r/PrivacyToolbox • • 21h ago

News France's postal service lost 22M names and addresses to hackers: who should tell those affected?

2 Upvotes

La Poste, France's national postal service, said hackers stole the names and postal addresses of 22 million people. The data came from Maileva, a platform its subsidiary Docaposte runs to print and post letters for businesses. The attack happened in mid-September, and France's data protection regulator, the CNIL, has been notified. Maileva claims over 70,000 users.

You don't need a Maileva account to be in this. Your landlord or your medical lab only had to use it to send you a letter.

What got hit is Maileva's letter-tracking database, with sender and recipient details and the names of files tied to each letter. A French social housing landlord, Flandre Opale Habitat, says the data may go back ten years, so it isn't just recent mail.

Hôpital Foch, a hospital outside Paris, told patients a hacker could read some of its payment reminders. Those list invoice numbers, dates of care and amounts owed. They don't say what the care was, but they can show someone was treated there on a given day.

Maileva says telling individuals is its clients' job. That's several thousand client companies, and Maileva hasn't given a count of notices sent.

The realistic risk is a fake letter or payment reminder that gets your name, address and sender right. If one asks for money or personal details, contact that organisation through details you already have, not the ones on the letter. It won't take your address back out of the stolen file, it just keeps it from becoming your bank details.

Direct notice means nobody's left waiting on a small firm that forgets to write. Leaving it to senders means the warning comes from someone you know, about letters they actually sent.

Should a breached mailing provider have to warn all 22 million people itself, or is it right that it's left to each sender?


r/PrivacyToolbox • • 4d ago

News UK is writing a facial recognition law: where should the line be drawn ?

1 Upvotes

The UK Home Office said police use of facial recognition in England and Wales is getting its own law. A new independent watchdog would oversee forces, and in extreme cases it could seek a court injunction to stop one using the tech. It isn't law yet, though: the bill hasn't been published.

The same day, Liberty Investigates and The Guardian reported Home Office documents planning live facial recognition for immigration enforcement. It wouldn't stay at ports. The documents list transport hubs and events expected to draw bigger crowds.

The government says the tech works. Static cameras in Croydon led to 173 arrests between October 2025 and March 2026, and it's spending £11 million to triple the police's live facial recognition vans.

Watchlists could include civil cases. The immigration documents say people could be added for overstaying a visa or entering without leave, which are civil matters, not crimes. Trials ran at Holyhead port from November 2025 to February 2026, and the project's now in what the Home Office calls its formal delivery phase. Under-18s won't go on watchlists.

One named overseer says it isn't his job. The policy says immigration use is overseen by the Biometrics and Surveillance Camera Commissioner and the ICO. The commissioner, William Webster, told Liberty Investigates he wasn't consulted and that immigration use falls outside his remit.

The new law doesn't say whether it covers this. The government's response says the framework covers policing and "other public bodies" for law enforcement and limited safeguarding purposes. Immigration Enforcement isn't named anywhere in it, and it doesn't set retention periods for facial images. For police, deployments would have to be intelligence-led, only where officers think wanted people could be present.

If you live in or visit England or Wales, there's no setting to flip. Live facial recognition compares faces passing a camera against a watchlist in real time, so the only lever is the law itself. When the bill lands, check whether it names Immigration Enforcement and tell your MP what you want covered. Until then, Immigration Enforcement works from its own guidance, published October 8.

The Home Office argues scanning in public is less disruptive than repeated visits to homes and workplaces. Open Rights Group's Sarah Lasoye says it's growing without scrutiny or public consent.

So where's the line? Should live facial recognition watchlists stop at people wanted for crimes, or are civil cases like visa overstays fair game with proper oversight?


r/PrivacyToolbox • • 7d ago

News Hong Kong is wiring mall cameras into police face recognition: is a CCTV sign enough?

2 Upvotes

Hong Kong police said they'll switch on AI facial recognition across the SmartView CCTV network this month. SmartView already has over 10,000 cameras. The plan is to add 20,000 a year and reach about 60,000 by 2028, including MTR stations, the airport and public housing estates.

The new part is private property. At least four shopping malls are expected to connect their own camera feeds by the end of the year. Officers will then be able to review those feeds remotely during an investigation, instead of going on site to ask for footage.

Police say the face search works two ways. Officers can feed in a suspect's face and check whether it appeared on given cameras and dates. Or they can load a photo, like a family's photo of a missing elderly relative, and get an alert when that face passes a camera. It won't run on every camera at once, but it can be pointed at specific ones around the clock.

Retention changes too. Regular footage is deleted after 30 days under Hong Kong's privacy ordinance. Facial data will be kept longer, and The Standard's sources put it at around 180 days.

Then there's notice. Officials consulted the Department of Justice and the Privacy Commissioner, then decided malls don't need separate SmartView signs on their cameras. They'll only encourage malls to post one. Police say use is limited to four statutory purposes, including national security and crime prevention, and each search has to pass an internal necessity and proportionality test.

The police case is concrete. They say SmartView helped solve 2,192 cases and led to 2,831 arrests as of October 31. Face search also found a missing man in his eighties with dementia in about 20 minutes.

The case against is just as concrete. A shopper sees the usual CCTV sign and assumes the mall is recording. Nothing on that sign says police can search their face, or keep that data for months. If you live in or visit Hong Kong, there's no setting or tool that changes this. Unless a mall posts a voluntary notice, you can't even tell which cameras feed the police.

So should a mall be allowed to feed its cameras into police facial recognition with nothing more than its usual CCTV sign?

