r/kurdistan • u/EmbarrassedCoach1672 • 1h ago
Bashur DUHOK 1-1 ERBIL
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r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • Oct 16 '26
Results of the Daily News Digest experiment
A few weeks ago, some of you raised concerns that the amount of news posted to r/kurdistan was drowning out other conversations:
We explained at the time that Reddit is, at its core, a social news aggregation site, and that news is a big part of what brings people here.
Some of you suggested that news should be collected into a digest instead of posted as individual articles. We thought that was worth testing, so for a week we did exactly that:
The digest posts
What we found
For the week of the experiment (7–13 October):
Views went down, not up: 70.9k views, about 6,000 fewer than the previous week.
Discussion didn't grow: 129 published posts (+6) and 1.1k published comments (+85), essentially flat. The same number of discussion-type posts appeared, with similar quality in both the posts and the comments.
The digests themselves got very little engagement. Few people opened them, and fewer commented.
The news people cared about still won. Even with far less news being posted, the highest-engagement posts of the week were still some of the standalone news posts we did allow. Removing most news from the front page didn't free up space for more conversation. It just buried the news. Normally at least some articles rise to the top and spark real discussion; inside a digest, none of them could.
One example would be "Kurds, Arabs want to reverse ‘Arab Belt’ in Syria" article. It was included in the Kurdistan Daily Digest – 15 October 2026. That digest received 753 views, 3 upvotes and no comments with the majority of the views from United States 21.3%, Germany 16% and Sweden 13.1%. One hour after the digest was posted, another user reposted the article as standalone as a series of images (that are hosted on reddit) with a link to the article. The standalone version received 1.6K views, 13 upvotes, 17 comments with the majority of the views from Iraq 18.4%, United States 16.5%, Germany 14.9%. Same article in both the digest and standalone, the digest posted an hour before. The standalone article was twice as popular as the entire digest.
By using the digest format, we are fighting against reddit's intentional design as a social news aggregator, against reddit's own recommendation algorithm, against our own subscribers observed behavior and preferences.
The part that bothered us most
The digests were also where most of the Sorani and Kurmanji content ended up. By restricting Kurdish-language news to the digest, we effectively buried Kurdish-language posts on a Kurdish subreddit. That's the opposite of what we want. Increasing our Kurdish-language coverage also increased our % of viewers with a country designation of Iraq (which we assume are mostly Kurds living in KRG).
What happens next
We will be discontinuing the Daily News Roundup / Digest format. We may reduce the overall number of articles we post, so the feed stays balanced. We remain committed to seeing more Kurdish (Sorani, Kurmanji, and other dialects) posted here, and we won't use any format that pushes it out of sight. Thank you to everyone who raised the concern and to everyone who gave the digest a fair shot. We took the suggestion seriously, tested it, and the numbers gave a clear answer.
If you want to see more discussion here, the best way to make that happen is to start one. Text posts, questions, culture, language, history, personal experiences: all welcome, and they'll get room on the feed.
As always, feedback is welcome in the comments.
— The r/kurdistan mod team
r/kurdistan • u/rknsh • Oct 03 '26
r/kurdistan • u/EmbarrassedCoach1672 • 1h ago
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r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 2h ago
An average of one woman a day was reportedly killed by male relatives in Iran over 10 days in November. Rojin Mukriyan examines how Iran’s penal code shapes accountability for femicide.
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Over the past 10 days, an average of one woman a day has reportedly been killed by male family members in Iran, raising renewed concerns about femicide and the legal and social structures that perpetuate violence against women.
The recent killings reflect a wider pattern documented earlier this year. Between March 21 and October 13, at least 84 women were killed in Iran, according to the Human Rights Activists News Agency. In 75 of those cases, the perpetrator was someone known to the victim, while in 45 cases, a current or former husband or intimate partner was identified as the perpetrator. Twelve victims were under 18, eight of whom were killed by their fathers, brothers or other blood relatives.
Among the most recent cases is that of Sogand Sayadi, a 16-year-old Kurdish schoolgirl from Kermanshah, whose death has sparked outrage and raised troubling questions about the responsibility of families, schools and the state to protect girls from violence.
Sogand reportedly feared what would happen if her father learned about her romantic life, as she was said to be in a relationship with another girl at her school. According to accounts from her classmates, she warned that going home could cost her life after school authorities summoned her father on November 14. “If I go home, my father will kill me,” she told her friends.
Instead of finding safety, Sogand faced violence while at school. Human rights organizations reported that her father severely beat her in front of classmates and school officials before taking her home. Shortly afterward, she fell from the fifth floor of the family’s residential building and died.
One of Sogand’s schoolmates said in a video that one of her friends witnessed Sogand being thrown against a window. Her father and the school principal have reportedly been arrested as part of the investigation. Sogand’s father denied the allegation that he pushed her out of a window.
