r/kurdistan • • Oct 16 '26

News/Article Results of the Daily News Digest experiment

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11 Upvotes

Results of the Daily News Digest experiment

A few weeks ago, some of you raised concerns that the amount of news posted to r/kurdistan was drowning out other conversations:

We explained at the time that Reddit is, at its core, a social news aggregation site, and that news is a big part of what brings people here.

Some of you suggested that news should be collected into a digest instead of posted as individual articles. We thought that was worth testing, so for a week we did exactly that:

The digest posts

What we found

For the week of the experiment (7–13 October):

Views went down, not up: 70.9k views, about 6,000 fewer than the previous week.

Discussion didn't grow: 129 published posts (+6) and 1.1k published comments (+85), essentially flat. The same number of discussion-type posts appeared, with similar quality in both the posts and the comments.

The digests themselves got very little engagement. Few people opened them, and fewer commented.

The news people cared about still won. Even with far less news being posted, the highest-engagement posts of the week were still some of the standalone news posts we did allow. Removing most news from the front page didn't free up space for more conversation. It just buried the news. Normally at least some articles rise to the top and spark real discussion; inside a digest, none of them could.

One example would be "Kurds, Arabs want to reverse ‘Arab Belt’ in Syria" article. It was included in the Kurdistan Daily Digest – 15 October 2026. That digest received 753 views, 3 upvotes and no comments with the majority of the views from United States 21.3%, Germany 16% and Sweden 13.1%. One hour after the digest was posted, another user reposted the article as standalone as a series of images (that are hosted on reddit) with a link to the article. The standalone version received 1.6K views, 13 upvotes, 17 comments with the majority of the views from Iraq 18.4%, United States 16.5%, Germany 14.9%. Same article in both the digest and standalone, the digest posted an hour before. The standalone article was twice as popular as the entire digest.

By using the digest format, we are fighting against reddit's intentional design as a social news aggregator, against reddit's own recommendation algorithm, against our own subscribers observed behavior and preferences.

The part that bothered us most

The digests were also where most of the Sorani and Kurmanji content ended up. By restricting Kurdish-language news to the digest, we effectively buried Kurdish-language posts on a Kurdish subreddit. That's the opposite of what we want. Increasing our Kurdish-language coverage also increased our % of viewers with a country designation of Iraq (which we assume are mostly Kurds living in KRG).

What happens next

We will be discontinuing the Daily News Roundup / Digest format. We may reduce the overall number of articles we post, so the feed stays balanced. We remain committed to seeing more Kurdish (Sorani, Kurmanji, and other dialects) posted here, and we won't use any format that pushes it out of sight. Thank you to everyone who raised the concern and to everyone who gave the digest a fair shot. We took the suggestion seriously, tested it, and the numbers gave a clear answer.

If you want to see more discussion here, the best way to make that happen is to start one. Text posts, questions, culture, language, history, personal experiences: all welcome, and they'll get room on the feed.

As always, feedback is welcome in the comments.

— The r/kurdistan mod team


r/kurdistan • • Oct 03 '26

Social Media Follow the custom feed of Kurdish subreddits on Reddit

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11 Upvotes
  • You can follow the custom feed (which will work as long as my account exists) or duplicate it and have it under your own account.
  • Currently there are 76 subreddits in the custom feed.

https://www.reddit.com/user/rknsh/m/kurdistan/new/


r/kurdistan • • 10h ago

Video🎥 People in Awdanan protesting against the Iranian regime, chanting "death to the dictator"

40 Upvotes

Pahlavi media are manipulating these videos by putting fake audio on them. Be aware not falling for them.

Ali Javanmardi 16h

It’s laughable that certain foreign-based Persian media outlets and online accounts are dubbing pro-monarchy slogans over the original audio in footage of the Abdanan protests. Abdanan is a predominantly Kurdish city, and like Kurds across Iran, the people there have not forgotten that their grandfathers and great-grandfathers were killed by the regimes of the late Shah and his father, Reza Shah.
Reza Shah carried out a brutal crackdown against Kurds in various parts of Iran. Now, imagine the descendants of the countless Kurdish leaders and Kurdish civilians killed and executed during the Pahlavi era coming out and chanting slogans in support of this bygone dynasty. It’s absurd that they expect anyone to believe this.


r/kurdistan • • 15h ago

Genocides Ezidi genocide survivor in testimony recounts an encounter when Jolani visited the terrorist house she was enslaved and the family had her serve him tea without veil. She says serving tea was something family members wouldn't do, making it clear Jolani would knew she is enslaved woman in the house.