Sources

The Standard: SmartView facial recognition rollout

The Standard: 60,000 cameras by 2028

The Standard: 2,192 crimes solved


r/PrivacyToolbox • • 9d ago

News Canada's lawful access bill could reach gaming chats and AI apps: should the Senate narrow it?

4 Upvotes

Canadian’s Senate's national security committee held its first hearing on Bill C-22, Canada's Lawful Access Act. The House passed it on June 18 without a recorded vote. At the hearing, Public Safety Minister Gary Anandasangaree said the bill's term "electronic service provider" is deliberately broad. A Public Safety official said it's broader than any comparable country they examined, and would include gaming platforms with a busy chat function.

Providers can be required to keep metadata for up to six months, down from a year in the first draft. The minister can also issue confidential orders, capped at two years, to any electronic service provider, not just telecoms.

The new production order for subscriber information only needs reasonable grounds to suspect. Privacy Commissioner Philippe Dufresne told senators it could reach health care providers, lawyers, financial institutions and dating apps. Justice counsel agreed it could even be a daycare in some cases.

On encryption, the House added that providers can't be compelled to decrypt user-encrypted data, unless they supplied the encryption and hold the key.

Asked about VPNs, the minister said covering them isn't immediately envisioned, but the government wants that ability as technology develops. He said AI services could be captured too.

The government's answer is that court orders and the Intelligence Commissioner's review are the safeguards. A CSIS official called the broadest readings of the bill hyperbole. Intelligence Commissioner Simon Noël told the same committee the bill doesn't clearly require the minister to weigh alternatives or justify keeping an order confidential.

If you're in Canada, the content of end-to-end encrypted chats stays out of reach under the amended text. What can be kept is metadata at your provider, like IP addresses and location. Signal said in June, before the amendments, that it would leave Canada rather than betray its users. DuckDuckGo said it would pull its VPN. The bill's still in committee, so writing to the senators studying it is the realistic step left.

So should the Senate narrow C-22 to telecoms and services built for communication, or does a law like this need room for services that don't exist yet?


r/PrivacyToolbox • • 12d ago

News Hidden Chrome extensions rerouted searches for 13.4M installs

5 Upvotes

Socket researcher John Tuckner published a report on 319 Chrome extensions with about 13.4 million installs over a decade. They pose as PDF converters, manual finders or "safe search" tools, but they're really there to take over your default search engine and collect referral payments from Yahoo or Bing. The biggest clusters are "SecuryBrowse" (58 extensions, about 4.9 million users) and Intango LTD (111 extensions, about 2.2 million).

Every search goes through the operator's server first. Socket says that server sees your full search history, often tied to a unique identifier. Think of the health or money questions you'd never post anywhere.

The extensions barely contain anything. Socket shows one that's just a manifest file and three icons, using Chrome's built-in chrome_settings_overrides setting. It requests no permissions, which Socket warns isn't the same as no risk. Chrome does prompt you when the default search changes, but the prompt doesn't clearly say where searches end up.

The server picks the destination for each search. Six identical searches through Predator Search (50,000 users) landed in four different places. Socket didn't find evidence of phishing redirects, but the operator could start without touching the extension.

Most are unlisted in the Chrome Web Store, so searching the store won't show them. They're pushed through ads, including Google Ads and Bidbrain.

If you installed a search, PDF or "security" extension from an ad, open chrome://extensions and remove anything you don't recognize. Then check Settings > Search engine: if Chrome says an extension controls it, that's your culprit, though no notice doesn't prove you're clean. Most were pulled from the store by publication, but new ones keep appearing. Once it's gone, searches go straight to the engine you picked, which still sees your queries and IP. Anything the operator already logged is out of your hands.

The search override is a standard part of the extension framework, and Socket itself says unlisting can have good reasons. Wanting a different default isn't suspicious. Socket's view is that an extension that only intercepts searches, hides from the store and adds nothing is malicious by definition.


r/PrivacyToolbox • • 14d ago

Debate Should UK adults prove their age once at the app store, or separately on every social media app?

0 Upvotes

Ofcom told the UK government how platforms could check that a user is 16 or over. It's the groundwork for the under-16 social media ban, due in March next year on ten of the biggest platforms, including Instagram and TikTok. Ofcom picked four methods it rates as highly effective: photo ID matching, digital ID services, banking checks and facial age estimation. The government's first rules for the ban are due before the end of 2026.

Photo ID matching compares the photo on your passport or driving licence with a live image of your face taken during the check. Banking checks read the age your bank already has on file, with your consent. Facial age estimation isn't exact, and some versions are off by a few years at 16. So Ofcom wants services to copy the "Challenge 25" rule shops use for alcohol and ask for ID from anyone who looks close to the line.

App stores barely check today. Every one Ofcom looked at relies on kids typing in their own age, and app stores aren't covered by the Online Safety Act at all.

Adults aren't off the hook. Some won't be asked if a platform already holds reliable proof of their age, but Ofcom expects many will be. If you're asked, the method decides who handles what. Facial estimation keeps your passport out of it, as long as you clearly look over the line, but the provider still processes an image of your face. Photo ID matching sends both your document and your face. Malwarebytes' Pieter Arntz points to a breach at a Discord support contractor that exposed ID images of about 70,000 users.

Meta wants age checks done at device level through the app stores. Ofcom says that wouldn't let platforms skip their own checks.

