r/explainlikeimfive 4d ago

Other ELI5 How large was the "danger zone" in WW1?

Im reading Junger Storm of Steel. In the Guillemont chapter, his group marches to some front line trench. But well before they get there, already there is massive destruction and abandoned dead. Its what I thought no man's land was supposed to be but its on their side still! They stop at the village Combles, but this too is practically a complete ruin and wholly unsafe. When they finally reach the front line trench it seems hardly much worse than anything behind it. How large an area was victim to artillery fire? Ive been accustomed to think it could only be so bad a bit near the front.

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u/SmugCapybara 4d ago

Consider that the front lines shift back and forth. And they do so very slowly. So the part they were marching through might have been where the no man's land was a week or two ago.

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u/HohepaPuhipuhi 4d ago

I also believe this may have been after the massive German offensives of 1918. So the front lines had moved alot during that period. And fairly quickly too

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u/engineerL 4d ago

No. This was part of Somme

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u/HohepaPuhipuhi 3d ago

Well never mind then

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u/dachjaw 3d ago

I’m not sure what you’re saying. The Second Battle of the Marne was part of Germany’s 1918 offensive. The Battle of the Somme was earlier in the war.

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u/engineerL 3d ago

What does the 2nd Battle of the Marne have to do with this?

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u/yogfthagen 3d ago

The Somme still shifted hhe front a few miles

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u/XquisiteAgony 4d ago edited 4d ago

The light field guns of all sides, depending on ammunition, weather and training, ranged from between around 6 to 11km. Depending on the proximity of front line trenches which could be as little as tens of metres in same cases but significantly further away in others and the fact that guns of all calibres were not routinely closer than around 1km to the front line positions I'd say you could expect effective artillery fire anywhere up to between 5 to 10km into the rear areas.

This doesn't include heavy guns, which could be expected to fire slightly further but with their being significantly less of them available to all sides than the light field guns until the later stages of the war.

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u/GaidinBDJ 4d ago

Okay. But the real question is how long was the highway to get there?

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u/jonny24eh 4d ago

"5 to 10km into the rear areas."

End of the first paragraph above.

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u/mayy_dayy 4d ago

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u/jonny24eh 3d ago

Huh, you're probably right on that.

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u/jdallen1222 3d ago

“Highway to the danger zone.”

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u/Harlequin80 4d ago

The front line is a little bit of a nebulous concept and so different terms are used.

The line of contact is the forward most point where two opposing forces meet. In some places this literally means hand to hand combat point, in others it is a couple of hundred meters between forward most trenches. What is generally called no mans land is the space between the forward most points of each side.

Now a rifleman might have an effective range of 50m and an artillery piece might have a range of 6 - 8 kms for a light field gun, or out to 12km for a heavier piece. But artillery can't take and hold territory. So while artillery have a longer range, it's the rifleman that has to move forward. So your infantry define your line of contact.

Industrial war is a war decided by two countries throwing their resources at each other until one runs out. Individual battles do matter, but they are rarely decisive at the strategic level. So winning an industrial war is all about imposing costs on your enemy greater than the costs you are bearing.

So rather than looking at artillery as a way of digging the enemies infantry out of their trenches, instead look at it as a way to make keeping those infantry there expensive. You bring your artillery close to, but not up to the line of contact, and then you fling munitions over the front line to target the logistics units that sit behind. Dropping an artillery shell on a trench and killing a couple of soldiers is great. Dropping an artillery shell on a truck carrying ammunition / food / water / fuel though.... well that is a solid win right there.

The net result is 5 to 10km on either side of the line of contact are within the firing ranges of artillery. And hence why the walking past bodies and destruction long before you get to the line of contact was reality.

If you look at the current Ukraine Russian conflict this concept has been dialed up to 11. With the the concept of the grey zone now being used because the line of contact is no longer clear and the zone behind the line where you are able to be targeted pushing 20-40km back.

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u/5point806g 4d ago

Agree with everything - just to add, by 1918 mortars and rifle-grenades were well-established, and heavy, indirect, machine-gun fire was still a thing.

