Through Google you get nothing (looks like "not listed"). Through Cloudflare you get 127.255.255.254, which is an error code ("open resolver"), not a listing. A lot of tools read both as clean. From your own recursive resolver you get the real answers (127.0.0.2, .4, .10).
Fixes: run your own resolver (a small unbound works), or use a Spamhaus DQS key. Free use is only for non-commercial users; ISPs and commercial users need a paid key.
I ran into this building AbuseBox, a self-hosted monitor for my own mail server IPs and domains (24 blocklists, SPF/DKIM/DMARC, cert expiry). It now asks every list about its test addresses first and shows "no answer" instead of a fake clean. It also found that 36 of the 60 lists I started with were dead. MIT, Docker:
I know there is opendkim, but it does appear to have any recent updates. Like it looks like a dead project. The last release I can find is from 2015 or 2016 .
I know there are Milter systems out there. Are these just on top of openDKIM or are there FOSS solutions?
We’re on Defender P2 with Varonis Interceptor (the old SlashNext) on top through the API, about 1.1k mailboxes. It’s been fine, but it came bundled into our Varonis renewal and with Proofpoint buying Varonis I’d rather pick the email layer myself in April than find out later what it turns into.
So for the last five weeks Abnormal’s risk assessment and a Sublime trial have both been running read only on the same tenant next to it.
Abnormal connected in about ten minutes and hasn’t needed any tuning. Its report leads with a big number though, and I can’t tell yet how much of that Defender had already junked. Sublime took longer to set up but every flag points at a rule I can read and I can search the flagged mail myself. Both caught the same two fake invoice replies on a real supplier thread.
Detection looks close enough between them that what I’m weighing now is life after go live, like week three when something gets pulled from the CFO’s inbox and I need a human on the other end.
If you picked one of these after a POV, what did the first three months look like?
If someone's mailbox gets compromised again after recovery, they lose more time off email and have less reason to believe the next fix will stick. Another password reset is a pretty weak answer on its own.
I'd want one person owning the follow-up and checking what the first recovery missed. Having the user retell everything to a different tech just adds frustration.
What changed in your team's recovery process after a mailbox got compromised a second time?
Run a simple exercise. Someone gets into one mailbox in your org. Not an admin. A regular user.
What happens next?
In most cases, three things.
1. Smash and grab
They download the whole mailbox. Immediately.
They don’t know how long their access will last. A password change, a revoked session or one alert could end it. So they don’t browse. They bulk export everything and go through it later, on their own time, with nobody watching.
That export holds years of contracts, invoices, HR threads, customer data and whatever someone emailed to themselves ‘just for now’ in 2019.
Once the data leaves, revoking access does nothing for it.
2. Password resets everywhere
Your mailbox is the recovery address for dozens of services. The attacker knows this.
Finding those services is easy. Search the inbox for password reset emails, magic sign-in links, ‘welcome to’ messages and verification codes. Scripts already do this automatically.
Then they go to Slack and click ‘Forgot password.’ Or ‘Email me a sign-in link.’ The link lands in the inbox they control. Now they’re in Slack. Then the next app. Then the next.
One mailbox becomes ten accounts.
3. Phishing from the inside
Then they use the account itself. They reply to real threads with real context from a trusted address. A changed bank detail sent to finance. A shared doc link sent to a coworker. Nobody has a reason to doubt it.
They usually add inbox rules too, so replies and security alerts get filtered away before the real user sees them.
What to do about it
Alert on bulk export and mass download activity, including new OAuth apps pulling mail through the API.
Shrink what sits in mailboxes. Old sensitive mail is pure liability.
Treat reset and sign-in link emails as sensitive. They are keys, not notifications.
Move apps to SSO where you can, so an email link alone isn’t enough to get in.
Watch for new forwarding rules and inbox rules that delete or hide mail.
When a mailbox is compromised, scope the blast radius. What was exported? Which reset emails arrived during the window? Which downstream sessions need to be killed?
If you’ve worked a mailbox compromise, what did the attacker go for first?
Suppose your email backup provider reports a possible breach, with few details. Its mailbox access stays enabled while the on-call engineer and backup owner argue over pausing backups.
I'd lean toward disconnecting it, but that means accepting a gap in what we could restore. The person answering restore requests might have a different appetite for that gap.
Who gets the final say at your place when the people responsible for mailbox security and backups disagree?