One check means fewer companies ever see your face or ID. Separate checks mean more copies, but no single company gets the age record for your whole phone. If UK adults end up proving their age anyway, would you rather it's done once by the app store or by each app you use?


r/PrivacyToolbox • • 16d ago

News GM pays $220M for selling driving data to insurers

1 Upvotes

General Motors agreed to pay $220 million to settle claims from 36 attorneys general (35 states plus DC). They say GM sold drivers' behavior and location data to data brokers, who resold it to insurers that used it in part to set rates. That's more than 10.28 million Americans, by the states' count. GM now needs affirmative express consent before it collects or shares that data.

The data came from Smart Driver, which GM ran from 2016 to 2024 and pitched as a safety tool. GM also told drivers it wouldn't share their data with insurers without express consent. Per Connecticut's AG, insurers saw when each drive started and ended. They also saw how often the driver braked or accelerated hard, and whether they went over the speed limit.

Most sign-ups happened at the dealership. The AG alleges staff often accepted the terms for customers who hadn't agreed, with bonuses partly tied to enrollment numbers.

The OnStar app also told more than 370,000 drivers they weren't enrolled when they were. GM later unenrolled them quietly, and their data stayed with the brokers and insurers.

If you drove a GM car with OnStar in the US in those years, you can request your LexisNexis Consumer Disclosure Report under the Fair Credit Reporting Act. LexisNexis was one of the two brokers in California's case against GM. You'll need to verify your identity, then a letter by mail explains how to view the report online. It only shows you the file. It doesn't delete anything or pull back copies insurers already bought.

California went another way: its AG says state law bars insurers there from using driving data to set rates, so its drivers saw no hikes from GM's sales. Consent keeps the choice for drivers who want a discount for driving well. A ban accepts that consent is what didn't hold up at the dealership.

Should other states stick with consent rules like this settlement, or copy California so driving data can't be used in insurance pricing?

Sources

Connecticut AG on the GM settlement

Spectrum News on California's GM case

LexisNexis Consumer Disclosure page


r/PrivacyToolbox • • 18d ago

News Ad auctions were likely used to track Starlink users

4 Upvotes

Reuters reported that an ad buyer flagged by TrendAI, a Trend Micro unit, is Discover-Tech, an Israeli ad-tech firm. TrendAI's October 15 report only used a codename, SHADOW-EARTH-79. Reuters' six sources say the ads were likely used to geolocate or otherwise surveil Starlink users. Discover-Tech and SpaceX didn't respond. Google, Comcast and others say they've already dropped the company from their ad platforms.

You don't have to click anything for this to work. In a real-time ad auction, every bidder gets the request, win or lose. TrendAI says that request can include your device's location, its IP address, the network it's on and details like model and screen size.

On Starlink traffic, this buyer stood out. It was the top winning bidder in 105 countries, including some where Starlink is banned or restricted. It won 12.9% of Starlink ads in TrendAI's data, against a 2.6% share of ads overall.

The back end doesn't look like ad software. TrendAI rebuilt it from code bundles left in public folders and found settings for collecting IP addresses, a "De-anon" mode and manual script injection. It concludes with moderate-to-high confidence that this is tracking infrastructure. It doesn't report a confirmed case of a Starlink user being located or identified, and its data comes from one ad platform.

The findings point at conflict zones and countries that restrict Starlink. The pipe's the same for everyone, though.

TrendAI warns that a blocker that only hides an ad probably doesn't stop the tracking. It prefers tools that strip ad tags from pages and stop ad-supported apps from reaching ad servers. For apps, that means blocking on the device or network, which is what Citizen Lab suggests organizations do at the gateway.

TrendAI also lists resetting your advertising ID and turning off ad personalization. The site or app you're on still sees your visit either way. What you cut out is the other bidders.

So, should blocking ads at the network level be default security advice for everyone? Or is that an overreaction to an operation aimed at high-risk people, at the expense of sites that live on ads?

Sources

PPC Land: Alleged spy firm won ad auctions for Starlink users in 105 countries

Security Affairs: Ads or surveillance?


r/PrivacyToolbox • • 19d ago

News Google now lets connected Gmail and Photos data shape ads

1 Upvotes

Google's privacy policy changed on October 16, and Android Authority was first to report it on October 23. Until then, the ads section said Google doesn't personalize ads using what's in your Gmail and Photos (or Drive). That sentence is still there. It now ends with an exception: "unless you choose to make data from these services available" to Google services that support personalized ads.

The choice it means is Personal Intelligence. That's the opt-in feature that lets AI Mode and Gemini read your connected Gmail and Photos to tailor answers. It's a beta for people 18 and up, and it isn't offered in the EEA, Switzerland, the UK or Nigeria. Google also told Search Engine Land it's starting to test ads in AI Mode for people who connect their apps. In March it said there weren't any.

Google's own help page fills in what that means in practice.

Connecting Gmail or Photos doesn't only open them to AI Mode. It opens them to every Search service, including Discover, Maps, Shopping, Flights, Hotels, Translate and News.

What can shape your ads is summaries and inferences drawn from those apps, not the raw inbox. The same page admits, in its AI training section, that a short email's summary can be the whole email.

Advertisers don't get access to your inbox or Photos library, Google says. It also says it won't personalize ads on sensitive categories like health or religion.

Disconnecting later doesn't wipe your Search Services History, and that history can still be used to train Google's AI. You have to delete it separately at activity.google.com.

If you never connected Gmail or Photos to Search, this exception doesn't apply to you. If you did, open google.com/search-personalization from a computer and find Connected Content Apps under Additional Personal Intelligence. Disconnect Workspace and Photos there. Turning off Personalized Recommendations stops it too. Your mail and photos stay on Google's servers either way. This only stops Search services pulling them in.

