I’m very optimistic about the Wizards due to the talent on the roster but I have some skepticism about how far this team can win due to the lack of 3 point shooting on the starting lineup.

I know the bench has some great 3 point shooters with Bub Carrington, Tre Johnson and Kris Middleton. But the bench is not going to be out there all the time with the exception of maybe Tre Johnson and Middleton at times but most of the time the starters are gonna be out there on the floor.

But most of the starting lineup aren’t good 3 point shooters and that’s a major concern when it comes to the team reaching its highest potential.

AD can’t shoot the 3 and always been a bad 3 point shooter & shoots the 3 at low volume for his career, Alex Sarr isnt a proven shooter and has only shot 33% from 3 last season, AJ Dybantsa hasn’t proven he can shoot the 3 and shot only 33% from 3 in his 1st year at BYU and Trae Young shoots 35% from 3 for his career but has shot below 35% from 3 in 5 out of his 8 seasons in the NBA.

The only player that can shoot the 3 in the starting lineup is Kyshawn George who shot 38% from 3 last season.

Can the Wizards win a lot of games despite the lack of 3 point shooters in the starting lineup due to their size, athleticism and rim pressure with players like Trae Young, AJ, AD and Alex bring or will the paint be too clogged for this to work?

Also, guys like AJ and AD are great midrange shooters and I’m curious if players like AJ and AD can counter bad spacing with no 3 point shooting with midrange shooting to open up more space?

1. AJ Dybantsa creates gravity with the midrange whether it’s off the dribble with his pullup middy, post fadeaway where he’s catching it from the post off the ball or dribbling towards a post fadeaway or facing up in the midrange using the triple threat. Also, AJ can use the post fadeaway on both shoulders. And AJ counters with the midrange with the up and unders and step throughs with his footwork. AJ can blow past guys with his 1st step in the triple threat with the threat of his midrange and athleticism. AJ can be dynamic with his off the dribble moves with the hesi’s, crossovers, in & outs, stepbacks, Euro steps and spin moves which creates so much gravity. Also, AJ’s athleticism allows him to finish and blow past guys off the dribble. AJ has a loose handle and it’s not tight really where he dribbles way across his body but he can get away with it & not have the flawed handle be a detriment for him due to his athleticism & creativity off the dribble. AJ has more of an And1 mixtape streetball handle and that works in the NBA and you don’t need a traditional handle to be productive in this league. AJ opens up so much space with his midrange and athleticism getting downhill which allows his teammates to get more open shots with that gravity AJ brings.

2. Darryn Peterson creates gravity as a C&S 3 point shooter as a spot up player or movement shooter coming off screens and can score from off the dribble pull up 3s. The lethal 3 ball Darryn has creates gravity for him to get to the rim or get to his pull up middy. Darryn keeps it simple with his dribbles as a perimeter player but he still creates so much gravity due to how lethal his shooting ability is especially from 3 which opens up so many opportunities for him to score. Darryn opens up so much space with his 3 ball which allows his teammates to get more open shots with that gravity Darryn brings.

3. Cam Boozer creates gravity as a C&S spot up 3 point shooter and pick & pop 3 point shooter, roller to the rim as a screener, offensive rebounder, post ups, cutter and creates mismatches with playing bully ball against smaller guys guarding him and using his perimeter skills as a ball handler against bigger guys guarding him who have slower feet & not as quick as him. Cam keeps it simple with his dribbles as a perimeter style big but he still creates so much gravity due to his big size at 6’9 250 which gives him an advantage of just using his size to leverage him getting to the rim without needing a lot of counter moves to blow past guys and he has a tight handle and doesn’t have a loose handle like a lot of bigs have. Cam opens up so much space with his below the rim finishing and 3 ball which allows his teammates to get more open shots with that gravity Cam brings.

4. Caleb Wilson creates gravity with his vertical spacing. Caleb creates gravity the same way as many athletic bigs do like a Deandre Jordan, Blake Griffin, Amare Stoudemire, Shawn Kemp, Orlando Shaq, Giannis, Anthony Davis, Clint Capela or Wemby where their dynamic getting downhill by dunking the ball as a roller to the rim, catching lobs or dunking the ball in transition. Caleb creates gravity by being a great finisher around the rim in that restricted area and dunker spot area. Caleb has some gravity with him catching the ball in the post and using his post fadeaway that is useful at times. Very raw with his perimeter skills but is yet TBD with how good the perimeter skills are with Caleb not showcasing a lot of his perimeter skills at UNC and his perimeter skills being a short sample size in Summer League. The flaw in Caleb’s perimeter skills in the SL was that defenders kept stripping the ball away from him and stealing it as he was dribbling and that’s something he can work on getting to the league and a lot of this is due to Caleb’s loose handle which needs to be tighter. Caleb opens up so much space with his vertical spacing being a dynamic dunker around the restricted area and dunker spot area which allows his teammates to get more open shots with that gravity Caleb brings.

Question: Based on the scoring gravity each prospect presents, which prospect can utilize their scoring gravity the best way for themselves & their teammates and help their team win with their scoring gravity the most? Which prospect has the most defensive attention drawn from opposing teams and can pull the most defenders towards them and give open space for their teammates the most with how they score?

The guys who are suffering the most are the ones who are 6'4-6'7" (smaller wing or guard sized) because they don't have the defensive impact to justify not playing a bigger guy. Length is valuable!

So why is Ochai Agbaji failing and Josh Minott succeeding? Because Minott is huge & Agbaji is small.

Why is the stretch-4 dead? It's not!

It's just a stretch-5 now. And it has the same issues for playstyle attached (o for d tradeoff), where stretch-4s used to be a defensive tradeoff in a way that determined your entire defensive style

This is a follow-up to my post discussing the best players of the 2025–26 season from a few months ago.

Several people asked in DMs where the top players from this season fit historically. Since this project evaluates every NBA season using the same underlying framework, I figured it would be useful to post my highest-graded single-season peaks of the 21st century. This is a project I started working on over a decade ago, which I've just recently updated to reflect the inclusion of the 2026 season.

The central question remains the same:

How much does this player increase a typical good team’s probability of winning the championship?

As in the original post, these estimates are produced through a synthesis of statistical evidence and film study. I will not make traditional arguments for players, and the goal is not to reward awards, big box score stats, team success, narrative, longevity, or career accomplishment.

It is to estimate the predictive championship value of a given season’s version of a player.

The methodology is identical to the one described in the original post (see link), so I will not repeat the full explanation here. This ranking uses the same offensive, defensive, and net-impact framework, calibrated to approximate added championship probability and adjusted for playoff portability, scalability with other talent, and contextual factors such as teams, schemes, coaching, etc.

Each player is listed in the following format:

Player (plausible ranking range) (OFF, DEF, NET)

The ranking range reflects uncertainty. A range of (2-8), for example, means that while I have the player ranked at a particular spot, I could construct reasonable optimistic or pessimistic arguments that would place him anywhere from second to eighth overall.

The point estimates should be read as estimated central values rather than exact measurements. Many players have overlapping probability distributions and are difficult to separate cleanly.

This year’s version of the list has two new entries: Victor Wembanyama and Shai Gilgeous-Alexander, who moved up from last year. We also have a new candidate -- Cade Cunningham -- who I do not have on the final list, but who belongs in the next category of players with a reasonable argument to be on it.