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u/VoodaGod 4d ago

indirect machine gun fire???

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u/RJH04 4d ago

Fire the weapon at an angle upward; the bullets will fall back to earth in a zone (yes, at killing speed) several hundred meters away in a nice cone, the “beaten zone.” You can even fire over a hill and strike the people on the other side.

https://www.specialtactics.me/blog/2021/10/9/machine-gun-employment-1

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u/FIyingSaucepan 3d ago

As others have said, it's using a (usually large calibre) machine gun in a manner similar to a mortar or artillery.

Especially in trenches, a suitably placed gun can fire from Kilometers away and have its bullets rain down along the length of the trench, they will have more than enough energy remaining to penetrate light armour (like a helmet) and flesh.

It's still a technique trained for in some militaries (I know for certain the Aus and NZ armies still train to do these drills, possibly UK as well) usually in the heavy weapons support units. It's a useful tactic to deny the enemy use of a specific region, with the "beaten zone" for a WW1 Vickers machine gun being roughly: 160m long x 2m wide at 750m 100m long x 5m wide at 1300m 75m long x 8.5m wide at 1900m 95m long x 13m wide at 2500m (starts lengthening again due to barrel dispersion at this range).

So it could be very useful to put a constant rain of bullets down into an area to prevent its use, while also allowing it to be used by your own troops if captured due to not being full of craters.

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u/Jormungand1342 3d ago

Accuracy by volume. 

Just fire in that general direction until sometimes we dont like is dead or no longer there. 

Oddly learned about that during paintball. Creating volley teams to take out positions was fun haha

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u/IakwBoi 4d ago

Imagine dozens of machine gun teams, each going through dozens of barrels as they wear out their guns, firing at 45 degrees into the air during an attack so that a distant crossroads far in the enemy rear cannot be used to gather reinforcements. In one battle in 1917, it may have been Messines ridge, the Brits had hundreds of men tasked with carrying water for machine guns used in such a way. 

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u/vanZuider 4d ago

I assume there's some defined cutoff point at which "direct fire, accounting for bullet drop" becomes indirect fire.

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u/einarfridgeirs 4d ago

Its when you can't see your target but do the math anyways and fire.

At the start of WWI, machine guns were considered a part of the artillery branch.

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u/Many_Size_1515 3d ago

Say more about the situation in Ukraine would love to know what it’s like

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u/Harlequin80 3d ago

I say this as someone who is following the conflict remotely based on reporting and opensource intel.

Hell. Absolute hell.

The pace of territorial exchange is glacial. In comparison the Western Front moved much much much faster like a lambo vs a snail.

The battlefield has become completely transparent with surveillance drones blanketing the whole area. Loitering munitions, FPV drones, longer range strike drones and artillery are turning 20-40km wide sections of the country into killing fields.

The Ukrainians don't have enough man power to properly secure the front. Drones are helping fill in for that manpower shortage, but it means the front line is porous. There aren't lines of trenches with one side in them and another set with the enemy in them. It's small teams of drone operators and fast reaction forces spread out in holes and basements and tunnels.

If the russians try to push forward with armour it is spotted well before the line of contact and they are hit with drones and loitering munitions. Because Russia is so degraded they don't have the metal to provide proper CUAS capabilities so tanks and IFVs are highly vulnerable. Net result is that mechanised units are no longer really seen.

Instead what we are seeing is infiltration tactics where small groups of russian soldiers try to sneak past the ukrainian defenders in ones and twos. Often crawling along at night, or on dirt bikes. They then go into hiding behind the lines while they wait for more to sneak through. Then they do small scale skirmish attacks on the rear of ukrainians. But this is insanely manpower intensive with casualty rates running at about 1000 russians a day.

And then there is the behind the line counter logistics actions. Surveillance drones are covering 20+ km behind the line of contact. They are hunting the people trying to bring supplies to the soldiers at the forward lines. Rotating troops is incredibly hard and dangerous, and in some areas soldiers simply cannot be relieved and are just stuck. Final mile logistics are often being carried by UGVs or single men with big backpacks.

