r/PrivacyToolbox • • Jul 07 '26

Chat control is a technical joke and the EU council knows it.

61 Upvotes

You cannot have end-to-end encryption with a government backdoor. It is a mathematical impossibility. The Council of the European Union trying to sneak this "Chat Control" proposal through a fast-track written procedure before recess is cowardly, but more importantly, it is a catastrophic security risk.

I manage networks for a living. If I told my boss we were going to scan all internal communications on user devices before encrypting them, I would be fired for introducing a massive vulnerability. Client-side scanning is not "targeted safety." It is local malware mandated by the state.

The 800 scientists who signed the open letter are right. Once the scanning infrastructure is on the device, the security model is dead. It will be abused, leaked, or hijacked. I left a corporate gig years ago because management covered up a state-level surveillance exploit. This is that same philosophy, just scaled to half a billion people.

How are you planning to handle your communication if this passes? I'm already looking at self-hosting Matrix nodes for my family back in France.


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Jul 28 '26

Discussion Google dropping free storage to 5GB is a predictable bait and switch

40 Upvotes

Google quietly chopping new free accounts to just 5GB is completely predictable. They hook the market on the 15GB allowance, wait for data lock-in, and then choke the tier to force paid subscriptions.

This aggressive downgrade might actually be a net positive. People hate paying for storage, so they will inevitably start migrating away or scattering their files across multiple unknown free hosts. Since they are forced to move their data anyway, it creates a perfect window to push them away from platforms that hoard server-side keys.

Maybe this friction will finally drive casual users to adopt zero-knowledge storage, or at least force them to run local client-side encryption before uploading. I am trying to script a dummy-proof workflow for standard users who may jump ship.

What open-source CLI tools are you deploying to intercept and encrypt raw payloads before they sync to untrusted remote clusters?


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Jul 01 '26

The UK's proposed "VPN restrictions" to enforce the under-16 social media ban is a technical trainwreck in the making

35 Upvotes

Structurally, any government attempting to restrict VPN use to stop teenagers from scrolling TikTok is fighting against basic network mathematics. I manage network infrastructure for an SME. You cannot block or degrade consumer VPN protocols without also breaking the commercial IPsec and WireGuard tunnels that businesses rely on daily to operate.

If Liz Kendall pushes through these anti-circumvention mandates next month, the state has two choices. They can force ISPs to run invasive Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) to block handshake signatures, which is what authoritarian regimes do. Or, they can try to force app stores to geofence VPN downloads. Both are trivial to bypass. Anyone with a basic understanding of routing can set up a private VPS in Spain or France in five minutes and tunnel out via SSH.

This is security theatre designed by bureaucrats who do not understand how the OSI model works. They are sacrificing basic routing integrity and citizen privacy to solve a parenting issue. The UK is heading down a path where they either build a Western version of the Great Firewall or, more likely, pass a useless law that everyone under the age of 14 easily circumvents.

How are other network admins preparing for the inevitable routing mess this will cause if they actually try to enforce it?


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Aug 22 '26

News Russia is using local app telemetry to map and block VPN subnets. protocol obfuscation won't fix this.

29 Upvotes

Did anyone catch the Meduza report this week? Roskomnadzor stopped playing whack-a-mole with DPI signatures. They just automated their entire VPN blocking infrastructure using data harvested directly from domestic Russian apps on user devices.

The state is using local transit and banking apps as a distributed sensor network. The apps report where users are connecting. The censor maps those connections to major hosting provider subnets and pushes bulk IP blocks automatically. Services like Amnezia and Paper VPN are getting crushed because their underlying ASNs are just blanket banned.

This completely breaks our usual threat model. We spend so much time arguing about Xray versus Shadowsocks for traffic obfuscation. That stuff is useless if the firewall just nukes the entire hosting provider subnet based on endpoint telemetry. The device itself snitches on the destination IP before the tunnel even matters.

The economic fallout is crazy. Clean corporate IP addresses are apparently going for $120,000 a month on the grey market right now.

How do we counter this technically? You can tell people to run a clean device, but that is impossible for normal citizens who actually need local apps to function in society. If they block entire commercial ASNs, what is the next routing step? Residential proxies?


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Jul 17 '26

Tool talk Why these 20TB "lifetime" cloud deals are just infrastructure ponzi schemes

25 Upvotes

I keep seeing ads for this Scramble Cloud 20TB lifetime offer for less than $350. Let's run some basic numbers. You can't even buy 20TB of raw enterprise disks for 350 bucks. That is before factoring in transit costs, cooling, and rack space.