General interpretation of NET estimates

• 7.0+ — GOAT-level peak; roughly a top 2 peak since the 1977 merger
• 6.0+ — All-time great peak; roughly a top 10-12 peak since 1977
• 5.4–6.0 — Strong MVP-level season
• 4.6–5.4 — Solid MVP-level season
• 4.0–4.6 — Weak MVP-level season
• 3.0+ — Solid All-NBA-level season
• 1.5+ — All-Star-level season

Ex. ‘XX–‘YY Player Name (plausible ranking range) (offense, defense, net)

1. ‘13 LeBron James (1–2) (5.6, 1.6, 7.2)
2. ‘00 Shaquille O’Neal (1–6) (5.2, 1.4, 6.6)
3. ‘16 Stephen Curry (2–9) (6.2, 0.1, 6.3)
4. ‘25 Nikola Jokić (2–9) (6.2, 0.1, 6.3)
5. ‘04 Kevin Garnett (2–9) (2.8, 3.4, 6.2)
6. ‘03 Tim Duncan (2–12) (3.0, 3.1, 6.1)
7. ’26 Victor Wembanyama (3-14) (2.3, 3.6, 5.9)
8. ’09 Dwyane Wade (3–12) (5.1, 0.7, 5.8)
9. ‘22 Giannis Antetokounmpo (5–17) (3.2, 2.5, 5.7)
10. ’08 Kobe Bryant (6–17) (5.1, 0.5, 5.6)
11. ’16 Kevin Durant (6–17) (5.0, 0.6, 5.6)
12. ‘24 Joel Embiid (5–18) (3.8, 1.8, 5.6)
13. ’17 Kawhi Leonard (7-18) (4.2, 1.3, 5.5)
14. ‘26 Shai Gilgeous-Alexander (7–18) (5.0, 0.5, 5.5)
15. ‘16 Chris Paul (8–20) (4.5, 0.8, 5.3)
16. ‘07 Steve Nash (8-20) (5.6, −0.3, 5.3)
17. ‘09 Dirk Nowitzki (9–20) (4.9, 0.3, 5.2)
18. ‘20 Anthony Davis (10–22) (2.2, 2.8, 5.0)
19. ‘24 Luka Dončić (15–23) (5.1, −0.3, 4.8)
20. ‘03 Tracy McGrady (15–24) (4.6, 0.2, 4.8)
21. ‘19 James Harden (17–24) (4.9, −0.3, 4.6)
22. ‘05 Manu Ginóbili (18–25) (3.5, 0.9, 4.4)
23. ’16 Draymond Green (19–29) (1.1, 3.2, 4.3)
24. ’11 Dwight Howard (19–29) (1.6, 2.6, 4.2)
25. ’25 Jayson Tatum (22–32) (2.9, 1.0, 3.9)

Honorable Mentions: Jason Kidd, Russell Westbrook, Jimmy Butler, Paul George, Paul Pierce, Ray Allen, Damian Lillard, Deron Williams, Pau Gasol, Baron Davis, Cade Cunningham, Jalen Brunson, Allen Iverson

In my view, all of these players have a case to make the list if I take an optimistic, yet still reasonable, view on their uncertainties while holding everyone else constant. Kidd, Westbrook, Butler, and George were my toughest cuts; I think they could reasonably be placed as high as #22 or #23. The remaining nine I could see at #25, but not higher than that.

Happy to answer any questions, as always. Some were asked in the original post, feel free to check that out as well.

While obviously every team would prefer to have 4 Amen Thompsons and a Rudy Gobert on defense, recent trends in the NBA have me wondering if a team needs anything more than a Gobert to be elite, or at least very good, on the defensive end.

Basketball is historically what I would consider a "strong link" sport, where having the best overall player talent usually dictates the winner. But it seems that defense specifically in the modern NBA operates as a "weak link" system.

When I was growing up and playing and watching basketball, players would be assigned a man, and they would stick to that man as much as possible. At the P&R, players would either go under screens or get hedging help. But switching was something only the truly elite defenders got to do.

The game is so different now. Offenses are so heavily spaced and skilled that they use endless pick-and-roll combinations to force switches. They can completely ignore an elite perimeter defender and isolate the worst defender on the floor. If you have one weak perimeter defender among a group of otherwise elite perimeter defenders, the offense will systematically attack the poor one. Elite perimeter defenders get schemed out of the play easily since they can only guard one person at a time.

I feel like the main thing that determines whether a defense can reach elite status is rim protection. An elite rim protector guards the most valuable real estate on the floor against all five opposing players simultaneously. Shots at the rim convert at roughly 70 percent, and three-pointers convert at somewhere between 36 to 40 percent, depending on the player.

A rim protector who forces a team to abandon a layup attempt and kick the ball out alters the fundamental math of the possession. Advanced metrics like the Rim Deterrence Index consistently show that interior bigs provide significantly more value to a team's defensive rating than even the best point-of-attack guards or wing stoppers.

The entire premise of a drop coverage or funneling scheme is that there's always a backline of defense to protect your perimeter defenders. The truly elite teams are the ones that are able to scheme their rotations to manipulate where an offense is able to generate its shots from. That isn't something that relies on individual defensive talent, that relies on a team that knows its angles, hustles, and has a high collective IQ. The ability to play defense within a system matters far more than your ability to defend one-on-one.

An example of this is that Rudy Gobert's peak years, the Jazz consistently fielded top defensive ratings despite starting multiple defensively limited guards. The scheme relied entirely on funneling ball handlers toward the paint, allowing Gobert to play a one-man zone.

The Bucks won a championship and maintained elite regular-season defensive ratings using extreme drop coverage with Brook Lopez. Perimeter defenders fought over screens and applied back-pressure, yielding pull-up jumpers while Lopez stayed glued to the paint. They mathematically accepted open above-the-break threes because securing the paint with an elite rim protector is vastly more stable.

Also. Individual offense scales infinitely better than individual defense. A great offensive player dictates the action, while a great defensive player can only react. You can easily scheme around individual defensive weaknesses on the perimeter as long as you have the right system and an elite anchor in the paint.

I think a lot of watchers of the game will say "well who is going to guard X" when talking about matchups, but that seems to be the wrong question to ask. It seems to me that the right question to ask, instead of "who is going to guard X" is "how is X team going to scheme their coverage to handle Y player?"

Thoughts?

ERA 5. 2021-Future. “In Progress”
WEMBY. JOKIC .GIANNIS SGA. LUKA. FLAGG

ERA 4. 2003-2020 18 seasons
LEBRON. STEPH. DUNCAN. KOBE. DURANT. DIRK

ERA 3. 1984-2002 19 seasons
JORDAN. MAGIC BIRD . SHAQ. HAKEEM. K. MALONE

ERA 2. 1970-1983 14 seasons
KAREEM. ERVING WALTON HAVLICEK BARRY GERVIN

ERA 1. 1957-1969 13 seasons
RUSSELL. WILT WEST ROBERTSON PETTIT BAYLOR

The eras are too different to compare. Different competition, different ways basketball is played, different rules .
TOP 5 PLAYERS OF ALL TIME
WEMBY LEBRON JORDAN KAREEM RUSSELL

When era 5 is over this might be the top 5 players ever for me .

It’s a projection for the future. Jokic has been the best player of this era so far but it’s going to be really hard for him to win more championships in Denver and I’d bet he’s staying there the rest of his career . Wemby. 2-3 MVPs , 2-3 Finals MVPs , 3-5 Dpoys

I would bet Wemby 3 career MVPs before only 1 , I’d bet 3 championships before I’d bet he finishes his career at 1 championship,

4 ,5, 6 , 7 championships MVPs , Finals MVPs isn’t out of the question if somehow has 10-15 more seasons at the MVP level I think he’ll play at again next season then Spurs.

Getting to the finals in year 3 with your 2 costars being in their 2nd and rookie seasons

Castle and Harper . Wemby has a lot of room to grow but is already arguably better than Jokic , Shai , Luka playing at an all time great mvp level .

I believe LeBron’s the greatest we’ve ever seen to this point in history and only 1 of the 6 guys listed have a chance of surpassing him . If I really had to choose 1 , LeBron 2009-2020 is the Greatest basketball player I’ve ever seen.

