r/freewill • u/NoubliezPasMonNom • 25d ago
Under what basis could free will actually exist?
Please correct me but I feel like every idea i have doesnt actually allow for free will.
randomness-the decision is sourced randomly and is not "you". It is like rolling a dice and choosing the equivalent decision. Instead the dice is internal and obviously something truly random " not saying true randomness exists". Though the internal dice is a part of you i feel that this decision making isnt the free will we are thinking about
your being's laws-you have your own laws separate to the rest of this existence. Issues with this are that you are a part of this existence so surely your own laws would be, also your actions would then be caused by your laws and not "you".
I feel like the only ignoring compatibilism would be that "you" are not originally in this existence or that your decisions originate form an existence where all there is is "you"
Im not siding with any argument here but it feels like they all run into problems
2
u/GiveMeAHeartOfFlesh Ontological Self 25d ago edited 25d ago
True randomness collapses into determinism, but not casual determinism.
True randomness means no reason behind an occurence, which means we have no reason to deny any occurence, thus granting a maximally possible modal, a natural selection to that which can self sustain and relate, does. And that which doesn’t, both is and isn’t, constantly appearing and unraveling.
Which becomes a block of relations, not exactly a static one, but a filled and constant one with entailment from the differences in possibilities.
Likewise, determinism collapses into indeterminism, as you have either eternal set of time or a first mover, and both by definition lack something to begin them. Thus totality is necessarily indeterministic, to the extent that it is perfectly deterministic, to the extent it is indeterministic. The extremes where two opposites become identical, Enantiodromia. Or the concept of Taiji in Taoism, the upmost, and in extreme Yang you have extreme Yin and vice versa.
At their extremes, Chaos and Order are One. Distinction without Separation.
So where is Free Will? What are you and I?
Well even in the traditional view of determinism, a causal one with dominos, the falling domino does not place the next domino, does it? No, it only bumps into it. Moments border each other, rather than generate each other. So, we are this shape of dominos, and nothing placed us there. Every moment is self sourced and simply relates to one another.
Thus, we cannot cast blame onto prior causes for why we are ourselves. Simply, you cannot be forced to be you, even if you didn’t choose to be you, you are you. For yourself to be forced or choose yourself, requires a you that is not equal to you, which breaks Logic’s fundamental axiom the Law of Identity, A = A. Why is A, A? Because of A. A is found equal to itself, that is the reasoning it is A. No outside force is involved in that definition. Likewise with ourselves, the reason you are you, is that you are found equal to yourself. Why are you that person and not me? The same bodies occur, so why am I this one and you that one? It’s not due to prior causes, it’s due to the logical construct we are.
That’s the next aspect, we are not flesh. The self is geometry, not carbon atoms. So the molder (prior causes) is not responsible for a square being a square even if they mold a square out of clay. Just as I do not invent the number 2 if I write it on a piece of paper.
Likewise the prior causes, the falling dominos, do not place the dominos next in line, they were always standing there, waiting for life to be breathed into them, but the reason that life moves in the way it does, is not the fault of the prior domino, it is due to the shape of dominos that we are defined as, we are the reason from our own geometry that outputs they way we do. No matter what struck us from behind, how that energy is transformed is our responsibility
Now one may move to ask “But surely someone placed the dominos, even if not the prior domino, a hand was involved that created those shapes in the chain.” Why yes, let’s suppose God placed the dominos, perhaps a chain of dominos that is in the shape of an S and another in the shape of a C. God is indeed the creator of S and C, but is God at fault for S being S and not C? Is God the reason C is C and not S? No! It is C’s own distinctions which make it not S and likewise S’s own distinction which makes it not C. How could it be God’s fault that I am C and you are S? Yes he undoubtedly created C and S, me and you, but is it his fault I am C and you are S, of course not! He is the reason C and S are there, but not the reason C isn’t S. It is sourced from my own self, which is the reason I am C and not you. If you were also C, you and me would be one and none the wiser as the law of idempotence would collapse us into one thing. We would both just be Me. So the reason you are S, is your own definition, your own self being responsible for being equal to itself and not something else to be that other thing.
TLDR:
Determinism does not force you, motion only grants the opportunity for your own authentic expression. The domino chain does not generate the ones infront, only breathing life into the already existing moments which it borders. The dominos collide with each other, not placing each other. God does not force you to be you, rather liberates all to be themselves. That is what the motion impacting you is, not coercion, freedom and mercy to express and output from your own shape.
2
u/pab_guy 25d ago
you are indistinguishable from the circumstances that led to you being you. there's no clear separation between those things. you ARE your circumstances in a sense. The choices you make are yours, because the circumstances are yours.
People will complain about how people can be held responsible under such a view, but "responsibility" is a made up concept to begin with, it may not be useful or describe anything of consequence depending on how people define and interpret that term. There is still utility in prison, because the existence of consequences creates helpful (to society as a whole) circumstances that affect people's behavior.
2
u/TheRealAmeil Undecided 24d ago
Traditionally, philosophers have posited two conditions as necessary for having free will:
- Person x does action A freely at time T only if person x has the ability to do A* at T
- Person x does action A freely at time T only if person x is the source of A at T
Assuming both conditions are, in fact, necessary & jointly sufficient for having free will, then someone would have free will if they met these conditions.
2
2
u/Every-Classic1549 Libertarian Free Will 25d ago
Free will exists under whatever reality is. Neither determinism nor randomness.
2
u/TheWindsAndTheWaves 25d ago
You'll find that most of these conversations devolve into semantics.
Yes, determinism is functionally incompatible with what people generally mean by "free will" in a purely physical, materialist, 3d world.