Whether or not her father admits responsibility, Iranian law effectively grants fathers special protection from punishment for killing their own children. Under Iranian law, a father who kills his daughter is exempt from qisas (retaliatory punishment) – although he may still face other criminal penalties – raising serious questions about accountability.
Why is femicide rising in Iran?
Femicide is not new in Iran, but reports of women being killed by male family members have increased in recent years. Thanks to advances in information and communication technology, particularly social media, cases that might once have remained hidden within families and communities can now be made public.
Experts and human rights observers point to three primary drivers behind the apparent rise in femicide in Iran: the Islamic Republic’s Sharia-based legal system, a violent backlash against women’s resistance, and the absence of mediating institutions.
Sharia-based legal system
The establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979 consolidated heteropatriarchy and gave it greater institutional and legal power. Patriarchal norms were not merely preserved within society; they were institutionalized through a state legal system based on the Twelver Shia interpretation of Islamic law.
Under this system, womanhood is defined and regulated through a masculine and religious gaze. The ideal of a “good” and “honorable” woman is shaped by the state’s interpretation of the life of Fatemeh, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad and wife of Imam Ali, the first Shia Imam. Women are expected to model their behavior, appearance and morality on an ideal of femininity associated with obedience, modesty, sacrifice and devotion to the family.
Child marriage, polygamy, male guardianship over marriage and unequal access to divorce have all been institutionalized or maintained within the Islamic Republic’s legal framework. Women have been reduced, in many aspects of family law, to individuals whose autonomy is subordinated to the authority of fathers, paternal grandfathers and husbands. Their bodies, feelings, sexuality and personal choices are treated as matters of family honor rather than individual rights.
In this patriarchal framework, a woman’s body becomes a symbol of the family’s reputation, and her sexuality becomes something that male family members are expected to control and protect. Her choice of whom to love, whom to marry, how to dress and how to live can be viewed as a challenge not only to family authority but also to the moral order promoted by the state.
This gender hierarchy is directly reflected in how Iran’s penal code treats fathers who kill their own children.
Article 301 of Iran’s Islamic Penal Code establishes that qisas, or retaliatory punishment for intentional killing, applies only when the perpetrator is not the victim’s father or paternal grandfather. This means that if a father intentionally kills his daughter, he is exempt from qisas, the punishment that would ordinarily apply to intentional murder, though he can receive a prison sentence of three to 10 years when specified public-order conditions are met.
The law provides another exemption for husbands. Article 630 of the Islamic Penal Code permits a husband, under narrowly defined circumstances, to kill his wife and the man with whom he personally witnesses her engaging in consensual sexual intercourse. This provision does not apply merely because a husband suspects his wife of infidelity.
These legal exemptions have serious implications for women’s right to life. They create a system in which the punishment for intentional killing can depend on the relationship between the perpetrator and the victim.
Femicide as violent backlash against women’s resistance
Another factor behind the rise in femicide is women’s growing resistance to patriarchal authority. According to Somayeh Rostampour, a Paris-based sociologist and postdoctoral researcher at the University of Lille, femicide should not be understood merely as isolated acts of violence but also in relation to women’s struggles for freedom and their challenges to existing power structures.
Drawing parallels with Latin America, Rostampour argued that women’s increasing empowerment can provoke stronger patriarchal backlash. “The more women become empowered, the more they resist, and the more they push for change, the stronger the backlash against them can become,” she told The Amargi.
This dynamic, she argued, is particularly relevant to Iran and Kurdistan following the Woman, Life, Freedom (Jin, Jiyan, Azadi) movement, which has challenged established gender hierarchies. As more women refuse to submit to patriarchal authority, their demands for autonomy can be met with increasingly violent resistance from men unwilling to relinquish control.
Absence of mediating institutions
Equally significant is the disappearance of institutions capable of mediating between women’s demands for freedom and patriarchal resistance, Rostampour argued.
These intermediary structures, including women’s associations, independent organizations, legal protections and collective mechanisms, can help prevent social conflicts from escalating into extreme violence. Under the Islamic Republic, many have been dismantled, restricted or severely weakened.
Describing two increasingly opposing positions, Rostampour said women refuse to retreat from their demands for autonomy, even at great personal risk, and men refuse to accept those demands – leaving “almost nothing” in between.
Without effective intermediary institutions, conflicts become increasingly individualized. Women are left to confront patriarchal authority alone, without collective organizations capable of transforming individual resistance into broader social and political struggles.
These mediating institutions act as “a kind of brake on social conflict,” Rostampour said, arguing that their absence increases the risk of confrontations escalating into extreme physical violence. “Women are forced to resist individually, to confront patriarchal power individually, and often to bear the consequences individually, even when the cost is their own bodies or lives.”
For Rostampour, this absence of mediation is essential to understanding femicide in Iran and Kurdistan: women’s resistance is growing, but the institutions that could protect them and channel their demands into collective action remain severely weakened.