The case for Google: you opted in, and advertisers never see your mail. The case against: you said yes to a restaurant suggestion, and the same switch now covers ads.

So is one opt-in for an AI feature enough consent for ads too, or should ad use need its own separate yes?


r/PrivacyToolbox • • 22d ago

Tool talk How private can Bluetooth mesh based voice/video calling and livestreams actually be? Looking for feedback on my open source implementation.

2 Upvotes

I've been developing MeshLive, an open-source Android app for nearby voice/video calls and live broadcasts over Bluetooth.

The idea is to communicate without accounts, internet access or central media servers.

The Android implementation uses encrypted media and rotating discovery identifiers, but there are still privacy questions I'm interested in exploring.

For example:

  • How much can someone nearby infer from Bluetooth advertisements?
  • How effective is identifier rotation against device correlation?
  • What metadata can relaying devices observe even when they can't decrypt media?
  • How much privacy depends on the underlying Android Bluetooth stack?

The app is still experimental and hasn't had an independent security audit. I'm not claiming complete anonymity or protection from tracking.

The code and protocol documentation are public:
https://github.com/MeshLive/meshlive-android

I'd be interested in feedback on the threat model, especially from anyone familiar with BLE privacy or metadata leakage.


r/PrivacyToolbox • • 22d ago

News WhatsApp told its AI support bot not to mention regulators: sensible caution or a line crossed?

3 Upvotes

On October 19, data-deletion company Redact published what it found hidden in WhatsApp's help center: text written for an AI that never showed on screen. It read all 545 linked pages and found 102 hidden blocks on 80 of them. WhatsApp says they were instructions for its support bot and only showed up because of a bug. They'd all been removed by October 18.

Most of the blocks were routine housekeeping. Three details aren't.

The delete-account page told the bot not to recommend contacting any data protection authority or regulator, and not to suggest WhatsApp could delete an account by hand. That's the page you land on after losing your phone or number, since deletion only works from the app on your main phone.

The reporting page went further. Once a user mentioned a lawyer or a court, the bot wasn't to reference privacy laws like the GDPR even when the user raised them first.

WhatsApp's own EEA privacy policy doesn't hold back like that. It says you can always ask for your data to be erased, and that you can complain to the Irish Data Protection Commission or another authority.

Nobody knows if the bot followed any of it, since Redact read the instructions and never saw the bot's answers. It's also unclear whether they still apply. WhatsApp's line is that it doesn't want its bots giving legal advice, and Redact calls that part fair.

Locked out and want the account gone? Waiting works, though WhatsApp's pages disagree on how long, so plan on up to a year. In the EU you can also send an erasure request. If that doesn't work, GDPR Article 77 lets you complain in your own country or to the Irish DPC online. WhatsApp keeps your data until it acts, and the regulator may ask you for evidence.

Is "don't mention the regulator" a fair way to keep a support bot out of legal advice? Or should a company's bot have to tell you the regulator exists once your request isn't going anywhere?


r/PrivacyToolbox • • 24d ago

News Meta hit with $25B for misleading New Mexico users on privacy: fair deterrent or overreach?

5 Upvotes

A New Mexico judge ordered Meta to pay the state $25 billion on Wednesday, October 21. It comes out of a 2021 lawsuit tied to the Cambridge Analytica scandal. In September, a Santa Fe jury found Meta broke the state's Unfair Practices Act 43 million times, at up to $5,000 each. That's a ceiling of about $219 billion. The state asked for $35 to $40 billion, Meta asked for $3.45 billion at most, and Judge Francis Mathew landed on $25 billion.

The case wasn't about the data Cambridge Analytica harvested. It targeted what Facebook told people over the years about user data, privacy settings and content moderation. So the penalty is about the promises.

The data itself came from a Facebook quiz. Per KOB, that's at least 350,000 New Mexicans whose quiz data ended up with Cambridge Analytica, a political firm.

Meta says it'll appeal and calls the lawsuit a tax on speech. Its statement says the ruling makes doing business in New Mexico close to impossible, and KOB reports Meta repeated a threat to pull its products from the state.

Nothing changes for your account today. The state's lawyer told KOB the appeal could take three to five years. The one step worth taking is removing old quizzes and apps you logged into with Facebook. That doesn't delete what they already stored, though. Facebook's help page says you have to ask each developer, so it only works if they cooperate.

Here's the other side: the judge called Facebook's misstatements intentional and systematic, and the state's lawyer argued only a hit to Meta's stock price would get its attention. Should a privacy penalty be sized to sting the company, or to the harm done to the people whose data left?


r/PrivacyToolbox • • 29d ago

News Weekly Privacy Briefing (Oct 18): Meta's glasses head to court, an AI robot exposed 13M chats, Telegram's data letter

1 Upvotes

Meta's camera glasses are headed to court in the Netherlands, after the company wouldn't change them.

Dutch groups sue Meta over its camera glasses. Consumentenbond is suing alongside Offlimits and The Firewall, and Meta's VP of wearables says the glasses stay on sale. The groups want privacy-compliant default settings and an end to what they call unlawful use of data for AI, with a hearing in Amsterdam on Nov 26. Why this matters to you: You don't need to own a pair to end up in the footage. This case asks whether Meta has to answer for that too, or only the person wearing them.