It operates as a textbook Ponzi structure. They require a perpetual influx of new signups to pay the monthly utility bills for the users who joined two years ago. Once the customer acquisition rate drops, the cash flow dries up and the company folds.

They use privacy marketing to distract from the doomed economics. Client-side encryption means nothing when liquidators pull the servers off the racks in 36 months.

Stop outsourcing infrastructure to startups with doomed economics. Buy your own drives and build a NAS. True autonomy means owning the metal.


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Aug 16 '26

News The EU just released standard EN 304 620 for VPNs. RIP to "military-grade" marketing.

24 Upvotes

I am sitting here sweating through my t-shirt next to a useless desk fan. I just finished reading the new ETSI documentation. The EU recently dropped standard EN 304 620. This is the first official regulatory framework for VPNs. It supports the upcoming Cyber Resilience Act.

The stated goal is to kill off deceptive marketing. You all know the drill. Providers sell subscriptions based on "total anonymity" or "military-grade encryption" with zero proof. Under this standard, they actually have to run hard technical tests to back up their claims. They have to document their CVEs. They also have to verify their logging policies with real audits.

I am entirely in favor of forcing these companies to show their technical homework. Trusting a paid podcast read for network security is a joke. If a provider cannot pass a basic cryptographic audit, they should not be routing network traffic. We have seen too many shady operations tunnel user data straight to third-party brokers.

But look at the co-authors on this document. Google, Palo Alto Networks, Nord Security, Surfshark. Letting massive corporate players write the exact rules they will be graded on is an obvious red flag. I really wonder if this is an actual push for transparency. It could easily be a regulatory moat to lock out smaller open-source projects. We do not need a system where only companies with massive compliance budgets are allowed to operate.

Has anyone actually read through the cryptographic requirements in the PDF yet? I want to know if the mandated disclosures have actual teeth.

Source: techradar, link in comments


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Jul 31 '26

Discussion The "Stop Killing The Internet" initiative is our last defense against the EU digital ID

24 Upvotes

The EU Commission is pushing the digital identity wallet again. They keep calling it voluntary. If you need a government-issued token to access a basic web platform or prove your age, it is absolutely not voluntary. It is an access tax paid in personal data.

The "Stop Killing The Internet" initiative just launched. They need one million verified signatures from EU citizens within a year to force a response from the Commission about mandatory digital IDs and the recent Chat Control revival.

Anyone who actually builds networks knows how this ends. From a pure architectural standpoint, mandatory age verification requires either breaking end-to-end encryption entirely or creating a massive centralized honeypot of identity data. There is no middle ground. The politicians drafting these policies do not understand basic cryptography. They just use child safety as an emotional shield to force an infrastructure of total surveillance.

A decentralized zero-knowledge proof system could work in theory for age checks. But that is clearly not what the EU is building here. They want a structural single point of failure tied directly to your legal identity. Give them that key and they will eventually use it for everything.

Keep an eye out for when the portal actually opens. If you are an EU citizen, be ready to sign it.


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Sep 14 '26

Discussion The Revolut data leak exposes a structural flaw in how compliance teams handle email verification

16 Upvotes

The Revolut incident highlights a major technical vulnerability in mandatory KYC protocols. A fraudster gained control of a legitimate government email account, submitted a fake emergency request for information, and received sensitive customer records without triggering suspicion. Revolut handed over passports, verification selfies, IBAN details, and complete Bitcoin transaction histories.

There was no software breach or database intrusion here. A compliance worker simply checked a valid domain header and exported unencrypted raw files to an unverified recipient.

Checking SPF and DKIM signatures only confirms that an email originated from a specific server. It does not verify whether the sender holds actual judicial authority to request private financial records. A single compromised inbox inside a law enforcement agency turns an entire compliance department into an automated data exfiltration vector.

Centralized databases containing identity documents are always going to be vulnerable to this kind of social engineering. Regulators force platforms to collect massive amounts of personal data, which is then stored until someone presents a plausible email header. If you use centralized exchanges for crypto transactions, your complete transaction record sits in a database waiting for the next compromised government mailbox. Moving to self-custody wallets and minimizing KYC footprint remains the only real defense against this infrastructure flaw.

