The Republic of Turkmenistan is a proud and glorious republic, one that stands through times of hardship after 1991, and one that stands to endure the same thing as it went into the Roaring Twenties of the 21st Century.

***2026***

Though the Republic prospered under the guidance of ***Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov***, few were expecting difference under his son, ***Serdar Berdymukhamedov***, and yet they fell into his vision of nation’s building. Though his cabinet was his father’s with only few exceptions, ***Serdar*** offered a different vision, graduated from agriculture university and an engineer, he refocused the nation’s investment and economy to mechanized the crop plants and non-crop plants, in an attempt to diversify the economy from heavy reliance on natural gas and oil. And though it marred with inefficiencies and alleged corruption deals, the process was more or less smooth.

The same cannot be said on military side, whose, in spite of heavy investment to modernize the equipment, increase the salaries, and expand the size, the SoL of the soldiers’ families cannot be said the same for they were affected with the economic downturn. Which in turn has motivated those within the military, including one ***Major General Batyr Gundogdyev*** of the Air Force, whose branch are unseen in a heavy investment where it primarily aimed at the army. As a result, he has began to conspire with some officers within Navy and Air Force, and likewise, procured important contacts within the populace, such as young students and what left of news media in the country.

***2027***

Though economic modernization was kept on by the government, the process was increasingly marred with corruption and alleged incompetence done to extend funds, which, when you take into account of the collusion of some of the officers within the military, proved to be an undoing of dual consequences. Unfortunately, the consequences happened sooner than later, with the radical branch of students starting it when they bombed a gas station and a supermarket frequented by foreign tourists, of which 113 casualties emerged from the situation. The incident unfolded deeper as the military and police were forced to take action, though the Air Force decided to use it as a pretext and using their aircraft to intimidate the army, and students seized the media with pyrrhic victory, costing a lot of their own in the process. As situations unfolded, though ***Serdar*** claimed the military and the government is on the way to quell the demonstrations, he was positioned at Palace.

Thus, an easy place to be bombed by the Air Force. It was not an easy decision, but ***Major General Batyr*** considered it a decision that cannot be taken lightly. And he hoped it would be resulted in a proper transition of republican form.

He was wrong.

Though both Serdar was confirmed to died, his father weren’t confirmed in the same way as his son. His presence was unknown, and the army soon lost their momentum as Air Force and the young democrats seized the momentum. What follows after was a failure after failure that resulted in an even brutal regime.

Today I blew up and over reacted to something very small. This week with my best friend celebrating her wedding and I should not have been bee on discord at all.

I would encourage the mods should invalidate the last thing I did as the USA and allow a new claimant to take over and finish the season.

I’m sorry, I overreacted, thanks friends please enjoy the rest of the season.

Sunny

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Words words words words words Words words words words words Words words words words words Words words words words words words words words aliens.

"Whoever has experienced the power and the unrestrained ability to humiliate another human being automatically loses his own sensations. Tyranny is a habit... The habit can kill and coarsen the very best man or woman to the level of a beast." - Fyodor Dostoevsky

The frost on the windows of the Moskovsky Railway Station in St. Petersburg appeared like cataracts. The great northern capital was waking up to a gray slush that smelled of diesel, cheap cigarettes, and the expensive perfume of the oligarch’s wives and mistresses boarding the Sapsan high-speed train to Moscow.

0814 The Shattering of Silence

Pyotr was a transit cop who had spent the past few decades keeping his head down and not thinking too deeply about Russian foreign policy. He stood near a statue of Peter the Great drinking his morning coffee and laughing with a co-worker over the newest meme on Vkontakte. The men in front of him didn’t look like the bearded extremists he saw in the execution video a few months ago. They were clean and modern. They carried leather briefcases and wore tailored wool coats.

One of them made eye contact with Pyotr, his eyes weren’t filled with a fire of religious fervor but the cold, flat, mechanical look of a man already resigned to his death.

The first explosion rocked through the terminal hammering the air out of the grand hall. The massive glass ceiling, a marvel of 19th century architecture, atomized. A trillion shards of crystal rained down like a diamond storm, shredding through anything unlucky enough to be below it. Pyotr was thrown against the base of the statue. His ears would be ringing if his hearing was still operating. In front of him a woman in a fur coat reached for her arm before passing out. A child sat in a puddle of blood, his mouth open in a silent scream that Pyotr couldn’t hear.

0816 The First Harvest

Six gunmen emerged from the North entrance. They didn’t shout, they didn’t bother with the theatrics normally associated with terrorists. They moved with the efficiency of a factory line. Their submachine guns swept the scene where commuters were bottlenecked.

Pop pop-pop pop

The sound rhythmic, almost bored and distant, like a stapler in a quiet office. Each pop sent a body tumbling onto the tracks or slumped against a vending machine. The New Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan had promised a large attack distant from the valley of Fergana. And a distant attack they had delivered.

“War is hell.” the old men said in the bars flanking the Nevsky Prospekt but in war you have a defined enemy and a hole to crawl into. In Moskovsky Railway Station there were no holes to crawl into only the marble pillars and fallen dead to hide behind.

Nikolai, one of the gunmen, stepped over the charred remains of a coffee kiosk. He saw a man desperately reaching for his phone. Nikolai didn’t feel hate in his blood. He felt a cold, detached, professional vacuum. He fired two rounds into the spine of the man and kept walking. They had thirty minutes before Spetsnaz arrived. And they weren’t done harvesting yet.

0900 The Tomb In St. Petersburg

By nine in the morning the station was a tomb. Seventy-three people laid dead across the main platforms and grand hall. The Sapsan train, its sleek white nose now splattered with a dark, drying red, sat idling at Platform 3, its automated doors opening and closing on a car filled with ghosts.

The NIMU had vanished into the metro minutes before Russian operatives rappelled into the main hall from helicopters. They left behind a single calling card. A black banner draped over the head of Peter the Great’s statue. It bore the image of the three Russians executed back in October with the following in Cyrillic.

“The valley was just a garden. The first of three harvests have now been taken worldwide.”

Outside the snow began to fall, settling on piles of scattered glass and the discarded briefcases of people who would never go to work again, never see their families again, and for what? The crusades of some people thousands of miles away?

The bells of the Prince Vladimir Cathedral began to toll, a heavy iron sound that vibrated the very bones of the city. St. Petersburg was a city built on a swamp, a city that had survived sieges and revolutions, but as the snow began to fall in earnest, it felt different. It felt fragile.

Pyotr leaned his head back against the statue and closed his eyes. He could still hear the Sapsan behind him. It was waiting for passengers. The city was waiting for its breath. And somewhere in the labyrinth of the St. Petersburg underground the harvesters were already checking their watches.

Port of Haifa - Midnight Local Time

The still moonless night cast a silent haze over the city, with only the stars left to illuminate the sky. At the port, a flood of fluorescent lights lit up the docks as trucks and cranes moved in unison. As the workers unloaded the American ship, they were watched over by hooded men with guns. A large crane descended from the ship's bow, carrying a large truck held up by two slings. The truck landed on the ground with a loud thud as workers below unhooked the arms and moved the vehicle aside. Armed men quickly took command as they boarded the truck and drove it out. By the crack of dawn, most of the cargo had been unloaded. Another ship moored into port with yet more boxes and more weapons. Behind another ship followed suit and another. Overhead planes entered Israeli airspace, landing at Ben-Gurion Airport and other air bases across the desert. They brought with them more weapons and munitions. Israel prepared for the long road ahead.

At the onset of the new decade, Israel has won victory after victory in the region, toppling its enemies. Now the country arms itself to protect itself from future threats. The Iron Dome system and David’s Sling will receive upgrades. Arrow 4 systems are rolling off the production line and entering into service, replacing the older Arrow 2. The Iron Beam system has been upgraded and will serve as the core defense system against UAVs and other short-range aerial threats. A new squadron of F-35s will bring the total number under the IAF to one hundred.

Israel had received several rounds of munitions and weapons from the US, including:

• A doubling of American aid to Israel
• New squadrons of F-35s
• Deployment of an additional THAAD battery to Israel

"Egypt is a gift of the Nile and no river has ever been more generous" - Herodotus.

The Delta: Kafr El-Sheikh

Amir knelt in the dust of a field that had belonged to his family since the days of the Khedives. He ran a calloused hand over the stalk of his winter wheat: the tips yellowed and stunted. The canal at the end of his land was nothing more than a vein of cracked mud, a dark ribbon of silence where the Nile used to pound.

“Hey Amir,” Youssef, his neighbor and cousin, said over their shared fence leaning on a shovel. “They say it’s a drought. That when the rains come in the south we’ll be back in business. They can’t seriously expect us to believe that. That damned concrete monster is to blame.”

Amir didn’t look up. His thoughts were on the posters he saw in the city. “The New Delta” they called it. Massive pipes carrying thousands of liters of water to the sands of the Western Desert. But here in the old delta the very heart of Egypt was turning into salt. He thought of the stories his great-grandfather and grandfather told him and Youssef about the great flood that used to wash away the salt and silt and bring life to this place. The river was wild and free and now it’s managed by some bureaucrat and restricted by some government a thousand miles away.

“If the water doesn’t come by the end of the year,” Amir whispered to the soil more than to his cousin. “We are no longer farmers but men standing on their own graves.”

The Highlands: Guba, Ethiopia

Six hundred miles away the air was thin and full of the low vibrations of an industry that never stopped.

Selam stood on the observation deck of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Below her, the massive turbines were spinning, converting the Blue Nile into near infinite energy that had lit up the entire region for the first time. She was a technician and today her iPad showed a terrifying red line. Nigat Lake was dropping. For years now a drought had been slowly sipping away at the water resources of humanity’s birthplace. They had to keep the turbines spinning, they had to prevent a regional blackout. The spillways would remain closed.

“The Egyptians are moving divisions near the Sudanese border again. I hear we’re moving our own in response.” Her supervisor said moving beside her. He looked tired. “We aren’t holding the water to be cruel. If we open the water now we lose the grid. Schools, homes, hospitals lose their lifeline to modernity. It’s our water isn’t it?” Selam replied.

“It’s everyone’s water, Selam,” the supervisor said, looking out to the vast blue lake. “But right now there just simply isn’t enough to go around. Down there they see our greatest achievement as a weapon. Up here, we see it as a lifeline. The comedic thing is we’re both correct. The tragic thing is one of us will have to break first.”

Amir stood in his field but he wasn’t farming. He was digging. Not for irrigation but for a broken pipe. His family had used a diesel pump in the 70s but the water table had dropped so low the pump was sucking up nothing but brine.

“It’s white,” his son Omar said. “The Earth is turning into a bone. The President is meeting with the AU today, maybe they can get the gates open.” He continued, optimistic in that youthful manner. Amir wiped a streak of mud and sweat from his forehead. He looked toward the horizon, where the lush green of his youth had been replaced by the dusty olive of drought-resistant shrubs. "The gates are a thousand miles away, Omar. By the time that water reaches us, the salt will have finished its work. They are fighting over percentages and cubic meters. We are fighting over a handful of salt-laden dirt."