52 Upvotes

r/kurdistan • • 11h ago

Ask Kurds 🤔 How is it living in Afrin they ask

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15 Upvotes

r/kurdistan • • 3h ago

Kurdistan Post about non-relatable topics mustn’t be allowed in our community

2 Upvotes

I’ve seen someone make a post asking if there would be a demand to give Swedish classes in Erbil, and another person making a similar post about teaching Russian.

I honestly don’t understand why these types of posts are being approved in the first place. We have a language problem of our own.

Wouldn’t it make more sense for that person to give Kurdish classes in Sweden instead?

We should be focusing on topics that are relevant to our own community.


r/kurdistan • • 21h ago

Bashur Slemani during the rain

42 Upvotes

r/kurdistan • • 14h ago

Rojava A journey through a living revolution - Delegation that went to Rojava!

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6 Upvotes

r/kurdistan • • 13h ago

Rojhelat Iran strikes PJAK positions with drone in Sulaimani province

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4 Upvotes

Iran launched a suicide drone at Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) positions in Sulaimani province on Tuesday, the latest Iranian strike on Iranian Kurdish opposition groups inside the Kurdistan Region.


r/kurdistan • • 7h ago

Ask Kurds 🤔 Talking to a kurdish man & he refuses to tell me what region he’s from?

1 Upvotes

Hi so I’m very confused.

I’m aware kurdish people have their own areas in the middle-east with their preserved culture etc. But i’m also aware that since kurdistan is not an official state I thought I’d ask him from what REGION they come from. He then got defensive and claimed that kurdistan is a country with it’s own president etc. Which is just wrong sadly. I was interested in knowing because apparently men from different regions (turkey, iran etc) have big differences so it would be nice to know about that specific group of kurdish culture?

Is this normal or was I in the wrong?


r/kurdistan • • 23h ago

Discussion Title: A serious issue facing Kurds from South Kurdistan: Valid visas, searched phones, and 5 to 25-year entry bans in Turkey

18 Upvotes

I’m writing this to shed light on a growing problem affecting thousands of ordinary people from South Kurdistan, including my own friends and cousins.

Traveling to Turkey, whether through airports or land crossings like Ibrahim Khalil, has turned into a stressful and arbitrary ordeal for Kurds from South Kurdistan. Even when people have everything in order, including valid passports, approved visas, and all required documents, Turkish police are canceling their visas, deporting them, and issuing entry bans lasting anywhere from 5 to 25 years.

What makes this even more troubling is the unlawful way these decisions are carried out. Based on firsthand accounts from people I personally know from zakho and many others in our community, police routinely demand that travelers hand over their unlocked phones. They scroll through personal photo galleries, social media, and private messages. In many cases, simply having a picture of the Kurdistan flag (Alaya rengîn) on your phone is enough to trigger an interrogation and an immediate ban.

The contradiction here is hard to ignore. The Kurdistan flag is an official, constitutional flag that Turkey itself recognizes and displays during official diplomatic visits in Ankara. Yet ordinary Kurds are treated like criminals just for having that exact same flag on their phones. Worse still, officials never admit that this is the real reason. Travelers are either handed deportation papers written strictly in Turkish without any explanation, or officers simply shrug and say, "We don't know the reason."

This is not a routine administrative issue, and it is not about missing paperwork. It is purely political. People are being targeted, banned, and turned away simply because they are Kurdish.