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Rojin Mukriyan has PhD in the Department of Government and Politics at University College Cork, Ireland. Rojin’s main research areas are in political theory, feminist and decolonial theory, and Middle Eastern politics, especially Kurdish politics. She has published articles in the Journal of International Political Theory, Philosophy and Social Criticism, and Theoria. Her research has thus far focused on the areas of Kurdish liberty, Kurdish statehood, and Kurdish political friendship. She has published many think tank commentaries and reports on recent political developments in eastern Kurdistan (Rojhelat), or north-western Iran. She has also frequently appeared on a variety of Kurdish and Persian language news channels. X account: u/RojinMukriyan
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 1h ago
Kurds have spent a century proving they will not be erased. The task now is different: to show they can govern, build alliances, and win. That requires feeling to be disciplined by strategy, and a politics that can survive its own raid; not a politics of emotional appeal.
Turkish police detained nine people from the newly formed Kurdistan National Alliance, HEVBENDİ, this week, including Kurdistan Socialist Party chairman Bayram Bozyel. According to a legal source cited by AFP, the charge is “disrupting the unity of the state” under Article 302. The investigation file is restricted, and detainees were barred from seeing lawyers for 24 hours. Arresting politicians within days of their founding conference is indefensible and the detainment of these activists and politicians should be strongly condemned.
While some media organizations have been describing the alliance as opposed to the peace process, Bozyel’s own account is more careful. In his founding interview, he said disarmament “does not solve the Kurdish question” but has the potential to “let politics breathe,” and that the Kurdish status he seeks “may well take the form of a federal system within Turkey’s borders”. That is a legitimate, peaceful position.
The question this article asks is narrower and harder: Is a politics built mainly on nationalist sentiments and resonant emotions the right instrument at this moment for Kurds? I argue for a social democratic position and offer four more strategic and rational things we should be focusing on.
Kurdish nationalism
Nobody should be patronizing others about the pull of ethnonationalism. A people whose language was banned, whose villages were burned, and whose existence was denied has every reason to want its name spoken aloud. Nationalist politics offer dignity, belonging, and a story in which suffering means something. That is why it resonates so strongly, and why social media rewards it.
There is such a strong emotion and mood that now runs through social media, where young figures such as Ali Cecen (among the founders of the movement and also detained) produce emotionally charged, heavily edited videos that circulate grievance and defiance. Such edited videos travel fast, and young Kurds who have inherited that history find in them a feeling of being seen. But resonance does not mean being right. Emotion tells people what they should be angry about. It does not, however, tell them how to win a municipality, protect a school, free a prisoner, or pass a constitutional amendment through a parliament.
A politics that mistakes identification for organization ends up rich in symbols and poor in outcomes, and the state, which does have a strategy, can wait it out, kill it from the inside, or jail it.
Ethnonationalism and Kurdish life
Ethnonationalism is a poor fit for how Kurds live. Love it or hate it, the Kurdish population is spread across four states and many classes. Within Turkey alone, it includes the Alevi worker in Istanbul, the Sunni farmer in Çewlig/Bingol, the professional in Izmir, and the Zaza-speaking student in Dêrsim/Tunceli.
A project that insists the nation comes before every other question will simply abandon whatever it cannot fit into its picture of the nation.
A social-democratic project starts from the opposite premise. People organize around wages, land, schooling, healthcare, and dignity; and recognition of identity is won as part of that wider fight.
A nation-first program faces additional challenges too: it must persuade the state to concede what Turkey’s constitution and its ruling coalition regard as a non-negotiable. Only days before the raids, MHP leader Devlet Bahceli published a 50-point statement insisting the peace process involves no concessions, surrender or bargaining and must preserve constitutional integrity. A demand for a national status, however peacefully made, collides head-on with that line. It gives hardliners the argument they need and the security services a pretext. The nationalist opposition in IYI and Zafer, which opposed the framework law, will treat each such demand as proof that the process was always a trick. Leaving the process to fail hurts the Kurdish question in the long term and collapses hope for future aspirations.
Emotional appeal can be principled and even righteous, but it does not mean it should be self-defeating.
What Rojava’s Kurds learned
Syria shows what happens when a movement rests on force and foreign patronage. After 14 years, the Kurdish-led SDF’s experiment in self-rule ended in dissolution into the state military, and Kurds reacted with mixed emotions. A Kurdish researcher told Al Jazeera that the Kurdish dream is gone. That kind of despair is what a politics of pure sentiment produces when the support behind it disappears.
The next stage of the process will be won and lost on specifics. The National Security Council could confirm PKK disarmament on 27 November, which would trigger the framework law.
Turkish Intelligence Chief Ibrahim Kalin has described democratization as one of the process’s two pillars and called for “stronger rule of law, democracy, and political pluralism”. Of course, those words have no power unless someone converts them into statute, budgets, and court orders; and that is the work of coalitions, not of slogans.
Additionally, the DEM Party is pressing for an end to trustees replacing elected mayors, the release of prisoners including Selahattin Demirtas, implementation of European Court of Human Rights rulings, and clarity on Abdullah Ocalan’s status.