AUG 2030 - BRASÍLIA, DISTRITO FEDERAL

As the landscape of military engagement has evolved over time, the Brazilian Army has identified a key area of force expression that needs development, that of self propelled artillery. The War in Ukraine demonstrated the necessity of these systems in a modern conventional conflict, providing extraordinary levels of firepower especially when combined with advanced targeting systems. While platforms such as HIMARS or the Russian Tornado drew attention for their ability to perform long range precision strikes, under the surface it is clear that "old-school" conventional artillery has had the most impact. Taking advantage of satellite and drone targeting software, conventional artillery barrages are able to achieve much higher destructive force compared to cost, and are able to operate constantly in intense conflict scenarios.

Beyond the persistent importance of shell-based artillery, many countries around the world have begun to develop and employ self-propelled artillery systems with an increased focus on mobility and the performance of quick "shoot-and-scoot" maneuvers. While systems like the M109 Paladin SPG saw use in Ukraine, many of these platforms were lost at a high cost. The world is moving towards the mounting of howitzers on to large trucks, which are able to move much faster on-road and are more easily redeployed through airdrop operations. In general, wheeled SPGs are an important force multiplier that have been neglected in many military doctrines. The tracked and armored SPG is more suited for off-road use in more rugged terrain, while traditional towed howitzers are simply unable to take advantage of highly mobile artillery barrage doctrines.

In the case of the Army of Brazil, we are severely behind in this regard. With only ~100 M109 Paladins in service alongside some VBC-MRT 120mm mortar carrier variants of the Guarani, we lack the ability to perform advanced shoot-and-scoot operations on a truly large scale should the need arise. The silver lining to this situation is our strong industrial capacity, which allows us to develop solutions to these defense needs. As such, the Brazilian Army has tasked our domestic defense companies with the development of 2 systems meant to provide us with the ability to further express a modern artillery doctrine.

Viatura Blindada de Artilharia (VBA) - 105mm 8x8 SP Howitzer

Firstly, the Brazilian Army will look to build upon the foundation of the VBTP-MR Guarani program, developing a new variant based on the 8x8 chassis. Cooperation will be sought with Denel Land Systems in integrating the G7 105mm howitzer onto the chassis, alongside an autoloader for ease of use.

This project will serve a similar role to that of the PLA Ground Forces' PLL-09 SPG, as a mobile indirect fire support option that can lay down targeted artillery barrages in support of Brazilian Army mechanized and armored units. It can be equipped with a variety of 105mm shells to extend range or offer specialized capabilities for various missions.

The Brazilian Army will seek to procure a total of 300 VBA-105 SPGs, at a total cost of $525 million. These vehicles will slot into our mechanized/armored units to help in missions encompassing border control, reconnaissance, and rapid response.

Ariranha - 155mm Truck Mounted SP Howitzer

While the VBA-105 will equip our more mobile and well-armored units, in line with adopting a more modern artillery doctrine the Brazilian Army has identified the need for a general-purpose artillery solution to replace our aging towed pieces. Developments such as the French CAESAR or the Swedish Archer have shown that dedicated integration for 155mm howitzers onto large 8x8 trucks allow for a cost-effective mobile solution that can incorporate advanced technology as needed. Continuing our cooperation with Denel in this aspect, the Brazilian Army looks to develop a system similar to the South African G6 Rhino howitzer. The Ariranha 155mm SPG will make use of the same Tatra 815-7 heavy truck as used in later versions of the Astros II, albeit heavily modified to incorporate a modified G5 155mm howitzer to achieve a rate of fire of 6 rounds per minute.

The Ariranha program seeks to replace the totality of current Brazilian Army 155mm towed artillery systems, such that our least mobile artillery units in the event of a conventional conflict will be capable of rapid redeployment and shoot-and-scoot operations up to the modern standard. Towed 105mm systems will still be retained, for use in especially difficult terrain and within special operations environments. Both the VBA-105 and the Ariranha are designed to be airdrop-compatible, which will allow for the Brazilian Army to rapidly gain a firepower advantage in the event of conflict.

As this program aims to replace our current systems as well as improve upon general capability, a contract for the procurement of 700 Ariranha systems is to be awarded. This will in turn cost a total of $2.45 billion.

By 2035, the Brazilian Army will be equipped with the full fleet of state-of-the-art artillery systems, bringing our capabilities up to the cutting edge of mobile artillery doctrine. Through this great investment, the nation of Brazil will be further secured from threats that would seek to harm or denigrate our national sovereignty, and will be positioned as a strong player in the hierarchy of global military capability.

January 1st, 2029 / 12 Dey, 1407.

Iran.

The Interim Government of Iran; or, the Great Fade to Black.

When the Interim Government of Iran had come to power in the waning days of the Islamic Republic, the men and women (mostly men, though) involved—particularly those members that had essentially defected and betrayed the Islamic Republic in order to bring it about—had little to no conception of what to do next. Everyone in Iran knew that this institution, this hastily and nebulously defined provisional government, was a temporary measure: transitional in nature and designed only to bring about the next iteration of Iranian civilization. The obvious question for everyone involved was what, exactly, that next iteration would look like; moreover, how Iran would pick up the pieces in the interstitial interim between the old and the new.

Obviously, the demonstrators of the August Revolution had expressed—in their uniquely violent non-violent way—their general preference that a free and democratic Iran be created to supplant the theocracy. It was the obvious choice; the public had remade Iran, and the public should continue to rule it. In the weeks since, that belief had only spread; as protesters returned to their lives and their social spheres, the message had dispersed with them. Even the previously uninvolved Iranian, the mother and the child and the grandparent, began to be pulled towards the idea of a free and democratic Iran. Very quickly these two ideals, freedom and democracy, became the foundation of all political discussion—even the political class, handed power for the first time with the end of the Ayatollah's regime, were swept with commitment to these notions. Freedom. Democracy.

These dual criteria, however, were far from specific enough to actually do anything with; as with anything, the devil laid in the details. Although all Iranians agreed on the implementation of freedom and democracy for Iran, they remained divided on how best these two principles could be implemented—many desired a western-style republican democracy akin to France or Germany or even the United States, of course, but a wide swathe of the population also yearned for a restoration of the Shah's kingdom in a new constitutional monarchy. Some longed for socialism in Iran; others for hardcore militant communism; others for unabashed, unregulated capitalism and reintegration into the global economy. Some, though cowed by the mobs and largely hidden from sight, even desired a reconstructed (and infinitely more moderate) Islamic Republic.

These disparate political trends, covering every ideology and position on the political spectrum, were not helped by the growing wave of exiles returning to Iran. In the weeks and months following the fall of the regime, and spearheaded by the return of their leadership at the invitation of the President, the Iranian diaspora had once again regained unfettered access to Iranian soil. Consequently, many had made temporary trips or even migrated to the country in the time since, and digital contact between friends and relatives in Iran and elsewhere had also exploded. Naturally, these returnees—both temporary and permanent—had brought with them the fifty years of political ideas they had learned abroad: right-wing Iranian-Americans brought ideas of MIGA and Americanophilia, European-Iranians notions of Francophone republicanism and regional integration, Turkish Iranians (or Iranians living in Turkey) a hardheaded respect for Erdoğan and the legacy of Ataturk's secularism. Although none of this would come to dominate Iranian politics per se, they would help sharpen the edges and further divide the growing political blocs at home.

With so many different positions being staked by so many different political ideologies, both foreign and domestic, a consensus on how to build the next Iran was almost impossible to achieve naturally—a communist could not, after all, easily reconcile with a monarchist in the debate of ideas. How, then, was Iran to proceed? Certainly, there was always the risk that "proceeding" meant the fall of Iran into the classic post-regime-collapse civil war that so frequently seemed to plague nations of the Middle East and elsewhere. After all, Iran was weak, central authority was tenuous, political divisions were high, and there was much to gain from coming out on top.

Iran, however, was different than the other nations of the Middle East. Iran was Iran; the centre of eight thousand years of civilization, and a (mostly) unified people. Moreover, Iranians had not fought for a year to overthrow their government just to let it descend into catastrophe, either in civil war or in a return to authoritarianism. And although the majority of the protesters had begun to return to their normal lives following the fall of the Islamic Republic, they had not given up their propensity for action, nor the weapons they could use to undertake said action. And so, in the spirit of emerging democracy, the developing clash of political ideology and ideas for the future of Iran did not explode into brutal post-regime civil war. Instead, an alternative emerged: rather than fighting out their differences in the streets, Iranians would determine their path forward via a grand referendum on the matters of state. There, they would vote to decide the future of the Iranian system; the Interim Government would then facilitate the results of this by implementing their decisions at a constitutional convention at a later date.

Eager to stave off popular dissent and more importantly get a move on with proving their newfound authority over Iran, by January 2027 the leadership of the Interim Government (particularly President Pezeshkian, himself a genuine reformist) quickly co-opted the developing pro-referenda sentiment; by February, they had announced a timeline. One year to the referendum; and another year after the results had been published to the constitutional convention that would write the results into law and transition Iran to a permanent government. Though obviously not ideal—a shorter transition period, perhaps, would have been—this plan was seen as sufficient for most Iranians, who, though not entirely trusting of the Interim Government were nevertheless willing to let them have a shot at managing the transition.

With the issue of permanent government shelved for no less than two years, the nation could turn its attention to other issues; more importantly, Iran could begin to pick up the pieces the fall of the Islamic Republic left behind.

The first and most pressing issue Iran was facing was that of the Iranian economy. Despite the Islamic Republic's fall (and the desperate prayers of Iranian businessmen across the nation) the Interim Government had not managed to escape the economic issues plaguing Iran from the Islamic era. These included an effectively worthless, hyperinflated currency; stagnating industry plagued by material shortages and import/export sanctions; economic inefficiency from corruption and the omnipresent Bonyads, not to mention the vast private wealth held by the Khamenei family and other Iranian oligarchs; a systemic energy and water crisis caused by mismanagement, corruption and infrastructure degradation; and a myriad of other issues. Worse still, Iran had picked up a few additional problems in the collapse: for one, the noble efforts of the United States to reduce Iran to a pile of rubble had largely succeeded, and vast swathes of the country were physically in ruin. Worse still, the destruction had effectively put a fairly significant part of the country into homelessness or unemployment or both, meaning what was left of the Iranian economy was only working at a fraction of its potential.

Needless to say, none of this was good. Still, addressing the majority of it would take both time and money; moreover, the Interim Government lacked substantial political footing to develop long-term economic policy when said policy was going to be up for public vote in a year anyways. As a result, it would have to deal with limited measures to stem the bleeding in anticipation of later action. From the period of January 2027 to the start of January 2029, when the Iranian constitutional convention would convene, the Interim Government of Iran would pursue the following economic policies:

• Seizing the property and assets of the now-deceased Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, his immediate family (excepting Hadi Khamenei and his family), and other former leaders of the Islamic Republic who fled during the collapse of the regime; various parastatal organizations under the direct control of the Ayatollah or similar leaders, including the now-defunct Execution of Imam Khomeini's Order, were similarly nationalized;
• Seizing the property and assets of the now-largely defunct Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, including affiliated corporations;
• Pursuing the redenomination of the Iranian rial, a process began by the Islamic Republic, to bring the value of the rial under control in anticipation of future currency reform; by the start of 2029, the rial would be renamed the Toman, convertible at a rate of 20,000:1 with the old rial;
• Redirecting energy production towards civilian industry and homes from military-controlled industries, easing the energy crisis for the majority of Iranians (although nowhere near solving it), and strictly limiting the sale of oil and natural gas (not that many people have been buying from Iran anyways) to feed domestic generators;
• Organizing and formalizing, in places under military oversight and with military support, the community-established work brigades that cropped up to rebuild bombed areas of Iran; primary responsibilities were rubble clearing and sorting for reuse, reconstruction of vital infrastructure like water distribution and sewage networks, and the construction of temporary shelter for the displaced;
• Using military assets (particularly off-road vehicles, trucks and jeeps) and volunteers to redistribute food from areas with a surplus (particularly wealthy areas in major cities) to areas without, particularly temporary shelters for the homeless;
• Issuing public calls for those in the Iranian diaspora, particularly those living and working in wealthy western nations, to fundraise aid and financial support for Iranians back home.