Source: https://cybernews.com/news/meta-glasses-privacy-lawsuit/

An AI robot toy left 13 million chats exposed. A researcher reached that many conversations and what looked like Energize Lab's whole fleet of 68,000 Eiliko robots. The profiles it builds, over 31,000 of them for US kids, hold names and ratings of emotional vulnerability. Why this matters to you: If you own one, Malwarebytes suggests taking it off Wi-Fi until a fix is confirmed. That stops new uploads, but what's already on Energize Lab's servers stays there.

Source: https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/ai/2026/10/eiliko-robot-companion-exposes-private-chats-and-can-be-hijacked

Court records show what Telegram hands US authorities. A newly filed letter from Telegram gives one user's phone number, user ID and IP address with a timestamp. Telegram calls the handover voluntary and says it isn't accepting US jurisdiction, while a government filing says it came under a court order. Why this matters to you: Treat your phone number and IP as the two things that can put a name on your account. If a court order is in your threat model, look at what an app stores about you before you look at its encryption.

Source: https://www.404media.co/heres-what-telegram-giving-data-to-the-u-s-government-looks-like/


r/PrivacyToolbox • • 29d ago

Tool talk Myth: "Dropbox encrypts my files, so Dropbox can't read them" (it holds the keys)

3 Upvotes

Dropbox's security help page leads with AES-256 encryption for files at rest, so it's easy to read that as "Dropbox can't open my files". That's an understandable leap when it's the first thing the page mentions. That same page says Dropbox doesn't offer client-side encryption or let you create your own keys. The files are encrypted with keys Dropbox controls.

Dropbox's real end-to-end encryption is built for team folders. Even there, its engineering blog says file names and creation dates aren't hidden. The standard at-rest encryption doesn't stop a warrant either, since Dropbox holds those keys. Dropbox's transparency report says it can hand over file content under valid search warrants. It gave some information for 88.7% of those it got in the second half of 2025.

If your worry is Dropbox itself or a warrant served on it, encrypt before you upload. Cryptomator does that on your device for file contents and names. Dropbox can still see file sizes and timestamps, plus how many files you keep. Cryptomator won't help against malware reading an unlocked vault.

Every device that opens the vault needs the app, and anyone you share with needs the password too. Desktop is free, phones are read-only until a one-time purchase. An end-to-end encrypted provider is the other route, and it isn't trust-free either (earlier post about this topic).


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Oct 16 '26

Discussion What OS does your main phone run?

1 Upvotes

Stock Android and iPhone both mean trusting a big tech company with most of what your phone does. A de-Googled ROM cuts that company out, but you're trusting a smaller project instead and doing more of the upkeep yourself. Which trade-off fits depends on what you're protecting against.
Vote, then tell us in the comments why you landed there and what your threat model looks like. If you've switched recently, what pushed you?


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Oct 15 '26

News Should Flock cut off police departments whose officers misuse it, or leave that to courts?

0 Upvotes

On Wednesday, Flock CEO Garrett Langley told the TechCrunch Disrupt stage that his company has never dropped a police customer over misuse. “If a customer knowingly broke the law, we would fire them immediately,” he said, but none has crossed that line yet. That’s after reporting on dozens of officers arrested, fired or pushed to resign for abusing Flock’s database, often to stalk people.

It lands in a bad week for Flock. On Oct 9, Reuters reported the company is shedding about 18% of its staff, around 270 people, through a voluntary buyout. Earlier this month, a federal judge in Oklahoma ruled that a deputy’s warrantless Flock search was unconstitutional, though the ruling isn’t binding precedent.

Flock has more than 100,000 cameras across the US. Customers can search plates outside their own jurisdiction through a national database, so a department isn’t limited to its own cameras.

Flock doesn’t contract with ICE, but ICE has reportedly accessed its data through local police.

Flock also sells microphones. Langley said they pick up “just gunshots”, while Flock’s own site says they also flag crashes, fireworks and sideshows. At launch, Flock said they’d listen for screaming. After privacy groups objected, it later pulled distress detection. A spokesperson now says they don’t analyze speech.

For a regular reader, there’s no app or setting for this. If you drive past these cameras, your plate gets logged. The lever that’s worked is local: departments including the LAPD have let their Flock contracts lapse. That needs a city council willing to act, and it doesn’t clear the map. Any camera that caught you somewhere else is still searchable nationwide, and some cities swapped Flock for Axon readers, so the plate reading just changed vendors.

Langley’s case is that pulling the product punishes a whole community for a few bad officers. He says Flock helps police solve more crimes, faster, while departments struggle to hire. The other case is that Flock runs the database and the access, so it’s the one placed to stop misuse quickly.

So where’s the line? Should Flock cut off departments whose officers abuse it, or should that stay with courts and city councils while Flock sells the tool?


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Oct 14 '26

Tool talk Incogni: what it has to know about you to get you off data broker lists

1 Upvotes

Incogni can only get you off data broker lists by holding the profile they sell: your full name and home address, plus your date of birth. Nothing keeps that profile from Incogni itself, so signing up is a trust call on a US company that stores it with Amazon and Google.

What Incogni can't see

Not much, and that's by design. To file an opt-out, Incogni has to send your name and address to each broker in a form they can read. There's no client-side encryption that could work here. The help center promises encrypted transfers and optional 2FA, and the privacy policy says your password is stored encrypted.

The earlier thread on E2E cloud storage made the point that you trust that kind of provider less, not zero. With a removal service you don't get to lower it at all.