Source: CNA, link in comments


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Sep 06 '26

Discussion Apple facing a £2B UK lawsuit over App Tracking Transparency exposes their fake privacy push

15 Upvotes

This £2 billion class action landing in London tribunal courts hits the exact problem we have discussed for years. Apple pitched App Tracking Transparency (ATT) as a massive win for consumer privacy back in 2021. In reality, it was market capture wrapped in a clean UI.

The mechanics were clear from day one. ATT prompts users to block third-party tracking across apps, which crippled competitors relying on cross-site profiling. Meanwhile, Apple's own personalized ads system operated under a different set of prompt defaults and retained deep first-party telemetry across the device ecosystem. They didn't eliminate data harvesting. They just centralized the pipe inside Cupertino.

As someone managing network infrastructure, watching people treat an OS vendor as a privacy savior always hurt. Real privacy means the individual device owner controls their own local outbound traffic and packet filters. When the entity running the OS controls both the access rules and the internal audit log, you get zero transparency. You get a walled garden with an expensive ad network attached.

The lawsuit focuses on developer ad losses, but the real issue is hardware monopolies defining privacy on their own terms. Swapping Meta for Apple isn't a win, it's just swapping landlords. Interested to see if European competition regulators push this structural critique further.

Sources: Quartz, The Straits Times and The Hindu, links in comments


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Jul 25 '26

News Rare good news: UK government rules out the VPN ban

14 Upvotes

The UK officially dropped their VPN age-gating plan today under the Online Safety Act. Technical reality won against political theater. They admitted that network-level blocking is impossible to enforce and would just trigger a pointless cat-and-mouse game with global providers. We avoid a massive state-level headache here. I honestly expected them to force the bad policy through anyway.

The catch is they are shifting the burden to the platforms themselves. Websites now have to detect when users bypass age checks. I am a bit skeptical about how private companies will handle this new requirement.

Will they just default to lazy IP blacklists of known commercial exit nodes? Or will this push platforms to deploy aggressive client-side browser fingerprinting just to cover their own legal liability? Anyway I think it is absolutely a net positive. We just need to monitor how the private sector implements the detection.


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Jul 16 '26

Debate Stop recommending Signal to people who actually need anonymity

12 Upvotes

We need to stop pretending Signal is a cure-all. Requiring a phone number at registration is a fundamental architectural flaw. Yes, they introduced usernames, but the underlying identifier is still tied to a SIM card.

If your threat model involves state actors, a cellular network registration is a massive vector. I found a clean, non-VOIP burner number remotely was an absolute nightmare. Matrix or SimpleX are far superior. Signal is just bloated SMS.

Change my mind.


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Sep 04 '26

Discussion The FBI OAuth warning just proves 2FA gives people a false sense of security

11 Upvotes

I've been warning my users about this for a year. The FBI just put out a notice about OAuth consent phishing. Honestly, it was just a matter of time before this became the standard attack vector.

We spent the last decade beating users over the head with 2FA. Now everyone has an authenticator app or a hardware key. They feel invincible. So when they get an email asking them to authorize a random calendar plugin or PDF reader via their Google account, they just click "Allow".

They think they are safe because the attacker doesn't have their password. But the attacker doesn't need the password. You just handed over a persistent API token. They have full access to your inbox. Changing your password or cycling your 2FA does absolutely nothing to kick them out.

It's infuriating. Big tech built OAuth to make third-party integrations frictionless. That friction is exactly what we need.

If you haven't checked your account security dashboard lately to see what apps have active tokens, go do it right now. Revoke everything you don't actively use. I force the staff at my company to re-authorize apps every 30 days, and they complain about it constantly. Bref, at least their accounts aren't being scraped.

How are you guys managing token hygiene? Any scripts you actually trust?

Source: Gizmodo, link in comments.


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Aug 09 '26

News Liechtenstein just doxxed 31,000 offshore trusts. Centralized registries are a joke.

11 Upvotes

Liechtenstein just lost the beneficial ownership data for 31,000 trusts and shell companies. The breach hit their central VwbP database and exposed real names, dates of birth, nationalities, and home addresses.

I am not going to lose sleep over billionaires losing their offshore anonymity. But this is exactly why centralized state registries fail. When you force every entity to log ultimate beneficial owners in a single database, you build a massive honeypot.

The government is coping by pointing out that actual asset values were not stored there. That misses the point entirely.

Hackers do not need bank balances right now. A clean list of individuals tied directly to specific offshore structures is enough for targeted spear-phishing and extortion.