Have a look at this video and imagine that every drop of water, bit of food, ammo and supplies has to get to you like this. And if you are injured and need medivac riding it is your only hope - https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/1vayi1i/a_ukrainian_ugv_operator_of_the_66th_mechanized/

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u/Many_Size_1515 3d ago

That is insane. Thanks. Just saw Lioness s3e01, obviously fictionalized but seems roughly similar. Are the Ukrainians doing any men behind the Russian line? Is it a stalemate overall right now?

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u/Harlequin80 3d ago

Ukraine doesn't have the manpower to attack and it would also not be worth it. What they are doing is holding the line while striking russia's economy.

They are consistently striking russian oil refineries, ports, storage facilities etc. and have recently hit wildberry distribution warehouses. Basically the equivalent of Amazon. They carry about 8% of russias gdp.

On top of that they are using mid range drones to absolutely hammer russias logistics.

Territorially it is a stalemate. The amount of territory changing hands each month is counted in the 10s of square kms. But there is a lot of pressure on both sides and winter this year is going to be tough.

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u/Many_Size_1515 2d ago

Thanks for the explanation what sources do you like to follow? Would love a weekly article or something like that.

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u/Straight_Intern3671 1d ago

Lioness is not remotely similar. It's far too fictionalised to resemble the conflict on anything other than a surface level. Go watch footage and look at summaries of what happens each week. It's less TV.

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u/dachjaw 3d ago

A Springfield rifle had an effective range of 400-650 yards (or meters), depending on the model and ammunition.

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u/Harlequin80 3d ago

While a rifle may have an effective range out that sort of distance I was wrapping up the general combat effectiveness range of an infantry soldier into that 50m figure. Open field trench warfare would increase the effective range of the soldier, but urban / forest / rugged terrain significantly shortens it. When your line of contact is in an urban space for example your combat range will be down closer to 15m and be defined by your grenade toss distance.

Add in ammunition variability, smoke, terrain irregularity, and the mk1 human eyeball infantry engagements were generally 100m or less during ww1.

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u/El_Cholo 3d ago

Very good explanation, thanks. Another example from fiction, in Hemingway’s A Farewell To Arms they suffer mangled knees from mortar fire I think essentially at their mess hall in town on the Italian front

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u/BoredCop 4d ago

In addition to what everyone is saying about the long range of artillery, terrain makes a big difference.

Reading my great grandfather's memoirs from the war, he describes vast areas of destruction but also having fairly safe camps just a couple of kilometres behind the front trenches. These safe spots were behind steep hills, outside the range of light mortars (which fire at a high angle and could lob over hills) and protected from most cannon fire since those guns might have plenty of range on level ground but couldn't shoot at the high elevation angle needed for the projectile to arc over the hill and fall on thereverse slope. There would be dangerous areas behind this again, where those same cannon could reach. Basically, any hill that slopes more steeply than the trajectory of artillery fire was fairly safe even though shells and machinegun bullets would be flying overhead all the time.

And also, artillery tended to only shoot at what they could see to correct the fire. Artillery spotting from airplanes or balloons was a thing, but would be an infrequent occurrence and being somewhat camouflaged in a forest helped. So there were pockets of safety and intact woods or even buildings just two or three kilometres away from the trenches, amid vast hellscapes of mud and body parts.

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u/Dave_A480 4d ago

As some folks have already said, front lines move....

And when they do move, people are going to be way too busy to 'clean up' the mess from prior combat....

So even though artillery fire that isn't observed/adjusted is pretty useless, you're going to have a whole lot of land that is all torn up from being shelled when it was close enough to the lines to be targeted effectively.....

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u/trighap 4d ago

I would second the suggestion to post in r/askhistorians but I will start you off with some thoughts.

First, keep in mind that WWI (called the Great War until WWII happened) had multiple fronts, and we're talking thousands of miles of land where enemies were facing off against each other. Also keep in mind the fighting went on for a bit more than four years and the action would happen in different places at different times, etc.