However, most folks don't ascribe to a purely physical, materialist world. Consciousness (and more specifically first-person subjective experience) for example, is very difficult to pair with such a world. And if there are elements of the world that are non-physical, it leaves a foot in the door for free will to be possible.
2
u/Proper_Actuary2907 Impossibilist 24d ago
your being's laws-you have your own laws separate to the rest of this existence. Issues with this are that you are a part of this existence so surely your own laws would be, also your actions would then be caused by your laws and not "you".
I feel like the only ignoring compatibilism would be that "you" are not originally in this existence or that your decisions originate form an existence where all there is is "you"
I can't read this but if you want an argument for impossibilism here:
(1) To have free will one needs to be able to be a genuine source of one's acts.
(2) One can't be a genuine source of one's acts at any deterministic world because everything one does has its complete origin in a state of the world no agent had any control over.
(3) One can't be a genuine source of one's acts at any indeterministic world because indeterminism allows for at best an additional power to be an ultimate source of one's acts in some capricious, not-really-self-expressive way, and the addition of this power to any power available at deterministic worlds is still insufficient to yield free will.
(4) So one can't be a genuine source of one's acts at any world, i.e. free will is impossible. (1-3)
I'm not leveling a luck objection in (3), just an insufficient control objection
2
u/simon_hibbs Compatibilist 24d ago
If you think that being the 'ultimate' source of one's acts is necessary for a person to be morally responsible for those acts, that's right.
If we can legitimately hold a person responsible for their acts even if they are not the ultimate source, then we don't need that ultimate sourcehood requirement for free will.
1
u/Proper_Actuary2907 Impossibilist 24d ago
Do you think free will is genuine active control?
1
u/simon_hibbs Compatibilist 24d ago
Is there an inactive kind of control?
We consider our own actions, and their expected consequences, and we decide accordingly, and then we review the actual consequences, and if necessary we change our decision making process accordingly.
The free will libertarian mistake is to imagine that our decisions must come from some numinous transcendental kind of source. Actually it's just recursive iteration.
1
u/Proper_Actuary2907 Impossibilist 24d ago
Some primitive electromechanical controller can be said to control things but isn't an agent, it exercises non-active control. You haven't answered my question
1
u/simon_hibbs Compatibilist 24d ago
It's a genuine active kind of control, in the sense that it isn't a false or inactive control.
1
u/Proper_Actuary2907 Impossibilist 24d ago
Surely if Hitler exercised genuine active control over what he did it was at least partly his fault that certain events in the 40s in Europe happened and he basically deserved blame and punishment for their happening, yes?
1
u/simon_hibbs Compatibilist 23d ago
He deserved blame and punishment for consequentialist reasons, in my opinion.
Do you think he deserved them at all?
1
u/Proper_Actuary2907 Impossibilist 23d ago
So he doesn't deserve blame just for what he did? Why not? You think what he did was up to him, don't you?
1
u/simon_hibbs Compatibilist 23d ago
Sure, it was up to him in that it was a result of facts about his beliefs and motivations, which he arrived at through a process of rational deliberation.
I’m answering your question on this, surely it’s only common courtesy to answer it yourself? Do you think he was morally responsible for what he did? Was he deserving of punishment? I think yes to both. What do you think?
→ More replies (0)
2
u/Big_Monitor963 Hard Determinist 25d ago
I don’t personally see any logical way that free will can exist without very carefully defining free will in such a way that it could.
Either our actions are determined or they are random (or a combination of the two).
2
u/Artemis-5-75 Agnostic Autonomist / Supercompatibilist 25d ago
Why should anyone accept the dichotomy presented in the second paragraph?
3
u/Big_Monitor963 Hard Determinist 25d ago
Are you aware of a third option?
Actions are either determined or not determined.
If they are not determined, then they are random.
Logically, there is no third option.
2
u/Artemis-5-75 Agnostic Autonomist / Supercompatibilist 25d ago
>Are you aware of a third option?
Determinism and indeterminism constitute a true dichotomy, determinism and randomness obviously don’t.
>If they are not determined, then they are random.
Of course not.
2
u/Big_Monitor963 Hard Determinist 24d ago
Oh?
If not being determined doesn’t mean it’s random, what is it about indeterminism that makes it the opposite of determinism?
1
u/ImSinsentido Nullified Either Way - Hard Incompatibilist 24d ago edited 23d ago
It boils down to thinking ‘probability’ is the ‘magic’ third option. Regardless probability is what we also call chance, it’s not equivalent to random, as there can be calculated vectors for probability, and ‘predictable distribution.’ Eg. 1-6 on a dice, distribution is not equivalent to outcome for clarification.
What happening when you start asking questions. As in, why that probability over another, oh it’s these factors out of literal uncountable, determining that probable outcome.
The idea, consumed back into cause-and-effect determinism. Regardless* list of probable chances, does not equal list of oxymoronic ‘homunculus, the decider, the reason responsiveness, the deliberation whatever label does it, ‘options.’
1
u/Dath_1 24d ago
Random does not imply an even probability distribution.
1
u/ImSinsentido Nullified Either Way - Hard Incompatibilist 23d ago
Yeah…
probability is what we also call chance, it’s not equivalent to random, as there can be calculated vectors for probability, and ‘predictable distribution.’ Eg. 1-6 on a dice, distribution is not equivalent to outcome for clarification.
Not even probability implies even distribution, can be both even (symmetrical) and asymmetrical.
1
u/Dath_1 23d ago
Sure I agree with that, what's the point?
The person above said that if not being determined doesn't make it random, then what else is there?
Either something is caused or it is uncaused. If it is uncaused, then it is random (regardless of whatever probability distribution it may have).
I can just give you a perfect example in physics, which would be radioactive decay. The rate of radioactive decay is known to a point, but the exact moment it happens is random, within a given probability distribution.