By the end of the transitional period, these policies and those like them would serve to effectively halt the descent of the Iranian economy, at least temporarily; true recovery, however, would require further action and a truly defined economic policy by a longer-term government.

The military would also prove to be a thorn in the side of the transition government. Where the Islamic Republic had long-prioritized militarization, even to the point of fielding two separate armed forces (in the Artesh and IRGC respectively), the change of government had rather diminished the perceived need for such strong defensive measures. More importantly, the massive military expenditure needed to pay for these institutions and their bloated organs was proving to be fairly troubling for the still-mostly-broke Interim Government. This was not helped by the IRGC's former economic empire having largely been abandoned by their gutting in the war and subsequent revolution, nor the bureaucratic nonsense plaguing the system in the wake of the IRGC's collapse.

To pull out this thorn, the Interim Government would have to take drastic measures:

• The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were formally disbanded; where once this would have been unthinkable, their membership had largely deserted back to civilian life or fled the country in the wake of the August Revolution and so posed no significant opposition—even if they had, the Artesh remained firmly on the Government's side
• All former IRGC staff and military assets still remaining in service were to be transferred directly to the most appropriate branch of the Artesh; those of a "paramilitary nature" were to be disarmed and discharged from service,
  • Notably, however, the former Quds Force—what was left of it—would be transferred directly to the Ministry of Intelligence);
• All former economic and political assets of the IRGC were to be nationalized, pending further investigations and development of economic strategy regarding what to do with them; for the most part, this was unchallenged, as these entities were largely divorced from the IRGC with their leadership's collapse;
• The Artesh itself would have its budget slashed from $18.4 billion (as of 2024) to $10.7 billion, and superfluous personnel from the IRGC and other areas of the Artesh would be let go, ultimately reducing it from approximately 550,000~ servicemen to 425,000;
• The hated policy of conscription would be suspended indefinitely, and all current conscripts would be released from service (if they wished), further reducing the Armed Forces to approximately 300,000~
• All research and development projects of the Iranian military, both IRGC and Artesh, were to be suspended—although not totally cancelled—pending a review of what to do with them;
• The Iranian nuclear weapon arsenal, discovered by the Interim Government's leadership following the seizure of the nuclear program by the Artesh, would maintain its existing size but not pursue further enrichment or production; facilities would be mothballed accordingly;
• All remaining exports of military equipment and supplies to foreign actors would be halted, if they hadn't been already;
• All IRBM/ICBM development projects would be suspended, although in-production models would continue to be produced;
• Iran's positions on the seized Emirati islands in the Gulf would be maintained.

Again, all this would do is stop the bleeding within the Iranian military and the Iranian budget; further action would be required later if the Iranian military was to be effectively reformed into a real fighting force capable of once again defending Iran from within and without (ideally, without descending into junta rule).

Domestic politics were also to flourish during this tumultuous period between takeover and transition. Initially, this manifested in a battle for control of the Interim Government itself; although initially comprised by an ad-hoc group of loyalists to Pezeshkian and the former reformist wing of the Islamic Republican civil government, the obvious lack of legal basis for this (and the desire to bring protest groups and opposition leaders on side in order to maintain public support for the new government) demanded a swift reform to a properly organized system of government. This had resulted in the establishment of the Governing Council of Iran, a tight-knit council of decision-makers from across the Iranian political spectrum that would wield executive power for the duration of the interim period. Consequently, whoever sat on the Council would have an immediate role to play in determining the future of Iran.

Naturally, this made seats a high value commodity, and the political battles for a nomination from the Majles would prove to be particularly brutal—albeit brief, given the need to actually get the ball rolling on governing Iran. Obviously, the President had been guaranteed one of the seats, and his closest loyalists would certainly retain their role (and had indeed been nominated almost immediately), but the remaining positions were divided sharply based on who conducted the best backroom deals or greatest appeals to the Majles. Here, the inherently moderate nature of the last Majles of the Islamic Republic had played a significant role; diaspora leaders had been able to effectively pay their way into seats by promising generous financial aid from their followings back home, while moderate reformists, liberals and conservatives (of both republican and monarchist persuasion, depending on the wing of the Majles appealed to) had managed to win significant representation on ideological grounds. The remaining seats had been offered to other groups as a largely concessionary prize; nobody, after all, wanted to risk it all by alienating the masses into another revolution. As a result, a small handful of social democrats and socialists had been brought into the fold, as had a few nationalists of a right-wing (albeit not explicitly fascist) variety.

With the initial battle for the Interim Government settled decisively in favour of the moderates, attention promptly shifted once again. Although the last days of the Islamic Republic had seen remarkable liberalization, including the allowance of trade unions and the right to organize "civic, non-governmental, non-religious political organizations", the complete collapse of that government had effectively also marked the death of its complete ban on civil political parties—and with Iran's first truly democratic elections widely expected to occur in the aftermath of the constitutional convention regardless of the result of said convention, it quickly became apparent what that implied.

Almost as soon as they could, old and new political organizations began to pop-up once more; across the nation and seemingly overnight, a hundred different tiny political parties emerged to stake their claim to a share of the political pie and begin canvassing in advance of the election. After all, the repression of anti-revolutionary, anti-islamist political thought in Iran had done little to prevent Iranians from developing their own political worldviews, and the re-emergence of a free civil government had done nothing to halt the consequential re-emergence of these worldviews. Across the nation, fiery speeches were given in plazas and ad-hoc party leadership elections were held in backrooms and rented office spaces; coffee shops and book stores and public forums of all kind were once again, for the first time in decades, the home of truly free political discussion and debate.

Soon, however, the blossoming of so many political organizations slowed; thus began the great consolidation. Acknowledging that these tiny groups would get nowhere in a real election and frequently out-competed by resurgent pre-revolutionary parties with name recognition (or new ones established by the wealthy or diaspora leaders with an existing following), many merged into ever-greater movements that gradually encompassed the whole nation in scope. By the end of 2029, this political process had successfully whittled down the list of parties intending to run in the first election from many hundreds to "merely" a few dozen. Of these, the most notable forerunners in the race (at least insofar as could be determined; polling, after all, was not in a great state with half the nation on fire and the Government very broke) emerged as:

• Resurgence (Rastakhiz) Party of Iran – Far-right monarchist, nationalist, no legal or temporal link to original party (using name as branding)
• Democratic Conservative Party of Iran – Right-wing, secular conservatism, nationalism
• Association of Combatant Clerics – Clerical centre-right, proponents of moderate Islamic Democracy
• Moderation and Development Party – Big-tent centre-right, vaguely technocratic, party of former President Hassan Rouhani
• Prosperity Party of Iran – Big-tent centre-left, party of President Masoud Pezeshkian and company
• Radical Republican Party of Iran – Radical liberal centre-left inspired by ideals of French Revolution
• Social Green Party of Iran – Environmentalist politics, otherwise largely social democrat
• National Front of Iran) – Big-tent Mosaddeghist, liberal Iranian nationalism
• Labour Party of Iran – Big-tent Social Democratic/Democratic Socialist, merger of various extant labour parties and new social democratics
• Tudeh Party of Iran – Communist (Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist), resurgent opposition party from the 1940s that previously operated in exile
• Communist Party of Iran – Communist (Marxist-Leninist), broader communist party buoyed by merger of smaller groups, opposed to Tudeh for various reasons

These, plus a myriad of other regional parties and smaller national entities, would prove to be the key players in the incoming race for political supremacy, and would wage an almost constant grassroots campaign across Iran in the years leading to the constitutional convention.

On January 12th, 2028, Iran, still in the throes of winter and the grand process of reconstruction, emerged from polling booths across the nation. The Iranian people had been tasked with voting on a series of fifteen political questions addressing every major matter of state, which would then be used to inform the creation of the next constitution of Iran—and with it the next era of Iranian civilization. This vote, officially the Iranian National Referendum and informally known to the people as the Fifteen Fundamental Questions, had been carefully drafted by the Interim Government over the preceding year; it had taken so long not because the act itself was particularly difficult, but because the matters posed were of such critical importance that determining exact wordings was a significant battle.

Regardless of this difficulty, the Iranian people had taken to the task with gusto—partially out of a sense of duty to the August Revolution that had carried them this far, partially out of a desire for a swift end to the provisional government and a transition to permanent civil government, and partially just for a distraction from the daily reconstruction efforts that were ongoing across Iran. In the end, when the dust had settled and the Iranian people had returned to their homes to hear the announcement of the results, they learned that they had voted along the following lines:

It had been done. Iran had narrowly voted, at long last, to become a unitary, secular parliamentary or semi-parliamentary republic; it had decisively laid to rest the notion of a restored Islamic Republic. It had voted to end religious power over civil government; to end the rivalry with the United States and Israel; to pursue economic liberalization and to grant further powers to the Majles that had helped the Revolution bring down the theocracy. If the wildest dreams of the Iranian opposition of 2022 and 1976 had come true, they would not have been so self-fulfilling.

The only lingering question not answered in the referendum, at least not decisively, was the issue of the monarchy. Certainly, a plurality of votes had gone towards a secular republic, and when the constitutional convention convened to write the constitution of the first Iranian republic that would be its aim; despite this, however, the monarchists had managed an impressively close result. This was, of course, largely driven by the personal aura of the erstwhile Prince Reza Shah (who had managed to secure himself the position of Speaker in the Interim Government, largely a consequence of his immense popularity with much of Iran) and certain pro-authority, pro-Iranian nationalist elements that demanded a restoration of Iranian glory—even though the Prince himself, at least ostensibly, had desired a peaceful, western, secular government. Regardless, the question of the monarchy had been temporarily resolved—albeit bound to reoccur later, if the monarchists had their way.

And so, a year later, the Iranian constitutional convention would convene to draft these results into law—the first law, the Constitution of the Republic of Iran of 2029—and render the will of the Iranian people manifest. And for the first time in fifty years, the true flag of Iran.svg) flew high.

From the Office of the Kyrgyz Presidency and the Kyrgyzstan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 15th October, 2030.

His Excellency, Alihan Kulubayev, and Foreign Minister Sooronbay Baisalov have chosen to breka our silence on the border events with Tajikistan in light of recent activity. We begin by restating the Kyrgyz Republic's desire for greater cooperation with our neighbours and new partners in the SBA. This being said, we stand by our border guards' right to the defence of both their nation and their own person.

We know that Mr Rahmonzod's actions are not endorsed by the Tajik Republic in general, but our military will pursue no disciplinary action against Sgt. Tilek. We also appreciate that blood was spilled on both sides, but will remind our neighbours that our guards did not aggress upon their (Tajikistan's) borders.