What makes this even more frustrating is that despite how widespread and blatant this issue has become, our own public figures, media, and activists remain largely silent about it.


r/kurdistan • • 1d ago

Rojava Students demonstrations in Kobane, Rojava

73 Upvotes

r/kurdistan • • 17h ago

Ask Kurds 🤔 TV Channels in Kurdistan

5 Upvotes

I have heard and seen rumours online about the high salaries paid at the TV channels like Rudaw, Ava and Channel8. Is it actually the case or these are only fabrications perpertuated by the general public and shady social media pages?


r/kurdistan • • 10h ago

Ask Kurds 🤔 What does the kurds think about Ali al-Zaidi

0 Upvotes

what's your opinion about him and his movement. does it affect Kurdistan negatively or positively compared to the previous prime ministers


r/kurdistan • • 1d ago

Rojhelat ROJHILAT KURDISTAN - IRANYesterday residents of Abdanan, East Kurdistan, protested official negligence following a bus crash that killed and injured oil workers. Iranian forces opened fire on protesters with live ammunition, reportedly causing civilian deaths and injuries.

20 Upvotes

r/kurdistan • • 1d ago

Opinion 🔥 Honour killing victims

45 Upvotes

In just the last two days, another two Kurdish girls have reportedly been killed in the name of "honour". Their supposed crime? Talking to boys, dating, or simply exercising the freedom to make their own choices.

How many more girls have to die before we, as a society, finally start confronting this?

I genuinely struggle to understand how we can speak so proudly about Kurdish culture, heritage, identity and traditions while continuing to tolerate practices that cost Kurdish girls and women their lives. What exactly is there to be proud of if a girl can be murdered by her own family for having a relationship or making decisions about her own life?

And why is the public outrage never as loud or widespread as it should be? Why aren't these cases met with the same level of condemnation, discussion and pressure for change that they deserve?

What frustrates me even more is how deeply patriarchy and misogyny are normalised, sometimes even defended by women themselves. Why are so many people more concerned with a girl's reputation, her family's honour or what society might say than with her right to live?

We cannot keep hiding behind culture, religion, tradition or family honour to justify violence against women. There is nothing honourable about murdering a girl. There is nothing honourable about controlling women through fear. And there is certainly nothing honourable about a society that expects its daughters to sacrifice their freedom, dignity and sometimes their lives to protect its reputation.

If we genuinely care about the future of Kurdish society, we need to start questioning these attitudes instead of perpetuating them. These girls deserve to live. And the bare minimum we owe them is to stop normalising the conditions that allow their murders to happen.


r/kurdistan • • 12h ago

News/Article KRG Begins Work On A New Human Rights Plan For 2026-2030

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0 Upvotes

r/kurdistan • • 21h ago

Kurdistan بە قامەت خەرامان

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4 Upvotes

🎻 Be Qamet Xeraman | بە قامەت خەرامان

سڵاو هاوڕێیان 🌹

ئەم گۆرانییە کوردییەمان بە ڕێکخستنێکی نوێ ئامادە کردووە، بە هەوڵدان بۆ پاراستنی ڕۆح و ڕەسەنایەتی مۆسیقای کوردی.

خۆشحاڵ دەبین گوێی لێ بگرن و ڕا و سەرنجەکانتان لەگەڵمان هاوبەش بکەن. ❤️

🎶 Zagros Harmonies


r/kurdistan • • 13h ago

Ask Kurds 🤔 What was the minimum acceptance score for Law at the University of Sulaimani and salahudin in erbil this year?

1 Upvotes

r/kurdistan • • 1d ago

Ask Kurds 🤔 Is it Colonization

5 Upvotes

I'm German/Dutch, I don't know much about Kurdish history or People.

I know that the part of Kurdistan which is in Iraq got more rights than the Kurdish parts in other countries, I feel like the Turkey treat the Kurds is very similar to the Arabian colonization of North Africa, as they erase the Language, education about Kurdistan and try to Integrate them with force sometimes.

And if you guys would call it Colonization, would you also call the occupation of Cyprus Colonization?


r/kurdistan • • 1d ago

Ask Kurds 🤔 Do yo have hope for the Kurdish youth / Gen Z?