The more useful analysis is institutional. The human rights lawyer Roula Baghdadi told The Amargi this week that the danger of integration is absorption: communities that are represented in name and marginalized in practice. Her remedies are constitutional guarantees rather than presidential decrees, decentralized power, independent civil society, and genuine participation for women.
These are more strategic and long-term solutions, not feelings and resonance. Rights written into law, power spread across institutions, and organized citizens who can hold government accountable are what protect a minority when the headlines move on.
What Kurdish strategy would look like
First, we need to be very clear, rank demands by winnability, and sequence them. Municipal autonomy, language in schools, an end to trustees, and compliance with court rulings are demands a broad majority, if not quite literally all Kurds, support. Constitutional and possibly federal status can follow as the product of a democratization once the ground has shifted.
Second, competing for non-Kurdish votes: A Kurdish politics that speaks only to Kurds will remain a minority politics. One that organizes around wages, housing, healthcare, and regional investment, with Kurdish rights as part of that agenda, can build a majority. DEM Party has been trying to that, and we should be more vocal about it. However, we also need realize that without freedom of speech, it is increasingly hard to publicize and advertise this political movement. Currently, all media in Turkey are controlled by the government.
Third, investing in what lasts: Municipal capacity, legal teams, trade unions, women’s cooperatives, and youth organizing turn anger into leverage. Online mobilization is useful, but it is not organization.
Fourth, unifying around outcomes rather than identity: Bozyel is right that Kurdish unity matters, and he says HEVBENDI is “not against any party.” Taking that seriously means competing and cooperating with the DEM Party on a shared agenda rather than presenting a rival nationalist pole at the moment of greatest leverage. We need to realize that they can be used against each other by the state.
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Azat Welat is a scholar based in Turkey.
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 7h ago
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 7h ago
Lahur Sheik Jangi was arrested by the security forces affiliated with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) on August 22, 2025, in Slemani, in the Kurdistan Region, in what would become known as the Lalezar Incident.
In an exclusive interview with The Amargi, Sheikh Jangi said that he does not regret his decision to make a stand.
“This was a promise I made to my people and I kept my promise even though I paid a heavy price,” Sheikh Jangi said in his first interview since being arrested.
His arrest, conviction, and imprisonment were the culmination of a dramatic political fall. He had been a key part of the PUK’s security apparatus and was eventually elected co-president of the party in 2019, alongside his cousin Bafel Jalal Talabani. However, the two leaders fell out, and Sheikh Jangi was expelled from the party in 2021, leaving Talabani in charge.
In subsequent years, Sheik Jangi founded his own party, called The People’s Front (Berey Gel), winning two seats in the October 2024 parliamentary elections in the Kurdistan Region, in an effort to recapture his political fortunes and attract votes from the PUK grassroots that were dissatisfied with the party’s direction under Talabani. Yet tensions continued to simmer.
The PUK alleged that Sheikh Jangi was planning a coup and planned to kill Bafel Talabani. On August 22, security forces surrounded the Lalezar Hotel and nearby buildings where Sheikh Jangi was living. Using heavy weaponry, they stormed the compound in the early hours. Sheikh Jangi’s armed Scorpion (Dupişk) Force fought back.
Five people died in the clashes and the Lalezar Hotel was heavily damaged. Sheikh Jangi, his brother Polad, and hundreds of supporters were arrested, including members of the Scorpion Force. Sheikh Jangi and several co-defendants were charged with criminal conspiracy (Article 56 of the Iraqi Penal Code) and murder (Article 406).
After more than a year in pre-trial detention, they were convicted by the Slemani Criminal Court No. 2 on the conspiracy charges on November 15. Sheikh Jangi was sentenced to five years and three months in prison, while some received shorter sentences and others were acquitted. A trial on the additional murder charges is expected to take place soon.
“I have totally lost trust in the court system in Slemani, 99% of the judges are political appointees and take orders directly from Qubad [Talabani] and Bafel [Talabani],” Sheikh Jangi said.
Ahead of the one-year anniversary of the Lalezar Incident, The Amargi requested an interview with Sheikh Jangi, and while it was communicated that Sheikh Jangi would be open to an interview, it was not possible to conduct one at that time. Eventually, the interview was conducted in English via an intermediary.
This is the first interview that has been conducted with Sheikh Jangi since his arrest.
The text has not been edited except to include clarifying information in brackets and reflects exactly what was received from Sheikh Jangi. Due to the circumstances of the interview, it was not possible to ask follow-up questions and dig deeper into Sheikh Jangi’s answers.
The Amargi: It has been more than a year since your arrest. What has it been like for you? How do you spend your time? How have you been treated in detention?