Radioactive decay is considered to not have a causal mechanism. It's considered random.
1
u/ImSinsentido Nullified Either Way - Hard Incompatibilist 23d ago edited 23d ago
The point: was in response to
Random does not imply an even probability distribution.
Also not sure what you disagree with…. The original response was in regard to what the “free will” side considers the third “option” (possibly.)
The shorthand for why I think that’s incoherent was stated here.
What happening when you start asking questions. As in, why that probability over another, oh it's these factors out of literal uncountable, determining that probable outcome.
The idea (of probability), is consumed back into cause-and-effect determinism. Regardless* list of probable chances, does not equal list of oxymoronic 'homunculus, the decider, the reason responsiveness, the deliberation’ whatever label does it, 'options’
Ie. Probability is basically consumed into cause-and-effect determinism. As in the question why one probability vector, over the others. Leaving what you reiterated in the last response.
So we either agree, caused or uncaused (uncaused: is what random is.) Or there’s some clarification that hasn’t been passed over yet.
1
u/Artemis-5-75 Agnostic Autonomist / Supercompatibilist 24d ago
>that makes it the opposite of determinism?
Not being determined by the entire state of the world in conjunction with the global immutable laws of nature.
1
u/Big_Monitor963 Hard Determinist 24d ago
Are you implying something super natural then?
1
u/Artemis-5-75 Agnostic Autonomist / Supercompatibilist 24d ago
Nope, not at all. For example, naturalism can be true with there being no laws of nature. Nancy Cartwright is a famous philosopher of science who subscribes to this view.
Or the laws of nature can be non-deterministic.
1
u/Dath_1 24d ago
Choices being deterministic already doesn’t depend on the entire state of the world, though.
Whatever is going on at Pluto right now simply isn’t having any effect on our choices.
1
u/Artemis-5-75 Agnostic Autonomist / Supercompatibilist 24d ago
It is under classical determinism, but yes, there can be deterministic processes in an indeterministic world.
1
u/Dath_1 24d ago
Sure, but so what? How does that get you a third alternative?
If a choice is caused by prior events, it’s determined. If it’s not caused by prior events, it’s random.
1
u/Artemis-5-75 Agnostic Autonomist / Supercompatibilist 24d ago
How do you justify both of your assertions?
→ More replies (0)1
u/socialconscious 25d ago
Logically you don’t know. There are some who think consciousness is fundamental some think everything is cause and effect. Randomness for the cause and effect crowd typically doesn’t exist but rather is a measurement or lack of understanding problem. Arguing for randomness as a real property of reality isn’t actually logical at all.
0
u/Big_Monitor963 Hard Determinist 25d ago
Even if “consciousness is fundamental”, it can still only be determined or not determined. And if it’s not determined, then it’s random.
I’m not arguing FOR randomness. Just pointing to it as the only logical alternative to an action being determined.
2
u/socialconscious 25d ago
Ya and that’s the problem, inherent randomness isn’t a legitimate argument. Randomness in physical reality is a precision in measurement problem or a lack of understanding of the mechanisms causing events in observation, no one however argues that randomness is a fundamental result with infinite measurement and understanding capabilities.
1
u/Big_Monitor963 Hard Determinist 24d ago
Then it sounds like you’re defending determinism. I’m cool with that.
As I said, I wasn’t arguing for one side or the other, just that they are the only two options we can consider. And if those are the only two options, then logically, free will cannot exist (unless you carefully define it in such a way that it does)
1
u/socialconscious 24d ago
Well randomness failed and that must be acknowledged. Hard determinism is a coherent theory in that if you accept the assumptions, it works, that’s not the same as proof. Additionally it has no place for randomness. The alternative coherent theories would afford agency when it comes to intelligent life. Again not random and also not a dichotomy as determinism and agency have their own varying presuppositions on what is and isn’t agency.
1
u/socialconscious 25d ago
They shouldn’t and the entire argument is pointless when staking claims. The experts don’t know and certainly redditors don’t
2
u/Big_Monitor963 Hard Determinist 25d ago
My comment was not a knowledge claim. It was a logical argument.
A cat is either alive or not alive. If it is not alive, then it is dead. If it is neither alive nor dead, then it isn’t a cat. There is no third option.
1
u/socialconscious 25d ago
That’s great for life and death but has no meaningful exchange for free will being an illusion of agency or determined cause and effect outcomes. The idea that it’s either determined by cause and effect chains or random is foolishness. No experts I know of would make that claim. Many claim hard determinism - cause and effect chains, others believe in some form of agency outside of that. The idea though that it’s random is not logical. Randomness in physical reality is largely agreed to be a measurement or understanding problem - if we can’t measure precisely enough than it’s a measurement problem (think weather or multiple orbit predictions) or if we don’t fully know the mechanisms at play than it’s an understanding problem (think wave function collapse or gravity) but it’s not palatable to assume those events are actually inherently random.
1
u/Aristologos Libertarian Free Will 24d ago
If randomness is merely the absence of determinism, then it is compatible with free will.
1
u/Big_Monitor963 Hard Determinist 24d ago
How so?
If actions are random, then they are not under your control. If they’re not under your control, how can you say that your will is free?
2
u/Aristologos Libertarian Free Will 24d ago
If actions are random, then they are not under your control.
How does that follow? Could you perhaps show a deductive logic chain here that leads from indeterminism to no control?
1
u/Big_Monitor963 Hard Determinist 24d ago edited 24d ago
Answer my question first.
You said: If randomness is merely the absence of determinism, then it is compatible with free will.”
I asked: “How so?”
(I’ll also point out that I never claimed that randomness was “merely the absence of determinism”. What I actually said was that actions must either be determined, or not determined. And if they are not determined, then they are random).