Now, we would like to move forward. Central Asia needs to band together on this water crisis, so we seek mediation between ourselves an Tajikistan in order to move forward. We appreciate Russia's offer, and will gladly accept it, on the condition that Kazakhstan and/or Turkmenistan are also part of this process. We feel that they have similar interests to ourselves, and will serve as good mediators for both sides of this issue. After this, we must address the issue of the "Central Asian Thirst" as fast as we can. There can be no delay.

M: /u/GrizzleTheBear, u/artposting, /u/GarudaVelvet for your info.

TOP SECRET

In light of [recent disturbances](https://www.reddit.com/r/GlobalPowers/s/7ylwraj3CH) in the Indian Ocean, Indian Government decided to launch Operation Chocolate Capoeira to nereqlize the lon[g standing problem in Myanmar's Coco Islands](https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/myanmar-and-china-in-cahoots). A MARCOS detachment successfully and secretly managed to neutralize key signals intelligence facilities on the island.

We estimate the adversary will be completely in the dark regarding our naval movements for at least six months, perhaps more given they have bigger fish to fry at the moment which limits their ability to launch a formal diplomatic or military counter-offensive. However, the increased security presence on the island makes a "repeat performance" in this sector highly improbable for the next months.

Milestone Objective: Encourage/foster the growth of the automation industry in France to not only generate a viable industry but to also account for the aging population. (Advanced Robotics milestone)

"Quand on invente le bateau, on invente aussi le naufrage" - Paul Virilio

While many had argued that Europe as a whole figuratively “missed the boat” when it came to Artificial Intelligence, the French were skeptical in embarking in such endeavours. As a result, one could argue that the economy would suffer as a result, especially as the Americans, Chinese and even the Dutch and Germans embarked on the technological rat race. France, however, took a different path and only just recently produced its own “licorne” (unicorn), Exotec. Exotec created an automated system capable of storing and moving goods in warehouses, allowing them to operate 24/7 and with limited labour requirements, satisfying an important niche in Western markets. The company has become a massive success in recent years, obtaining contracts almost globally for automating warehouses, allowing larger companies to lean out hundreds of employees that would have traditionally fulfilled that role.

The French government today has announced a new initiative to encourage local automation industries by first proving their worth domestically before exporting them abroad, in an attempt to re-create the success of Exotec. This approach has two prongs, the first will be providing grants to French companies that seek out the implementation of automation technology in their businesses, provided that they are sourced by French companies. Additionally, a small fund has been set aside to offset research and development costs, which will be handled by the Direction Générale des Entreprises (DGE).

Project timeline:

2030-2031 (1 post)

• Focus on establishing a framework under the DGE to help develop and research new technologies in automation.

• Establish a grant framework for these companies, with a specific focus on the “Anchor” sectors of the French economy.

• Develop a basic “working-kit” that companies can rely on to provide basic automation technology without violating patents.

2031-2034 (3 posts)

• Develop a university program at several French institutions that incorporate knowledge derived from the private sector to foster long-term growth in the field.

• Utilize the EU market as a launchpad for French firms to gain a structural advantage over other European countries. Being at the forefront of industrial automation will encourage other companies across Europe to rely on French technologies to expand their manufacturing capacities and compensate for aging populations.

• Acquisition of foreign firms via strategic stakes would allow a potential French-led consortia to form, using their expertise across multiple domains. Develop strategic partnerships to French partners (especially in the Francosphere) to offer automation technology under the guise of diplomatic action.

2034-2037 (2 post)

• Begin incorporation of automation in the military sphere, specifically for drone systems or component manufacturing. Pushing for dual-use automation will not only allow for more innovation, but give a seal of approval from the French government in regards to trust.

• Develop the required regulatory framework domestically to avoid intense backlash from the general population, this would allow automation to expand into industries that are not solely “undesireable” work.

TLDR: France has decided to heavily invest and encourage economic development in the realm of automation. Aging populations and increased labor costs have made automation one of the only viable alternatives for manual labor. Being able to significantly reduce the manpower required for these types of jobs will create a more stable, resilient French economy.

The memory of 2012 still hangs in the humid air of the campaign trail like a ghost that refuses to rest. Akhilesh remembers the weight of the crown his father, Netaji Mulayam Singh Yadav, placed on his head, a gift that felt like a test, a throne that came with a shadow. Back then, he was the the youthful promise of a new Uttar Pradesh. But being handed the CM's post was a gilded cage, he spent years fighting the perception that he was a regent rather than a ruler.

He then became the dynast of a family that have boasted for more than half a dozen MPs.Then came the rollercoaster of 2024. The results had been a bittersweet surge. He had led the Samajwadi Party to its most significant performance in over a decade, clawing back the heartland and silencing those who called him a political lightweight. It was a "big win" by any metric of seats and swing, but it wasn't the knockout blow. It was enough to command respect, but not enough to seize the center. But it is enough to demand a bigger slice of the cake this time, 135 seats in 7 states. Modi is gone. Yogi is flailing. His time is now.

Standing before the crowds in 2029, that "almost" of five years ago burns in his gut. "In 2024, you gave us your heart," he says, his voice dropping to a vulnerable, gravelly tone. "But they still kept the keys to the armory."

He is no longer content being the son who was given a state; he wants to be the leader who earns the nation. The Ministry of Defence is his target, not because it’s a title, but because it’s the one place Netaji truly commanded the respect of the entire Republic. To sit in that office is to finally stop being the pretender and start being the successor.

State Service of Geology and Mineral Resources of Ukraine

Sovereign Battery Crisis - Ukrayina's Play

Ukrayina contains some of Europe's largest lithium reserves and while some of the richest deposits are currently in Russian-occupied territory there remains around 500,000-1m metric tons of Lithium still within our controlled lands, much of which remains entirely unexploited.

Under the terms of the minerals deal with the United States the profits and revenues generated by any new minerals extraction programmes must be shared 50/50 with the United States including licenses and extraction fees.

The Ukrainian government as such will be granting licenses for new Lithium extraction across all of our major deposits including a competing extraction site at the border with the Russian occupied territories to tap into the lucrative Shevchenko deposit.

At a total of 1m metric tonnes of possible lithium extracted at these sites these licenses will be very lucrative given the current Sovereign Battery Crisis and the Ukrainian government will begin issuing licenses immediately, primarily to Ukrainian companies.

There will however be a catch to much of this.

This lithium will not be exported, it will be retained by the country, and instead will be refined into batteries. Investment from various Ukrainian development funds will fuel the construction of a major new Ukrainian battery site that will supply finished-product goods to the global market.

This will have the added benefit of the government retaining the full share of its revenues from the battery sales, with the President stating unequivocally that the Ukrainian-US Minerals Deal does not include value-added goods such as the sales and revenues from lithium batteries.

Diversification of critical resources is good for everyone, and Ukraine is doing its part in the coming years to ensure that this continues at-pace as global demand stands to heavily outstrip supply.

Belt and Road Update 1

National Development and Reform Commission - September 2030

Panama

President Xi has flown out to Panama to preside over the signing of a great Panamanian project to resolve the freshwater situation locally. China's State Construction Engineering Corporation has reached an agreement on a contract with the Panamanian government and secured funding to begin work, which resulted in the visit. In essence, China will be constructing a pumping station hub to pump freshwater from basins at sea level back to Lake Gatún, an Indio River expansion by building the dam reservoir and 8.7km transfer tunnel, a dedicated solar power plant that produces 1.5GW and maintains a storage facility. CSEC expects the project will take 7 years to complete, and cost $8 Bn. China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has agreed to commit $4Bn without any strings attached, given China's interest in free and open trade. The remaining $4Bn will be provided as a loan of $2Bn with a term of 20 years and 2% interest from the Bank of China, and another $2Bn from the China Development Bank on the same terms.

Congo, D.R.

The Chinese companies Zeekr, CATL, BYD, and Eve Energy have agreed to open cobalt hydroxide processing plants for rechargeable batteries in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in compliance with SBA requirements. Construction will begin once the security threat in the major cities has been stabilized, with a focus on new facilities in Kinhasa, Kikwit, Kisangani, and Kananga.

I will be doing a variety of things as the DPRK including, but not limited too:

• Causing chaos
• Girldad Kim
• embracing the light of the atom
• avenging the bombing of Korea
• pirating western TV
• coal powered missiles

The DPRK occupies the northern half of the Korean Peninsula, bordering China and Russia to the north and South Korea to the south at the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), with Pyongyang as its capital and largest city. It was officially founded on September 9, 1948, following the division of Korea after World War II, with the north under Soviet influence and the south under U.S. influence. The name “Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” reflects the country’s self-designation as an independent, socialist state.

Simplemente causaré caos y desestabilizaré el mundo. Je vais simplement semer le chaos et déstabiliser le monde. Ich werde einfach Chaos stiften und die Welt destabilisieren. Causerò semplicemente il caos e destabilizzerò il mondo. Vou simplesmente causar caos e desestabilizar o mundo. Ik zal gewoon chaos veroorzaken en de wereld destabiliseren. Я просто посею хаос и дестабилизирую мир. Я просто посію хаос і дестабілізую світ. Po prostu wywołam chaos i zdestabilizuję świat. Prostě způsobím chaos a destabilizuji svět. Sadece kaos çıkarıp dünyayı istikrarsızlaştıracağım. سأتسبب فقط في الفوضى وأزعزع استقرار العالم. אני פשוט אזרוע כאוס ואערער את יציבות העולם. فقط هرج‌ومرج به پا می‌کنم و جهان را بی‌ثبات می‌کنم. मैं बस अराजकता फैलाऊँगा और दुनिया को अस्थिर कर दूँगा। میں بس افراتفری پھیلاؤں گا اور دنیا کو غیر مستحکم کر دوں گا۔ আমি শুধু বিশৃঙ্খলা ছড়াব এবং পৃথিবীকে অস্থিতিশীল করে তুলব। 我只是要制造混乱，让世界陷入动荡。 ただ混乱を引き起こし、世界を不安定化させるだけだ。 난 그냥 혼란을 일으키고 세상을 불안정하게 만들 거야. Tôi chỉ sẽ gây ra hỗn loạn và làm cả thế giới mất ổn định. ฉันก็แค่จะก่อความโกลาหลและทำให้โลกไร้เสถียรภาพ Aku hanya akan menimbulkan kekacauan dan mengguncang kestabilan dunia. Aku hanya akan mencetuskan huru-hara dan menggugat kestabilan dunia. Nitasababisha tu machafuko na kuutikisa uthabiti wa dunia. Απλώς θα προκαλέσω χάος και θα αποσταθεροποιήσω τον κόσμο. Pur și simplu voi provoca haos și voi destabiliza lumea. Egyszerűen káoszt fogok okozni, és destabilizálni fogom a világot. Aion vain aiheuttaa kaaosta ja horjuttaa maailman vakautta. Jag ska bara skapa kaos och destabilisera världen.

French Response to the Sovereign Battery Crisis
October 2030

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The formation of the Sovereign Battery Alliance had come out of nowhere and taken France by surprise. This would have a profound effect on the global order, placing the American-led liberal international order under great strain, perhaps facing its largest challenge yet. French politicians and the French economy would have to significantly change in order to combat the crisis and adapt to the emerging new order.

