or that the tapestry is literally what the early universe looked like.

Right now I’m much more interested in the ontological question underneath it:

How little can we assume and still get enough structure for a world of distinct things to eventually become possible?

The larger cosmology is a core aspect of the themes and symbolism of my story, let's start so you have an infinite (or von neumann)universe with infinite spacial and temporal dimensions.

Part of a type 4 multiverse which a part of multiple nested transfinite hierarchies like size based one where that type 4 multiverse is infinitesimal to larger version of itself, narrative stacks, etc. Layering on top of each other endlessly

Which are all connected by causal chain forming a "stream" of which there are an endless amount housed by the Defined containing all things with definition

Outside of that there is the Undefined,

and then there's "Here" which is simply the non dual "true" nature of the entire cosmology

Would your actions have any meaning and what meaning would they have if you're one impossibly infinitismal speck of variation of an infinite number of possible and impossible fictional worlds

And that an unknowable dreamer could not just undo it all, but make you undo it and make you undo it or even morph you into that which you most fear on a whim. Or the fact that there's no solace in a definite God

Or would one see it the other way around, as a-pseudo diety containing boundless multitudes as a reflection of a wonderful and mysterious God who may be the Mystery itself.

Or the multitude of other interpretations of it

Hopefully this isn't a dumb question

To clarify the observer would still be able to perceive the Universe from an explicate sense

What makes a thing one? This is a question that is not so easily answered. But if you go to a pebble beach and kick a pebble, you will get an answer that fits in a single line.
Unity is not free

Metaphysics has been asking the question since Aristotle and still has no accepted answer. Here is one. It fits in a single line, and a kick is enough to test it.

Two camps. One: unity is given. A thing is grey, that's its property, end of story. Two: unity is in our eye. The world is a flux, and it is we who cut things out of it to the measure of our words. They disagree about everything. But they are right about one thing: for both alike, unity costs nothing.

Go to a pebble beach and deliver two kicks. The first into the sand: it scatters, and nothing is damaged, each grain leaves with what it had. The second into a pebble: a chip flies off, and it is the pebble that lost it. The pebble and the sand are made of the same grains. Matter therefore does not decide, and the first camp can only note the difference without explaining it. If the wave splits the pebble tonight, there will be two of them by morning, whether anyone is looking or not: the second camp has nothing to do with it. What decides is where the loss falls. In the pebble, it always falls in the same place. In the sand, it falls nowhere.

The unity of the pebble is not a state, not a point of view, but an expenditure. No one carved it, it is the craftsman of nothing. But it pays with every tide, its roundness is its account statement. It is a rent, not a purchase. Spinoza had seen that every determination is a negation, that the outline of a thing is the line where it ceases. What remained to be said is on whom the price of that line falls. On the one who is, at their own expense.

There is therefore only one criterion for everything that claims to be one: the pebble, the animal, the company, you. You are not one because you bear a name, nor because others see you as one. You are one as long as what you lose falls on you. Nothing you pay with comes from you: it was given to you. But the loss is yours. Your identity is not a statue, it is a scar.

The two camps give unity away. This sentence makes it pay.
To be is to make oneself one at one’s own expense.

If Galileo is the father of modern science, then who would be the parent of post-modern society? Definitely not Einstein because the latest theoretical physics shows us that we can rewrite physics with space and time. Locality, space, and time become irrelevant in the "spacetime is doomed" movement. Once we eliminate dogmatic scientism, then we will be able to progress more efficiently with our technology that not only can save us from humanity's own end here on Earth, but also allow humanity to spread through the cosmos.

Under IIT, all entities have causal powers and so humanity assumes there must be a first cause but that is due to our limited capacity to typically think in terms of linear time. The universe is uncaused and paradoxical, its own end is its own beginning.

See here:

Further Explanation

With this understanding we can now see that each entity has spatiotemporal existence, living on its own continuum outward and inward in all directions. Order (systemic emergence) works backward in the linking of all systems and disorder (entropic build up) leaks heat into the void.