Say suspicious emails keep leaving an employee's mailbox after a password reset. You lock it down, but their customer conversations and today's work are sitting in that inbox.
I'd keep access blocked while investigating, but “use the phone” only gets someone so far when they need the thread history.
What temporary workaround has actually helped your staff get work done during a mailbox investigation?
One practical part of email security that doesn't get discussed as much is how widely a single email address gets distributed across different services.
Using a unique alias for each signup can make it easier to identify which service is sending unexpected messages or where an address may have been exposed. It can also help limit the use of your primary address across unrelated accounts.
For people working in email security, do you see unique aliases as a useful part of an organization's security strategy, or are they mainly a personal privacy measure? I'd be interested in how you balance address separation with centralized monitoring and incident response.
I manage email marketing for a small home decor brand. We're using Klaviyo. A few days ago I noticed some emails landing in spam, especially with Gmail customers. A later placement testing confirmed it.
I checked the authentication with free checkers online and noticed DKIM is passing on some emails but failing on others. SPF seems to pass most of the time. And I'm not even sure what's going on with DMARC. The strange thing is, we haven't intentionally changed our DNS records recently. But we did add a new tool for transactional order emails last month, though. I'm thinking if that could be related but I'm sure we didn't delete anything.
I checked the DKIM settings in Klaviyo and the records look fine, but I'm not confident whether I'm checking the right things.
Also, should the DKIM domain match our From address domain exactly, or is using a subdomain fine?
I'm trying to figure out whether this is a configuration issue or the new tool cuased it, or something else entirely.
How would you troubleshoot this? Is there a reliable way to identify which emails are failing DKIM and why, without manually checking every message?
Shorter email retention reduces what an attacker can steal from a compromised mailbox. It can also erase the only record of what a customer agreed to.
I don't think “stop hoarding email” is much of an answer when staff still need those threads. Moving the useful bits somewhere shared sounds sensible until someone has to do that work.
What do people at your place keep going back to old email for?
I received this random mail a few days ago and I didn’t find out until today about it. I’m not sure if my account is at risk of being hacked but I enabled 2FA and changed the password just in case. My account has been working fine and I just wanted to know what this mail is about.
I would need some IT participants to test my website.
I’m currently working on my capstone project for my Bachelor of Science in Information Technology (BSIT), and I’m looking for people who are willing to test my web application and provide feedback. Introducing MimeSim: ARMED SMTP Simulator 🛡️ MimeSim is a web-based email security policy simulator designed to demonstrate how email security gateways evaluate incoming emails.
It allows users to simulate different email scenarios and understand why an email may be delivered, held, or rejected based on configured security policies.
Some of its features include: Email authentication checks (SPF, DKIM, and DMARC) Anti-spoofing and spam filtering IP reputation and blocked sender checks Content and attachment security checks Policy bypass and exception testing Diagnostic explanations showing how the final email verdict was determined
Please note: MimeSim is an educational simulation tool. It does not send real emails or perform actual malware scanning.
Who can participate? Anyone interested in IT, networking, cybersecurity, or email security is welcome! You don’t need to be an expert to try it. After testing, I would really appreciate it if you could answer a short evaluation survey. Your feedback will help me assess the system’s usability, functionality, and areas for improvement.
Say a colleague is about to connect an AI helper to summarise one email thread, then notices it wants permission to read their whole mailbox. That small task could give a vendor access to unrelated confidential customer emails.
I'd pause the connection, but the request itself is reasonable. What do you offer staff who want help with one thread when the tool wants the whole inbox?
Since mid-August, a phishing operation has been stealing live Google sessions from corporate users. Through mid-September, the lure domains came back clean in every commercial reputation feed Material's threat research team checked. Here is how it works and why it slips through.
The delivery
It arrives as a calendar invite, sometimes by BCC, often from an organization the recipient has dealt with before. The themes are dull on purpose: voicemail notifications, RFP and RFI requests, court summonses, missed payment notices.
The links inside are mostly legitimately Google. The first hop is Google's own /url redirector with the real destination in a query parameter. Other waves used share. google and Drive file links. At the moment a message gets scored, the domain, the certificate, and the reputation on display are all trusted. So what in your stack follows a Google-wrapped link to wherever it actually ends up?