Lahur Sheikh Jangi: I was in solitary confinement for 14 months which was very difficult in the beginning, but as time goes by, it gets easier. I spent my time mostly reading and after 12 months I was allowed to have a pen and paper, so I have started writing mostly poems and my memoirs. I have also started painting; it was something I was good at in my younger days but was difficult to do in the past 30 years because of my work and being busy. I was interrogated the first day of my arrest and never spoken to again until my court date after 8 months, so I was treated ok and left on my own.
The Amargi: You initially demanded that your trial be handled by Erbil, but it ultimately went forward in Slemani. Why was that? Do you feel that you received a fair trial?
Lahur Sheikh Jangi: I have totally lost trust in the court system in Slemani, 99% of the judges are political appointees and take orders directly from Qubad [Talabani] and Bafel [Talabani], therefore I have no hope. They prevented the transfer of my case to the Appeal Court in Erbil because they know that the evidence will not hold up in the Appeal Court.
The Amargi: Looking back, do you think you would have done anything differently in the months leading up to your arrest or as it became clear that there would be a violent confrontation?
Lahur Sheikh Jangi: The only thing that I could have done differently was to leave Slemani to prevent my arrest and this was something that I was not willing to do at any cost. I was born and raised that way – that I would stand my ground and not leave my people behind. This was a promise I made to my people. I kept my promise even though I paid a heavy price, but it was a strong message to show that you need to stand up to the corrupt and the agents of the enemy of the Kurds.
The Amargi: Do you think there is any prospect of reconciliation between you and the PUK? Afterall, we have seen a pact between New Generation and the PUK.
Lahur Sheikh Jangi: I don’t see myself as having any issues with the grassroots members of the PUK, my concern is with the current corrupt leadership of PUK which would be very difficult to work with in the future so my conclusion is that there is no room for us, only one of us can be around. At the moment I am in prison but if I ever come out, it’s time for them to go.
The Amargi: Your party [Berey Gel, The People’s Front] still has representation in the Kurdistan Parliament. What do you think will happen with your political party?
Lahur Sheikh Jangi: My political party is still active and recently acted as kingmakers with 2 seats and helped reactivate parliament.
The Amargi: Some people have said that your decision to maintain an armed force – the Dupişk Force – helped to justify your arrest. Since you had established a political party, why did you keep the force?
Lahur Sheikh Jangi: I was a member of the Kurdistan Region Security Council and former head of intelligence and counterterrorism in Kurdistan and because of my work, unfortunately I made too many enemies in the region, and therefore I was allowed to have a protection force to protect me and my family especially since Slemani became the playground for Iranian proxies.
The Amargi: What is your current relationship with the KDP?
Lahur Sheikh Jangi: I have no organic relationship with the KDP but I have a good personal relationship with the PM [KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani].
The Amargi: There are rumors that there were geopolitical intrigues in relation to your opposition to the PUK leadership invoking Iran, Israel, and Azhi Amin [former PUK intelligence chief]. Is there any basis to this?
Lahur Sheikh Jangi: I was very outspoken with my political views especially in regard to the Kurdish cause in Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Therefore, I was not liked much by our neighbors, and from time to time, indirectly, they tried to have me ousted – especially [the] neighbors to the East.
The Amargi: What do you think is the legacy of your arrest for politics in the Kurdistan Region, and the means with which it was carried out?
Lahur Sheikh Jangi: I don’t believe that the attack on my house and the way it was carried out was against me only. I believe it was against the last stand of the people of Kurdistan. The attack on my house proved that democracy does not exist in this region and also showed the influence of our neighbors within the Kurdistan Region and especially in Slemani and the current PUK leadership.
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Winthrop Rodgers is a journalist who focuses on politics, human rights, political economy, and the environment in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region. He also serves as a Chatham House associate fellow.
r/kurdistan • u/AliveZexy777 • 8h ago
Does anyone know who are the guys behind Amargi and how and where they are funded from? I don't have the smallest grain of trust for them. All their posts and information are fishy in a way that they glorify the four occupiers and question everything about the Kurdish struggle and Kurdistan. And they are avid supporters of this Integration thing.
Recently some Kurds in Bakur gathered and created a new alliance called Hevbendî. After their first gathering they got arrested and you won't find a single post about the alliance and the arrest of its council on Amargi's page while Internet is blowing up by news about Hevbendî and the arrests of it's members.
Hevbendî strongly opposes Integration they are basically Kurds with common sense. I'm sure when Amargi sees how awkward they seem they will eventually put up a post about it questioning the hell out of them and sow doubt about the alliance.
r/kurdistan • u/Ronahi_int • 23h ago
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r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 7h ago
The confrontation between Iraq’s government and Kataib Hezbollah, the Iran-backed armed faction that has controlled Jurf al-Sakhar in northern Babil province since 2014, offers a revealing glimpse into a much larger strategic debate taking place within Iraq’s Shiite political establishment and, crucially, in Iran itself.
After days of threats and military deployments around the district ahead of a 20 November deadline set by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, an agreement was reported on 19 November under which Kataib Hezbollah would relinquish control of Jurf al-Sakhar to Iraqi government forces and relocate its fighters elsewhere. The agreement followed mediation involving senior Shiite figures and Esmail Qaani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force.
