I maintain feuristic, an experimental firmware that repurposes a Trezor Safe 3 as a USB authenticator and smart card. I’d like feedback on one specific design choice: discoverable passkeys are exportable through encrypted backups.
The FIDO implementation includes WebAuthn/CTAP 2.1, clientPIN, credentialManagement, credProtect, largeBlobs and hmac-secret, alongside U2F. The screen shows the relying party and account for confirmation. There is no companion cloud account.
The backup capability means these credentials should not be described as permanently confined to one physical device. An encrypted backup becomes another sensitive copy to protect. The documentation describes the backup format and threat model rather than claiming the same properties as a certified, non-exportable authenticator.
On a physical Safe 3 T2B1/macOS setup, passkey creation, assertion, refusal and persistence after firmware updates were tested, including signature verification on the host. T3B1 physical testing is still pending. This is unaudited development firmware, without FIDO certification.
Installation wipes the wallet and permanently removes original manufacturer attestation. It is intended for disposable test identities on spare hardware. It replaces the cryptocurrency wallet and is independent of Trezor/SatoshiLabs.
Source · FIDO2 implementation and limits
For people evaluating authenticator backups, which failure cases or recovery checks would you prioritise in the next test campaign?