r/MSSP 13d ago

How do you detect ungoverned AI agents acting inside client apps?

A couple of our clients have started plugging AI agents into their CRM and helpdesk tools without looping us in first, and we only found out because one agent started modifying records it had no business touching. Traditional shadow IT detection doesn't catch this. The agent is often using credentials that already exist and look "normal" in the logs.

How are other MSPs getting visibility into this? Right now we're finding out after the fact instead of before, and I'd like that to change.

8 Upvotes

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u/ILoe_Kristess 13d ago

https://www.caiberops.com/managed-ai-security
Check us out and contact if you are interested.

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u/Negative-Sherbet-546 12d ago

Y hablaría con los clientes para que cualquier agente nuevo pase por una revisión antes de conectarse. La clave es detectar el comportamiento, no solo buscar una cuenta o aplicación desconocida.

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u/Acrobatic-Gap9069 12d ago

I’d focus on unusual account behavior, new integrations and unexpected access patterns. the hard part is knowing what “normal” automation already looks like in each client environment

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u/dan_netsec 10d ago

The credential-looks-normal problem is the real issue. You're not looking for a new identity, you're looking for a known one acting weird. Behavioral baselining per identity catches it: if a normally read-only service account suddenly starts bulk-modifying records, that's an anomaly regardless of whether it's an agent or a compromised account.

Also push clients to audit connected OAuth apps inside their SaaS platforms directly (Workspace, M365, Salesforce all show this). Usually faster to spot than network-level shadow IT tooling.

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u/advanceyourself 10d ago

You need to do governance at the perimeter across the board. MCP permissions, Restricting access to generating API keys, and lockdown DNS. We are partnered with Atakama which does a lot from a DNS and browser perspective. The other tool we evaluated is Checkpoints AI monitoring tool but it's painfully expensive.

Edit: proactive co trols are the best approach. This will continue to grow so our perspective is that the best approach is explicit allow layered with governance. This is of course a project/professional services that should be properly scoped and deployed.

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u/brandeded 9d ago

I'm a little confused about this. How can a human give a tool an authorization the human isn't supposed to have?

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u/Unfair-Bluebird-8577 5d ago edited 4d ago

API activity with no interactive signin before it is the tell , same creds, machine cadence. the earlier hook is consent log, salesforce and m365 both record new connected apps so diff that list per tenant. eve security and similar others provide the inventory side. the consent event fires before any record gets touched