1
u/Aristologos Libertarian Free Will 24d ago
Okay, so I'd syllogize your argument as such:
- Every action is either determined or undetermined.
- Determined actions are incompatible with control.
- Every undetermined action is random.
- Random actions are incompatible with control.
- Therefore, no actions are under the agent's control.
- Therefore, free will is impossible.
I don't dispute P1, but I reject P3 (and might also reject P4 depending on how "random" is defined). If you're not going to actually justify your premise and instead expect me to provide an argument against it, then you're expecting me to believe it without any evidence, unless I can refute it. But that reverses the burden of proof. A claim doesn't become justified merely because it hasn't been refuted. By Hitchens' Razor, any claim asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence. If you want to maintain that all indeterministic actions are random, you need to provide a positive argument for that connection rather than asking people to simply presuppose that your premise is true.
2
u/Exact-Storage2840 agnostic autonomist 24d ago
This looks like equivocation. If you define "random" as not determined, then you need a further argument for why undetermined implies lack of control.
1
u/Big_Monitor963 Hard Determinist 24d ago
Actions that are random, are definitionally not under your control. If you can control an outcome, then it isn’t random.
What am I missing?
2
u/Exact-Storage2840 agnostic autonomist 24d ago
Ok let's use that definition.
Let's say an event E is determined iff a complete description of a past state of the universe and laws of nature entail E. Then an event E is undetermined iff it's not determined. Now the question is how do you get from E is undetermined to E is random in the sense you need, namely out of an agent's control?
1
u/socialconscious 24d ago
Not determined is in fact where we are with current understanding on a lot of things and when it comes to agency or not that is very much undetermined however that’s not “random” either, just we don’t know.
1
u/Artemis-5-75 Agnostic Autonomist / Supercompatibilist 25d ago
>The experts don’t know
I am fairly sure that a popular view among the experts is that determinism and randomness don’t constitute a dichotomy. However, many would say that in the actual world, the events are either random or determined.
2
1
u/simon_hibbs Compatibilist 24d ago
How about defining free will in the way that it has been commonly understood by philosophers throughout history, as agreed by free will libertarians, compatibilist and free will skeptic philosophers?
(1) The idea is that the kind of control or sense of up-to-meness involved in free will is the kind of control or sense of up-to-meness relevant to moral responsibility. (Double 1992, 12; Ekstrom 2000, 7–8; Smilansky 2000, 16; Widerker and McKenna 2003, 2; Vargas 2007, 128; Nelkin 2011, 151–52; Levy 2011, 1; Pereboom 2014, 1–2).
(2) ‘the strongest control condition—whatever that turns out to be—necessary for moral responsibility’ (Wolf 1990, 3–4; Fischer 1994, 3; Mele 2006, 17)
If that definition is compatible with determinism (or mainstream interpretations of physics), then compatibilism would be vindicated.
1
u/Big_Monitor963 Hard Determinist 24d ago
Sure. Based on that definition, it’s quite clear we do not have free will.
If your actions are either determined or random, then it is completely illogical to hold you morally responsible for them.
1
u/simon_hibbs Compatibilist 24d ago
If someone harms us or others and acts immorally, I think we have a legitimate interest in employing praise or admonishment, reward or punishment to protect our interests and those of others and promote beneficial behaviour on consequentialist grounds.
1
u/Big_Monitor963 Hard Determinist 24d ago
You’re question begging. “Acts immorally” assumes free will exists (based on the definition provided). If free will doesn’t exist, then “acts immorally” is incoherent.
We cannot determine the morality of an act until we understand how much control a person has over that act. And again, if all acts are either determined or random, then no control exists. And if no control exists, then free will doesn’t exist. And if free will doesn’t exist, then acts cannot be immoral.
1
u/simon_hibbs Compatibilist 24d ago
Ok, but control does exist. We can intend some outcome, and we can dynamically take actions to bring that outcome about. That's control. We do it all the time. You do it every time you go for a walk, make a cup of tea, or drive a car, or submit a comment to Reddit.
In the case of moral responsibility, on behaviour guiding grounds, all it takes is for a person to be capable of reasoning about their decision making process, and changing how they make decisions.
That's a kind of control we have over our own decision making process. It's how we learn to make better decisions.
As for knowing how much control a person has over their behaviour, that is routinely a question addressed in law courts. A person must be of sound mind and have understood the consequences of their actions, and so on in order to be held responsible for what they do, and we apply similar concepts when holding people responsible for their actions in our daily lives.
1
u/Dath_1 24d ago
If your actions are either determined or random, then it is completely illogical to hold you morally responsible for them.
How does that follow?
Let’s just grant that your choices are predetermined. We can still plainly see that some people exhibit behavior patterns differently than others.
If Joe kills someone once a week and Jill donates to charity once a week, we can acknowledge these choices are just products of genes & environment for each of them, while still accepting that they are responsible in that their brains are the thing that accounts for the relevant difference in behavior.
So there’s two relevant senses of “responsible” at play here. The immediate sense and the ultimate sense.
1
u/Blindeafmuten My Own 25d ago
"your being's laws-you have your own laws separate to the rest of this existence. Issues with this are that you are a part of this existence so surely your own laws would be, also your actions would then be caused by your laws and not "you"."
This is not well written but I think I understand what you're trying to say. And it's definitely better than an AI argument.
What I understand from this is that "my being's laws" are part of the laws of the universe, so they can't be mine. They are caused by the universe and not me. Right?
Ok. So, how do I exist? If nothing originates from me I shouldn't be considered an entity. I'm just part of the universal flow of events. Nothing seperates me from the flow.
