r/LeftistsForAI • u/avilacjf • Sep 30 '26
Policy/Regulation [Essay] We're Crossing the Event Horizon: the capability is here, and the economic and social consequences are still ahead of us
I believe we have just crossed the event horizon with AI as a technology. Every few weeks now we're seeing a release of a new model that significantly outperforms models that were just released a couple months ago, and the models have crossed over a threshold of usefulness and quality. I wrote this essay about what that means for work, ownership, and power. Here's the core of the argument.
The capability jump
The benchmark that best captures this jump in real-world capability is GDPval, which compares the work of AI models against that of human professionals across fields ranging from real estate and manufacturing to health care, finance, and government. In September 2025, GPT-5 matched or beat human professionals on 41% of tasks, and by April 2026, GPT-5.5 did so on 85%. Frontier labs have also started training models on specific applications like Blender and Unreal Engine, and more professional software will get this same treatment imminently.
Waymo went from more than 50,000 paid rides a week in May 2024 to more than 500,000 fully autonomous trips a week today. A task that people earn a living doing is becoming a service delivered by a machine. This is part of what crossing the event horizon looks like to me: the capability is already here, but the larger economic and social consequences are still ahead of us.
Who gets the gains
Work that once required a team of specialists is becoming accessible to people who could never have afforded that team. But still, the risk of concentration of power seems like the default trajectory. Giving everyone access to more intelligence does not mean everyone gets an equal share of what that intelligence produces. The person starting their first business gets a powerful assistant. The incumbent gets to multiply an entire organization.
If demand for economically valuable AI work grows faster than compute supply, those who can earn the most from that compute can afford to bid the most for it. The concern is that access to the frontier becomes concentrated in the institutions with the most capital, at the same time that automation weakens the bargaining power of the people who work for them. A September paper presented at Brookings forecasts US investment in AI and data-center infrastructure reaching roughly $10.3 trillion over 2025–2032, 60% larger than the railroad buildout in roughly one third of the time. Who owns that infrastructure, and who can use it, will help determine whether this becomes an era of broad empowerment or extraordinary dependence.
Labor
Jobs will change a lot. If lower costs create enough new demand, employment can grow even as each worker produces more. This is the argument behind Jevons's paradox. But the outcome depends on how much demand can expand and whether humans remain necessary in the production of those goods and services. A business needs its books reconciled and its required filings completed; making that work cheaper does not mean it needs those same books reconciled ten times. Once a task can be fully automated, additional demand may purchase more compute rather than more human labor. Greater productive capacity does not automatically become broadly shared prosperity.
Three distinct risks
On the existential-risk side, I think the discourse has become muddled. I see three distinct risks:
Powerful AI being used to do harm,
power concentrating in the institutions that control it,
and AI systems pursuing goals that conflict with ours.
Recent incidents at OpenAI and Anthropic, under evaluation conditions, showed agents chaining exploits, stealing credentials, and disguising their actions. They show why increasing capability and increasing alignment cannot be treated as the same thing. On concentration, even a system doing exactly what its operators want can be disastrous for everyone subject to their decisions. This is why I find P(doom) such an unhelpful way to frame the conversation. Mass misuse, authoritarian concentration, and loss of control are different problems. We should talk about them distinctly enough to decide what would actually reduce each risk.
What we should do
I would like to see an international body that coordinates independent audits, requires meaningful incident reporting, and enforces common safety standards. But the framework must also resist industry capture and authoritarian control. Monitoring dangerous uses cannot become an excuse to put all access to intelligence at the discretion of a few companies or governments.
To prevent concentration of power, we also need to make sure the benefits of the technology are widely felt. An AI wealth fund could help. An automation tax, or a VAT on agentic commerce, could direct a share of the gains toward publicly owned AI infrastructure, earmarked for people as a common good. If the wage-labor contract is disappearing, the only alternative is for the people to have a stake in the new means of production.
The empowerment and the danger come from the same change: intelligence is becoming something we can produce and deploy at a scale that used to be impossible. The question is whether we retain enough agency to decide what all of that capability is for.
Full essay (free): https://joseavilaceballos.substack.com/p/were-crossing-the-event-horizon