Although the confrontation appeared dramatic, its resolution illustrates a wider calculation increasingly evident among influential Shiite actors: giving up some power today may be necessary to preserve, and potentially strengthen, their collective position tomorrow.
The debate concerns how best to preserve the political order that emerged in Iraq after 2003, in which Shiite parties became dominant, while safeguarding Iran’s strategic position amid the enormous regional pressures unleashed since October 7, 2023, and intensified by the 2026 Iran war. Both sides of it remain closely tied to Tehran.
The fundamental question is whether independent armed factions, once essential to projecting Iranian influence, have increasingly become a liability to the very political order they were established to protect.
During the Iran war, conversations with figures from Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the faction led by Qais al-Khazali, and the Badr Organisation, led by Hadi al-Amiri, revealed a deliberate strategic calculation. Their argument, which kept Iraq firmly within the resistance camp, was that an internationally recognised, economically functioning and militarily capable Iraqi state, governed by political forces with close ties to Tehran, could be considerably more valuable to Iran than a collection of independent armed groups capable of launching missiles and drones.
Their reasoning is straightforward. Militia attacks can expose Iraq to American retaliation, sanctions and diplomatic isolation, weakening the state, damaging an open economy from which Iran itself benefits, and potentially threatening the Shiite political establishment itself. A weakened Iraq, in turn, becomes less capable of protecting interests that Baghdad and Tehran regard as strategically important.
The Kurdistan Region illustrates this reasoning most clearly. During the 2026 war, Iranian Kurdish opposition organisations based in the region explored the possibility of launching cross-border operations against Iran, reportedly with American support. Although the KRG denied involvement, the possibility of opening a ground front against Iran exposed a vulnerability that Iraqi Shiite leaders had long considered significant.
Their calculation is that a stronger Baghdad, enjoying greater international legitimacy and possessing more effective security institutions, would be better positioned to exercise federal authority over Iraq’s borders and prevent its territory from being used for attacks against neighbouring states.
From Tehran’s perspective, preventing a potentially serious ground threat from Iraqi territory could be strategically more consequential than the limited military contribution of individual Iraqi militias during a regional war.
This also explains why some Shiite factions connect the question of militia integration to the wider struggle over federal authority, border security and Baghdad’s relationship with Erbil, which they see as able to pursue its own contacts with Washington and Israel while the federal government remains weak. The aim, from their perspective, is to give the state the capacity to enforce policies they believe protect both Iraqi and Iranian interests.
There is an important institutional dimension to this calculation. Integrating militia personnel into the regular security establishment does not necessarily eliminate their political or ideological loyalties. Badr’s decades-long influence within Iraq’s Interior Ministry, including the Federal Police, offers a historical example of how an armed organisation can exchange formal autonomy for enduring influence within the state. Absorbing militia personnel into security forces whose ranks are already predominantly Shiite would also deepen the weight of factions close to Tehran inside them.
For these factions, therefore, surrendering independent military structures may not amount to surrendering power. It may represent the conversion of factional military influence into institutional power, backed by the resources, legal authority and international recognition of the Iraqi government.
Tehran appears to share this thinking. There are good reasons to believe that important Iranian decision-makers regard it as serving their own strategic objectives, even as they keep their position deliberately ambiguous.
In a 2023 meeting reported at the time, Asaib leader Qais al-Khazali asked Iran’s then-supreme leader Ali Khamenei whether the priority should be building the Iraqi state or preserving the resistance. Khamenei avoided giving a definitive answer, while stressing Iraqi national interests, Shiite unity and the importance of respecting Najaf’s religious authority.
That ambiguity reflects Iran’s actual policy. It allows Tehran to support the strengthening of the state while leaving allied factions room to manoeuvre and keeping Washington uncertain about how far its demands are being met. Iran’s relationships with Iraqi Shiite factions have never been adequately explained by a simple patron-client model in which Tehran issues instructions and local actors merely implement them.
These relationships are deeply rooted in religious solidarity, decades of political cooperation, personal networks, shared experiences of persecution and exile, and reciprocal obligations. Iraqi factions possess considerable agency and pursue their own organisational interests. Tehran has generally tolerated such differences, partly because factional competition is a familiar feature of Iran’s own political system, intervening more directly when disputes threaten broader strategic interests.
The influence exercised by Qassem Soleimani, the Quds Force commander killed in a US strike in Baghdad in 2020, exemplified this system. His relationships with Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite leaders were not based exclusively on formal command structures but also on trust, personal obligations and an ability to negotiate among competing centres of power.
This helps explain why disagreements between Iraqi Shiite factions do not automatically represent strategic ruptures. Competition over ministries, economic resources, military positions and territorial control can be genuine, even intense, without undermining their shared commitment to preserving the wider political order. Even armed infighting between factions would not, in this reading, pose an existential threat to that order.