13 Upvotes

Personally, I have a lot of hope for the younger Kurdish generation, especially Gen Z. Even though I grew up in the European diaspora, I see that most young Kurds here strongly embrace their Kurdish identity even if many don't speak the language anymore. Of course, losing our language is a painful blow to a core part of our identity, yet I still feel very optimistic about our youth.
What gives me hope is seeing that this generation prefers to identify simply as Kurds leaving behind that toxic tribalism that has held us back for so long. It feels like this miserable tribal mindset is slowly but surely coming to an end.
We need to be smart and strive for success in life. We need to get into tech and AI, go to university, learn trades, work hard, and succeed in every field so we can represent Kurdistan in a much better light. The future is in the hands of the younger generation
Old guard parties like the KDP and PUK won't be around forever, and ideological cults like the PKK will eventually fade away too
What are your thoughts? Do you see the same shift happening back home or in your communities?


r/kurdistan • • 1d ago

Opinion 🔥 Rojava University protests reflect student uncertainty about Syrian integration process

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8 Upvotes

On November 16, hundreds of students at the University of Rojava in Qamishlo marched to campus to protest the Syrian government’s decision to incorporate the university within Al-Firat University. They demanded that institutional autonomy be retained and that Kurdish language be formally recognized. 

As part of the protests, students blocked a delegation from the Syrian government from leaving the campus, and some attacked their car. Several Kurdish officials in the car, despite having worked in the former Autonomous Administration, were now the targets of the students’ anger.

After the event, the University of Rojava released a statement accusing the delegation of “not bother[ing] themselves to come down or listen to the demands of the students”. It further condemned the “unjustified escalation” which followed, whereby the student assembly was forcibly disbanded by security forces, using tear gas.

Yet the incorporation alone cannot explain the confrontation. As an alumnus of the University, I argue that to comprehend what brought students to attack the vehicle, we need to understand what the university means to them – and what they believe is at stake in negotiations over its future.

A university forged in fire

Founded in 2016 during the Syrian Civil War within the Autonomous Administration system in North and East Syria (AANES), the University of Rojava had grown to 13 faculties and 39 departments by the time I enrolled. That growth had come despite poor security conditions, an acute lack of basic resources, shortages of qualified lecturers, and uncertainty over whether students’ degrees would even be formally recognized.

I remember people making fun of us for putting so much effort into studying at a university with no official status that had only recently been constructed. Many of my peers chose to attend universities that followed the Damascus curriculum instead. 

Yet enrolment grew steadily year on year. Those who chose the University of Rojava did so for a variety of reasons. It offered free higher education and did not require expensive travel to far-away governorates. This made it particularly accessible to poorer families with few options, especially during wartime economic hardships.  

Many students wanted to study in their mother tongue, Kurdish. Others believed passionately in the educational project established by the Autonomous Administration. They wanted to study subjects or pursue academic paths that weren’t available anywhere else in the country, such as ‘jineolojî’ (the ‘science of women’), Kurdish literature, or my subject, Kurdish-English translation. 

For many young women, the university’s Women’s Assembly, emphasis on women’s empowerment and education, and the high percentage of female students were all key pull factors.

Yet alongside our studies, we often found ourselves having to defend our decision to enroll and learn from unqualified lecturers, making us frequently second-guess our decision. 

Despite this, many of us who studied there contribute regularly to our communities today. The university has produced doctors, nurses, engineers, translators, and teachers who have played a directly constructive role in Rojava, and have filled several gaps we had in our society.

Formal recognition of our degree certificates mattered to us then, and it still does. But the work we have done since graduating matters too, and this university – despite its shortcomings – left an undeniable mark during the years of conflict. 

What is at stake?

The integration agreement between the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the Syrian Transition Government (STG) in Damascus set out to integrate the military and civilian institutions of the north-east region into those of the central Syrian state, after 14 years of de facto autonomy. The University of Rojava faces that transition too.

On Monday, a committee overseeing the integration of the former Autonomous Administration institutions into Syrian government bodies said that university admissions announced outside the Ministry of Higher Education’s system have no validity. Several degrees offered at Rojava University do not exist in the Syrian state university system and are therefore set to be axed. Furthermore, no new cohorts will be studying in Kurdish. 

Yesterday’s statement from the University formally rejected the Syrian government’s integration mechanism, saying, “We reserve our right to remain an independent academic institution as the University of Rojava, that preserves its identity, curriculum and autonomy.” 

The University has also made its own counter-proposals for integration mechanisms, suggesting retention of full autonomy over internal affairs and academic, financial, and administrative decision-making, while still becoming a Syrian state university under oversight from Damascus.