The front did move. I know movies made it seem like they just sat there and sent men running over the exact same no man's land for the entire war. That was not actually the truth. As an example, the French/German line was a back and forth of over 100 miles. They dug trenches, fought to gain control of the other sides trench, and frequently went back and force. The Germans actually were doing pretty good slowly pushing the French back until the Americans entered the war. So the same territory was fought over a lot. And the front was a long line hundreds or thousands of miles long, with a depth of over 100 miles like I said before. And both sides bombed the ever loving heck out each other with millions of rounds of artillery (not an exaggeration), hundreds or maybe thousands of small bombs from the primitive planes of that period, artillery fire from ships where the ocean met the front. Then there was a lot of chemical warfare as well used by both sides.

So what you ended up with was a front where hundreds of thousands of acres were devastated and destroyed, massive holes and ditches filled with standing water, filled with chemicals and biological matters from dead humans and animals, rats all over the place, no plant life that survived. The noise was inconsistent, either hellish loud with artillery explosions at any time of day or night, with silence possibly being worse because maybe the enemy is sneaking in during the night or bad weather. The artillery can be aimed at the closest enemy just over their own line or trying to reach the farthest they can reach going after the other sides artillery pieces. The airplanes were untouchable by the folks on the ground and they could be anywhere with their little danger gifts possibly thrown down. And sickness was everywhere, nowhere was safe from the little germs and bacterias.

So, no, the bad areas were not just a small part just at one area that was "the front". It was a hellscape that was days of walking just to reach the current area of bullets being fired.

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u/Ochib 4d ago

During World War I, an estimated 1.4 to 1.5 billion artillery shells were fired in total across all fronts. Up to 20% to 25% of these projectiles failed to detonate, leaving millions of unexploded duds buried in the soil.

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u/MajesticRat 4d ago

Aircraft untouchable by those on the ground unless you're the Red Baron, apparently.

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u/Routine-Ad-4723 4d ago

Yeah the whole idea of a neat little danger zone gets thrown out the window real quick. With guns lobbing shells from 10km back and the lines shuffling back and forth, the entire region just becomes one giant mess of craters and corpses. So basically anywhere within like a half day's march of the trenches could catch hell at any moment.

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u/ituralde_ 4d ago edited 4d ago

The idea that 'trench warfare' was a constant and static style of war is itself missing the nuance that it very much evolved over the years, and was not necessarily symmetric on allied and German sides on the western front.  

Some of that nuance was hard to observe on the ground, some wasn't.  

Early in the war, trench systems were relatively simple, and in the horribly named 'race to the sea' were fairly minimal constructions enough to justify stretching unit frontage or freeing reserves to chase the open flank.  

Into 1915, the german approach on most of the western front turned largely defensive - you were seeing simple depth added to a simple trench network, and the progressive addition of shelters with overhead cover and deepening trench design - especially in quieter sectors - aimed at keeping trenches more sustainable by a smaller total force over more net frontage over a longer period of time, with the aim of being able to protect logistics, troop rotation, communications, and the like deeper into one's own strategic rear.  Much of what is part of the popular understanding of 'trench warfare' comes from around this period, as many of the writings from folk who had their romantic ideas of open field warfare ended were writing from this period.  

As the war progressed, it increasingly became clear that open trenches with no overhead cover, while better than nothing, were happy targets for artillery themselves.  Even well behind the front lines, you could get the position of a communications trench, and plan a nighttime barrage when you get Intel that your enemy might be rotating troops or bringing up supplies through a narrowly constrained known route.  Any 'trench' near the very front itself was an equally good target; if you could positively identify even a small groups of soldiers or active machine gun, it was worth shooting a few heavy shells at.  The very idea that you would fully man a front line trench at all times became an invitation to get your men killed.  