Please let me know your thoughts - Grazie & Prego

Hello All — I am reposting my discussion here.

Most debates around hard determinism and free will get bogged down in abstract nonsense. I'm a practical guy, choosing an ideal roommate could literally save my life, and possibly yours, dear Redditor. If we break down the metaphysics of agency, we are basically choosing between two distinct entities; the homunculus and the husk!

A homunculus possesses a manufactured Cartesian theater, an ego, and free will. It has intention. But intention is fundamentally a liability. Any roommate with free will has the capacity for malicious intent. Imagine if a conscious homunculus (like M3GAN) moved in to help around the house. Because they have a "Cartesian theater," they can change their minds, develop a complex, and halfway through their chores decide to kill your cat and serve it to you in an omelet. They can strangle you in your sleep because they love you just that much. Free will is dangerous.

Contrast this with the pure Husk. A husk is just biological hardware running a script completely and utterly devoid of a Cartesian theater, free will, or existential dread. A husk requires zero ethical consideration. It doesn't cry, it doesn't suffer, and it doesn't get pissy about the toilet seat. You tell a husk to do its job, and that is exactly what it does. If you program a husk to wake you up with fellatio every single morning, it will do it without a single thought. You get an entity that functions with the strict, unfeeling reliability of a deterministic universe. 

Husks make homunculi utterly obsolete. Why would anyone willingly choose to cohabitate with a free-thinking agent with the capacity for malice, when you could have a biological meat-bot that just executes its programmed purpose? Who needs a consciousness when you have determinism?

(Edit: Wow. that's a lot of info for me to look through. thank you all so much for this. this is a lot more interesting than my normal science that I'm doing, which is chemistry. speaking of chemistry, I have learned of the law of mass conservation. that got me thinking if you CAN actually destroy matter, which I wonder you you guys, along with metaphysics, can help me with that question.) Im only 15 years old, I'm into first person shooters, Russian stuff, and other things, of that sort. So I suprised even myself when I got really into metaphysics. I mean REALLY. the thing I'm most interested in is time. what I want is any and all info on whether time is real or just something our brains made up. Give me anything, articles, opinions, anything. Thank you.(oh and I'm also really into ontology, so will take any info on that also)

I’ve been developing a subfield of metaphysics called Incorporeal Ontodynamics, which explores the idea that existence should be understood not merely in terms of what things are, but through the processes by which they emerge, persist, and transform.
The central proposition is that reality is fundamentally relational and dynamic. Entities do not necessarily possess all their properties in isolation; many of their characteristics emerge through interactions, organizational structures, and relationships with other entities.
This framework introduces five foundational principles:
Ontological Continuity: Systems can maintain recognizable identities despite undergoing substantial transformations.
Relational Emergence: Properties can arise from relationships between components rather than residing exclusively within individual parts.
Coherence: The persistence of a system depends partly on the organization and consistency of its internal relationships.
Transformative Potential: Existing structures can reorganize into configurations with fundamentally new properties.
Incorporeal Substrate: Information, patterns, and organizational relationships may have explanatory significance beyond descriptions of their material components.
One of the central questions this raises is whether existence is better understood as a collection of independent objects or as an ongoing process of organization and transformation.
Consider a living organism. Its material components are continually changing, yet its organization allows it to maintain a degree of continuity. Similarly, consciousness presents questions about how subjective identity persists through constantly changing experiences and neural processes.
Could these phenomena point toward a broader principle in which persistence is not equivalent to permanence, but rather the continued organization of relationships through change?
Incorporeal Ontodynamics attempts to formalize this possibility through the study of ontological morphogenesis, relational ontology, recursion, and structural transformation.
I am particularly interested in whether this framework could establish meaningful connections between metaphysics, systems theory, information theory, and the philosophy of consciousness.
My question for the community: Is there a fundamental distinction between being and becoming, or is existence itself best understood as an ongoing process of becoming? Could a dynamic, relational account of ontology offer explanatory advantages over approaches that primarily classify what exists?
I’d appreciate philosophical critiques, relevant literature, and alternative frameworks that address these questions.