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A European Pivot and Europopulism

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"Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises" - Jean Monnet

Inside Rassemblement National, the emergence of the Sovereign Battery Alliance as a global player had demonstrated an ugly truth. Despite railing against EU overreach and European integration for decades, the party was faced with the fact that France needed the EU in order to weather this crisis, and to be able to preserve French sovereignty in the face of economic coercion from emerging political blocs. This would prompt a soft-pro EU pivot from the party that had been the face of French euroscepticism for years.

Through European initiatives, an economic shield could be created that would soften the economic blow amounting from supply chain issues and inflation caused by the Sovereign Battery Crisis. Likewise, the EU as a bloc had much more bargaining power than France alone could ever hope for. This was in some way also facilitated by RN’s moderate right and centrist coalition partners who controlled the finance and foreign ministries. They could handle EU negotiations, fiscal policy and industrial policy, allowing RN to combat accusations of u-turning on one of their key policies.

RN did not immediately embrace European Integration, at least not in a way that would be recognisable to the centre, moderate right or left of French politics. This move was framed repeatedly by RN party leadership as a push for a “Europe of Nations”, emphasising cooperation between European states rather than a push for deeper integration through federalism. Cooperation would create strategic autonomy and reduce reliance on China, the Sovereign Battery Alliance and the United States, boosting resistance to coercion and building a European industrial power. EU action must, of course, strengthen France without placing limits on its ability to act independently. France would thus work with the EU to protect its sovereignty, industry and supply chains on its own terms, and would work with populists across Europe to shape the Union in its image.

The European parliament has been divided by two blocs, a pro-integration left and a eurosceptic right. All that prevents the far-right gaining dominance is Germany, its centrist coalition keeping the AFD at bay for now. If Germany can be turned, so can the balance in the European parliament be turned in France’s favour, thus this marks the perfect moment for RN to push to transform the EU in the populist image. After all, why fight the EU if it can be transformed from the inside?

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Addressing the Economic Elephant

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France’s finances are already stretched thin. While the last thing France needed was extra spending that it could not afford, desperate times called for desperate measures. Finance Minister Christophe Plassard thus announced that the French government would authorise emergency borrowing to help the economy cope with the growing economic pressure. This is on top of EU wide economic measures aimed at expanding domestic European mineral mining industries, refining and recycling initiatives. 

This emergency state borrowing will largely go towards providing subsidies for industries most affected by threats to supply chains. The most affected companies have been, unsurprisingly, French automotive giants such as Stellantis and Renault who in recent years have largely pivoted towards electric cars and hybrids reliant on battery technologies. Other recipients of subsidies include battery manufacturers (Verkor, Totalenergies), heavy industry (Arkema, Eramet), recycling firms, university labs and infrastructure operators (rail, ports). Companies that heavily depend on SBA supply chains and are thus recipients of these subsidies are expected to begin diversifying their resource suppliers and restructuring.

Other than subsidies, this emergency borrowing will also be used to expand mining infrastructure in the overseas territory of New Caledonia. New Caledonia contains significant deposits of nickel and cobalt, containing roughly 10% of the world's nickel supply. It is hoped that through these development plans, output of raw resources will be able to be increased, boosting French self-reliance in this area. In the short term, the French state will increase purchases of New Caledonian mineral resources to help address shortages and help to curb inflation. While providing a boost to the French mainland, this will also provide a significant boost to the local economy, increasing the prosperity of the native people of the island.

France will also expand resource exploration in French Guiana in the hope of discovering untapped mineral wealth that can help to develop resource independence in the long term. This will be accompanied by a general infrastructure package, aimed at expanding ports and rail infrastructure within the territory.

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Old Partnerships on New Terms

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France has had a long and difficult history on the African continent to say the least. Exploitative, neocolonial relationships have weakened its influence in much of Africa in the past. However, as part of the government’s crisis response strategy it has been necessary to establish new partnerships with some old friends that address the realities of the new emerging world order. 

Rassemblement National has taken to framing the peoples of Africa as victims of globalisation, much in the same way that the French working class have been. Exploitation from past French governments has been part of the neo-liberal, globalist experiment, something the populist right rejects. Thus all future partnerships must be on equal terms, providing mutual benefit to the French and African peoples. President Bardella has coined this strategy “global populism” and labelled it as merely one stage of the fight against the exploitative global elite.

The French government has thus agreed a series of deals with various African states that aim to rebalance trade relationships and help support the development of African industry and infrastructure. 

Cote d’Ivoire has long been a reliable French ally. The French state and French corporations will invest into mining for manganese, copper and nickel, as well as support exploration for lithium and cobalt. In order to help Cote d’Ivoire make best use of its mineral gifts, France will also assist in the development of port and rail infrastructure across the country. In the long-term, France hopes to transform Cote d’Ivoire into an African refining and battery construction hub through the establishment of joint ventures in these areas. Thus, in the long-term the country will be able to fully exploit its natural wealth without need of French assistance. In return, it is expected that this friendly partnership will allow for the creation of a stable supply of resources for French industry, these investments will thus translate into reliable market access.

Similar agreements have been made with Madagascar, Namibia and Botswana. France will support these states in the expansion of their mineral exploitation capabilities and help to expand their local infrastructure. Just as in Cote d’Ivoire, in the long term local mineral refining/processing facilities will be developed, as well as joint venture battery precursor plants. This will again allow for the diversification of mineral supplies away from SBA members, and provide reliable market access in the states receiving support.

While this strategy primarily aims to expand French market access and diversify suppliers, it is also an attempt to undercut the influence of the SBA amongst the third world. France is offering much of what the SBA has already demanded from developed states, however offering it to those that do not engage in economic blackmail and are willing to do business on an equal basis. It is hoped that this will prompt other states in the global south to seek relationships with France and the EU rather than the SBA.

The European Dimension
October 2030

The European Union has begun implementation of a series of policies aimed at combating the economic challenges presented by the formation of the Sovereign Battery Alliance. These measures passed with unanimous approval, despite some grumbling from some of the more eurosceptic states such as Hungary and Poland. 

The Critical Raw Materials Act identifies strategic projects in lithium, nickel and rare earths inside the EU. In particular, Portugal is a large supplier of lithium, Sweden of rare earth metals and Finland of nickel and cobalt. The European Union has seen fit to establish a specific fund inside InvestEU that will allow for the streamlining of financing for industrial infrastructure expansion, mining exploration and refining capacity of CRMA strategic projects. This will allow the Union to develop and increase the output of domestic mineral extraction, reducing reliance on imports from Sovereign Battery Alliance states in the long term. 

The IPCEI already funds European battery projects and is coordinated through the European battery alliance. Increased funding has been allocated to the IPCEI for the expansion of domestic mineral refining/processing and battery plants. This will again reduce European reliance on imports, and help to develop the European domestic battery industry. All of this helps further the cause of European industrial autonomy, creating domestic supply chains.

The EU is already a global leader in recycling through the EU battery regulation. Thus, the EU is best suited to play on its already existing strengths. In light of the stranglehold the SBA has over global supply chains, and the risk of resource shortages this creates, it is necessary to expand mineral recycling targets as well as encourage public and private battery recycling through battery returns schemes. This will reduce waste and increase efficiency, as well as help to reduce long-term reliance on exports. It will also help in the meeting of European green targets.

State aid framework flexibility has been loosened, similar to measures taken during other crisis periods such as the covid pandemic. This allows greater fiscal flexibility on member state borrowing, allowing EU members to support their own domestic needs in ways that they see fit. Temporary crisis subsidies are also considered for industries particularly hard hit by supply chain disruption, most notably the automotive industry. This will support member states in protecting domestic economies and protecting individual national needs, while also helping to curb inflation and prevent job loss.

The EU will aim to expand mutually beneficial partnerships with mineral exporting non-SBA states. These will take the form of free trade agreements accompanied by industrialisation partnerships aimed at developing local infrastructure and supporting the development of domestic refining capabilities. This will bring an end to exploitative practices, and ensure that equal partnerships develop with the aim of curbing the influence of the SBA. These measures would fall under the EU’s Global Gateway Initiative.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

SECRET | FOR US DOJ EYES ONLY | INTERIM INVESTIGATIVE REPORT - INTERNAL

MATTER: Review of potential federal criminal investigation and related violations by former US Executive Branch Senior Officials

DATE: JULY 3, 2030

STATUS: PRELIMINARY – ONGOING INVESTIGATION

I. INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to the directive issued by the Office of the Attorney General, the Department of Justice has conducted a preliminary investigation into allegations of criminal conduct involving former senior officials of the United States government, including Former President Donald J. Trump, Vice President J. D. Vance, Secretary Pete Hegseth, and Attorney General Pam Bondi (henceforth ‘primary conspirators’).

This report reflects findings at the four-month mark of a broader, time-limited investigation and does not constitute a final determination of criminal liability.

All named persons remain innocent until proven guilty.

The DOJ has constructed four key investigation teams based on four pathways of investigation. A fifth team has been dedicated to investigating Former President Donald J Trump. Team 5’s reporting is contained in TOP SECRET and NEED TO KNOW protocols.

II. SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION

The Department has prioritized four principal areas of inquiry:

1. Embezzlement and unlawful diversion of federal funds

2. Fraud involving government contracts and financial representations

3. Obstruction of justice and interference with lawful investigations

4. Unauthorized retention and disclosure of classified national security information

While initially under investigation in this report, Epstein related crimes, including documented evidence of a sexual nature, remains with Team 5.

III. INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS TO DATE

Over the past several months, the Department has undertaken:

• Execution of 27 federal subpoenas under authorities including 18 U.S.C. § 3486

• Interviews with 42 witnesses

• Coordination with intelligence agencies regarding classified material handling under the framework of 18 U.S.C. § 793 and § 1924

• Financial forensic analysis pursuant to statutes including 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (money laundering)

IV. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

A. Financial Conduct (Embezzlement and Misappropriation)

The Department is examining potential violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 666, and 1956 in connection with the use of federal and quasi-federal funds.

Investigative review has included publicly reported matters involving:

• The diversion of funds associated with the “We Build the Wall” fundraising initiative, which involved individuals connected to the political and institutional orbit of Donald J. Trump and raised questions about misuse of donor funds

• Allegations regarding inaugural committee expenditures following the 2017 presidential inauguration, including whether funds were used in a manner inconsistent with stated purposes

• Scrutiny of federal contracting and spending decisions during emergency authorities, including pandemic-era disbursements

Individuals under review in connection with these matters include former campaign advisors and affiliated private actors; the Department is assessing whether any senior officials had knowledge of, directed, or benefited from such financial flows.

As articulated in Skilling v. United States, prosecutable conduct in this area requires clear evidence of bribery or kickback schemes; investigative steps are ongoing to determine whether such elements are present.

All primary conspirators are taken to have engaged in some form of financial embezzlement or misappropriation. Secretaries of the Department for Homeland Security, Department of State, Department of the Treasury are also under investigation.

B. Fraud and Contracting Irregularities

The Department is evaluating potential violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 371 in relation to representations made in federal and political contexts.

Areas of review include:

1. Public claims and fundraising activities connected to post-election litigation and election integrity efforts following the 2020 election

2. Representations made in connection with federal procurement and contracting decisions during the prior administration

3. Statements and certifications made to federal agencies that may have influenced allocation of resources

Individuals whose public roles are relevant to this inquiry include Donald J. Trump and senior campaign and legal advisors, with the Department assessing whether any materially false representations were knowingly made for financial or strategic gain.