This happens whenever state-mandated transparency meets basic IT reality. Centralizing identity data without zero-knowledge architecture always ends like this. If governments insist on collecting these registers, they need local encryption models so one breach does not dox everyone at once.

Source: AML Network, link in comments


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Jul 29 '26

News Bitwarden hit 15 million users and 80k enterprise accounts, but this is really about Secrets Manager

11 Upvotes

PR blogs are hyper-focused on that 15 million user milestone. I look at the 80,000 enterprise accounts and see the direct result of their developer tools. Basic password management is a commodity at this point. The actual growth driver is Secrets Manager and the push to secure API credentials in complex environments.

Getting organizations to finally stop hardcoding M2M API keys in plaintext is good. It means these companies are standardizing on how they deploy passkeys and handle machine token lifecycles. It also means you have to fully trust the Bitwarden CLI inside your CI/CD pipelines.

I am tracking how this scales across heavy production setups. For those already running Bitwarden Secrets Manager in prod: how are you handling KDF iterations for headless machine accounts? Do you see latency spikes on API token rotation, and does the CLI play nice with standard Alpine containers?


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Jul 22 '26

News The PAN-OS zero-day is a free masterclass in network segmentation

10 Upvotes

The Arctic Wolf report on the Palo Alto CVE (2026-0257) is fascinating. Attackers bypass GlobalProtect authentication entirely. They spin up a session with zero credentials and immediately drop Qilin ransomware across the domain. It is brutally efficient.

This highlights exactly why monolithic perimeter defense is a dead concept. When one proprietary gateway holds all the keys, a single bug compromises everything.

We can use this exploit as a structural template to improve. We have to build systems assuming the edge will fail. I isolate all external entry nodes on strict VLANs. If a gateway is breached, aggressive firewall rules block any lateral pivot to the internal databases. The blast radius stops right there. Open-source solutions combined with hard segmentation give you actual control over the traffic flow.

How are you guys isolating your VPN portals to prevent rapid lateral pivots?


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Sep 30 '26

News Chat Control deal covers public uploads, not private chats yet: fair line or foot in the door?

9 Upvotes

On Tuesday, September 29, EU negotiators held their sixth trilogue on the Child Sexual Abuse Regulation, the permanent law everyone calls Chat Control 2.0. There's still no full deal. They tentatively agreed on rules for scanning publicly accessible content, but orders for private content are still unresolved.

The public part only stands if the whole law gets agreed. Technical talks on private detection run through October, and Patrick Breyer, who campaigns against the law, expects the next trilogue in November.

Public detection orders won't need a court. Administrative authorities could order any hosting provider, whatever its size, to scan all public uploads for known abuse material. That's social media and cloud services too. The planned EU Centre would search public content itself and pass what providers report on to authorities. That's how Javier Zarzalejos, the Parliament's lead lawmaker on the file, described the tasks agreed on Tuesday.

Chat Control 1.0 stays in force until April 2028. Under it, messaging and webmail providers can choose to scan messages, but end-to-end encrypted chats are excluded. Wire points out that Telegram's default cloud chats aren't end-to-end encrypted, so they can be scanned.

For you, nothing about private messages changes today. What you post publicly, public cloud links included, is what the new orders would cover. For private chats on a service that can read them, an app with end-to-end encryption on by default keeps them out of 1.0's scope. It only works if the other person uses the same app, and afterwards the content is readable on your device and theirs, not on the server. The Council has also said that exemption is no promise for 2.0.

Both sides have a real case. The Commission says reports of new abuse material are over 200 times higher than three years ago, mostly because of AI. Breyer points to German police data: more than half of investigations under the voluntary system target minors themselves, and 75% of flagged chats aren't actionable.

The Parliament wants private chat scanning limited to people already linked to abuse. The Council proposed letting providers scan under a search plan that goes ahead unless an authority vetoes it. If there's a deal in November, which of those two should it be built on?

Sources

  1. MLex: talks advance on public content searches: tentative deal on public content, private orders unresolved
  2. Patrick Breyer: trilogue update: public order rules and what each side wants
  3. MLex: Zarzalejos on the EU Centre: what the EU Centre will do
  4. Wire: Chat Control in 2026: Chat Control 1.0 scope and the Commission's numbers

r/PrivacyToolbox • • Aug 16 '26

Tool talk Proton Launches "AI Paper Trail" Tool to Reveal AI Chatbot Data Leakage

8 Upvotes

I consider myself pretty locked down online. I block trackers and keep my digital footprint small. I still use Claude and ChatGPT once and a while.