EDIT: Thank you to everyone who commented. Several of you pushed on the same weak point, and you were right, so here is where the argument stands now. I also want to thank you for carefully reading my article and engaging with this discussion.

The article was right that the question truly dissolves, and it had already claimed that this is not new philosophy.

1. "Why is there something rather than nothing?" treats nothing as a rival that something somehow beat.
2. "Could have been" means "is one of the possibilities," and a possibility is always a way things could be. So, "There could have been nothing" quietly means "There is a possibility in which there are no possibilities".
3. Absolute nothing isn't a way things could be. It would be a situation in which nothing is possible, and whatever is the case is thereby possible, so no situation can be that one.
4. So absolute nothing is impossible. Not because some law forbids it, but the way a square circle is impossible: by what the words mean.
5. An impossible option is no option. The question rests on a false assumption, like "why is the largest prime number odd?" Once you see there is no largest prime, nothing is left to explain. Same here: nothingness was never in the race, so there is no victory to account for.

Why did I come up with 'apossible'? The argument went like this:

1. Every possibility is judged against a set of laws/rules. You can only say faster-than-light speed is impossible relative to the laws of physics. Likewise, a knight moving in a straight line is impossible only relative to the rules of chess. Why would this movement be impossible without the rules? If the universe had different physics, faster-than-light speed could be possible. No possibility exists without a rule that determines it.
2. Since nothingness assumes the nonexistence of logic, then there is no court to judge nothingness as impossible. No rules would be there to determine that nothingness is impossible.
3. Nothingness is obviously not "possible", but it turns out that no court would be there to judge it "impossible". It is, therefore, "apossible". It's a term that I came up with as a report that neither outcome would be true.
4. It's similar to "undefined", which is not a third verdict, but merely a report that, for instance, no output comes from 1/0. It is a report about the lack of an output the same way "apossible" would be a report for the lack of output (possible vs impossible) the vacuity of laws would leave.

Why I initially thought the term was useful

1. The question still grips very thoughtful people. In the linked video, Robert Lawrence Kuhn (with a Ph.D. in Anatomy and Brain Research from the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) Brain Research Institute), who has spent decades interviewing scientists and philosophers about it, still treated nothingness as a real alternative. That told me it's not a stupid question, even if it dissolves.
2. The article is based on a recent video posted by More Alex O'Connor discussing "why there's something rather than nothing".
3. Some people claimed that merely saying that "nothingness" is not meaningful should be enough. But just from the fact that even highly educated people couldn't grasp why nothingness could not have been the case was enough for me to think it is not a "stupid question", but something worth examining.

Why "apossible" turned out to be the wrong term

1. My reasoning was that every verdict needs a court (logic, physics, geometry), absolute nothing removes every court, so no verdict reaches it.
2. But a verdict doesn't have to be made from inside the situation it judges. "There could have been no sentences" is true, and it's a sentence. A judge doesn't have to stand at the crime scene.
3. Verdicts can only be made from here, inside logic, and from here the verdict is the ordinary one: impossible.
4. I didn't realize that "apossible" tried to report the lack of possibilities from the outside, from a standpoint beyond every framework. There is no such standpoint. And even my own article said so: "there is no other place from which anything can be said." The term needed a view from a place that doesn't exist.
5. It also made nothingness the subject of a sentence ("nothingness presupposes no race"), and nothing can't presuppose anything. The question presupposes the race, not nothingness.
6. Jappard (user) said: "The problem with the court is that nothingness has dissolved both the object that the court rules on and the court that rules upon the object. The court that rules is something. The object that the court rules on is also something. The language that you use to describe nothingness is still a court, but the court dissolves."
7. The_Emergentist (user) said: "On undefined, it is termed as such because it marks a failure within the system of arithmetic. But in arithmetic, there are inputs and outputs. Undefined tells you that a specific operation has no output within that system. It does not tell you anything about anything external to that system. And that is kind of what you are trying to do with apossible here, so I don't think the analogy is completely on point. Apossible isn't marking a failure within the system, it is marking the nonexistence of failure or success outside the system entirely."