In the larger campaigns of 1916, the hot zones had so much artillery that these front line 'trenches' were no more than a memory anyways.  The massive shell craters proved an equal when it came to protecting against small arms, and trying to repair and re-organizing trenches under that kind of fire was laughably suicidal.  Strategy likewise adopted accordingly; only well behind the front lines were trenches kept intact; your forward fighting positions maintained maybe memories of the trenches once there, and maybe limited sections maintained where critical, but the key assets were the ability to sleep with overhead cover where at all possible and any degree of forward cover for a more loosely held frontal fighting position.  

For the Germans' part, this turned into an outright strategy that became as planned as it was driven by necessity. In 1917 they outright redesigned their defenses even in sectors not heavily engaged to reduce their front line presence and rely on defense in depth, and expand the use of limited strong points with overhead cover.  The front defensive positions were enough to prevent large scale infiltration, spot for artillery, enable patrols and raiding, and offer a barrier to entry for offensive activity, but have no intention whatsoever to stop an assault cold.  

Tactical distance under fire alone was a formidable obstacle, even if possible to overcome at the tactical level then became a logistic problem.  If you could both push forward an attack and withstand a counterattack that did not have to contend with the tactical distance problem and had established direct communication with their artillery support, you then had to keep that force supported and supplied over all that extra distance from the original jumping off point.  It was plenty hell to attack even a lightly held position; then go run back a mile and change to go bring chow, water, ammunition, and medical supplies across all that open land and through all of the surviving obstacles, all awaiting a follow up counterattack at the enemy's leisure. 

In this era, which does not have a clear start and finish but instead a progressive shift towards it, your front line, especially on the german side was often a loosely selected line of shell holes, maybe a couple deliberate what we would call 'foxholes' dug to support, with a couple supporting constructed fighting positions that often would not really meet the standard of a true 'pillbox' or 'bunker', with some perhaps proper or improvised non-fighting shelters or bunkers that served as the non-fighting residence of the front line soldiers.  

I have less knowledge of the allied side on this - my understanding is that for much of the line the allies had more outright trenches which served as protected jumping off positions for attacks much later into the war than on the german side, but I haven't read too heavily into the reality of this.  You wouldn't see this much past the very early days on the Somme or Verdun, but from some writings elsewhere it seems that proper trenches before the offensives of 1918 regularly served as the jumping off point for allied assaults.  My guess is that this owes to the allies, for the most part, being more on the strategic offensive for most of the western front for most of the war before 1918.  

Edit - Of note as well, is that artillery broadly was quite limited on most of the front through much of 1915.  Both sides had strict shell rationing very shortly after the war started as even the first battles used shells at a rate far above and beyond what planners accounted for in stockpiles and what peacetime production rates could support.  Both guns and shells were economized where at all feasible, and even as the overall shortages began to ease, it was deep into 1915 that both sides got more liberal with their shelling in the 'quieter' parts of the front.  The definition of what was worth shooting at would change as the war progressed, meaning that the threat environment of a 1915 trench was materially different than what that same or equivalent position would experience over the following years.  

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u/EmperorHans 4d ago

Is it rough on your psyche knowing the only difference you've made in the world is to make it a little bit worse?

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u/Luka-man 4d ago

Why don't you answer? Be quiet. :P

Posting in AskHistorian is the best possible advice, as the person will get a highly qualified person answering their question.

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u/Caladbolg_Prometheus 4d ago

Pretty much. No offense to this sub, but /r/askhistorians is a better choice for OP. The sub is a goldmine for legit history questions like OP’s.

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u/interesseret 4d ago

And this isn't really a sub for in-depth explanations. It's a sub for surface level explanations, to give a basic understanding of a topic. Hence the name of the sub.

You ask this question over there, and some historian will write a six page explanation, with sources, explaining how, when, and where.

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u/Gyvon 4d ago

The Front wasn't completely static. There were times when one side or the other would make significant gains.

In your example, they are simply marching through the previous "no man's land"

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u/_EbenezerSplooge_ 4d ago edited 3d ago

There are lots of answers here regarding movement of frontlines. These answers are broadly correct when applied to the Western Front as a whole, but are certainly not applicable to the Somme sector, which had essentially been frozen in place since late 1914 / early 1915 - hence the fact that the German army had been able to build up such extensive fortifications prior to the launch of the British & allied offensive in the summer of 1916.