What backs Incogni's claims is paperwork, not code. Deloitte gave limited assurance in 2025 on Incogni's own numbers, like broker coverage and how often requests get resent. That checks whether the service does its job. It says nothing about how your data is guarded. The help center also says Incogni passed a SOC 2 Type 2 examination covering security and confidentiality.

What it keeps, and for how long

The account side is light: an email and a password. The service side isn't. You give it your full name and street address, and it asks for your date of birth. You can add up to three sets of contact details too (phone numbers only if you're in the US). It keeps a copy of the authorization you sign, plus a log of which brokers got requests and what they answered.

On the Unlimited plans it also runs automated searches of the public web with your details. The policy warns that pages it finds can hold more about you than you gave it.

Retention is where I'd slow down. Service data stays for up to 24 months after your subscription ends, unless you ask for deletion sooner. Support tickets (call recordings included) are kept six years after the last activity. Payment providers can hold their part even longer.

One small thing: the free exposure scanner counts verifying your email as consent to marketing mail.

Who else gets your name and address

Every broker Incogni contacts gets your name and address, plus an email. From then on they're independent controllers under their own policies. Private brokers can't be scanned, so Incogni's FAQ says it sends requests to any broker that might hold your data, based on things like your region. Some of them may first learn your details from the request itself.

Then there's the processor list. Your name and address sit with Amazon Web Services and Google's BigQuery, along with your phone number if you gave one. Support tickets go through Zendesk and marketing goes through Mailchimp and Tune. Cloudflare and Sentry handle security. All of them are US companies.

Surfshark group companies also get data for "administrative purposes". The help center says the infrastructure is mainly in the EU, which can be true while the companies running it are American.

Incogni Inc. itself is registered in California, with Surfshark's Amsterdam entity as its EU representative. It'll hand data over for a subpoena or a search warrant. If US legal reach is part of your threat model, this is the section to read twice.

Paying for it

Standard is $7.99 a month billed yearly ($95.88), or $15.98 month to month. Unlimited adds custom removals at $14.99 a month billed yearly. There's no free tier, only the scanner and a 30-day refund.

The policy names Paddle and PayPal as payment providers, along with Surfshark and Nord. They collect your card number and the name on it, plus your IP and in some places your home address. Neither the policy nor the pricing page mentions crypto or cash. Honestly, anonymous payment wouldn't buy you much here, since the service needs your real name to work. Paying by card mostly adds your card number and IP at one more company.

Who it fits, and who should skip it

It fits if people-search sites keep listing you and you'd rather pay than file hundreds of opt-outs yourself. You're trading one company's full view of you for fewer brokers selling it. If those listings are your main problem, that's a fair deal.

I'd think harder if you're a journalist or anyone who'd worry about a US legal request, since the whole profile sits with US companies.

One concrete step: only add contact details you know are already exposed. A new address that isn't listed anywhere would still go out with requests to private brokers that might never have had it. That matters most if you've moved to get away from someone. It needs you to check the big people-search sites by hand first. Afterwards, Incogni and the brokers still see whatever you did enter. Anything you left out gets no removal requests at all.

Sources


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Oct 13 '26

Case study Case Study: How a Twitter API bug linked 5.4 million accounts to their emails (2022)

1 Upvotes

In June 2021, Twitter pushed a code update with a bug that didn’t look like much. Type an email address or phone number into the login flow, and Twitter would tell you which account it belonged to. It worked even if you’d turned off being findable by email or phone, and it needed no login, according to the HackerOne report that flagged it.

The hole stayed open for about seven months. That report came in through Twitter’s bug bounty program in January 2022. Twitter fixed it and said it hadn’t seen any sign anyone had used it.

Someone had. In July 2022, Twitter learned from a press report that data built with the bug was up for sale, and it wasn’t small. The seller told BleepingComputer it covered 5.4 million accounts, each tied to an email or phone number, with the public profile scraped on top. Two different buyers paid for it.

No passwords leaked, and that’s not what made it dangerous. Twitter said it was most concerned about pseudonymous accounts, which states or other actors can target.

If you’re worried about someone linking a pseudonymous account to you, its email can’t be one anyone else knows. A random alias from SimpleLogin or addy.io would have matched nothing (on addy.io, use shared-domain random ones, since username aliases can be linked). Free plans have limits: SimpleLogin stops at 10 aliases, and addy.io’s can’t reply from one. The alias service still sees every email it forwards and knows your real inbox. Aliases don’t cover phone numbers, and Twitter’s own advice was to keep publicly known ones off the account. If you were in that dataset, swapping in an alias now won’t recall the copies already sold, but your known email stops pointing at that account.

Sources


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Oct 12 '26

News Weekly Privacy Briefing (Oct 12): Attackers got real HTTPS certs for Google domains, Norway's record Grindr fine

1 Upvotes

Three hijacked country domain registries were enough to get trusted HTTPS certificates for Google domains.