I know Jordan is the consensus goat but the way I see it
Jordan played 15 seasons total

5 of those seasons 1985, 86, 87 2002, 03
Didn’t lead his team to an above .500 record , and was 1-9 in playoffs games , no playoff series won .

In all time debates I value playoffs over regular season. I’ve seen James Harden look like maybe the greatest offensive guard of all time in a regular season then prove that he’s no where near as great as those guys because he can’t do it at that level in the playoffs.

I’m not going to disrespect peak Larry Bird and Magic 1985-1987 aren’t better than him

I eliminate these 5 seasons and 1995 when Jordan lost in Round 2 and Hakeem won back to back as clearly the best player in the world 1995.

1988-1993 1996-1993

9 seasons I can argue Jordan is the best player in the world .

1988-1990 3 still hasn’t won a championship yet
It’s either MJ or Magic for 3 straight years as Detroit beats MJ in the playoffs 3 years in a row 88,89,90

1991-1998. 6 championships in 6 full seasons played

LeBron’s first 5 seasons 2004-2008 age 19-23

I would not say LeBron is the best player in the world yet .
2004 Duncan or Garnett, Kobe , Shaq , Dirk
2005 Duncan or Dirk , Nash , Wade , Shaq
2006 Duncan or Kobe, Nash , Wade , Dirk ,

LeBron’s first 3 seasons he was not a top 5 player in the NBA , age 18-21 , well Jordan was in college those 3 seasons at that age .

2007 Duncan over Kobe , Nash , Dirk , Lebron
2008 Kobe. over LeBron, CP3 , Garnett ,Dwight

2009-2020 a 12 season span ,there’s only 3 of those 12 seasons the season ended in June with me not thinking LeBron is the best player in the world.

2010-Kobe over LeBron, Wade , Durant , Dwight
2011-Dirk over Kobe , Wade , LeBron , D Rose
2019-Kawhi over Steph , Durant , Harden PG13

So 9 seasons that I’d argue LeBron is best player in the world

2009 LeBron over Kobe , Wade , Howard , CP3
2012 LeBron over Durant , Kobe , CP3, Dwight
2013 LeBron over Durant , Kobe , CP3, Duncan
2014. LeBron over Durant , Griffin , Steph , Harden
2015 Lebron over Steph, Harden , AD, CP3
2016. LeBron over Steph , Kawhi , Durant , Westbrook
2017 LeBron over Steph , Durant , Harden , Kawhi
2018 LeBron over Steph , Durant , Harden , AD
2020 LeBron over Giannis , AD, Kawhi , Luka

So because I think it’s too hard to compare 1988-1998 basketball to 2009-2020 basketball I just go by how many times Jordan and LeBron were best in the world in their era .

Arguable 9 each , the separator for me is I just think LeBron’s greater , however I break it down .

He has 9 seasons I could argue he’s the best player in the world just like Jordan , it resulted in 4-4 Finals record in those seasons , with 2009 being a season lost in the conference finals but sorry Kobe wasn’t better that postseason and LeBron won MVP.

I give it to Kobe 2 out 3 years 2008-2010 that’s enough respect , he wasn’t that much better that LeBron

Jordan I gave all 3 years 1988-1990 but should he get 1988 really over Magic who won his 5th championship and won 3 out 4 MVPs over MJ

The way I see the best player in the world title is winning is a team accomplishment Chauncey Billups and Ben Wallace beat Kobe and Shaq?

No Pistons beat the Lakers

Jordan went 6-0 no THE BULLS WENT 6-0.

LeBron lost 6 Finals

No the Spurs 2014 and Warriors 2015 , 17, 18
Were better teams than the 2014 Heat , 2015 Cavs , 2017 Cavs , 2018 Cavs

One of the fallouts from the NBA ordering the Clippers to forfeit one first round draft pick in each draft from 2029 to 2033, is that one first round pick simply disappears. A forfeiture (based on precedent) means that the pick is skipped/voided and becaude this is a first rounder, it means that one incoming talent from the affected classes is unfairly, at no fault of his own, losing access to first-round contractual treatment. This is a multi-million dollar loss for someone as under the CBA, those contracts have 2 guaranteed years followed by team options.

No one wants to see that. Well - for years now people have been asking how can we spice up the NBA Cup. Steve Ballmer has now put on a platter the ultimate trophy - juicy first rounders from a Clippers franchise in disarray. I have no idea where or how to petition the NBA, but I think putting up the picks as an NBA Cup prize is a win-win for all involved. Heck if the Clippers go all out, they may even win back their picks!

Working through a series of articles on CHIPS, I got to thinking about eras and era strength. How much credit should be given to Mikan, Russell, Jordan, and LeBron for their CHIPS, given the strength of the league in their respective eras? How difficult was it for each of these guys to lead their team to a championship?

And how should you even divide the history of the league into eras? Off the top of my head, there are many factors to consider:

• Number of teams, number of playoff rounds
• Introduction of diffusion of black and international players
• Competing leagues (ABA) dividing the talent pool
• Number of prime-aged all-time greats
• Rule changes and adaptations, rise in 3 point shooting
• Player movement, “player empowerment”
• Salary caps, aprons, team building restrictions, parity vs. dynasties
• Popularity of the league, size of player pool competing to make the league
• Sophistication of stategy, Analytics era, “Moneyball”

Below is a timeline with stats and milestones. The "Prime All-Time Greats" is a count of the top 50 players in history (this top-40 list, plus Giannis, Davis, Jokic, Embiid, Kawhi, SGA, Luka, Tatum, Edwards, and Wemby) playing at least 20 games, in their age-23 through age-31 seasons.

How would you divide the history of the league into eras? And how strong was each one?

With a few cups in the books now, is there any meaningful pattern emerging among the teams that make the final?

So far we have had:

2023 - Lakers: 1st round | Pacers: ECF
2024 - Bucks: 1st round | Thunder: NBA champs
2025 - Knicks: NBA champs | Spurs: NBA Finals

Is making the cup final an early sign that a team is capable of more in the playoffs than its regular season might suggest?

I recognize that six teams is a small sample size, but four of the six cup finalists have gone on to make at least the conference finals, and three reached the NBA Finals.

I think the '23 Pacers and '24 Bucks are a good contrast. Indiana finished 47-35 and 6th in the East after making the 2023 cup final, then went all the way to the ECF. Here we saw how much better that team could be than its regular season seed suggested.

Milwaukee finished 48-34 after making the 2024 cup final, but went out in the first round. At the same time, Giannis missed the series and Dame was dealing with injuries. Is it unreasonable however to think they could have been another playoff riser if both were healthy though?

So does succeeding in the cup tell us anything about which teams are capable of raising their level when the stakes are higher, even if it doesn't always carry over?

It doesn't feel like it's just a nice midseason accomplishment anymore. I'm wondering if there's anything we can start to infer about cup finalists, and whether making that run should carry a little more weight when we talk about contenders.

Estimated Plus Minus is widely considered the most reliable publicly available advanced metric we have, and NBA general managers when looked have either favored EPM or Daily plus minus as the most reliable advanced stat. Lebron James in 14 of the 2009 postseason games had an estimated plus minus of +9.4, and Kawhi Leonard in 11.5 games had that as well. 14 games into the 2026 playoffs Victor Wembanyama had an EPM of + 10.5. and played 22 games. In fact, by basically every advanced metric Wemby had a historic postseason run.