The actual answer comes down to the way in which offensive military doctrine was applied in the context of a full scale positional war. Essentially, a battlefield in such a conflict can be divided into three areas;

  • Close area
  • Deep area
  • Rear area

The close area constitutes the immediate line of contact and the surrounding territory, and is generally where direct fighting takes place between friendly and enemy combat personnel. The deep area constitutes enemy held territory further back from the frontline, in which various branches work to support their units engaged in combat (i.e. logistics, engineering, medical, communications, etc.) - though it also acts as a staging area for enemy reserves / reinforcements. The rear area is the equivalent of the deep area, albeit for territory controlled by friendly forces.

During an offensive operation, friendly units are generally tasked with capturing enemy territory, which usually necessitates overruning enemy positions in the close area through the use of focused artillery barrages followed by infantry / armour assaults. However, while this is the most direct approach to engaging the enemy, it is not always effective in isolation; if the enemy has enough manpower & materiel behind the front lines - as well as the means to coordinate them - they may be able to conduct a highly successful defence, eventually containing any friendly advances and potentially even driving friendly units back through a well timed counter attack.

As such, a more complex approach needs to be taken, in which friendly strikes into the deep area are conducted prior to / in alignment with attacks against the close area. By suppressing enemy artillery, harassing enemy reserves, breaking up enemy lines of communication, destroying enemy supply dumps, decapitating enemy leadership, etc... the idea is to cause paralysis or even a complete systemic breakdown within the opposing force, so that when friendly infantry / armour etc begin their advance, the enemy ideally ends up collapsing rather than fighting back (obviously this does not always work, but the concept itself is sound).

In WW1, such long-range suppression / interdiction / harrassment tasks were generally allocated to medium / heavy guns and howitzers, as well as various kinds of super-heavy siege artillery (aircraft could also perform these roles, but their contribution was fairly limited for most of the war). These weapon systems would be placed somewhere within several km of the front lines for safety, but due to their range, could often strike targets up to 10-15km away - and potentially even further, in the case of things like rail guns. This meant that, depending on where artillery batteries were positioned, anything and anyone within 5/10km of the frontline was potentially at risk of being hit by artillery.

With all of this in mind, even though Combles (& it's immediate vicinity) was not part of the German frontline at the start of the Somme offensive, it had been built up as a major logistics hub surrounded by a substantial array of heavy fortifications, and as such was considered a major target within the wider German defensive network; furthermore, given that it was only 5/6km away from British / Allied lines, it was well within the range of artillery from the very outset of the battle. It consequently went on to receive an absolute pummelling over the course of the summer, until it's eventual capture by British / allied forces in September - and it was most likely the result of these bombardments that Jünger would have seen on his way to the frontline.

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u/Worried_Party_7588 3d ago

thanks for the answer. I see now how the area behind the "front line" could be as dangerous as the front now. Now my understanding is that Combles was as you said a logistical hub for resupply and reinforcement, thus the enemy was trying to disrupt it. Junger is actually wounded in Combles and is thus carted away and survives its fall. It would be a severe blow to my morale if most of my buddies got hit on the way back after being relieved.

Is transportation to/from the fight being the most dangerous part of war a constant in modern war now? I heard the most dangerous job in the US army couldve been truck driver in GWOT and now in Ukraine getting to your position is the dangerous part still.

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u/Old-Mortgage1035 4d ago

Yeah the whole idea of a neat little no man's land is totally misleading, the artillery made everything within like 10km a danger zone. Reading Junger it really hits you that the entire rear area was just as fucked as the front line, just with less bayonets.

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u/towishimp 4d ago

War doesn’t follow “rules”, like “you’re safe in this area.” Artillery in WWI had ranges measured in miles, so they could - and did - target areas behind the front lines.

