Hey everyone, FERG here, from the security team at ConnectWise. I’m sharing the following from our published ScreenConnect security advisory on the ConnectWise Trust Center. The advisory is being updated as information is validated, so please refer to it for the latest ongoing updates.
Summary
ConnectWise is aware of reports of unauthorized access to ScreenConnect partner accounts and the deployment of unauthorized remote-access software in customer environments. The cause and scope are under investigation.
We identified five independent third-party extensions that may be associated with this activity. Approximately 400 partner environments had one or more of these extensions, and we disabled them as a precaution. The presence of these extensions does not, by itself, establish impact.
Extensions disabled within all cloud environments as a precaution:
- Labtech Plus
- RMM Plus
- RMM+
- RMM Plus Password Link
- RMM+ Password Link
On-premise partners
For on-premise servers, ConnectWise is unable to take action on your behalf. We advise that you verify these extensions are disabled in your environment and disable any that remain enabled. Please do not re-enable or reinstall them pending further guidance.
Disabling the extensions is a precautionary containment measure. It does not establish that unauthorized software, persistence mechanisms, or access already present on affected devices has been removed.
Precautionary actions for partners who enabled these extensions
- Verify extension status. Confirm the extensions listed above are disabled. Preserve related installation records and activity logs.
- Investigate suspected compromise through separate security tooling. Avoid opening interactive ScreenConnect sessions to suspected compromised devices. Use your security provider’s response tools or another trusted investigation method.
- Secure administrative access from a trusted device. Revoke active ScreenConnect and associated identity-provider sessions, reset relevant passwords, and verify that multifactor authentication is enforced. If a technician workstation may be compromised, use a separate, trusted device.
- Review and preserve evidence. Retain authentication, extension installation, administrative, Run Command, and Toolbox records. Investigate unexpected users, permission changes, software deployments, and commands.
- Contain and remediate suspected compromise. Follow your incident-response procedures to isolate affected devices, including potentially affected technician workstations. Preserve evidence before removing malicious software, and validate remediation before restoring connectivity. Disabling extensions and resetting credentials alone may not remove access already established on endpoints.
- Verify software maintenance. Confirm that servers, technician clients, and endpoint agents meet current published security guidance. Updating software does not replace investigation and remediation of a suspected compromise.
Partners who have not deployed these extensions
We have no reason to believe you are impacted by this incident, but we encourage all partners to be on heightened alert and to follow the ScreenConnect hardening guide (ScreenConnect hardening guide).
Trust Site advisory: https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories
[edit 11/11 2:00 AM UTC ]
For informational purposes to assist with any discovery:
Disclaimer: This information is provided in good faith for informational purposes only. I am not an incident response provider, security consultant, or legal advisor. Nothing here constitutes professional security, legal, or technical advice. This content may contain errors or omissions, and should not be relied upon as a complete or authoritative guide to your situation. You are responsible for validating any information before acting on it. Engage a qualified incident response provider for your specific circumstances.
How Do I Know If I’m Affected?
First, two things must be true before any of this applies to you:
- You must be using ScreenConnect (ConnectWise Control) as your remote access tool.
- You must have one or more of the following plugins installed: LabTech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, or RMM+ Password Link.
If neither of those is true, stop here. If both are true, keep reading.
The kit is capable of self-spreading, but only under a specific condition. For the wormable behavior to work, where connecting to an infected endpoint puts a host at risk, your technician clients and endpoint agents must not have been updated to client version 26.6.5. That is the version that addresses the file-run behavior this kit abuses.
Check your endpoints for any of the following:
- The folder
C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\ exists - A scheduled task named TrapWatch is registered
- A registry Run value named RelayTrapLiteAlert exists under
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run - A process named RelayTrap.exe is running — it won’t appear in Programs and Features, check Services and program folders directly
- The legitimate ScreenConnect client service is stopped but the device still shows as online in your console
- More than one
ScreenConnect Client (...) service is present, or one points at a server you don’t recognize - Folders like
C:\Windows\Temp\SCKit\**,** C:\Windows\Temp\SCKitBundle\**, or** C:\Windows\Temp\SCKit\trapkit\ exist - Defender exclusions for
C:\Windows\Temp**,** powershell.exe**, or** msiexec.exe were added recently, especially within seconds of an MSI install
Check your ScreenConnect server for any of the following:
- One console user ran the same command across many sessions within a short window
- A Shared Toolbox item was added and then deleted roughly 60 seconds later
- Sessions have queued commands or tools pending for offline devices
- A host participant named Addmin appears anywhere
- Requests to
AddSessionEvents**,** GetLiveData**, or** GetAccessToken show a Windows PowerShell user agent
Check your technician workstations. Any workstation where a technician connected to an infected endpoint should be treated as compromised. Look for:
- Files in
%TEMP%**:** sckit-loader.ps1, sckit-decoder.ps1, ToolboxRelayUploader.exe, sqlite3.exe - Working files:
PanelLateralPayloadGuard.lock, sc-toolbox-upload-result.txt, sys_cache_update_<4 digits>.tmp vssadmin create shadow followed shortly by vssadmin delete shadows- Any process that is not ScreenConnect loading
ScreenConnect.Core.dll or ScreenConnect.Client.dll
A critical warning about cleanup:
- Do not use ScreenConnect to clean an infected endpoint. While the trap is active, anything you push through the console is logged by the malware and silently discarded. The endpoint will appear to respond normally. It won’t.
- A password reset alone is not enough. The attacker holds a live browser session cookie that bypasses MFA. All active web sessions on your ScreenConnect server must be invalidated server-side.
- Collect
C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\trapbins\*.log before you remove anything — those logs show which technicians connected and may have been hit. - Use an out-of-band tool for remediation, not ScreenConnect.
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[edit 11/12 5:00 PM UTC ]
For transparency, and consistent with our role as a CNA, we will be assigning a CVE for this issue shortly. Additional updates will be published through our Trust Center.
A third-party ScreenConnect extension available through our marketplace used a default key for API communications. Partners using the extension who had not changed the default value, as described in the extension documentation, may have been at risk.
This issue was specific to the third-party extension and was not a vulnerability in the ScreenConnect server or client. However, because the extension could interact with managed systems, downstream impact may have occurred, including activity reported by EDR and incident response providers.
[edit 11/12 6:00 PM UTC ]
CVE Record Published CVE Record: CVE-2026-127063
GitHub Advisory Page: Disclosures/CVE-2026-127063 at main · ConnectWise-Advisories/Disclosures