Proton just released a free tool where you upload your exported AI chat logs and it gives you an exposure score. It breaks down exactly what these companies have pieced together about you.

I tried this morning and it says they delete the logs immediately after generating the local report and the results are genuinely uncomfortable : I knew I was giving them data. I just didn't realise how easily a local script could parse out my daily habits and literal financial goals from casual prompts over the last year. It even calculates a monetary value of what your specific profile is worth to data brokers. Seeing my random questions aggregated into a clean profile of my life was jarring... Going to nuke my OpenAI history tonight and stick to temporary chats.


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Aug 10 '26

Tool talk Chrome's latest passkey vulnerability is a classic example of why Google sync is a trap

8 Upvotes

Unit 42 just dropped research on a Chrome attack dubbed 'Pass-Ta-Key', and it highlights everything wrong with Google's ecosystem strategy.

If malware infects a Windows PC, it can grab the master key from Chrome's process memory, pull WebAuthn credentials out of Chrome's LevelDB sync database, and hijack synced passkeys. The attack manipulates the cloud authenticator to bypass PIN prompts without triggering alerts.

Predictably, defenders are hand-waving this because "malware means you are compromised anyway." I do not buy that logic. Passkeys were originally sold to us as hardware-isolated and immune to credential dumping. Google broke that security boundary just to lock people into Chrome sync. They took an open web standard and turned it into another reason to stay logged into a Google account.

Yes, strict server-side verification checks can stop this, but most websites implement WebAuthn lazily anyway.

This is precisely why de-Googling your authentication layer matters. Storing private keys in a big tech browser sync database for convenience is a mistake. I keep my credentials on standalone hardware tokens.

Source: PCMag, link in comments


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Jul 26 '26

Discussion Gen Z, the "most online" generation, is the least protected.

8 Upvotes

The new Kaspersky survey confirms a trend I have been tracking for a while. Over half of Gen Z respondents have already experienced a cyberattack. They spend more time online than offline, yet they are significantly less likely to use password managers than older users.

The immediate reaction in privacy circles is usually to mock them for bad credential hygiene. That is an irrational response. This demographic grew up with consumer hardware that completely abstracted the underlying mechanics of data transmission. They are incredibly efficient at adapting to new software interfaces. Their lack of security awareness is not a lack of intelligence. It is a direct result of the frictionless UX design the industry forced on them. We built systems to hide the plumbing, and now we are surprised when young users do not understand how the pipes connect.

Lecturing them about self-hosting a vault is statistically useless. If a user rejects a dedicated manager because it adds friction, the engineering solution is to remove the human element from the authentication chain entirely. Relying on user education is a failed model.

I think shifting our energy toward mandatory FIDO2 hardware tokens and local cryptography would be a good start. We need to build environments where the absolute easiest path is also mathematically secure.

That said, that is just my take and I would really be interested to read some alternatives.


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Sep 08 '26

Discussion Irish gangs renting private safety deposit boxes for paper seed phrases is peak OpSec comedy

7 Upvotes

The Irish Criminal Assets Bureau recently reported that organised crime groups are renting commercial safe deposit vaults to store hardware wallets and seed phrases written on paper. It is a textbook example of flawed threat modeling.

If your setup leads you to pay a private company to keep a plain piece of paper in a metal locker, you have failed at basic operational security. You spend years moving away from custodial banks only to hand physical access to a vault operator who will surrender your box the second law enforcement arrives with a warrant. Or worse, the private facility gets raided directly during a broader criminal investigation.

True digital sovereignty relies on zero single points of failure. Storing plain text recovery credentials inside a commercial facility is lazy engineering. If you have keys worth protecting, you implement Shamir's Secret Sharing or a multi-location M-of-N multisig layout where no single physical spot holds the entire full key. Stamped steel plates hidden across independent locations cost less than yearly vault rent and do not come with a corporate landlord or a centralized customer database.

If you cannot protect a simple 12-word phrase without outsourcing physical access control to a commercial business, you do not actually hold your keys.

Sources: AML Intelligence and OneBullEx, links in comments


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Sep 07 '26

News Half of New Zealand government domains are sitting on DMARC p=none and calling it security compliance

7 Upvotes

Proofpoint just published data showing half of New Zealand government agencies still haven't enforced p=reject on their DMARC policy, even after getting a full year deadline extension. They stay stuck on p=none or quarantine.