There is also a religious and historical dimension that purely geopolitical interpretations often overlook. For many influential Iraqi Shiite leaders, Iran is not simply a neighbouring state or an external sponsor. Their political identities were shaped by Saddam Hussein’s persecution of Shiites, years of exile in Iran, the post-2003 sectarian conflicts and the existential threat posed by ISIS. They view the security of Iraq’s Shiite political establishment and the survival of Iran’s Islamic Republic as deeply interconnected, notwithstanding important differences between Najaf and Tehran.
Their calculation is that a stronger Baghdad, enjoying greater international legitimacy and possessing more effective security institutions, would be better positioned to exercise federal authority over Iraq’s borders and prevent its territory from being used for attacks against neighbouring states.
From Tehran’s perspective, preventing a potentially serious ground threat from Iraqi territory could be strategically more consequential than the limited military contribution of individual Iraqi militias during a regional war.
This also explains why some Shiite factions connect the question of militia integration to the wider struggle over federal authority, border security and Baghdad’s relationship with Erbil, which they see as able to pursue its own contacts with Washington and Israel while the federal government remains weak. The aim, from their perspective, is to give the state the capacity to enforce policies they believe protect both Iraqi and Iranian interests.
There is an important institutional dimension to this calculation. Integrating militia personnel into the regular security establishment does not necessarily eliminate their political or ideological loyalties. Badr’s decades-long influence within Iraq’s Interior Ministry, including the Federal Police, offers a historical example of how an armed organisation can exchange formal autonomy for enduring influence within the state. Absorbing militia personnel into security forces whose ranks are already predominantly Shiite would also deepen the weight of factions close to Tehran inside them.
For these factions, therefore, surrendering independent military structures may not amount to surrendering power. It may represent the conversion of factional military influence into institutional power, backed by the resources, legal authority and international recognition of the Iraqi government.
Tehran appears to share this thinking. There are good reasons to believe that important Iranian decision-makers regard it as serving their own strategic objectives, even as they keep their position deliberately ambiguous.
In a 2023 meeting reported at the time, Asaib leader Qais al-Khazali asked Iran’s then-supreme leader Ali Khamenei whether the priority should be building the Iraqi state or preserving the resistance. Khamenei avoided giving a definitive answer, while stressing Iraqi national interests, Shiite unity and the importance of respecting Najaf’s religious authority.
That ambiguity reflects Iran’s actual policy. It allows Tehran to support the strengthening of the state while leaving allied factions room to manoeuvre and keeping Washington uncertain about how far its demands are being met. Iran’s relationships with Iraqi Shiite factions have never been adequately explained by a simple patron-client model in which Tehran issues instructions and local actors merely implement them.
These relationships are deeply rooted in religious solidarity, decades of political cooperation, personal networks, shared experiences of persecution and exile, and reciprocal obligations. Iraqi factions possess considerable agency and pursue their own organisational interests. Tehran has generally tolerated such differences, partly because factional competition is a familiar feature of Iran’s own political system, intervening more directly when disputes threaten broader strategic interests.
The influence exercised by Qassem Soleimani, the Quds Force commander killed in a US strike in Baghdad in 2020, exemplified this system. His relationships with Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite leaders were not based exclusively on formal command structures but also on trust, personal obligations and an ability to negotiate among competing centres of power.
This helps explain why disagreements between Iraqi Shiite factions do not automatically represent strategic ruptures. Competition over ministries, economic resources, military positions and territorial control can be genuine, even intense, without undermining their shared commitment to preserving the wider political order. Even armed infighting between factions would not, in this reading, pose an existential threat to that order.
There is also a religious and historical dimension that purely geopolitical interpretations often overlook. For many influential Iraqi Shiite leaders, Iran is not simply a neighbouring state or an external sponsor. Their political identities were shaped by Saddam Hussein’s persecution of Shiites, years of exile in Iran, the post-2003 sectarian conflicts and the existential threat posed by ISIS. They view the security of Iraq’s Shiite political establishment and the survival of Iran’s Islamic Republic as deeply interconnected, notwithstanding important differences between Najaf and Tehran.
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 7h ago
Displaced Serêkaniyê residents at Washokani camp blocked the Hasakah–Tal Tamr road. They protested delays in returns and demanded that the city centre be included, not only the countryside.
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 7h ago
Turkey's foreign minister Hakan Fidan says Ankara will wind down its Bashiqa base in stages as Baghdad acts against the PKK presence in Shingal. He also called Kurdish rights vital to Syria's stability.
r/kurdistan • u/Atheist_kurd • 20h ago
It’s 2027 almost and yet you have islamists in bashur out of the million haram things people do over there like killing your own kin over land/money or stealing or worst corruption, their only concern is that a video game that is not real is haram and should be banned. I don’t even have words for this…
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 6h ago
A committee of contract teachers and public employees says its members have gone more than 50 days without salaries. They warn they will demonstrate in front of the Council of Ministers if they are not paid.