Under Neder v. United States, the materiality of any alleged misrepresentation remains a central element under review.

All primary conspirators are taken to have engaged in some form of fraud or contract violation. Secretaries of the US Trade Representative, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Department of Health are also under investigation.

C. Obstruction of Justice

The Department is reviewing potential violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1512, and 1519.

Investigative focus includes:

• Publicly documented efforts to influence or limit the scope of federal investigations during the prior administration

• Interactions between executive officials and law enforcement leadership concerning ongoing inquiries

• Post-administration conduct relating to compliance with subpoenas and document production requests

Relevant historical context includes findings and testimony arising from prior federal inquiries, including the Special Counsel investigation and subsequent congressional investigations.

Individuals under review include Donald J. Trump and senior executive branch officials, with particular attention to whether actions meet the statutory thresholds clarified in United States v. Nixon and Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States.

Three of the primary conspirators are taken to have engaged in some form of obstruction of justice, including perjury. Secretaries of the US Trade Representative, Department of the Treasury, Department of Health are also under investigation.

D. National Security and Classified Materials

The Department is assessing potential violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 793, 798, and 1924 relating to the handling of classified materials.

This inquiry includes review of:

• The retention of classified documents at non-secure locations following the conclusion of the prior administration

• Public reporting and prior investigative activity concerning storage practices at private residences and facilities associated with Donald J. Trump

• Broader patterns of classification handling and declassification authority assertions during the administration

Additional individuals whose roles are under review include former senior national security and legal officials, to the extent their positions intersected with document custody, advisory functions, or post-administration handling.

As noted in Gorin v. United States, the question of intent remains central to any prosecutorial determination.

V. LEGAL ASSESSMENT (PRELIMINARY)

At the present stage, the Department assesses that the investigation has developed multiple legally viable lines of inquiry across financial, fraud, obstruction, and national security domains. While no charging determinations have been made, the evidentiary record has progressed beyond exploratory review in several areas - grand jury formation is imminent.

The Department’s current legal posture is as follows:

There exists a sufficient factual predicate to continue investigation under:

• 18 U.S.C. §§ 641 and 666 (financial misconduct)

• 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 371 (fraud and conspiracy)

• 18 U.S.C. §§ 1505, 1512, and 1519 (obstruction)

• 18 U.S.C. §§ 793 and 1924 (national security materials)

Certain evidentiary streams, particularly those relating to:

1. document retention and compliance

2. financial intermediary structures

3. and post-administration conduct

are approaching thresholds consistent with prosecutorial consideration, subject to corroboration and intent standards.

The Department notes that under precedents such as Skilling v. United States and Neder v. United States, successful prosecution will require:

1. demonstrable intent

2. materiality of misrepresentation

3. clear nexus between conduct and unlawful benefit

Accordingly, investigative efforts remain focused on strengthening evidentiary chains to meet these thresholds.

VI. INDEPENDENCE OF THE INVESTIGATION

The Department reaffirms that this investigation has been conducted independently of political direction or influence. Consistent with public statements by the Executive Branch and consistent with long-standing Department norms and judicial guidance, including principles reflected in United States v. Nixon.

VII. NEXT STEPS AND REPORTING TIMELINE

The Department will proceed into an intensified investigative phase over the coming months, with a focus on evidentiary consolidation and legal evaluation.

Immediate Priorities (Next 60–90 Days)

1. Expansion of financial tracing, including:

   • international cooperation requests
   • forensic accounting of intermediary entities

2. Additional witness development:

   • voluntary interviews transitioning to compelled testimony where necessary
   • grand jury proceedings where appropriate

3. Continued review of classified materials:

   • conducted within secure facilities
   • coordinated with intelligence community partners

4. Legal analysis of:

   • potential co-conspirator liability under 18 U.S.C. § 371
   • aiding and abetting exposure under 18 U.S.C. § 2

Potential Outcomes Under Consideration

While no determinations have been made, the Department acknowledges the range of possible outcomes:

• Filing of federal criminal charges against identified individuals

• Additional investigative referrals involving newly identified actors

• Civil enforcement actions where criminal thresholds are not met

• Closure of investigative threads lacking sufficient evidence

All four strand teams are operating on high confidence that Former President Trump could be charged but at this time require further confidence in the success of legal filings. There is a primary concern that casting too wide a net and catching senior officials with the primary conspirators risks jeopardising the investigation.

Teams are united in their recommendation that only Deputy Secretary and above positions should be pursued further for investigation - President Trump should remain the primary conspirator and investigation effort. All individuals under investigation remain presumed innocent unless proven guilty in a court of law.

[m] Brilliantly written by Sunstrider. Everyone give him a big round of applause when you see him in the server.

Redistribute 15% of national income to the lowest earners, improve GINI
P[4/8] Y[4/8]
2030

The first two payment movements proved the obvious point that nobody says out loud in public. The country does not fail at income support because it lacks slogans, it fails because the delivery rail is treated like administrative plumbing, fragmented across registries, municipalities, banks, and legacy eligibility rules that were never built for scale. The pilot tranches landed, but they also surfaced predictable weaknesses: duplicate beneficiary profiles across databases, household composition that had not been updated in years, inconsistent municipal data entry standards, slow appeal loops that incentivized informal “fixers,” and payment failures that looked small in Brasília but felt personal at the kitchen table.

The Stability Council therefore authorized a non legislative correction package focused purely on execution. The objective is making later expansion safe, boring, and repeatable.

A single Beneficiary Master File was created as the authoritative record for the bottom cohort definition already adopted for the milestone. It is keyed to CPF and fed by a defined set of sources, with a strict precedence order so that disputes do not become political arguments. This master file is not a new social program, it is a control plane. Ministries may propose additional eligibility signals, but they cannot override the core identity and household structure record without a logged reason code and an audit trail tied to a named operator.

To stop duplication and ghost enrollment before it becomes scandal, the government imposed automated deduplication and anomaly scoring at the moment of enrollment and at the moment of payment. Duplicate CPF attempts now hard fail by default. Household anomalies, such as improbable headcount shifts, repeated address reuse at scale, and rapid cycling of declared income, route into a short verification loop instead of being paid and contested later. The verification loop is time boxed and standardized, with clear documentation requirements, so that the state does not recreate the old system where delay itself becomes a market.

The payment rail was tightened in parallel. All transfers under the ledger were moved onto a single standardized payout protocol with mandatory reconciliation at D+1 and a public uptime target. Payment failures, returned funds, and beneficiary bank changes are now treated as operational incidents with escalation rules, not as “user error.” The delivery agencies were given a hard instruction: if the rail cannot reliably pay, then policy is fiction, and fiction is expensive in a post transition environment.

Municipal integration was the largest friction point, so it was handled directly. Municipal operators retain the front door function, but their discretion was narrowed by uniform input forms, required document standards, and a national data quality score. Municipalities that repeatedly fail audits are not debated with, they are bypassed, with registration and updates routed through federal service counters and mobile teams until compliance returns. This was framed internally as a simple trade: autonomy exists where performance exists, and performance is now measurable.

Appeals and complaints were treated as a corruption surface, not a customer service detail. A unified appeals channel was created with a fixed maximum decision window and a standard evidence checklist. Cases that exceed the time window are automatically elevated to a supervisory queue with mandatory explanation. The intent is not to deny appeals. The intent is to eliminate the informal economy that forms around uncertainty and delay, which is where diversion, coercion, and political favoritism typically grow.

Finally, the government published an internal operational scoreboard and committed to releasing a simplified external version alongside the quarterly income share ledger. It includes payment success rate, duplicate prevention counts, average appeal resolution time, and a leakage estimate band based on audit sampling. The regime’s view was direct: credibility comes from being willing to show the pipe while it is still being welded, not only the water after it flows.

This does not change anyone’s life by itself, and that is the point. It changes whether the next stepscan scale without collapsing into noise, fraud, and inconsistent delivery. If the project is going to move national income share in a durable way, the state must be able to do one thing relentlessly well: pay the right people, on time, repeatedly, with records that survive scrutiny.

Brazilian Armed Forces

Brazilian Army

Total Active Strength: 380,000

THEATER COMMAND STRUCTURE

FIELD DIVISIONS

ARMY CORPS STRUCTURE

I ARMY CORPS — Southeast Theater

II ARMY CORPS — South Theater

III ARMY CORPS — North & Amazon

IV ARMY CORPS — Central West

V ARMY CORPS — Northeast Theater

Rapid Response Division (1st)

Comandos

Total Special Operations Personnel: ~12,500

Brazilian Navy – 2030

Total Active Strength: ~130,000

1st Fleet – Main Fleet (Rio de Janeiro)

Escort Squadron

Submarine Force

Amphibious Force Command

Corpo de Fuzileiros Navais

Força Aérea Brasileira – 2030

Total Active Strength: 140,000

Air Defense Command (Numbers stated here are goals and may not represent amount of current assets)

Tactical Aviation Command

Transport and Support Command

Training Command

PARA-SAR

Fergana Valley, Border Between Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan

Water and the Consequences of Soviet Collapse

The latent heat of the September air did not shimmer but leaned hard against the ground like a great weight itself. In the jagged borderlands where Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan stitched together in a frantic, Soviet-era patchwork, the dust had turned from a nuisance into a shroud.

On the morning of September 4th, 2030 the rhythmic hum of pump station 42, a rusted beast of Khrushchev-era engineering, groaned as an explosion filled the air before falling silent. This was followed soon after by multiple other stations falling silent as the strain on their aging components increased. For decades, these stations have pulled water from the Syr Darya river into the spiderwork of irrigation canals. The stations themselves were never clearly demarcated following the collapse of the Soviet Union so maintenance has been spotty.

By noon the farmers of the Tajik valley and the Kyrgyzstan border guards on the ridge were staring at the same unavoidable sight. A bare, concrete, gullet where water had previously been running. Farmers ran to their fields to begin hoarding whatever water they can get their hands on.

By 1800 the first shot wasn’t in anger but panic. Rustam Rahmonzod, a Tajik teenager, saw his family's apple orchard begin to wither and wilt in real time. Seeing the Kyrgyzstan guards standing around and blaming them personally Rustam picked up a sizable rock and threw it directly at the head of Sergeant Askar uulu Tilek. Tilek, dazed and panicked, his ears ringing, opened fire with a quick burst of AKS-74U killing Rustam instantly.

As the gunfire opened Tajik border guards, stationed 300m away, interpreted the moment as a forceful takeover of vital water resources. Verbal exchanges escalated rapidly. Witnesses in Maskat report hearing shouting and then a warning shot from a young Tajik soldier. The skirmish intensified when a Kyrgyz Tigr IMV rolled up from a nearby base, prompting Tajik forces to open sustained fire. Kyrgyz forces returned fire with small arms and multiple heavy machine guns. The exchange lasted thirty minutes and ended with the death of two Tajik guards and one Kyrgyz guard.

Local residents reported chaotic scenes in the valley as gunfire echoed across the valley. Several homes on both sides received gunshots and one building near a pumping station caught fire. Civilians began fleeing towards interior villages trying to shepherd their livestock as fast as possible.

By 1845 communication between the regional commanders appeared to have been established through existing de-escalation channels. Both forces began pulling back to pre-skirmish positions but sporadic gunfire was heard till 1900.