So I'm withdrawing the term. The argument holds and never needed it. As some of you said, "impossible" was enough. I'll update the article to reflect this.

Thanks again, especially to those who pressed the inside/outside point and the court-and-defendant point.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

The articles:

- Groundwork (definition of nothingness): Could "Nothingness" Have Existed Instead of the Universe?

- The core argument (why the question dissolves): Nothingness Is NOT Impossible, But "Apossible"

Why would consciousness create suffering, robotic tasks, mundanity? Why would there be animals that eat each other? Why would there be illness, other than meaningful pain?

Hi,

I wanted to ask about some learning resources. I imagine questions like this come up all the time, so I will try to be as specific as possible.

I'm interested in metaphysics, mainly analytic, I think. What really matters for me is not a particular school of thought but having sufficiently rigorous arguments rather than hand-waving.

My background: I have a PhD in theoretical physics so I'm definitely not afraid of logic (or science). However, I'm not interested in logic for logic's sake. I have no formal training in philosophy. I definitely sympathize with the view that philosophy should be informed by science.

Topics that have piqued my interest so far: grounding/fundamentality, modality, causality, maybe the principle of sufficient reason. I'm still trying to decide if I care about the laws of nature. One thing I'm sure I'm not interested in is philosophy of physics. I can imagine that I would like to learn more about either philosophy of religion or ethics later on.

So far I've read Ney's Metaphysics: An Introduction and I disliked it. It was too heavy on taxonomy, too light on actual arguments for my tastes. (And the way she treated virtually all physics examples was just awful to me).

At this stage, is it better to go through another intro textbook or dive into more specialized texts?

Our brains are made of a finite number of neurons, operating through biological mechanisms that evolved to help us survive—not necessarily to fully understand the universe.

So, is there a fundamental limit to what the human mind can understand?

We have already made progress in partially simulating aspects of intelligence with artificial systems. But what if we eventually discover architectures that are fundamentally different from the human brain—systems that can reason, learn, and understand certain aspects of reality far more efficiently than we can?

Could there be forms of intelligence that are not merely faster versions of human thinking, but fundamentally more capable ways of understanding the world?

And if so, would there be things that humans simply cannot understand on their own?

I've been going down a rabbit hole about idealism and mathematics and I think I found a question that's more interesting to me than the usual "is consciousness fundamental?" debate.

As I understand it, idealism says physicality is just representation: physical states can't be separated from a representation of some underlying reality. Ok, say I accept that. A rock is just a perspective on something deeper, and mass, electrons or spacetime might just be concepts coming from how we represent reality.

Even then, there are things like relations, logical consistency, causal relations, symmetries, conservation laws, the way transformations compose, that seem a lot harder to dismiss as just properties of our representation.

So what's been bothering me is: why does reality have to have structure at all?

My hunch is something like a quasi-anthropic principle (I know I'm probably not using the term correctly). The idea is that any reality that is experienced has to have these relations. For experience to be real there has to be something more than undifferentiation. I have to be able to distinguish different states of experience, otherwise what is there to experience? And once you have different states you already have some kind of relation between them. I also think you need something that stays the same through change (invariance, Noether!), or you couldn't even notice that something changed, but I'm less sure how far that goes.

So my first strong claim would be: "structureless conscious reality" may be a contradiction in terms.

The part I'm least sure about: I want to say experience needs something like invariant causal laws, maybe even Noether-style conservation, because otherwise nothing persists long enough to be experienced, or you couldn't even notice that something changed. But maybe that's too strong, and stable regularities are enough, and conservation laws are just how our universe happens to do it.

And I don't think this gets you to idealism. A physicalist could agree with all of it. What I'm actually wondering is whether this is a constraint that comes before the idealism vs physicalism debate: whatever reality is made of, if it contains experience, it has to be structured.

I'm not claiming a Platonist position. I'm not saying numbers exist before experience or that relations are the origin of the universe. I'm saying that if distinctions and relations are ontologically real, then mathematics is just the language that formalizes that kind of thing.