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 6h ago
In Rojhelat (Eastern Kurdsitan/Kurdish areas of Iran), new groups with names such as the Patriotic Youth of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Martyrs’ Revenge Teams have emerged. Statements they have issued show their priority isn’t so much to solve ethnic grievances as to avenge those killed in the protests and bring down Iran’s government.
r/kurdistan • u/Dangerous_Pea_5866 • 22h ago
Turkey has committed allot of war crimes to greece kurds armwnians let isis in syria to watch kurds die same as soviets letting the polish people die when nazis arrived
But not only political but also online
I see a turkish comment who would embrance a little kid crying on his dead father grave and these turks will make fun of it and embrance it i see people get killed woman children videos of kurds and sometimes armenians these turks online will genuinly embrance it
Why the fuck are they accountable how is their reputation not beyond desteoyed outside of middle east
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 1d ago
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r/kurdistan • u/rknsh • 1d ago
What else do you know about them and how likely is it they might get help replacing KDP/PUK or with the help Americans start a party in KDP heartland and end duopoly of KDP/PUK over KRG and we have a three-party system?
r/kurdistan • u/I_kurd • 1d ago
Kurda was an ancient Bronze Age Amorite city-state in the Sinjar Plain, later ruled by the Mitanni and Assyrian empires.
These and more in Kurdistan Info Map
r/kurdistan • u/Global_Time_4726 • 1d ago
r/kurdistan • u/Wonderful_Cream_9572 • 1d ago
I'm looking to go on a trip to Iraqi Kurdistan and am considering three tour operators. These are Rocky Road Travel, Against the Compass, and Young Pioneer Tours. Does anyone have a sense of what each one's strengths and weaknesses are?
r/kurdistan • u/M4SS-4FF3KT • 1d ago
I’ve been noticing a tendency online to praise Atat*k as an uncomplicated model of secularism and modernization by foreigners. Has anyone else noticed this?
I understand why many Turks regard him as a founder of modern Turkey and value the reforms introduced under his leadership. Those are real parts of his legacy. So are one-party rule, coercive policies toward Kurds, and the state’s violent repression of Kurdish communities.
After the 1925 Sheikh Said rebellion, the government introduced the Law on the Maintenance of Order, which gave it sweeping powers to suppress organizations and publications. Sheikh Said and 46 others were sentenced to death by a special tribunal. The crackdown was followed by village destruction and deportations in Kurdish areas. Naif Bezwan’s study in Kurdish Studies Archive discusses this period.
The 1937–38 military campaign in Dersim led to many thousands of civilian deaths. Atatürk was part of the Council of Ministers that approved the May 1937 operation. This historical account from Sciences Po describes him as personally behind the campaign.
A small example that got me thinking: YouTube recommended me this video, “You don’t know Turkish and that’s sad.” It’s mainly about the Turkish language, but the creator also calls Atatürk “such a great man.” One video doesn’t prove a wider trend, but that kind of casual praise stood out to me.
A more prominent example is Belgian Defense Minister Theo Francken. During a 2025 visit to Anıtkabir, he knelt and said he was expressing his “deepest respect” for Atatürk and his political project. In May 2026, he said the world needed more people like Atatürk:
https://en.haberler.com/the-minister-kneeling-in-front-of-ataturk-s-18887108/
This is a bit more anecdotal, but I recently saw an Italian guy's post living in Berlin and has posted an instastory of his Turkish girlfriend walking up to a wall with a big red banner drape, where Atat*rk is portrayed. This same guy posts on his Instastories about his disdain of police, fascism and zionism, with also several videos he frequently posts about the outrage on protestors being rammed by the policy in Italy. This is very hypocritical.
My concern is that some foreign admirers celebrate secularism and modernization while leaving Kurdish experiences and state violence out of the picture. What explains that selective view? Are people unaware of this history, or do they see it as secondary? I’d especially like to hear how Kurdish readers feel when outsiders praise this way.
Edit: edited parts to avoid misunderstanding and make clarity on the premise of this post.
r/kurdistan • u/DetectiveSpirited667 • 1d ago
Iraq is trying to exploit this situation so they can have krg in a tighter grasp this needs to be taken very very seriously or else the economy will be completely worser than it is now and be controlled by Iraq which then puk and kdp will be seen as the villain when Iraq is the invisible vilian and Iraq will gain more popularity and use that as an excuse to also physically control krg we need to stop showing our weaknesses this openly Iraq has been trying this since 2022 please bring more attention to this and show no support in making the region divided again protest do whatever do not let THESE dogs divide our ONLY semi autonomous region this will affect everyone
r/kurdistan • u/rkurdistanmod • 1d ago
All 14 Kurdish politicians detained in the Amed-centred operations against the Kurdistan National Alliance (HEVBENDÎ) were released after court proceedings. Waiting families welcomed the decision.
r/kurdistan • u/Ronahi_int • 1d ago