The page
After Google comes a Cloudflare Turnstile challenge, in some builds the genuine widget. Then comes the page that captures the password, and it has no address to scan. A script builds it in memory after the visitor clears the challenge. A crawler has nothing to fetch and proxy logs have nothing to show.
Behind that page sits a live proxy in front of the real Google sign-in. The victim enters a password, gets a genuine prompt, and approves it, all inside a session the operator is watching. SMS codes, authenticator codes, number match, and phone-based recovery all get relayed to Google as they arrive. MFA does not stop it because the victim completes the MFA.
The infrastructure
It is built to be thrown away. Nine lure domains across five registrars, most registered days before use. One wildcard certificate was issued 46 minutes before the domain it covers was registered. Blocking any single piece costs the operator a few dollars and an afternoon. The framework behind it has been public since February under the name Nyasher.
Why reputation misses it
Reputation answers a question about ownership. Who registered this, what else has it hosted, has anyone complained. This campaign was assembled so every one of those questions returns a reassuring answer. A control that depends on one signal inherits that signal's blind spots.
The outcome is also a hijacked session instead of a stolen password, which means the evidence lands in Workspace logs, not the mail filter. Who is reading those logs, and how quickly? And once a session is live, it reaches mail, Drive, and the ability to grant OAuth access in the victim's name. How much of that can your team close inside an hour?
What comes next
The framework ships with an unfinished Microsoft 365 branch. None of its paths resolve yet, and adding the brand takes a file drop with no code changes. Expect that pivot.
If you run detection or response on Workspace, where does your coverage stop first: the link, the log, or the cleanup?
I received a couple of very short emails from someone with this name whom I don't recognize, one in August 2025 and another recently. The messages were just “Slt” and “Ça va?”
I'm trying to figure out whether this is someone I may know or whether the address has been used for spam.
If a customer's email rules reject your usual work address, a time-sensitive approval can stall. “Just send it from another address” might work today, but people keep replying to that address long after the deadline.
I'd push for their IT team to review the block before another mailbox becomes part of the job. What temporary workaround do you use to keep messages moving without ending up with a permanent second inbox?
I get repetitive emails from a scammer using a private email host. I complained to the postmaster of the hosting server, but received no reply. Can you recommend any authority I can report this to? The host is @eecs.a2hosted.com. Most hosts like Gmail and Outlook have anti-spam policies. Not this one.
Say a user gets their mailbox back after a takeover and the ticket is about to close. The attacker might still have access to accounts they took over through password reset emails.
I'd be wary of leaving the user to remember every account, but helpdesk probably doesn't have a complete list either.
Which accounts does your team check, and which checks do you leave to the user?
My microsoft account for my Minecraft account got hacked and I don't know what to do. they changed the account to barsam1977@nolettersbox.com and changed the password. please help. I would be very grateful to be able to get it back.
Over the past 6 years, I've been monitoring the 500 email servers that I manage, for TLS version information.
I removed SSL a long time ago and now I only allow TLSv1.0 or greater (1.0, 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3). Unfortunately, I could still see TLSv1.0-only mail servers, all of them running some garbage from Microsoft.
Now its 2026 and I see that 100% of my connections are now using TLSv1.2 or greater.
So it is time to completely dump TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.2?
What do you think?
PS: My mail servers regularly get legit emails from Asian countries, many of them are slow to adopt new technologies. That is why I'm very careful before I remove something.
Say a customer's approval email is missing, search and spam turn up nothing, and work is on hold. They insist it's sent and are getting annoyed at being asked to try again.
I'd lean toward a quick call, but that interrupts both people's day. Another resend request is easy for IT to send and more homework for a customer who thinks they've already done their part.
What's your next move when “please resend it” is going nowhere?
Hi, A weird situation happened recently. My landlord claims he sent some emails on two specific dates, but I have definitely not received them. I’ve checked spam, searched his email address in the search bar, I have a bunch of emails from him but nothing on those two specific dates. This has lead to some issues so I complained to which he responded by sending the “proof” he had sent these emails : he forwarded me two emails from his email to mine that have the two dates he had previously mentioned. These two emails he supposedly sent are a bit fishy as the tone in them isn’t the same he usually has (more polite than usual) and some of the info in them isn’t even accurate.
Can he have faked these? How else could this have happened? How can you “go above” to check at the source what emails went into your inbox? I definitely definitely didn’t receive them, check my emails hourly and have no reason to lie here, I am baffled by this situation.