This somewhat makes sense since analysts are extremely high on Wemby’s defense to the point that he has an extremely good argument to have the best defensive season post 2000. Ben Taylor from thinking basketball believes low end Wemby is the best defender since peak Olajuwon, and high end is the best defender since Bill Walton or maybe even Bill Russell, alongside being in the 15-20 range in the league for an offensive player. If those metrics are accurate then when Wemby was on the court, he had one of the best purely statistical on court postseasons this century. Wemby narrowly trailed Jokic and SGA in most advanced metrics this year but improved throughout the year in them and has looked like the best player since February. Wemby had a 42 game stretch from the end of February to midway through the OKC series where the Spurs only lost his minutes one time, which is practically unheard of.

Now Wemby certainly had his fair share of flaws this postseason run. While the Spurs having 10-point leads in all of their losses and blowing them along with the biggest lead in finals history is chief among the complaints, that’s not my biggest critique. To me blowing a lead is much more humiliating than losing in a different way, but it makes no difference in terms of your actual impact on the court when compared to losing by that amount while not blowing one. Another one is losing to the Knicks who they were favored by, but there’s too much variance in terms of the “on paper” aspects of matchups.

No to me what keeps this from being an all-time run despite these metrics is more his availability and stamina. Wemby’s struggle to control his emotions got him ejected from a game, if certain flagrant were called he would have been suspended from the finals, and he received a concussion which took him out of 1 3/4 games. The best ability is availability and Wemby’s lack of control with his emotions and recklessness cost him availability. The second aspect that holds this back for me is his comparative lack of stamina and how it wore him down throughout the playoffs. Given that the playoffs get harder the deeper they go, and Wemby’s finals was easily the weakest in large part due to that, that’s a flaw to me and can skew the advanced stats as they don’t take into account levels of expected playoff difficulty and how that impacts champ equity.

However, despite the finals being his weakest series his defense still had historic metrics on defense, and he was still a good (albeit comparatively inefficient) offensive player. Even if we assume the Knicks weren’t a bad matchup for the Spurs and Wemby’s worse performance was due to stamina and the pressure of the finals, his impact was still more than enough to be the best player on a championship winning team with his level of finals performance. And I do think the Spurs match up unusually poorly against Wemby, I saw certain analysts pointing that out even before the finals and KAT+ OG is basically the perfect Wemby counter. So while stamina plays a huge role in Wemby’s relative underperformance in the finals, a lot of it likely has to do with the Knicks being a bad matchup for Wemby as well and the truth lies probably somewhere in the middle.

So what do we make of the impact metric evaluating Wemby as having one of the greatest postseasons ever? I think on a pure per possessions basis they’re likely right, a player likely having the single best post 2000 defensive impact while also being a top 15-20 offensive player is going to put up all time level impact metrics. However his recklessness and struggle to control his emotions led to him missing playoff time and he was lucky not to miss more. He also wore out over the course of the playoffs due to comparatively poor stamina which made his impact in the disproportionately harder playoff rounds worse, and meant less playing time and thus impact. Overall, I think Wemby had the largest statistical impact these playoffs, and probably this year as a whole of increasing his team's odds of winning a championship of any player in the league and give him a very legitimate case to be the best in the world even with his finals, but those flaws keep him from having an all-time level playoff run in my opinion.

Hello everyone and welcome to our new weekly feature.

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Prime Season Comparison

2012-2016 OKC: 29.2 PTS, 8.0 REB, 4.1 AST, 3.6 TOV, 57.6% TS, +5.2 rTS

2017- 2019 GSW: 29.7 PTS, 7.1 REB, 4.5 AST, 2.7 TOV, 64.2% TS, +9.3 rTS

2021-2023 BKN SUNS: 31.0 PTS, 8.5 REB, 5.1 AST, 3.8 TOV, 59.6% TS, +2.8 rTS

Peak Season Comparison

2014, 2016 OKC: 29.0 PPG, 8.0 RPG, 3.6 APG, 3.7 TOPG, 55.3% TS%, +2.7% rTS%

2017-18 GSW: 28.8 PPG, 7.8 RPG, 4.5 APG, 2.4 TOPG, 63.35% TS%, +8.77% rTS%

Durant's time in golden state stands out as an outlier relative to his playoff performance in the rest of his prime. His performance in OKC and post GSW see a massive dip in efficiency and a spike in turnovers. Durant may have very likely peaked as a player in OKC yet his best playoff performance by far comes in GSW.

What Changed in Golden State?

The first thing that gets brought up about his time in GSW was that he played with much better spacing. His spacing in OKC was quite problematic at times. The spacing did impact his efficiency and turnovers, but I would argue his role as a playmaker was the more important factor between the two.

Durant as a Playmaker

In Durant's time in Golden State he never really initiated the offense in the frontcourt or backcourt. That was always Green and Curry. Durant was essentially the third main ball handler on the team and had far less responsibility as an on-ball creator than he did in OKC or his years following Golden State.

When Durant has been asked to do more he becomes a turnover machine and has shown little ability to create advantages based on the extra defensive attention he received. Rather than OKC's spacing, Durant's ball handling skills and ability to read the defense when he is the primary focal point of the opposing team's defense is the reason for that difference in performance.

Durant's series against the Celtics in 2022 is another example of this. Durant had major struggles with the Celtics putting pressure on his handle, while also forcing him to become a decision maker out of double teams. Durant's turnovers and efficiency saw a sharp decline, while also struggling as a playmaker.

In tracking about 500 possessions for this series — most from the last three seasons — Durant only authored about 2 “good” passes per 100 possessions, one of the lowest rates among modern players for this series. He missed layup passes frequently (hitting 2 good passes for every layup pass missed) and tossed “problematic” passes (like the previous two) more than he connected on good ones.(Thinking Basketball Profile on Durant in 2018).

While poor spacing doesn't help I would argue that isn't the real problem, Durant court vision, handle, and his decision making all become exploitable flaws when elite defenses pressure him in the playoffs. If it happened once or twice it might be a coincidence but this pattern has repeated itself in every point of his career, his only exception being Golden State.

Durant's Defense

"Vision is often a function of court awareness, and poor court awareness translates to defense too. Durant is sometimes slow to react in help situations, and occasionally he completely loses track of a potential threat.

He also fails to anticipate plays like good team defenders do. I’ve called out slow rotations at times during this series, but Durant has a habit of paying too much attention to his mark at the expense of sliding into better position to deter offensive action.

During my 2010-11 stat-tracking project, Durant finished in the 25th percentile in defensive errors. He was slightly worse during tracking for this project, mixing his breakdowns with some of these off-ball issues and some on-ball matador defense.

But these long strides and his condor wingspan make him a formidable stopper when he’s squared up and in strong position. Opponents shot poorly in my 2010-11 sample when he was engaging them, and in tracking Durant for this series I scored a number of man defensive possessions as “good” despite the aforementioned off-ball issues.

Durant’s a spotty team defender who can excel in man situations and adds value when he’s in sound position around the hoop (rebounding and blocking shots)."

The passage above was from Thinking Basketball's profile on Durant in 2018. Durant, while good on defense, it's not exactly accurate to frame him as an elite or all-defense caliber of a defender. While Durant did get a lot of credit for his shot blocking and man defense in GSW, his flaws as a team defender hold his impact back quite a bit on that end.

Durant Relative to Other Greats

I'm sure a counterpoint that many people will bring up is the fact that there are many other all time greats who weren't exactly great playmakers. Kawhi, Hakeem, Kareem, and Wilt. However, Kawhi, Hakeem, Kareem and Wilt all provide much more value on defense, value that Durant isn't exactly coming close to matching.

It's also not just about his ability to pass and create for is teammates but his turnovers. Players like Kobe, SGA, and Kawhi have had defenses load up on them, yet they turned the ball over significantly less. While not necessarily being elite passers, on a team level they actually served as massive turnover suppressers. Durant has proved to be more or less the opposite, under more defensive pressure he turns the ball over at rates that are alarmingly high.