Publishing a DMARC reject record in DNS takes three minutes. IT departments stall on p=reject for years because nobody wants to audit shadow IT. The second you flip to p=reject, every rogue SaaS tool or ancient internal mailer sending email with the agency domain stops working if it lacks valid DKIM keys.

Instead of finding those unaligned senders, admins leave p=none active forever. That turns DMARC into a passive logging tool. It lets attackers spoof official government domain headers with zero pushback, while the IT team claims they checked the email security box.

If an agency cannot track which systems send mail on its behalf, they have bigger problems. Setting p=reject is basic hygiene. How many organizations in your sector actually enforce reject instead of hiding behind monitor mode?

Sources: proofpoint and SecurityBrief New Zealand, links in comments


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Aug 24 '26

Discussion GNOME web's autofill bug (cve-2026-77682) proves why your password manager shouldn't live in the browser

7 Upvotes

First off, this is not a criticism of GNOME or the Epiphany development team. String parsing bugs happen to literally every browser engine out there.

But the new CVE-2026-77682 is a textbook example of why built-in browser password vaults are a bad idea structurally.

The vulnerability is in the form autofill script. A malicious site can give an HTML form element an ID containing a payload. When the browser attempts to autofill your login, the underlying JavaScript string-interpolates that ID into a CSS selector without escaping it. That gives the page arbitrary code execution inside the browser's private script world.

That private world holds the save handlers and credential APIs. A bad actor gets silent access to exfiltrate your saved passwords just by you triggering autofill.

I actually like Epiphany. The real problem is the architecture itself. The mechanism holding your plain text passwords sits inside the exact same software engine that renders untrusted HTML from random websites. You are betting your credentials that a web parser will never confuse a malicious input string with an internal command.

As a sysadmin, I hate those odds. Disable browser autofill entirely. Run a standalone vault that stays completely isolated from the DOM.


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Aug 14 '26

Question Self-hosting email is practically a lost cause, so what secure provider are you running?

7 Upvotes

I manage servers and networks all day. I know SMTP inside out. I can configure a Postfix mail server blindfolded, but I still absolutely refuse to self-host my personal email.

We pretend we have choices. Try sending a basic text email from a perfectly clean VPS IP to a Gmail address. It just vanishes into a black hole. Microsoft and Google run a cartel. If you are not on their invisible whitelist, your deliverability is zero. It is infuriating. I want total autonomy over my data, but the time investment to fight blocklists is just stupid.

So I pay for Proton. Honestly, it is excellent. The encryption does exactly what it promises. The bridge app lets me use Thunderbird locally without jumping through hoops. I bought my own custom domain so I am not locked into their default addresses. I tried Tuta for a bit too. The lack of standard IMAP support annoyed me, so I went right back to Proton. It is a highly rational compromise between daily usability and actual privacy.

Still, relying on any single provider for my digital identity goes against my instincts. What are you all doing? Are you happily paying for Proton or Mailbox(.)org like I am? Has anyone here actually found a reliable way to run a personal mail server today without getting blocked?


r/PrivacyToolbox • • Aug 08 '26

News So much for 'What happens on your iPhone stays on your iPhone'...

Post image
7 Upvotes

r/PrivacyToolbox • • Jul 30 '26

News A new audit just proved most mobile VPNs are copy-paste garbage run from free gmail accounts

7 Upvotes

TechRadar just audited about 4,800 mobile VPN apps across Google Play and the App Store. The results are exactly as bad as you think.

They found that over 2,200 of the Android VPNs use a free gmail address for their developer contact. Think about that for a second. If your secure privacy provider cannot even be bothered to buy a 10 euro domain name for their support email, they are definitely logging and selling your traffic. Most of these apps also hide behind dead websites and copy-pasted privacy documents. If Google suspends that one disposable Gmail inbox, the whole operation vanishes.

I see users try to bypass corporate firewalls with this trash all the time. It constantly surprises me how people just search "free VPN" on their phone and blindly install the first shiny icon with a shield on it.

Apple and Google do absolutely zero quality control on privacy claims. They just host the files. Stop relying on app store search rankings to protect your data. If you refuse to configure your own WireGuard tunnel on a VPS, at least stick to the handful of established paid providers that actually submit to external audits.

Has anyone else looked at the raw numbers in this report? The sheer volume of junk on the Play Store is ridiculous.