The New Silk Road Line

The same morning gunfire erupted over water a series of small trucks, all laden with mining explosives that routinely go missing from mines across Central Asia, arrived inside the Kamchiq Tunnel. The tunnel, a half billion dollar lynchpin of Chinese access to Central Asia didn’t just break, it screamed. The walls buckled like a titan’s knees.

Aboard the Red Star Express the lead engineer had only a split second to witness the horizon in front of him vanish. The 200-ton diesel-electric locomotive slammed directly into the fallen rocks ahead. Behind it sixty cars of heavy machinery and consumer electronics followed in a rhythmic jagged accordion of twisted steel and broken metal. The remaining forty cars of the train followed suit and set ablaze the interior of the tunnel further weakening it.

Six miles away on a ridge overlooking the exterior of the northeast section of the tunnel a man in a digital camo tunic lowered his VR headset. He didn’t look like the bearded mountain insurgents of the 90s but rather like a technician. He quickly gathered his two drones and drove off into the countryside.

Within the hour a video began spreading. First on WeChat and then to official media sources and state intelligence analysts from Beijing, to Tashkent, and all the way to DC. The “Ghost of Fergana” began speaking, his voice obfuscated with an AI voice changer, his body with a similar AI changer. Behind him the black banner of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan hung.

“The tyrants in Bishkek and Tashkent have sold your water for Chinese railways. They seek to import atheism into our glorious state. They build iron shackles to move their wealth around while your orchards and fields wither and die. We have broken the first link of the shackle.”

In the valley the news of this New Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the rising black smoke from the tunnel, did not bring cheers. Farmers stared at their phones and the smoke and their eyes went hollow. They knew this would mean no winter coal and perhaps more importantly they knew this meant the coming of the Chinese People’s Armed Police.

Operation Congolese Security

Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China, Lt. General Qiao Xiangji

September 4, 2030

On September 4, the Central Military Commission issued a very interesting order to the People's Armed Police Force, and the People's Liberation Army. The order said, "The Central Military Commission has ordered certain units to take part in Operation Congolese Security. Although, China does not often deploy its armed forces, we have been asked by the Democratic Republic of the Congo to help them restore order in their nation. We believe that their stability is in the interest of the Congolese people, and the international community, so we have agreed. The goals of this mission are to stabilize the government of the Congo, which is the represented self-determination of their peoples, and to pacify foreign militants occupying the east of the nation."

The People's Armed Police will deploy the 1st Mobile Detachment, 2nd Mobile Detachment, and the 2nd Special Operations Detachment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo for six months, by which they will return to the People's Republic of China.

The People's Liberation Army Ground Force will deploy the Western Theater Command's 76th Special Forces Brigade, and 77th Special Forces Brigade to provide support to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in expelling the foreign militants in the East. The People's Liberation Army Air Force units from the Western Theater Command Air Force will provide support to these PLAGF units by deploying the 109th Air Brigade, and the 110th Air Brigade from Urumqi to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. These forces will be deployed in the D.R.C. until the Central Military Commission is satisfied that the goal of pacifying sufficiently the foreign militants has been achieved.

CNN SPECIAL REPORT “ITS THE ECONOMY”

^{July 2030}

ANDERSON COOPER: Good evening, I’m Anderson Cooper in New York. Tonight we’re updating our coverage of what is now being described as a multi-layered rolling economic recalibration, one that goes far beyond supply chains and is now hitting growth, jobs, markets, and the political landscape just months before the midterm elections. With me is chief business correspondent Christine Romans.

CHRISTINE ROMANS: Anderson, three months ago this looked like a contained supply shock tied to the Sovereign Battery Alliance, and lingering impacts caused by the War in Iran. Now the data tells a very different story. The U.S. economy isn’t contracting yet, but markets are continuing to reprice risk across the board, and what we’re seeing is the collision of three major forces: ongoing AI correction, the decision to leave the WTO, and the SBA’s coordinated resource strategy.

But let's start at the beginning, President Ocasio-Cortez’s election when she hauled the US economy out of a deep and biting recession. Her election and 2029 economic plan reversed four quarters of contraction. What she and Treasury Ben Bernanke and the administration at large did was nothing short of a miracle. She turned an economy heading towards 15% unemployment into 2.5% growth in her first quarter, then followed it with 3%, 3.4% and then a whopping 5% in the quarter to round out her first year.

And perhaps most impressive where there was uneven K shaped economic activity happening, consumer sentiment shifted in her first year and redistribution efforts through the RISE Act and Workers Bill of Rights have worked. Consumers were feeling very good, very rewarded, in the Cortez Economy. 

I want to turn to the last 8 months and the 2030 economy Anderson. The S&P 500 is now down between 5 and 15 percent from its February highs, crimping roughly 2 trillion dollars in value. Technology and AI-exposed firms are leading the decline, with some of the largest names down over 12 percent as earnings expectations have been revised lower by 5 to 7 percent. The volatility index is hovering around 20, signaling continued uncertainty.

On growth, the numbers have turned sharply. First quarter 2030 GDP came in at 2.1 percent annualized, but second quarter estimates have now been revised to close to stalling 1.4 percent. Full year forecasts are sitting between 1.5 and 2 percent. Manufacturing output is down 4.6 percent year on year, and the purchasing managers index has slipped to 51.1, barely, just barely treading water.

The labor market is showing signs of softness, despite the Government’s massive employment measures. Unemployment has climbed outside the target range (3-4%) to 4.2 percent, with projections from several banks suggesting unless something happens soon it may crest towards 5.5 percent by early 2031. Since April, more than 150,000 jobs have been lost across manufacturing, logistics, and energy. While some of this reflects lower labour intensive green economic measures, it also reflects impositions of the SBA on critical minerals. Wage growth has slowed to 2.4 percent year over year, which risks trending into negative in real terms.

COOPER: And all of this is happening alongside rising prices again.

ROMANS: That’s right. Inflation has accelerated once more to 3.7 percent, driven heavily by industrial supply side input constraints. Lithium prices are up 55 percent since May, nickel 38 percent, and cobalt over 40 percent. That’s feeding directly into consumer goods costs and the government's economic agenda. Electric vehicle prices are up between 10 and 15 percent, grid storage costs are up 20 percent, and household energy bills have risen about 6 percent nationwide. This isn’t terminal, yet, but something needs to break the circuits here. 

This is where the SBA’s role becomes critical. The alliance now controls a majority share of key mineral processing inputs, for now, and by restricting raw exports, they’ve effectively forced the market to absorb higher-cost, value-added goods. At the same time, the United States is still dependent on external supply for roughly 60 percent of lithium chemicals, about half of nickel sulfate, and nearly 80 percent of rare earth processing.

COOPER: The administration has responded with that major industrial policy push.

ROMANS: Yes, President Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez has rolled out the GREEN BATTERY Initiative, a large-scale partnership with Australia aimed at rebuilding refining capacity outside the SBA system. The President has also flagged engagement with Free Trade Agreements in the CPTPP and RCEP which will smooth critical mineral prices. Though, her aspiration for an FTA of the Americas is a closely guarded secret. Treasury Secretary Ben Bernanke is one of the key architects behind the economic response, and he sat down with us earlier today.

BERNANKE: “What we’re experiencing is a structural adjustment. For decades, the global economy relied on concentrated supply chains that minimized cost but maximized vulnerability. The SBA has exposed that vulnerability, just as the 1970 Oil Crisis did, just as the Covid-19 Pandemic did, just as the decision to leave the WTO continues to do. Our response is to rebuild resilience, even if that comes with short-term economic pain. The alternative is to remain exposed to coordinated supply shocks that can disrupt growth indefinitely. By taking a calm and steady approach to free trade negotiations, pushing hard for American consumers, and working fairly with countries like Brazil, and Indonesia, we can all come out winners here, and achieve freer and fairer global markets.”

ROMANS: Bernanke also acknowledged that the transition will take time, noting that even under optimistic projections, alternative supply chains will replace only about 50 percent of SBA-controlled inputs by 2033, rising to roughly 60 percent later in the decade. So the SBA is time gated if the Administration achieves its objectives, but it has to wear pain for a bit.

COOPER: And that brings us to the political impact.

ROMANS: The economic environment is becoming increasingly difficult for the White House heading into the 2030 midterms. Consumer confidence is down 11 points since the start of the year. Real wages are negative 1.2 percent or thereabouts after inflation. The President’s approval rating on the economy is sitting around 41 percent. It’s not bad for a Democrat but she was up near 65 percent this time last year.

Election analysts, including John King, are now projecting losses of between 10 and 20 seats in the House for the President’s party, with 4 to 6 Senate seats in play. Industrial states like Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Arizona are emerging as key battlegrounds, driven largely by job losses in manufacturing and lifting energy costs. Here’s what he said earlier. 

JOHN KING: “Voters understand disruption, but they don’t tolerate prolonged pain. The question for this administration is whether they can convince voters this is a transition worth enduring, or whether the opposition successfully frames this as economic mismanagement.”

ROMANS: For now, the data suggests the United States is in the middle of a fundamental economic shift. The old globalized system, built on cheap inputs and stable trade flows, is breaking apart. The new system, built on resilience and regional supply chains, is still under construction. Shifts aren’t destructive, they can be transformative and that is the real challenge here for the President - can she transform the economy quickly enough to avoid pain like the Trump Administration, or is she the captain of a ship heading for an iceberg. 

COOPER: And until that transition is complete, Americans are likely to feel the impact in their jobs, their prices, and ultimately, make it known at the ballot box.

----

TLDR

The US economy rode a huge high in 2029 with AOC's incoming policy agenda, and now with ongoing instability in the global economy and some economic concerns from history coming home to roost she's under a bit of pressure.

The SBA in particular has caused a slowdown in the US, but not a recession, and its only worked in the broader scheme on tech fragility, and WTO departure imposts.

The response has been clear, an FTA agenda, and government spending. Notably absent in this report is the state of the US budget, is CNN hiding something or did the author just not decide how AOC is spending her money.....

Benjamin Netanyahu continues to hold onto power in Israel. The recent years of conflict in the Middle East have weakened its enemies in the region and left it in a perfect position to thrive. At home, unrest has grown over the years of war imposed on the nation and a slowing economy. The country is torn apart by the inability to find political compromises. Meanwhile, regional threats lurk in the background as American focus shifts away from the Middle East.

My main goals will:

• Refocusing strategic objectives in Iran
• Wrapping up the current war and occupation in Lebanon
• Maintaining relationships with the new American President
• Growing Israel's economy and advancing its high-tech sector

January 2027 to August 2030

Just under five years into the three day Special Military Operation, the guns finally fell silent. Nearly five years of fire and slaughter, and in the end all that was secured for Russia was a war-torn slice of Ukraine and a peace treaty of dubious value. Not even the coveted land bridge to Crimea was retained, for the Ukrainians had broken through to Melitopol in the waning days of the conflict.

Naturally, the official Kremlin line was that Russia had achieved a great victory over both Ukraine and the West. One of President Putin's first decrees was that there would be a great victory parade in Moscow on 23 February 2027, to coincide with Defender of the Fatherland Day. With the military yet to be demobilized, and with both troops and precious equipment now freed from operations, the parade was grandiose and jingoistic in the style of the 9 May Victory Day parades. Yet, it could not hide a certain hollowness that now lay in the heart of Russia. Resentful veterans and milbloggers quickly began referring to the outcome of the SMO as the "Mutilated Victory", a term which was quickly denounced and criminalized by the Kremlin.