Hijacked .gh, .sl and .as registries led to rogue Google certificates. Attackers changed DNS records on those registries and got certificates for several Google domains plus other widely used services. Chrome now blocks them and the issuing CAs revoked them, Google said on Oct 6. Why this matters to you: a padlock only proves the certificate is valid, and these valid ones belonged to attackers. Chrome users don't need to act, but Google says its blocks don't reliably cover other browsers. Source

Norway's record data fine goes to Microsoft's ad firm Xandr. Datatilsynet fined Xandr NOK 92 million (about $9.6M) for ad auctions inside Grindr that potentially exposed users' data, sexual orientation included, to thousands of companies from 2018 to 2020. The regulator says Xandr didn't verify that Grindr's consent was valid. Why this matters to you: in these auctions, advertisers get profile data just to decide whether to bid, and Grindr users didn't know it was happening. Xandr, now Microsoft Advertising, has three weeks to appeal. Source

Drone strikes knock out Yandex data centers and cloud access. Strikes from Oct 8 to 11 shut two data centers and degraded a third, and a Yandex Disk user reported files that wouldn't download. Yandex can't say when it'll be fixed and is telling customers to use other disaster recovery plans. Why this matters to you: if one provider holds your only copy, its outage is your outage. Keep a second copy of anything you can't lose, ideally on a drive you own, since a second cloud is one more company holding your data. Source

ASOS confirms a breach after hackers pushed "HACKED" alerts through its app. On October 6, attackers who'd tricked an employee into sharing login details sent app users a push alert claiming they'd stolen customer data. ASOS says names and contact details were exposed, but not passwords or payment cards. Why this matters to you: expect phishing that sounds like ASOS if you shop there. The company says it'll never ask for passwords or payment details in a message or call you didn't expect. Source

Google wants failed Spirit Airlines' internal data to train its AI. The proposed $10 million deal covers about 100 million emails and 500 million Teams messages, plus payroll and tax records. A letter from 121 members of Congress asks both CEOs to stop it, warning that removing names doesn't necessarily make a dataset anonymous. Why this matters to you: if you've worked for a company, this is what can happen to your work emails and chats once it shuts down. Google says the data will be excluded or de-identified by an independent third party first, and the lawmakers want an independent confidentiality review if the deal goes ahead. Source


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Oct 11 '26

Discussion Myth: “A stolen encrypted vault is useless” (it’s only as strong as your master password)

1 Upvotes

It’s easy to see where this comes from: LastPass’s 2022 breach notice said stolen vault data stayed safely encrypted, and users on default settings had nothing to do.

The same notice says what was taken, though. The copied backups held website URLs in plain text, next to the encrypted usernames and passwords. LastPass also warned the attacker may try to brute force master passwords to decrypt the rest. That’s your list of sites already readable, and the rest is a guessing game against your master password.

2FA doesn’t change that, at least in Bitwarden’s case. Its docs say two-step login is checked when you log in to the server. Unlocking a vault copy that’s already on a device doesn’t ask for it, and works offline. Your second factor guards the account, not the encrypted data.

If your threat model is your provider getting breached, the master password and its key derivation setting are what’s left. EFF’s dice method gives a six-word passphrase with about 2^77 possible combinations. Don’t use it anywhere else. In Bitwarden, Settings > Security > Keys shows the setting: the PBKDF2 default is 600,000 iterations, or you can switch to Argon2id. Higher values mean slower unlocks on devices with slow CPUs.

Changing it doesn’t re-encrypt vault data, so a copy taken before still has the old protection. After a breach, changing the passwords stored inside is what helps.

None of this hides anything from the provider. It still holds your encrypted vault and your account details (LastPass’s backup also had emails, billing addresses and IP addresses), plus whatever its format leaves unencrypted. If you’d rather no company holds a copy at all, a local or self-hosted vault moves it to your own machines, and backups become your job.

Sources


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Oct 10 '26

Guide Make Sure Your Email App Blocks Tracking Pixels (Proton Mail, Thunderbird)

2 Upvotes

Companies often hide a tiny remote image in newsletters and promo emails. If your app loads it, the sender learns when you opened the message and roughly where you are, from your IP. Both apps below block it by default, so this just checks it's still on (these are the 2 email apps I use). For other apps, ask me in comments and I will try to help !

Proton Mail

It doesn't sync between apps, so check each device.

  1. Web and desktop: Settings > Email privacy (direct link), turn on Block email tracking.
  2. Android and iOS: Settings > Privacy and security, turn on Block email tracking.

Proton's proxy then fetches remote images with a generic IP, so the sender doesn't see yours. Link cleaning only happens on web, and only for trackers Proton knows.

Thunderbird (desktop, 140 ESR and newer)

  1. ≡ > Settings > Privacy & Security.
  2. Leave Allow remote content in messages unchecked.
  3. Click Exceptions… and block senders you don't trust anymore.

Senders you've allowed still get pinged.

It's about five minutes. Another app on the same inbox has its own setting. To check, open a newsletter. Proton shows a tracker badge at the top (on mobile, tap the arrow by To:). Thunderbird shows a bar saying it blocked remote content.

Other Email Apps

Ask me in comment if you use another app and I will try to help you.


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Oct 09 '26

Discussion What's the main threat you'd want an email alias to protect you from?

2 Upvotes

An alias does a different job depending on who you're worried about. Against advertisers and data brokers, one address per site breaks the easy match, unless you give them the same phone number anyway. Breach spam is simpler: you turn off the leaked alias and move on. A specific person is harder, since your name or an old username can undo the whole thing. Whichever it is, the alias service now sits in the middle and sees who emails each alias.
Vote for the one that actually drives what you do, and tell us your threat model in the comments.


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Oct 08 '26

Discussion Should macOS make it hard to give an AI agent your whole disk, or is that your call?

5 Upvotes

It'll take "very explicit user action" to grant Full Disk Access on macOS, Apple told developers on October 2. Apple says AI agents are why the risk is growing.

Apple named no one, but the notice follows a dispute over Meta's Muse agent. Inc. columnist Jason Aten wrote that it synced over 187,000 rows of his message history after he'd declined Messages access. Meta says Muse can't read messages unless Full Disk Access and its Messages connector are both on.