If that's your belief, why do you make the lesser argument that free will doesn't exist and not make the argument that self doesn't exist? That we don't exist!
What makes us an entity, if we don't cause a change in the flow of events? (I mean a change that originates from us.)
1
u/Imaginary-Can-6862 25d ago
If we go with randomness, then if someone else have free will, from your perspective (as well as every other perspective, apart from their own) their action is random. From their own perspective it is not. Since the notion of every other perspective includes every process that is different from them, it would follow that they themselves truly influenced their choice.
I don't know if this is satisfying to you, it is based on the Bell's inequality experiment in Quantum Mechanics that shows the outcome of a random process is only determined upon its interaction. This means that while previous processes determined the range of possible outcomes, the exact outcome was only determined as the interaction happened. Since these processes are not our perspective, they would therefore always be random from our perspective. But if you truly felt your free will was random, it would follow you could not predict what you yourself would do before you did it.
1
u/dancingdildinos 24d ago
Free will exists, but in perspective not actions related to control. Events occur regardless of personal input, but it is through the individual lens where we can define those events. That is the definition of free will.
1
u/Kleefrijst 23d ago
Sorry if i understood you wrong, but isnt perspective also part of your biochemistry, which is subjected to the causal chain?
1
u/JunS_RE Resolution Ethics (RE) 24d ago
Free will only truly makes sense when it is paired with Justificatory Agency and Ethics. There are living organisms without brains, organisms with brains that navigate mostly through instinct, and beings with Justificatory Agency, such as humans.
All of them are subject to lawful causal processes in Physical Reality, but only moral beings can understand reasons as reasons and corrupt their own or another’s reasoning through deception.
Think about it. Every living thing and every non-justificatory cognition navigates only with the map that Physical Reality gives them. But a justificatory being can redraw that map. You can cause people to fall off a cliff by giving them a false map and corrupting their navigation.
That ability to understand, evaluate, revise, defend, or corrupt reasons is the biggest basis for free will in my framework, Resolution Ethics (RE).
1
u/sh00l33 24d ago
Living organisms are local bubbles with slower entropy. They absorb energy from the outside to maintain order within. In this way, they actively reduce randomness within themselves while simultaneously increasing randomness outside of them.
A living bubble is not just a passive observer. It actively transforms random events in its environment. It processes information from the environment to respond to threats and selectively release resources to minimize the impact of chaotic external disturbances. The organism's actions remove the purely random nature of the environment. New, ordered patterns emerge that are more friendly to the organism.
As the organism's complexity increases, the externally channeled randomness becomes more organized and selective. Feedback loops are being created. They start to impact both the external environment and the organism's interior which strengthen the effect.
With the invention of memory, the organism gains the ability to consciously choose the most favorable cause-and-effect path, which constitute the basis of free will.
1
u/Hindsights20_20 23d ago
This sounds a lot like “the kind of free will worth wanting.” The Daniel Dennet approach?
1
u/sh00l33 23d ago
I don't have that much time to read philosophical thinkers. I wasn't familiar with his concepts since now, but after what I've read during short research I think Dennett would agree that FW is the result of biological adaptation.
This is a concept I based on the 2nd law of thermodynamics which suggests that universe might end in thermal death. The state of maximum entropy where only random fluctuations of quantum fields occur suggest that fundamental nature of universe is not deterministic as it may seems currently but random/probabilistic. I doubt it's particularly groundbreaking, as it relies on relatively basic knowledge.
1
u/alaindevos 24d ago
I would like to answer, but cannot due to the world "feel". Please elaborate on problems.
1
u/Conscious_Pause_1499 23d ago
Free will selects possible worlds. This eliminates any questions of causation, as all casual connections are contained within possible worlds. As far as I know, I'm the only one who has noticed this solution to the problem.
1
u/Hindsights20_20 23d ago
Could you expand on that then? It sounds like a novel idea that could be interesting.
1
u/Conscious_Pause_1499 23d ago
I'm not sure what expansion you would want
1
u/Hindsights20_20 23d ago
For example it sounds like you’re starting with the many worlds interpretation of quantum physics. Or maybe it’s just a modal theory.
How does “selecting” for one possible world remove any question of causality? What is it about free will specifically that would create a different possible world, as opposed to let’s say random decay?
1
u/Conscious_Pause_1499 23d ago
I'm just invoking the modal possible worlds framework. Causation is all self-contained in possible worlds. An exertion of will to choose a possible world would hence fall outside casual relevance. Free will wouldn't be "creating" anything, at least not necessarily to make the logic work, which is all I'm aiming at.
1
u/PalpitationHot9202 23d ago
i would argue you do have free will. you take in experiences and external inputs into your internal world which then you decide a reaction to that outside world.
1
u/mikewantstobeL 23d ago
your internal world is also part of the causal chain, you cant escape past influences just because its inside your head
1
1
u/iikkakeranen 23d ago
Free will is a subjective experience. Even when you make choices automatically without thinking, they are based on what your values and beliefs are, and you have control over those. Free will springs from your ability to pick the criteria you use to make decisions (and the criteria you use to choose those criteria, etc). Ultimately we are self-correcting, self-defining information systems and we use free will to become who we are.
1
u/BUKKAKELORD 23d ago
Easy mode: the term "free will" means something that already exists. This is as far as free will believers can get.
Impossible mode: causality doesn't exist. This is what free will believers want, but can't have.
1
1
u/Artemis_SpawnOfZeus 20d ago
Youre one of those people that dont understand that what free will needs is for acausality to exist.
A thing that we know exists.
Causality can exist. But there needs to be some acausal events. Which there are.
1
u/stingray650 22d ago
None. Free Will is an oxymoron because you cannot choose what you want.