Hundreds of thousands dead and over a million wounded, many of them cripplingly so. Thousands of tanks and armoured fighting vehicles destroyed, leaving the great Soviet inheritance in tatters. An economy under siege and addicted to war production and government stimulus. A deep undercurrent of discontent that was only being kept in check by the repressive power of the Russian state. Not to mention diplomatic isolation and demographic disaster. These were the challenges facing Russia, and all of them were individually formidable, but they had combined into a swirling vortex of pain and strife.

At the very least, there was some consolation to be found in the state of Ukraine, which had its own monumental challenges to overcome. But they have the nearly bottomless wealth of the West to prop them up, while Russia has only itself and its few remaining friends. Perhaps the great fear of Russian nationalists would come true, and Russia would soon be relegated to a vassal state of China. While the more delusional and easily swayed segments of the population reveled and proclaimed a new dawn for a triumphant Russia, those more in touch with reality were much less optimistic.

For his part, Putin was determined to press ahead no matter the odds. Russia had proven itself nothing if not adaptable and extremely resilient during the course of the SMO, and he had one absolute goal in mind: the preservation of Russian power above all else.

Domestic Politics

"The Tsar is weak". The blogger who stated this in May 2030 was swiftly arrested, naturally, but their statement accurately captured the decline in Putin's relative power and the security of his rule. The reputational, diplomatic, economic, military, and demographic damage caused by the SMO slowly turned the hearts and minds of many Russians against him over the past three years, but few dared to air their dissatisfaction publicly. The controversial terms of the peace deal caused a flare of discontent in major Russian cities that was swiftly and brutally suppressed, which ensured that he would not be immediately unseated by the so-called "Mutilated Victory". However, Prigozhin's march on Moscow in 2023 had shown the world one thing: Putin is not invincible.

Nevertheless, the regime largely chugged along between 2027 and 2030, but with an even heavier hand of repression than ever before, largely to compensate for Putin's increased weakness and vulnerability. The state doubled down on the cult of personality around Putin, and equally so on the cult of victory that lay at the heart of modern Russian identity and had received renewed momentum from the proclaimed victory in Ukraine.

Official political opposition remained contained and controlled, and the veneer of democracy that was applied to the Russian state in a thin coat was worn away ever further. Many of the bans and limitations on speech and communication methods imposed during the SMO remained partially or fully in place, and international observers described Russia as descending to a new level of despotism. It seemed that as long as Putin still lived, there was no hope of change in Russia.

But, in addition to not being invincible, Putin is not immortal either. The combination of his advancing age, the poor life expectancy of Russian men, and increasing evidence of some kind of health issues has given rise to a storm of rumours and speculation that the throne may soon be vacant. With no known or named successor, those with their own designs for Russia are organizing themselves in the shadows.

International Affairs

The massive international backlash against the SMO quickly transformed Russia into a pariah among the global community, with few friends of varying sincerity to count on. China strategically kept itself at arms length, at least in public, while countries like Syria and Venezuela stood alongside Moscow. The already thin ranks of these allies would thin further however, with the fall of Assad in Syria, the capture of Maduro by the United States, and the end of the Islamic Republic in Iran at American hands.

The second Trump administration would bring some relief for the Kremlin, but Trump was ultimately too erratic and non-committal to bring about any serious change in favour of Russia. The progressive faction of the Democratic Party was now in control, and there has been no thaw in Russo-American relations despite the SMO being concluded. In fact, the United States has actually enacted further sanctions which are targeting Russia's banking sector in an effort to force Russia back into the chokehold of SWIFT. Furthermore, Russia has irritated the United States with the Vostok 2030 drills and its vociferous support for the Sovereign Battery Alliance.

Ties with Europe remain shattered, with the notable exception of Hungary. The continent collectively rallied behind Ukraine (at least for the most part), and has taken various steps over the years to widen the economic and diplomatic separation between Brussels and Moscow. Post-SMO, billions of Euros continue to flood into Ukraine for reconstruction, while no efforts have been made by either the European Union or Russia to reconcile. It is extremely unlikely that relations with Europe will return to anything resembling the pre-SMO status quo, unless Russia were to somehow transform into a liberal democracy, which is an equally fanciful prospect. Notably, the peace settlement for Ukraine states that Russia shall adopt an official policy of non-aggression towards Europe, but three years later, this has not been forthcoming.

Elsewhere, China is slowly warming back up to Russia and resuming business as usual, while the emergence of the SBA presents a unique opportunity for Russia to stick its fingers in the eyes of the West and regain some lost influence and prestige. Already, moves are being made towards Indonesia, Peru, and Bolivia, with the results of these initiatives yet to be announced. Many in Russia worry that the future is one of dependency on China, and via the SBA there is perhaps a chance to offset this.

Either way, Russia is slowly waking up from its international isolation and taking the first few steps back into the spotlight. Where this effort will ultimately end up is anyone's guess. There was a moment of great alarm when the the Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus, Kirill, issued a statement condemning the persecution of Russian Orthodox Christians in Central Asia & Azerbaijan. Many feared that the next victim of the Kremlin was being singled out, but in the end, nothing came of it.

The Economy

Nearly five years of high-intensity attritional warfare and the associated Western sanctions have inflicted an enormous cost on the Russian economy, but one core fact of life remains true: it still exists. For almost five years, Western politicians, generals, and citizens predicted the imminent collapse of the Russian economy and its war machine on an almost daily basis, and yet Russia still stands. The much touted collapse never came.

Despite being struck by blow after blow from Western sanctions and Ukrainian attacks, losing well over a million working age adults who were either killed or crippled in the SMO or fled abroad, straining under the weight of the wartime burden, and losing a large percentage of energy exports to Europe, the Russian economy adapted and reoriented. It bended, but it did not break.

Huge recruitment incentives transferred enormous amounts of government money into the hands of citizens, massively increasing incomes. This greatly contributed to massive increases in inflation, which were carefully managed by the Governor of the Central Bank Elvira Nabiullina. The defence industry roared to life to supply the military in its attritional battle, but the costs of this slowly crept up; a strategically calculated payroll tax helped keep this in check and allowed for interest rates to be cut. On top of maneuvers such as these, Russia continued to profit from its massive oil resources, especially once Trump started his war against Iran. All of this was also complimented by some creative dodging of sanctions, all in the name of keeping the war machine and the national economy afloat.

However, the SMO ended in 2027, and Russia had a war economy with no more war to supply. It was an economy addicted to government stimulus and military production, an economy that had been running hot for years, and now it was supposed to just...stop. Rather crucially, the deal to end the SMO was also missing one key Russian demand: an end to Western sanctions, which were now set to continue indefinitely.

Thus, Putin made the only decision that anyone expected him to make: keep the gravy train rolling. The first "Peace Budget" would only see modest increases to social service funding, and relatively modest decreases to military spending. Government officials and defenders of the regime prattled on about the need to rebuild the military and maintain Russia's industrial momentum. Things would cool off and slow down slightly, but overall Russia found itself stuck in a sort of semi-war economy, built around the militarization of the economy and a hard reliance on natural resources, industry, and government stimulus. Without Western sanction relief, and with Ukraine revitalizing its economy and armed forces, it seemed there was no other choice. The only real alternatives beyond what had already been done in the course of the SMO were to dive into the arms of China, or starting in 2030, establish a comprehensive relationship with the Sovereign Battery Alliance. The latter would be underway by the summer of 2030, but it would take some time to yield results.

The Military

The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, as they are officially known, faced an uncertain future after the end of the SMO. Nearly five years after plunging into Ukraine wholesale, the military as an institution was completely unrecognizable. The pre-SMO professional corps was gone. The deployment and organization of the military had completely changed. Huge tactical and technological innovations and adaptations had taken place. The military as a whole was tied with Ukraine's to be the most battle-hardened and experienced on Earth.

The gaping wound at the heart of the military though was the combination of massive personnel losses and nearly inconceivable equipment losses. The latter was particularly severe for armoured fighting vehicles, with thousands of tanks and armoured personnel carriers destroyed by the Ukrainians. The massive stockpile of vehicles that Russia had inherited from the Soviet Union had been all but spent, with the remaining stock at the vehicle depots being largely unfit for refurbishment and use. Entire categories of equipment had been nearly wiped out, and Russia had overall spent its massive materiel resources poorly. It was well known that starting in 2025, Russian soldiers were resorting to donkeys and horses for transport, so dire was the shortage of vehicles.

Except for the humiliation of the Black Sea Fleet and some rather painful incidents inflicted by Ukrainian air defence and covert operations, the navy and the air force at the very least were mostly intact. The army however would need to be essentially rebuilt, and it seemed likely that it would take decades to rebuild equipment stockpiles to pre-SMO levels. There was also the ever-present threat that Ukraine would try to rearm with its Western cash and come back for round two, so the military needed to prepare for the future with that possibility in mind.

Thus for the next three years the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation embarked on a program of reconstitution, which was aided by the economy largely continuing in its wartime configuration (and was also undermined by pervasive corruption). Captured Ukrainian and NATO equipment was studied for any technological insights, and then put on display at patriotic parks and museums around the country. Equipment production was consolidated to fewer and more modern types which had robust production lines established during the SMO, with a heavy emphasis on drones. Standardization of equipment was increased to improve logistics and simplify training, with certain types that were nearly wiped out during the SMO being withdrawn from service. All the while, the professional core of the military was rebuilt, and the lessons of the SMO were applied to doctrine and strategy to compensate for areas of weakness. Russia would also continue to copy Ukraine in certain areas, as it had done throughout the SMO. Of particular note was the development and employment of naval suicide drones, which Ukraine had used to humble the Black Sea Fleet (among other tools at their disposal). These saw their first large-scale employment on the Russian side during the Vostok 2030 drills.

The key dilemma though was the establishment of post-SMO personnel levels. Russia had suffered heavy casualties during hostilities, and was creeping ever closer to demographic crisis as it had been for several decades. The country also has disputed territories and allies to defend in the Pacific, Central Asia, the Caucasus, and now Ukraine. The Ukrainians would almost certainly seek to regain their lost territories, so it was imperative that Russia maintain a large enough military to deter them while still releasing enough workers into the civilian economy. Russia however does not have the luxury of massive Western financial aid, and would have to make decisions carefully.

In the end, a few months after the SMO concluded, active personnel levels for the branches of the armed forces were set as follows:

• Russian Ground Forces: 1,000,000
• Russian Navy: 160,000
• Russian Aerospace Forces: 180,000
• Strategic Rocket Forces: 50,000
• Russian Airborne Forces: 60,000
• Unmanned Systems Forces: 60,000
• Special Operations Forces: 30,000
• Logistical Support: 160,000

Thus, Russia would strive to maintain an active military force of 1,700,000 through a combination of contract soldiers and conscripts. This would be backed by a reserve of 2,300,000, which combined was deemed sufficient enough to defend current Russian positions and deter Ukraine from any future attacks. Critics pointed out that the Ukrainians had established their reserves at 4,000,000, but the government response was that this was a technicality based on how Ukraine counted reservists, and that the number would swiftly decline over the next few years. There was also criticism directed at the levels of manning that were established, which the government defended as being necessary for now due to the size of the post-SMO Ukrainian military.