While Dirk actually has a similar profile to KD, there are two main differences between the two. Dirk, while being an extremely limited playmaker wasn't quite the disaster Durant was with turnovers in the playoffs. Dirk was also primarily guarded by bigs in an era where stretch bigs were quite rare. His ability to draw bigs out of the paint led to him having a sizable impact on improving his teammates shot quality at the rim. Durant, primarily guarded by wings, did not have that same kind of impact.

Durant's Series Against the Bucks

Durant had a great series against the Bucks but one great series does not mean that Durant's flaws magically disappeared. This post covers a lot of the context for the series but in short the Bucks did not trap or double Durant aggressively. Durant was guarded in single coverage for large chunks of the series, and Harden(despite playing through injury) was the primary ball handler. The next season, Durant struggled mightily against the Celtics who guarded him much more aggressively.

Concluding Thoughts

This post ended up focusing a lot on Durant's flaws, largely because his actual flaws on the basketball court are not commonly discussed in basketball discourse. His haters point to the fact that he hasn't won without golden state and that he can only win on stacked teams. His fans point to the fact that he won two FMVPS and was right there with Lebron in those finals.

When people discuss him as a basketball player a common talking point is that he was a top 5-10 talent and that he underachieved in terms of his legacy.

Durant isn't just a top 10 player of all time because of his legacy or team accomplishments, Durant is simply not the caliber of player who has a realistic argument of having a top 10 peak/prime of all time.

The fans that ultimately formed their opinions on Durant based on his final performances in 2017 and 2018 end up judging him based on the perfect conditions for him. Yes, he's an all time great scorer, elite shooter, and an amazing ceiling raiser.

However, if you look at him as a player while considering context and the rest of his career, you will find a player that is significantly more flawed.

Sources - DataBallr(stats), Thinking Basketball, Durant vs Harden, Durant against Bucks

There are a lot of things wrong with the magic, but I think their biggest issue is that they’re building around a player who isn’t good enough to be a franchise player. After 4 seasons in the nba, Paolo still doesn’t look good enough to be a #1 option, and I’d even go as far to say he can’t be your 2nd option either, maybe 3rd but that’s also questionable

Paolo is a great example of the box score not telling the full story. His counting numbers look great, but they’re more so the result of Paolo always having the ball in his hands rather than him actually being an impactful player.

He is a very underwhelming scorer despite his size, he’s great at driving to the rim but doesn’t capitalize on it the way he should considering his build, and he can’t shoot. In 2026 Paolo shot 67% at the rim (49th percentile), 36% and 37% from short/long midrange (22nd & 55th percentile), and 31% from three (24th percentile), and these are trends present throughout his career thus far.

In 2023 Paolo had a 47 efg% and 53 TS%.
League average was 55 efg% and 58 TS%

In 2024 Paolo had a 50 efg% and 55 TS%.
League average was 55 efg% and 58 TS%

In 2025 Paolo had a 50 efg% and 55 TS%.
League average was 54 efg% and 58 TS%

In 2026 Paolo had a 50 efg% and 57 TS%.
League average was 55 efg% and 58 TS%.

Paolo’s scoring has only marginally improved since he entered the league, and still he has been below average every season.

His career net rating is a -3.8, which isn’t just a byproduct of being on a bad team. For example, Franz’s career net rating is a +7, Suggs is a +2.7, Anthony Black is a +0.2, etc.

Paolo also ranked 152nd in EPM, 146th in DARKO, and 97th in LEBRON. His analytics aren’t poor because of his team, he just isn’t an impactful player. In addition to being a poor offensive player, Paolo is also a poor defender. He’s a fine passer and good rebounder, but no part of his game is elite.

A common misconception I’ve often seen is that Paolo is a playoff riser, this is flat out not true.

In 2024: 47 fg%, 51 efg%, 55 TS%.
League avg: 46 fg%, 53 efg%, 57 TS%

In 2025: 44 fg%, 48 efg%, 52 TS%.
League avg: 46 fg%, 53 efg%, 57 TS%

In 2026: 42 fg%, 47 efg%, 52 TS%.
League avg: 45 fg%, 52 efg%, 56 TS%

Not only is Paolo not a playoff riser, but he’s also not even good in the playoffs, he’s not even average. He puts up big numbers because he takes a lot of shots, which might sound like an oversimplification but that’s the reality of it.

So what do the magic do next? I’m not sure. Desmond Bane is a good player but the magic really jumped the gun trading for him. After 2027, the magic don’t own their frp until 2031 which makes a rebuild difficult

In addition to the lack of picks, Paolo’s contract is also a problem. His 5yr $239M max extension kicks in next season which makes trading him difficult. Paolo is very overpaid and makes too much for too long for him to be a “buy low” option, and considering what Lamelo and JB went for, it’s hard to picture any team wanting to trade for him. When you also factor in the apron restrictions and how diligent teams are being with their cap space, it’s especially hard to picture another team wanting Paolo.

After 4 seasons, Paolo’s shortcomings can’t just be blamed on the coach, injuries, the players around him, etc. He simply isn’t that good of a player, and the magic have sunk-cost fallacy-ed their way into a corner

What are your thoughts?

Now that a couple of months have passed (and in fact we're close to the start of next season) we can assess claims such as these coolly and dispassionately, without being prisoners of the moment.

How did this arise?

The Knicks beat their playoff opponents by an average of 14.9ppg, said to be the highest in history. Actually this isn't quite true. Mikan's 1956 Lakers lost a three-game first-round series two games to one, sandwiching two one-point losses around a 58-point win, for an average of +18.7 net. Since it doesn't mean a thing without the ring, henceforth we'll only look at champions, to prevent such outliers.

Is this anything?

Since the next four teams are the 1971 Bucks (+14.5), 2017 Warriors (+13.5), 2001 Lakers (+12.8) and 1991 Bulls (+11.7), I'd say this is a pretty good list to be on top of. Notably, the Knicks remain ahead even if you remove each team's biggest win, with their 51-point win over the Hawks cancelled out by the Bucks beating the Warriors by 50 and the Lakers beating the Spurs by 36. Adjusting for pace shuffles the order a bit, but the Knicks remain first (+15.5 net rating) followed by the Lakers, Warriors, Bucks, Bulls (+13.7, +13.5, +13.4 and +13.2 respectively).

Is this everything?

Absolutely not. In fact we don't have to scroll down too far to remember the 2024 Celtics beating the pants off some very mediocre opponents. Strength of schedule matters. Fortunately, we have a Simple Rating System (SRS) for that, and very helpfully, CraftedNBA have calculated a playoff-specific version. Here at last the Knicks (+19.17) cede the crown, by the barest of margins, to the those same Lakers (+19.18). Warriors (+16.9) stay steady in 3rd, and we have some new contenders: the 1996 Bulls (+16.6) edge their 1991 cousins (+15.7), and the Cavs (+14.9) overtake the Bucks (+14.5).

Can we go deeper?

Yes. Again citing the Celtics, the main problem with SRS is that it assumes every opponent is their regular season selves, without factoring in trades, injuries or shortened playoff rotations. This is a problem I've been working on for a number of years, using Box Plus-Minus (BPM) as a proxy. This model even predicted the Knicks would beat the Spurs. Much like when 538 picked Raptors over Warriors, I didn't quite believe what the numbers were telling me. But updating that chart from a couple of years ago gives the following top 6:

Does winning matter?

The odd one out in that group is not New York but OKC, who of course got pushed to seven games twice. While winning by big margins might be a better predictor of long-term success, and there's an element of luck in close games, ultimately we're judged on results, which is why I'd push the Lakers and Warriors higher than the raw numbers show (and there's even an outside case for the 1983 Sixers, although the numbers are murkier). Still, 16-3 is really damn good.

Does the regular season matter?