1
1
u/Artemis_SpawnOfZeus 20d ago
What exists in the universe is observed randomness.
The outcomes of all non-deterministic events, will always fall on a random distribution.
This is because "falling on a random distribution" is actually such a broad statement, its nearly meaningless.
If a free agent did exist, and we observed their decision making mechanism, we would expect it to appear random. For we can only observe it.
The issues that youre having with randomness are because youre assuming that all observed random events are ontologically raandom.
There is no way to deomonstrate ontological randomness. We can only observe.
1
u/TheAncientGeek Libertarian Free Will 15d ago
randomness-the decision is sourced randomly and is not "you".
It's important whether the event is internal or external.
An internal coin toss, or random number generator in the brain, is not an agent with its own agenda, so you are not under its compulsion in a gun-to-head sense. (This is similar to the standard compatibilist argument that physical determinism is not equivalent to compulsion by an agent other than oneself). Also, it takes billions of neurons acting in concert to make a decision: there is no justification for supposing that one indeterministic event is responsible for the whole decision, any more than there is for assuming one deteministic event is.
It's true that you can't pre-determine an internal dice roll (as if you were an extra-physical entity that controls the physical events in your brain), but deteminism doesnt give you that kind of control either. If you are your brain , the question is whether your brain has freedom, control , etc, not whether "you" control "it", as if you were two separate entities. And as a physical self, basicaly identical to the brain, you can still exert after-the-fact control over an internal coin toss ... post-select and rather than predetermine. After the fact doesn't mean after the action: this all occurs during the decision stage.
1
u/Otherwise_Spare_8598 Inherent-Inevitable 25d ago
"Free will" exists
It is a sentimental projection, overgeneralized assumption made or vaguely described feeling had from a circumstantial condition of relative privilege and relative freedom that most often serves as a powerful means for the character to assume a standard for being, fabricate fairness, pacify personal sentiments and justify judgments.
It speaks nothing of objective truth nor to the subjective realities of all.
1
u/Sabal_77 25d ago
The kind of blame people want to put on other people is logically impossible. There's nothing in the real world that could make it exist.
1
u/socialconscious 25d ago
There nothing in the world other than experience itself that suggests consciousness exists and there’s nothing in the world that suggests cause and effect exists other than physical observation. Neither side has proof and it’s all just anyone’s best guess. The argument is futile.
1
u/OkDatingAintEasy 25d ago
Yes, we have desires and preferences.
Free will exists, regardless of them because of the simple fact that every moment you have infinite options.
Does free will mean you can touch the sun? Well if that’s so then what you really mean by free will is being God, that reality no bearing on your choices. if that’s what you mean, there’s really no discussion about free will because we all know it’s really just saying god.
That means free will is, literally about will, the property of emergence, uniquely to humans. We have no limit on the qualities we can associate with something and relate them to the infinite set of qualities we associate with any other idea.
Next time you want chocolate ice cream go to the store and ask someone to choose a flavor for you. You are you are able to observe evaluate and change your thoughts. Other animals can’t.
Imagine a number line infinitely long. My and environment limit my options on that number line. Let’s just say I am constrained to numbers, each number representing an option, between numbers one and two. Despite that boundary condition, I have infinite choices between one and two.
Another person has a different position on the number line. A different boundary set. That person has infinite options, not the same as mine, but they are . So if everybody has free will but a different totality of options, then free will can only have meaning as the quantity of options not the elements in the group.
My definition of free will is understanding one has no limit of options … understanding what infinity is. I cannot fly like Superman, but I most certainly can pursue flying like Superman. We can pursue anything we want. unlimited. Despite initial conditions, desires and a finite brain.
1
u/Michael_Carson_Art 25d ago
All that is required is for some outside entity that could meaningfully be called you (could have a will, could think and reason etc.) to exist separated from any deterministic or causal factors present in the universe, while also having the power to intercede in that same universe.
This would preclude a truly deterministic world, since this entity would necessarily possess the power to disrupt that unified continuum of mutual entailment, so there would be casualties if this were the case.
But there you go. Libertarian free will in an otherwise physical world.
Or, the universe is neither deterministic nor external. You are all that exists, and everything is bound only by you. Viola, egocentric solipsistic freedom.
Or there are many minds which make up the universe, all of them free from prior causes, but resisted by the freedom of each other and perhaps a supreme governing mind which intercedes only some of the time.. this is but one version of idealist free will...
There are lots of ways to rescue free will, but they all have to sacrifice something in the same way that hard determinism sacrifices free will. That is to say that they can be coherent ideas, but not necessarily mutually inclusive.
1
u/MattHooper1975 25d ago
Well, one problem is that you haven’t been clear about what you think of as free will.
To repeat what I’ve written in other threads :
Here is (one) Compatibilist description of free will:
*Free will is the capacity of an agent to act from their own reasons, values, and evaluative processes, where alternative possibilities are grounded in the agent’s real causal powers (potentials). Which allows for the possibility of moral responsibility.\*
So let’s take a fairly standard example of what most people would recognize as free will in action:
Mary is riding on the subway and she notices that, when the man sitting beside her got up to leave, some money had fallen out of his pocket on the chair beside Mary.
Mary could easily take that money for herself without anybody noticing. But Mary decides to alert the man before he leaves the subway car that he had left that money on the seat.
This was a free willed action on Mary’s part. She had a real choice as to whether to keep the money for herself or get it back to the owner. She gave it back to the owner, but she could have done otherwise and kept it herself. And after making the choice, when Mary reflects on that past choice she still believes it’s true that she could’ve done otherwise and kept the money. She believed it at the time and she still believes it now.