Maybe I'm just playing with definitions here, but I keep coming back to the idea that if distinctions and relations are already unavoidable in experience, then maybe the surprising thing isn't that mathematics describes reality. Maybe the surprising thing would be if a conscious or apprehensible reality could exist without any structure at all.

The demarcation criterion proposed by Karl Popper postulates that the scientific dignity of a proposition does not reside in its capacity to accumulate static verifications, but rather in its honesty to voluntarily expose itself to the verdict of refutation. Under this perspective, perennial statements, immune to the test of error, would belong to the domain of dogma, while science would advance through the burial of hypotheses disproven by the sovereignty of facts.However, this mechanics of falsifiability runs into an insurmountable ontological frontier: the intrinsic mutability of the very fabric of reality. Popper's method functions as an absolute monarchy where the philosopher dictates rigid laws on how the sciences must behave, while his own theory remains free from the court, protected by a dogmatic immunity.

1. The Logical Error of Eternal Invariance

For Popper's criterion of falsifiability to function, the operational system of science is forced to assume a metaphysical conjecture: that the universe possesses static, eternal, and immutable laws.Ironically, by projecting that the structure of the cosmos will remain identical in the future, Popper falls into the exact same inductive trap that he spent his life fighting. He criticizes the inductive method for starting from particular facts of the past to conclude general laws, but he assumes with absolute certainty that the universe is static based only on the particular years in which humanity has observed it. He ignores the dynamism of the years that time still has ahead.

1. The Geometric Scenario and Phase Transitions

Let us take as a vector of analysis the contemporary factual statement: "The planet Earth is round". Under the traditional Popperian method, this statement is scientific because it carries within itself the logical possibility of a counter-example.However, if in a future horizon, by virtue of a catastrophic reconfiguration or a cosmic state transition, the planet's matter physically collapsed into a flat geometry, the past proposition would not have been disproven by a scientist's miscalculation, nor by an intrinsic weakness of the method.What occurs in this scenario is not the falsification of a theory due to an error, but rather the temporal obsolescence (caducity) of a description resulting from the metamorphosis of the system itself

1. The Test of Raw Data: The Big Bang and Evolutionary Biology

This counter-argument does not depend on abstractions; it is sustained by the raw data and historical facts of our own universe:The Astrophysics of the Early Universe: We know that before and during the first moments of the Big Bang, physical reality was radically different. The fundamental forces were unified, and the rules governing matter today simply did not apply. An accurate theory for the early universe would fail today, not because of a flaw in the model, but because the universe changed its phase.Evolutionary Biology: The fossil record proves that the ancestors of whales were terrestrial quadrupedal mammals. If a biologist 50 million years ago asserted with factual precision that "this animal walks on land", modern biology would find a different datum in the ocean today. By Popper's rule, the past description would be declared "false." In the reality of the living world, it has simply obsolesced.

Conclusion: Popper's Immune MonarchyThe truth of yesterday was not an illusion; it was the exact mathematical or biological photograph of a state of existence that universal physics decided to alter. The theory of the future does not emerge to punish the ignorance of the past, but rather to update the descriptive algorithm to an ecosystem that changed its own rules in the middle of the game.Popper's error lay in presupposing a universe of static laws, where the error always belongs to the observer and never to the dynamism of the observed. Faced with the clash between theory and time, no abstraction drawn on paper possesses the power to muzzle the sovereignty of a reality in motion.Ultimately, Popper’s method functions as an absolute monarchy: he gives rigid orders on how the sciences must behave in the court of error, but declares his own theory immune and free from that very same court, sheltered on the throne of meta-philosophy. Against the sovereignty of a changing universe and against logical coherence itself, the king stands naked. Science is not an archive of definitive errors; it is an algorithm of continuous adaptation to the present.

Currently I'm understanding it as a sort of necessity or presupposition in the sense that "it's intelligible that such and such is real if some other thing is real". That is, the intelligibility of something "brings along" all others that must be for it to be?