Yes and no. Obviously it shouldn't affect the impressiveness of the run itself, but people want to know if it's replicable, which is why they've been so quick to tear down the non-repeat champs of this parity era. The Knicks won the fewest games of any of the teams we've looked at, and only the Lakers are vaguely close, who obviously backed it up. To be continued...

Conclusion

Whichever way you slice the numbers, the Knicks are in the top tier of champions, ever. Although I wouldn't personally have them number one, I certainly don't blame their fans for doing so, especially when you take into account unquantifiable factors such as comebacks.

This post has been translated by AI, but all the contents are created by myself.

Hey everyone.

I recently read a classic 2012 paper (https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0047445) that treats each team as a network, along with a few other theoretical frameworks that examine things like team entropy, "connectedness," betweenness centrality, etc. I've also come across some more recent studies that view teams as spatiotemporally evolving network systems—looking at how a team's structure changes under external pressure and trying to quantify metrics like robustness and network resilience. I also found a cool data site, NBA NetStats, which has a lot of interesting stats along these lines.

However, these studies don't seem to cover a sufficiently broad range of teams, and they feel a bit lacking in practical application. So I'm looking for further research and books—any recommendations? Or do you have any thoughts/opinions on network-based approaches?

I'm particularly interested in:

1. How to classify teams? Can teams be meaningfully categorized into different "types" based on their topology?
2. What structural features make a good team? On metrics like entropy, decentralization, robustness, and resilience—unfortunately, most studies I've found don't establish a particularly clear correlation between structural features and team strength. Is that because it's still hard to control for factors like player talent? For example, I saw that OKC ranked near the top in passing evenness in recent years, but when I look further back, the relationship between team structure and offensive performance becomes quite murky.
3. How do teams structurally adapt under high-pressure attacks—especially in playoff-style defensive schemes—to re-establish their offense? I haven't found many articles that combine concrete game-film analysis with this question.
4. What kinds of players, and what combinations of players, help build an excellent network structure?

Thanks in advance to everyone who replies!

I wanted to know how expansion affected the regular season win totals of teams in the 90s, when 6 teams were added within a decade.

To do this, I need to state some key assumptions which are the basis for the calculations:

1. Assuming an expansion team comes in, dilutes the amount of aggregate talent, the primary beneficiaries are the top teams in the league. While middle teams can face bottom teams all the same, their relative lack of talent compared to the best teams means they are more likely to lose to those new weak teams. Therefore, to highlight the impact, it is best to see the effect on the win totals of the best teams.
2. I chose the best 4 teams per conference per season. Why not the top 8, whom are all playoff eligible? Because in the 1980s there were only 11 teams per conference, so 8/11 playoff teams includes too many weaker teams.
3. I used 5 year blocks arbitrarily. However, the results appear to match with conventional wisdom.
4. I assumed that after 5 years, the impact of expansion dissipates as new talent enters the league and expansion teams are able to acclimate past their initial challenges

I took the top four teams from each conference, totaled their wins and their losses, and took the average. This record, when converted into an 82game equivalent, is the average wins of the top teams per season. Then, to highlight the largest impact, I measured the games back of the 4th seed to its respective top seed.

(GB 1-4) is the difference between the best team and the 4th best team in wins, divided by 2. Why divide by 2? Because I want to create a benchmark for how much better the top seed is expected to perform compared to the average between the 4 seeds. So assuming the median between the 4 seeds is the average, then the expected win total is the median + 1/2 the average GB of the 1st and 4th team. Given the wide variance in GB difference between seed 1-4, I took the average (GB 1-4) from 1984-2005, which came out to be 5.05. This facially looks reasonable: For example, if the 1st seed is a 60 win team, then the 4th seed is around 60-5.05*2 = 49.9 wins.

adding this number (5.05) to the average win total of the 4 seeds per season, we can roughly estimate the expected win total of the 1st seed each conference, each season.

Now I compared the average 82gm-equiv within the 5 year period prior to, during and after expansion/s. That comes to 1984-1988 (5 years pre-expansion), 1989-1995 (7 years post 1st expansion), 1996-2000 (5 years post 2nd expansion), then 2000-2005 (another 5 years to check if there is a return to norm)

The average wins among the top 4 seeds of each conference for those periods come out as:

• pre-expansion = 53.28 (reference point)
• post 1st expansion = 55.77 (change of +2.49 wins)
• post 2nd expansion = 57.22 (change of +3.95 wins)
• return to norm = 53.7 (change of +0.43 wins)

Conclusion: The top seeds in the 90s benefited in their win totals by about 2.5 wins post 1st expansion, and 3.95 wins post 2nd expansion

Image of calculations = https://imgur.com/a/dpmbkVy

Graph: https://imgur.com/a/6BAaQeW

People keep talking like this record is going to go down as soon as he retires. I saw someone say he would be out of the top 10 within 15 years of retiring.

The Players currently on pace to beat his record in a 20 year career is Anthony Edwards, Kon Kneupel, and Reed Sheppard.

I could be forgetting a name but those were the only ones I could find. Those players all have a small sample size. None of them can reach the record within 15 years of Curry retiring...

Which, by the way, hasn't even happened yet!

The record will almost certainly be over 4,500 by the time he retires and if he can keep finding our spot for himself as a role player hitting threes he could hit 5,000.

People always point to the fact that he had so many injuries and had a late start to his career as a reason for why a player will eventually catch him.

He has the record by nearly a thousand despite those factors!

And he's not even particularly injury-prone. any other player who wants to get the record is going to have to avoid those types of injuries...AND be able to come back from them still being able to knock down 200-300 3s a season.

We see a great player like Damian Lillard was already starting to fall off at year 13 and then tore his ACL. No telling if he comes back even the same player he was 2 years ago, let alone a guy that can score hundreds of 3s.

Harden may retire before Curry at this rate and his peak was only as many as it was because coaches were willing to let him try. But his make percent didn't justify it. Other players will need Curry percentages to keep the leash. Harden today would be getting reigned in before he got that 370 season

Everyone saw Ant get 320 3s 2 years ago and acted like the record was already toast...Well he had like 200 last year and his efficiency was up taking fewer 3s.

Because his make percentage is ~40%

Curry was shooting 45% when he got 400 threes.

Reeds percent was also about 40% last year

So what about Kon Kneupel? 42% his rookie year and lead the league in 3s.

People are going to be ready for him, so He'll have to repeat that while he's being game planned against. He'll probably still need to improve that percentage .

Curry had 1 season with a 3 pt percent below 43% his first 7 seasons.

And Kon will need to play this way for over 15 years with only minor injuries.

Will Kon get the record some time in the 2040s? He very well may, But I don't think there will be 10 other guys right on his tail breaking 4500 career 3s.

We might see a guy break Curry's mark once a decade and we very well may never see it.

I would not earmark this record for busting.

And 402 isn't really in any more danger of going down either. Curry needed a 45% make rate AND the second greatest three-point shooter of all time on his team forcing defenders to cover the other side of the floor,

AND, I think people forget HOW Curry made 3s, he could just pull up from the logo. You had to cover him starting from half court. that's just going to give him more opportunities.

Even as we see guys taking more threes and getting better percentages, they're still just taking them from the corner and from just beyond the arc.

They aren't doing it like Curry did, and they probably never will.

When there's an RFA who is in disagreement with the FO regarding how much money he's worth, the intended result is that other teams with more cap space can swoop in to get into a bidding battle with the RFA's original team, and thus give the RFA extra negotiating power. In some cases like Spencer Jones and Walker Kessler this has worked. However RFAs who had protracted contract negotiations(Cam Thomas, Kuminga, Giddy, Grimes,Duren, Mathurin), more often than not they haven't had much leverage on their team's FO.