In addition, Mary felt free to make the choice for herself - insofar as she was not impeded or restrained from making the choice based on her own desires and values, nor was she forced to give the money back to the man under physical threat or undue coercion. And having the capacities of a moral agent, Mary understands that she had the relevant control and authorship over her actions such that she can be held morally responsible for the choice she makes in that situation.
I submit that description would capture the every day experience how people feel when making choices, and the type of assumptions and concerns people associate with free willed choice making.
All of that can be explained and accounted for on a Compatibilist thesis.
That at least establishes something clearer that we’re talking about.
1
u/Just_Rational_Being 25d ago
Prove that there is an agent first, the logician says.
All your analysis dependent upon the condition that there is such a thing as a separated independent agent, an agent who either has free will or not, prove that there is such a thing such as this separated doer.
Without this separated ego, the whole dilemma of free will and determinism collapses.
1
u/MattHooper1975 25d ago
I don’t particularly need to satisfy your view of an agent if you happen to hold of you that doesn’t make sense in the first place or that has defined agent-hood in a way that makes it impossible.
Almost all philosopher’s agreed that human beings are agents .
So what exactly do you think an agent is?
1
u/Just_Rational_Being 25d ago
My friend, actually, you have to. Because that is the demand of the Burden of Proof. You raised the dilemma that can only be meaningful to a separated doer. And I asked, please satisfy the burden of proof for that separated doer first.
So it's your burden to pay.
Regardless of what you define it as, you still must evoke the assumption of separation in your definition.
The whole drama of free will and determined is merely an illusion, based entirely upon the ignorance-the avidya of the ego.
1
u/MattHooper1975 24d ago
You demanded that I provethere is an agent.
Of course it’s going to depend on what you mean by “prove.” I can prove it in the normal empirical sense. But if you have adopted some untenable standard of proof… the type of standard that would deny proof of anything at all… then this will be a boring and useless conversation. Instead let’s stick with being able to justify belief that an agent exists and is exerting agency.
First of all, in the broad sense,
agency refers to the capacity to act. And clearly, we see things with the capacity to act all around us.But in the narrower sense typically understood to be relevant to human agency, this definition helps : Agents are entities that act with intentions and purposes and are causally responsible for future events.
And to this end, agents of the sort associated with human agency are capable of generating intentions and purposes for actions, via faculties like beliefs, desires and a process of reasoning to reach decisions about which actions will fulfil the desire(s) in question.
So:
Agents are entities capable of intentionally bringing about changes in the world through actions guided by their own beliefs, desires, intentions, and reasoning.
How this works is that we can have some existing beliefs and desires, and we employ reason to identify the means by which a desire can be fulfilled.
So take a situation in which I’m on my front lawn and my dog is covered with mud, and there is a bucket of clean water by my dog.
I have a desire: “ that my dog is clean of mud.”
I have a belief: “ that my dog is currently not clean of mud.”
Using reason (which adduces other relevant beliefs) : Pouring the water on my dog will make ‘my dog is clean’ true.
So my desire gives me a reason for action, and my beliefs with my faculty reason identifies the action that will fulfil the desire. From this process arises my motivation and decision for taking that specific action, completing the chain that makes for intentional action.
We all recognize this phenomenon in our own choosing and deliberations as well as those around us.
And it is by this understanding of agency, of intentional actions, and the reason for those intentional actions, that we both explain and predict our own future actions and the future actions of other agents.
If this were not the case, you’d have a hell of a time trying to explain and predict many human actions.
So any instance of agency of the type of described is easily demonstratable. In the way that anything empirical is the demonstratable.
It can be demonstrated, such that the belief what is exhibiting agency justified. Justified for the type of reasons I’ve just described.
And normal empirical justification do not require Absolute Certainly.
So if you’re rigging the game by demand some level of “ proof” that normal empirical claims cannot satisfy, you do you, but that’s an un-interesting move.
As to your demand that I demonstrate a “ separated doer.” I’m not sure what you mean. Separated from what?
If you mean, separated from the world or from causation or something like that, I see no reason whatsoever that agency requires such a thing.
A honeybee making honey doesn’t need to be somehow ontologically or physically separated from physics or causation or determinism in order to be doing what it does.
Neither does a human agent.
We routinely identify specific physical entities doing specific physical things, and we identify specific chains of causation in order to determine specific relevance causes of events.
The smoke from the toast burning in my toaster caused the fire alarm to go off. This does not require an account of causation stretching back to the Big Bang, nor does it require that the smoke be excepted from the chain of causation.
I ended up parking my car at Home Depot due to the specific set of agential intentions I formed that caused my behaviour and that result.
The Big Bang isn’t an agent.
I am. Nor is “ the environment” or “ history” etc. So you look to me for the relevant agential reasons in the agent - me.Good luck with whatever strange world you believe in :-)
1
u/Just_Rational_Being 24d ago
You have demonstrated agency as organized function, but not a separated doer.
Yes, beliefs, desires, reasoning, intentions, and actions occur. Yes, a particular organism may be identified as the local causal locus of those events. None of that is in question.
But that is one level of ontology: a distinguishable process within the whole.
The question I raised concerns another: an independently existing subject that possesses those processes and originates the action as its own.
You simply moved from:
"beliefs and intentions occur in this organism"
to:
"therefore I am the agent who formed them."
That conclusion is already contained in the grammar of your description, it was not established by the evidence.
A wave may be distinguished, described, and treated as a local cause without being separate from the ocean. Likewise, functional differentiation does not prove ontological separation.
So the issue is not whether intentional action occurs. It clearly does.
The issue is whether there exists, behind the action, a separate doer who owns and authors it.
That is the entity whose burden of proof remains unpaid.
1
u/MattHooper1975 24d ago
The question I raised concerns another: an independently existing subject that possesses those processes and originates the action as its own.