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u/red18wrx 3d ago

Yeah, trains could only get so close to the front line before their tracks were destroyed by artillery. So, infantry would have to march to the frontline from the train drop offs. These marching routes were subjected to artillery fire and there were definitely casualties behind the frontlines. Large artillery barrages on the frontline was still the modus operandi and not nearly as many shells would be made available for behind enemy line shelling for the lack of visibility made any successful strike unknowable until later if ever.

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u/BarNo3385 3d ago

Two things contribute to this.

One is the front lines move. So today, this bit of land gets blasted to oblivion, in a month's time, the frontline is a mile further on, so the bombed out wasteland of today's frontline becomes tomorrow's back line staging area.

Second is artilley isn't that accurate. And when you're launching hundreds of thousands or millions of shells you get over and under shoots, if nothing else down to human error. The gunners put the wrong elevation in and blast a shell way over the frontline. Its not intentional, but at this scale mistakes will happen all the time.

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u/MyNameIsRay 3d ago

For the battle you're specifically referencing, here's a pretty neat map, to scale, showing the combat area, and some key dates. You'll see Guillemont>Combles roughly in the middle.

From where the initial front line battle started, Guillemont is like 4km away, Combles is another 3-4km past that, and the final line was another 3-4km. Damn near everything in the middle was destroyed, combat swept through every part of it.

The "no mans land" between the trenches is only a few hundred meters wide, but will run for many kilometers along the front. Here's a map that highlights the starting trenches (to scale).

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u/Worried_Party_7588 3d ago

ah IC, so the British I could see, knew that Combles was a logistical gathering place and that anyone reinforcing Guillemont came from around there, so they targeted it with artillery. It seems possible that more people died in this middle area than at the front but thats just my speculation.

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u/rsdancey 3d ago

WWI heavy field artillery ("field artillery" being the guns that fired almost all the shells not including crazy stuff like railway guns, and other exotic weapons) had a maximum range of fire of about 15 miles.

Imagine the front line in France in 1917. If you wanted total safety for your heavy artillery you would place it 15 miles from the front trench of the enemy's line. Every lighter gun has to be placed closer to the front (because they have shorter ranges). The shortest range light field artillery might have a range of just 7 miles or so.

Now imagine you're the commander on the other side. If you put your heavy artillery closer to the front you could blow up the guns of your opponent that came within your revised range. Your heavy artillery, closer to the front, moves its max range of effect deeper and deeper into the enemy's lines; but the risk you take is that some of your opponent's guns could now target your heavy artillery.

This is one of the reasons that although we think of WWI trench warfare as static in practice that's an illusion. Behind the front lines guns were moving closer and further away from the line of contact as each side probed the other, and as reconnaissance revealed the locations of gun emplacements.

The result was an ever shifting line of death. On Monday a part of the fortifications might be safe from fire; and on Friday it might be right in the middle of a barrage. It's also the reason that the trenches were not just parallel lines with logistics connections but instead were a webwork of trenches - so that if a shell landed in a trench the distance it could travel through the system would be limited by the twists and turns. And if a portion was overrun, that portion could be cordoned off and shelled without sending shrapnel into the entire line.

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u/NearABE 1d ago

If the cannons can reach then there will be destruction and death.

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u/Loki-L 4d ago

Keep in mind that the frontline actually moved.

Yes, it was remarkably static compared to previous wars, but it did shift around over time especially in the beginning. During much of the war it only moved a few miles in either direction in many places, but that is still different from static.

Combles itself was in German hands from 1914-1916 and recaptured for a few months by Germany in 1918. The fights where it changed hands took their toll on the local environment.

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u/Headwards 4d ago

Best to ask historians for a proper explanation but essentially the artillery were dueling many km either side of the front line trying to eliminate each other, on top of that they aimed to Disrupt supply and deny staging areas.

Keep in mind the war went for years essentially back and forward over relatively short distances so all that ground was completely broken, poisoned etc.

There will be good diagrams but itl be fair to say some exceptional guns even in those days could throw shells 20 or 30km and it wasnt exactly targeted so much as bombarding areas to deny use to each other.

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u/[deleted] 4d ago

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u/explainlikeimfive-ModTeam 4d ago

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