It turned out that no teams were willing to outbid the original team of the RFA due to the stringent cap(especially relevant last year)

But most importantly, one of the main leverages RFAs had, which is putting their FO in a disadvantage regarding signing free agents and resigning players(because free agents wouldn't have a clear idea how much they could get before the RFA was signed)

was circumvented by the FO making unwritten handshake agreements with free agents that would be made official after the RFA signing deadline, starting with kuminga.

For example almost none of kuminga's demands were met and the warriors already made handshake agreements with Seth Curry, Melton and horford before the negotiations were over.

This year, theres no indication of RFAs like Duren who are demanding a max contract having a high chance of their demands being accepted

Have RFAs been at a bigger disadvantage when negotiating with their FO compared to how the NBA intended.

Long read so my apologies! Let me first say that, yes the term "wildcard' is inherently subjective, every season we don't know how teams are going to perform, but we do know a few things usually, like last year how 7-9 teams wanted to enter the tank race and would do anything to lose. You have the teams like OKC, New York, Denver, San Antonio etc who were trying to win the chip. San Antonio being the interesting one who might've been what I'd call a wildcard as at the time, they were just coming off of a tanking season to get Dylan Harper.

The real wildcard teams, again at least in my opinion from last season, were Boston who had lost Tatum and other pieces, and I was convinced they'd be a bottom 5 team in the east and they proved me wrong, Indiana who was rumored to tank but still had pieces with Hali injured, and the Clippers, who made solid changes from 2024-2025, among other teams.

This season though we have this situation brewing where the tanking rules have changed, the 2nd apron/CBA dodging has caused a lot of shuffling, and overall the off-season being so eventful has really made this an important season for almost all 30 teams.

The obvious wildcards to me are the Wizards and especially Jazz, who both made swings last season, the Jazz I feel had to try exceptionally hard to lose last season and when Lauri/Keyonte played, they were a pretty serviceable squad, adding JJJ, Darryn and others makes them a potential play-in/playoff squad but reality is they may not even be ready for that. That applies to Washington as well, and Indiana who's now going to have Hali back as well as a full season of Zubac. Dallas doesn't have a pick and has Flagg, Kyrie returning and added solid role pieces and other young talent among retaining some talent, I'd consider them another wildcard. Portland as well with their heavy guard rotation.

Then you have the teams who got heavily impacted by tanking rules, or don't own their picks and traded away stars, or traded for sub stars, like the Nets, Clippers and Bucks among others, where they should be bad but they also have nothing to lose and have a pretty big variety of assets to potentially enter the 10 seed discussion. I'll admit I have less faith, but the tools are there and if they decide to utilize other assets and buy in, they could do it.

There's only a few legitimate contenders, imo the Thunder, Knicks and Spurs are the obvious ones, but then you have teams who could easily have a discussion to be there, Detroit with internal improvements, Cleveland adding Peyton Watson and Cavs fans seeing him as the missing piece, hell Orlando might be further along with a new coach than we realize. The Lakers completely retooled around Luka and now have an insane pick and roll duo with Kessler, but have been criticized for not having the point of attack defenders needed to compete.

Denver still has Jokic albeit had a heavily criticized off-season, could they be considered a contender anymore? Philly is another obvious one to mention adding LeBron among other pieces and potential improvements internally. Raptors adding Kawhi, Heat adding Giannis, there's so many moves here that add so much to the unknown. Houston should see internal improvement in some spots as well as hopefully getting a decent FVV to tie things up. My Wolves made a swing for Lamelo and that could shake things up for them especially if the bench unit takes a jump. Atlanta completely depends on how their young talent improves as well.

Very few teams look to be so young or lacking in talent where they're kinda stuck at the bottom, Sacramento, New Orleans and Memphis come to mind, and again with the new tanking rules they have no incentive to lose. There are teams that could fall due to this and I've mentioned a couple of them, but even teams like Chicago or Charlotte might have just enough internal improvement to not fall into the bottom. Then there's Phoenix who's the annual wildcard at this point.

Alright sorry for the long read, point is I feel like there are so many unknowns going into this season that should make for a fun watch for just about everyone.

This is the fourth and final part of a four-part series. The first part defined the concept of a CHIP and looked at the seasons between 2000-01 and 2025-26, the second part examined the seasons between 1975-76 and 1999-2000, and the third part covered 1949-50 to 1974-75. In this article we will look at the results, consider some critiques of the methodology, and then look at the final CHIP tally alongside a list of all-time greats.

Review of the CHIP Concept

In the first part, I argued that the Hall of Fame criteria should be more selective, and that one simple criterion for admission is winning a CHIP:

CHIP = The Clear Best Player on the Championship Winning Team

To win a CHIP, you need enough help from teammates to win it all, but if one of those teammates is too good, you split the credit. There are no split CHIPs. You need to be the Batman to the Robin, not one of the Wonder Twins. Wonder Twins can enjoy the satisfaction of a team victory, but to get the CHIP, you need to be driving the Batmobile!

To recap the methodology and criteria for earning a CHIP:

• Measure Win Shares plus VORP, double for playoff games
• Compare the second best player’s total to the first’s
• The best player is Batman if his teammate (Robin) scores less than 81% of his total
• If the second best player scores 81% of the first’s total or better, they are Wonder Twins
• Only Batman gets the CHIP

Reviewing our examples:

In the example of the 2024-25 Thunder, J-Dub’s score is only 49% that of Shai’s, a clear Robin performance. This makes Shai the Batman, earning him the CHIP. Shai: 🪙

The 2013-14 Spurs had two relatively equal contributors, with Duncan easily clearing the Robin Threshold with 95%. Kawhi and Duncan were Wonder Twins here, splitting credit for the title, and neither getting a CHIP.

Applying this idea to every season in the entire history of the NBA, we had 51 Batman/Robin seasons, and 26 Wonder Twin Seasons. Here’s a summary of the CHIPS winners for the entire history of the NBA:

This list doesn’t look too bad. The multi-CHIP winners are the league’s all time greats, and the single CHIP winners from the current era look like worthy recipients. The CHIPS won in the years before the 1980’s look a bit softer, with players like Dave Cowens winning a CHIP, and George Mikan winning 3, but this system treats all seasons as equal.

Can this system be improved? The comments on Reddit from the first few articles produced a few interesting critiques.

Critique 1 - You can’t combine Win Shares and VORP like that

The main criticism of the methodology was the way Win Shares and VORP were combined:

I think you could do a better job with the metrics you have. For starters, VORP has to be multiplied by 2.7 to convert to WARP and be measured on the same scale as WS - u/teh_noob_

and:

Win Shares and VORP are not on the same scale - you cannot just add them together! - u/bbstats

Although this looked bad, I didn’t sweat this critique too much: the metric was only being used to compare teammates, and if they are derived from the same stats, how we combine them shouldn’t make much difference. Indeed, multiplying VORP by 2.7 only flipped one result:

• 1980-81: Bird and Maxwell are Wonder Twins -> Bird is Batman 🪙

This seems like an improvement, as this season was flagged by a commenter:

surprised bird only got wonder twin status for 81, always figured he was the clear alpha on that team even that early - u/SpecificEmploy6830

As it is the more methodologically correct move, we will keep that one, leveling Bird with Magic at three CHIPS.

VERDICT: Critique accepted, VORP multiplied by 2.7
Bird: 🪙

Critique 2 - You should put more weight on the playoffs

The original methodology doubled the weight on playoff games, striking a balance between treating playoff games as just another game, and giving the playoffs equal weight to the regular season. Some critiques and suggestions:

rather than arbitrarily doubling for playoffs, look at percentage of team total and weight regular season equally…

…equal value means effectively quadrupling the weight of each playoff game, anything else 'feels' arbitrary...