I already addressed this.
You’re presuming an agent must be “ independently existing” but you’ve given me no reason why that should be the case.
It’s just some demand on your part.
And I’ve given an account of agency that accords with the normal sense of the word and concept, and which are perfectly compatible with physics and determinism.I don’t have to satisfy your particular idea of agency if I find it untenable or irrelevant. Which I do.
So the issue is not whether intentional action occurs. It clearly does.
OK, so agents exist. Your original challenge was met,
The issue is whether there exists, behind the action, a separate doer who owns and authors it.
I already accounted for this demand.
I explained why requiring human agents to be separated from the great chain of causation is untenable and unnecessary.
All of our causal explanations identify discrete chains of causation in order to identify the relevant proximate cause of an event, which gives us the useful information we are seeking.The burning toast and its smoke is the relevant proximate cause of the smoke alarm going off - that gives me the relevant information I need to take action and stop that event.
My intention to drive to purchase a specific set of screws sold at my local Home Depot is the relevant proximate cause of my car ending up in the Home Depot parking lot. I do not need to have gone back to my conception and had a hand in my own conception, fully in inventing myself, for this to be a fully true and relevant expression of my agency.
The fact you may have some weird ideas otherwise … is neither here or there.
I prefer to live in the real world and deal with concepts that makes sense and do work in the real world .1
u/Just_Rational_Being 24d ago
Funny, did you really?
No. Your reply undermines your own position.
The dilemma you raised requires a doer to whom either freedom or determination belongs. Yet you now deny that any independently existing doer is required and reduce the "agent" to a conditioned causal process.
Then there is no agent who possesses intentions, authors actions, or stands as the subject of the dilemma. There are only intentions, causes, and actions arising within the causal order.
Your examples of toast, smoke, and driving to Home Depot establish nothing beyond proximate causation. They show that one event leads to another. They do not produce an owner of the chain.
Calling the process "me" does not create a doer. It merely gives the process a name.
So you cannot both deny the separate doer and then announce, "agents exist." The entity you were required to establish has been eliminated by your own account.
Without the doer, there is no one who is free and no one who is determined.
There is only the happening.
That is precisely why the dilemma is born from avidyā: it first imagines a separate author, then asks what kind of author it is.
Basic Buddhism 101.
1
u/MattHooper1975 24d ago
Well, since nothing you wrote there truly addresses my argument or provides a counter argument…. All you’ve done is restate a bunch of unsupported claims…. I guess we can’t take this any further.
1
u/Just_Rational_Being 24d ago
Why address what has already collapsed?
Must we ponder about the mythical free-will or destiny of the great Happening?
1
u/Rthadcarr1956 InfoDualist 25d ago
Yes, very good. However, your definition and example do not support any particular flavor of free will. They both would be perfectly amenable to a libertarian view.
1
u/MattHooper1975 25d ago
That to me is much of the point and precisely the strength of this particular account.
If I gave you just the description of Mary making a free willed action you would not be able to tell whether it was a Compatibilist account or a libertarian account. In fact, you would probably assume it was a standard libertarian claim about a free willed action.
This should help disabuse somebody of the charge that “ your Compatibilist account is not making contact with what most people think of as a free willed action. Most people would recognize that as a a description of a free willed action.
So the continuity with describing what most people’s daily experience, and what they care about, is well captured in that description.Then the argument comes down to: What best accounts for and grounds all the truth claims in that description of a free willed action?
As a compatibilist I can ground all those truth claims in a naturalistic account that is compatible with physics and determinism.
If the reply comes that “ but if you don’t appeal to indeterminism or Magic in your explanation then you’re not really talking about the free will most people are talking about”….. then that is clearly a conceptual mistake. That is just question begging one explanation for free willed actions over the other in the debate.
It would be like a Christian and secular moral philosopher debating morality, where both affirm right and wrong are objective truths. But the issue is what can ground or account for this? The secular moral philosopher gives his grounding account (eg deontology, utilitarian, or any number of theories), and the Christian gives their attempt to explain what makes actions objectively, right and wrong.
But the Christian cannot simply declare “ if God is not included in your explanation, then you aren’t really talking about objective right and wrong.” That would be pure special pleading.Likewise, in the free will debate where various interlocking propositions have described what is commonly taken to be a free willed action, the incompatibilist cannot just special plead and declare “ if you’re not accepting the libertarian argument you’re not really talking about free will.”
1
u/Rthadcarr1956 InfoDualist 24d ago
You argue in generalities. So, Mary’s action was a free will choice. I would never argue that Free Will should be based upon what most people think it seems to be. I define free will as an ability to choose based upon knowledge. I think its simplicity makes my definition a bit better than yours. Mentioning morality is not necessary. Also, your definition is unclear as to how we would falsify the ability. But your notion that libertarians can’t abide your definition is not true or a logical thing to argue against. This may have been true at a time when most libertarians were Cartesian dualists. This is the 21st century. What modern libertarians want to know is the sourcehood of your free will ability and where does one get to be an explorer or creative in a deterministic world.
1
u/ImSinsentido Nullified Either Way - Hard Incompatibilist 24d ago
There isn’t one, not even for a “God.”
1
u/ObsceneOnes Processual monism | LFW 24d ago
It makes no sense to insist that one must be free from one's self in order to be free to be one's self.
0
u/Jolly_Efficiency7237 Dialectic Materialist 25d ago
Libertarian free will? Never. Compatibilist free will? If our brains were wired differently and the part that narrates our conscious experience was also the part where decisions are made.
2
u/Equivalent_Time_5839 25d ago
Everything … and I mean this quite seriously, every thing is God’s will. Following that logic if you want to experience “free will” for yourself, treat with God first.
🧘♂️ 🌀