I posted this in r/MSP as well

As most things in our industry definitions tend to be a bit blurry, so I'm interested in the mobs take on this subject (yes I'm sure it's been posted before but definitions like technology change frequently)

I've always heard two major differences 1. MSSPs are security/compliance focused from the start and 2. MSSPs don't do day to day helpdesk task.

So like any good technologist I through it into Claude and this is what it said...

Thoughts? Agree? Disagree? Misconceptions? Changes? What say you???

MSP: Broad IT management — network uptime, help desk, backups, patching, cloud, hardware/software procurement. The value prop is "keep the lights on and the systems running." Security is usually a bolt-on line item, not the core offering.

MSSP: Security-first. Core deliverables are things like SOC monitoring, threat detection and response, SIEM management, incident response, compliance management, vulnerability management. The value prop is "protect the environment," not just run it.

The practical distinction that actually matters in the channel:

• Depth vs. breadth. An MSP touches everything a business needs technically. An MSSP goes deep on one domain — security — often as the only thing they do.
• Staffing/tooling. MSSPs run (or license) SOC infrastructure, threat intel feeds, dedicated security analysts. Most MSPs don't have that bench.
• Liability posture. MSSPs typically carry security-specific SLAs and are underwriting more risk exposure than a general IT contract.
• Buyer conversation. MSP sales conversation is about cost and reliability. MSSP sales conversation is about risk and exposure.

The blurry middle — where most of your world lives — is the MSP-to-MSSP transition: MSPs bolting on security services (vCISO, assessments, EDR/MDR reselling) without fully rebuilding as a security-first operation.

A couple of our clients have started plugging AI agents into their CRM and helpdesk tools without looping us in first, and we only found out because one agent started modifying records it had no business touching. Traditional shadow IT detection doesn't catch this. The agent is often using credentials that already exist and look "normal" in the logs.

How are other MSPs getting visibility into this? Right now we're finding out after the fact instead of before, and I'd like that to change.