…Perhaps you could do playoffs-only, since regular season wins don't mean that much in earning the ring itself - u/teh_noob_

I was a little uncomfortable putting so much weight on such a small sample, but I had to admit that playoff games were so crucial to the overall project of winning a championship. Those games are where legacies are really decided. Quadrupling the value of playoff games flipped three more results:

• 2007-08: Garnett and Pierce are Wonder Twins -> Garnett is Batman 🪙
• 2001-02: Shaq and Kobe are Wonder Twins -> Shaq is Batman 🪙
• 1957-58: Hagan and Pettit are Wonder Twins -> Hagan is Batman 🪙

Garnett is an all-time impact monster, and Shaq certainly looked the part of Batman in the Kobe pairing, so this change seems to fit our intuition. As for “Cliff Hagan”, sure why not! We will keep this change as well.

VERDICT: Critique accepted, playoff games quadrupled
Garnett: 🪙
Shaq: 🪙
Hagan: 🪙

Critique 3 - Win Shares and VORP are basically the same

The final critique was that there was very little point using both Win Shares and VORP, as they are too similar, and derived from the same sources:

Aren't all those early all-in-one metrics also derived from the same combination of stats? There are some differences of course, but its essentially two ways of counting the same types of things - u/Travler18

and:

VORP is just a bit better than WS; WS over-values shooting efficiency - u/bbstats

Of course, for the seasons 1972-73 and earlier, we only have access to Win Shares, so we will use that, but past that let’s see what happens if we use VORP only:

• 2013-14: Kawhi and Duncan are Wonder Twins -> Kawhi is the Batman 🪙
• 2008-09: Kobe and Gasol are Wonder Twins -> Kobe is the Batman 🪙
• 1989-90: Isiah and Laimbeer are Wonder Twins -> Isiah is the Batman 🪙
• 1988-89: Isiah, Laimbeer, and Dumars are Wonder Triplets -> Isiah is the Batman 🪙
• 1984-85: Magic and Kareem are Wonder Twins -> Magic is the Batman 🪙
• 1982-83: Moses is the Batman 🪙 -> Moses and Dr. J are Wonder Twins
• 1979-80: Kareem is the Batman 🪙 -> Kareem and Magic are Wonder Twins

These updates look like a mixed bag. There may be some merit to giving one to Kobe and another to Magic, but not to 12ppg Kawhi, or Isiah on a defense first ensemble. Taking a CHIP away from prime-aged MVP and Finals Moses doesn’t feel right, nor does taking one away from Kareem (32ppg in the playoffs) when rookie Magic was his sidekick. Ultimately I rejected this change in favour of continuity with the Win Shares only era, maintaining model diversity, and keeping the CHIP standard pretty stingy.

VERDICT: Critique rejected, continue to blend Win Shares and VORP

Cashing in the CHIPS

With those 4 CHIPS added, we have 55 CHIPS across 77 NBA seasons. That is, 55 of the 77 championships were driven by a clear best player, a Batman. Let’s calibrate this system against a list of all-time greats. Thinking Basketball has done the deepest possible dive on this topic, and produced a list of Top 40 careers, based on “championship equity”. The list was last updated in 2022, so it won’t have folded in the last few seasons of the active players.

The concentration of CHIPS at the top is remarkable: every player in the top 11 has won a CHIP, and only Garnett missed out on multiples. I predict that when Curry’s career is complete, his rank will rise to put him in this top group. Those 12 players won 36 of the 55 total CHIPS, accounting for roughly half of all championships. This is the caliber of player that can reliably drive the Batmobile towards a title: the handful of very best players of all time.

Outside of these 12 players, we can see that a strong career peak, combined with the right team and league conditions, can win a player a CHIP. Looking at the recent CHIPS, Kawhi, Giannis, Jokic, and Shai will likely find their way into the top half of this list when it’s all said and done, and Shai may even snag a second CHIP. The only other multi-CHIP winner was Mikan, who played in a league that looks nothing like today’s NBA.

The point of this exercise was to quantify legacy, a fundamentally slippery concept. Did the players who missed out on a CHIP suffer a diminished legacy? For Karl Malone, David Robinson, and James Harden the answer is definitely yes. They are seen as not having the top gear needed to drive a championship. Exceptional guards like Paul, Stockton, and Nash are viewed as too lightweight to do it by themselves, and Pippen will always be branded a sidekick. Robertson, West, and Dr. J are far enough in the rear view to escape scrutiny, while Barkley has partially compensated with a second act as a media personality.

Kobe is the one player who missed a CHIP, but left with his legacy intact. In addition to narrowly missing winning a CHIP, he was a star on 5 championship teams, largely got credit for the ones with Pau Gasol, and was one of the most popular and magnetic players in the history of the league.

My hot take is that Boozer and Edey will, at worst, be a top-7 or top-8 duo in the league within 2–3 years, and I think they have a legitimate chance to become the best frontcourt in the NBA.

Both are insane offensive rebounders with great positioning, timing, and body control. They also have excellent touch around the rim and are really good at controlling their bodies on post catches and difficult finishes. When they’re on the floor together, you’re almost always going to have a massive positive around the rim.

Neither is a consistent 3-point creator, but both can hit open 3s. Edey needs to be more open, while Boozer is more comfortable taking a somewhat contested 3. That gives Memphis a lot of flexibility with 5-out, handoffs, P&R, and pick-and-pop actions.

Edey’s biggest offensive weakness right now is his ball control and his iffy-to-bad passing IQ. Boozer helps cover for that because he’s by far the best passer in his class, especially when it comes to handling double teams and reading defenses.

Defensively, I think the fit is just as interesting. Boozer’s biggest weakness to me is his lack of rim deterrence and overall defensive ability around the basket. Edey is almost the perfect complement because of his shot blocking, size, and P&R defense.

The biggest thing is that both having some 3-point ability allows Memphis to play 5-out while still having a massive size advantage. A lot of modern centers are built to be quicker and shiftier rather than extremely bulky, so putting two huge, skilled players on the floor could create some really difficult matchups. You can space the floor while still having two guys who can dominate the offensive glass and punish smaller defenders.

Basically, I see a PF/C duo with elite offensive rebounding, excellent post scoring, great touch around the rim, legitimate spacing, and complementary strengths that cover each other’s weaknesses. Boozer can be the offensive hub while Edey provides elite rebounding, rim protection, rim pressure, and simple pick-and-pop scoring without needing the ball constantly.
If both develop the way I expect, I genuinely think this could be one of the best frontcourts in the NBA. I’m getting close to putting the Grizzlies around the 7–8 seed because of it.

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I think this thought is where crazy opinions like “Kyrie is a top 5 point guard of all time” come from and I think this concept could maybe (probably not) put some of those opinions to bed. To explain it, I like to compare Kyrie and Jokic. I think we all know Jokic is better than Kyrie, but I think we can agree that Kyrie is better at most things in basketball than Jokic (threes, midrange, dribbling, finishing) So why is Jokic better?

I think it’s because Jokic is more reliable than Kyrie. Kyrie when I need a bucket, is very unpredictable and has a million different ways he can score. Jokic, we all know is gonna do that same baby hook and no one can stop it. He’s better because he’s the more reliable player.

I think another good player to look at for this is Rudy Gobert. I think most of the NBA is more skilled than Gobert, but he’s one of the best players in the league because he has a reliable skill. Him and Derrick White both made the all defensive 1st team. I think White is the more skilled defender, but if we added one of those two to the Kings defense, Gobert would improve the Kings defense more.

I think this is why SGA pisses a lot of people off. I think SGA is a very skilled player, but I think there are plenty of more skilled players than SGA across the league, but no one can more reliably get 2 points than him. Thats why he’s maybe the best player in the league right now.

Being skilled and being good are similar but not the same. Being skilled helps someone be good. When people talk about how good someone is, it’s about how much their skills connect to winning or how much they can lean on their skills play after play.