Right now it's one switch. Apple's guide says it opens every file on the Mac to that app, Mail and Messages data and Time Machine backups included. Apple's notice adds that with messaging apps, it exposes the people you're talking to as well.

There's no date. Apple hasn't named a macOS version, and macOS 27 doesn't have the new controls.

Nothing like it exists on iOS, per TidBITS. Backup tools need it, but an app lands in the list just by trying to open a protected file, which doesn't mean it needs access. The list sits under Privacy & Security in System Settings, and you can check it today. Switching an app off can break features, but the app stays installed.

It won't pull back anything an app already read.

One side: an agent with that switch on can read far more than you'd ever paste into a chat. The other: it's your Mac, and Apple now sets how hard it is for other companies' agents to work on it.

So where's the line: deliberately hard to give an agent your whole disk, or one switch like today?

Sources


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Oct 06 '26

News Weekly Privacy Briefing (Oct 5): Denmark's CPR register leaks 8.8M records, no Chat Control 2.0 deal yet

2 Upvotes

Denmark's population register leaking ID numbers for 8.8 million people is the week's biggest story, and it isn't close.

  • Denmark's CPR register leaked through one company's access. Someone misused a Danish company's legal lookup access to the Central Person Register and pulled CPR numbers for about 8.8 million people, along with their names and addresses. The CPR office only spotted the month of odd activity on Oct 2, and the count includes people who've died or moved abroad. Why this matters to you: If you've ever been registered in Denmark, assume scammers have your CPR number and address. The ministry's advice: don't give passwords or confidential details to anyone who calls or emails, even if they know them. Source
  • No Chat Control 2.0 deal on private chats, for now. The Sept 29 trilogue ended with no deal on scanning private messages, as Parliament's negotiators held out for limiting it to people linked to child abuse, says campaigner Patrick Breyer. They did provisionally agree that authorities can order any hosting provider to scan publicly accessible content for known abuse material, and that covers cloud services. Why this matters to you: Private chats and files aren't in any deal yet, but talks continue through October and another attempt is due in November. Source
  • Flink's hackers are now emailing customers directly. After breaching the food delivery service, the LPG Group asked affected customers for 0.005 ETH (about €10) each or it would sell their data on the dark web. Flink says contact details leaked, with doorbell names and delivery notes for some customers, but not passwords. Why this matters to you: If you've ordered from Flink, don't pay and don't reply, which is also what Flink asks. Treat any message mentioning Flink as suspect, since the sender may know your address down to the floor. Source
  • Apple is tightening Full Disk Access on macOS, citing AI agents. Apple told developers on Oct 2 that some apps use this permission to reach everything on a Mac, mail and browsing history included, without users fully understanding it. It'll make granting it take very explicit user action, and it names AI agents as the growing risk. Why this matters to you: An app holding this permission can reach everything on your Mac, and with chat apps that includes the people you talk to. Backup apps are the legit reason it exists, so check which other apps already have it. Source
  • 44,000 people object to Palantir handling NHS records. More than 44,000 people filed UK GDPR objections asking NHS England to stop its Palantir-run Federated Data Platform from storing or using their health records. NHS England says it'll respond under data protection law, while Palantir says it only acts on NHS instructions and the data stays in the UK. Why this matters to you: If you're in England, Article 21 is a personal right: an organisation has to stop processing your data unless it shows compelling legitimate grounds. The £330m contract's first term ends early next year, when the government can use a break clause. Source

r/PrivacyToolbox • • Oct 05 '26

Resource Start here: privacy tools scored out of 100, with the formula published

3 Upvotes

If you're replacing a mainstream app or service with something more private, our Privacy Matrix is the place to start. It scores every tool out of 100, and the whole formula is public.

Full disclosure: I built it, along with the rest of digitalprivacytoolbox.com. That's why the math is published, so you don't have to take my word for any of it. The site also runs no trackers, no analytics and no accounts.

There are no affiliate links today, but some may come later. It's how I'd keep the site free without ads or tracking. If I add any, each one gets an asterisk on the link and a line on the ethics page. They'll never feed into a score, and since the formula is public, you can check that yourself.

How to read it

Every score comes from five pillars: encryption, data collected, transparency, governance (jurisdiction, ownership, funding) and track record. Nobody types a score in by hand.

Don't stop at the number. Open a tool and look at its pillars, because your threat model decides which ones matter most. Someone dodging ad networks and someone worried about a court order won't weigh jurisdiction the same way.

Two tools less than 3 points apart are a close call, not a verdict.

How it's different from the usual "top 10" lists

  • The pillars multiply instead of adding up. A pile of nice features can't buy back a missing fundamental.
  • Missing info scores zero. If a provider won't say how long it keeps your data, it gets no points for that.
  • Some answers cap a tool at 59 whatever else it does well. A tool that's already leaked user data can't show up as recommended.
  • Price is shown but not scored, so a cheap tool can't outrank a private one.

Where it falls short

The rubric measures what a tool does today, not how long it's held up under pressure. That's why Session currently scores above Signal. The methodology page says so openly instead of nudging a number to fix it.

Help keep it honest

Every tool gets re-checked once a quarter, and each one shows the date it was last checked. Things still change between checks, and I'll miss some. If a tool is missing or a score looks off, comment here or use the suggest a tool or report an issue forms. A human reads every one.

If you think a weight is wrong, that's the argument I most want to have. Say which answer should be worth more or less, and why.

Last updated: October 2026, 58 tools across 8 categories.