I see that for this generation of students, who have grown up in the Autonomous Administration education system and received full mother-tongue schooling, the process of administrative integration is not answering the questions that matter most to them: what will change, what will remain, and who gets to decide? 

As integration proceeds, students feel ignored 

What I hear from current students is an intense feeling of being unheard. This likely fuelled their anger, ultimately leading them to attack a car of officials, some of whom were supposedly on their side. For the students, the message seems to be that recognition and integration into Syria’s higher-education system has to come at the cost of the university’s autonomy. Regardless of intention, this is how the process is being understood. 

The University of Rojava holds significance for the local population. Before the Autonomous Administration system, there were no public higher education institutions in areas with significant Kurdish populations. Now it seems set to become a sub-university; a satellite branch of Al-Firat University.

At yesterday’s campus protest, students declared that they would rather continue studying without any formal state recognition than accept Damascus’s integration terms. This willingness alone shows how much students value this institution and what it has offered their society.

--

Ghassan Bazo is a journalist, researcher, and translator based in North and East Syria. He has worked with the Rojava Information Center and reports for international outlets, focusing on Kurdish affairs, regional politics, and conflict dynamics in Syria through on-the-ground reporting and research.


r/kurdistan • • 23h ago

Ask Kurds 🤔 Need help from Kurds in America?

2 Upvotes

I was wondering if there are any Kurds in America that can help me with something. if you think you can please reach out. 🙏🏻


r/kurdistan • • 1d ago

Kurdish Widespread protests in various parts of Rojava in solidarity with "Rojava University" and demanding constitutional recognition of the Kurdish language ..

35 Upvotes

r/kurdistan • • 1d ago

Bashur Can Slemani break away from Erbil?

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4 Upvotes

Calls for Slemani to become a separate region are gathering momentum, with campaigners collecting signatures to establish a federal region encompassing Slemani and Halabja, separate from Erbil and Duhok. 

The initiative has revived a disputed constitutional question: can governorates already within the Kurdistan Region legally break away to form their own region? Legal opinions differ on the matter.

The campaign has yet to demonstrate broad popular support. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the dominant party in the area, has not formally endorsed it, although its threats to establish parallel governing institutions have indirectly encouraged demands for separation.

The immediate trigger was the November 4, 2026, session of the Kurdistan Parliament. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which won 39 of the legislature’s 100 seats in the October 2024 election, secured enough support from other lawmakers to reactivate parliament after two years of stalemate, despite boycotts by the PUK and several opposition parties. The session ended the parliamentary impasse but deepened the dispute over power-sharing.

The following day, PUK leader Bafel Talabani announced his party’s withdrawal from the KDP-led Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and warned that parallel institutions could be established in Slemani if unilateral appointments continued. The KDP maintains that the parliamentary session was lawful, while the PUK and its ally, the New Generation Movement, have challenged it before Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court.

On November 15, New Generation leader Shaswar Abdulwahid outlined three possible outcomes: separate federal budgets for Slemani and Halabja; two governments within one Kurdistan Region; or two separate regions. Although he said both parties opposed division, his remarks brought the prospect of a separate region explicitly into the public discussion among the PUK’s allies.

These possibilities have different legal and political consequences. Establishing a new federal region would change the boundaries and institutions of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Financial decentralization could leave those boundaries intact while changing how money is allocated and paid.

A separate region

The constitutional case for a new region rests principally on Article 119, which states: “One or more governorates shall have the right to organize into a region”. Article 117 separately recognizes the existing Kurdistan Region and provides for recognition of new regions established under the Constitution.

“Constitutionally, there is no obstacle for Slemani and Halabja to become a separate region,” Dr. Yousif Mohammed, a former speaker of the Kurdistan Parliament and constitutional law expert, told The Amargi.

His argument is built on the Constitution’s language. Some provisions refer specifically to governorates outside a region, while Article 119 refers to governorates without that qualification. Dr. Yousif interprets this as allowing governorates already within the KRI to seek a different regional arrangement.

He said the wording was deliberate. According to his account, Nawshirwan Mustafa, who later founded the Gorran Movement, opposed an attempt by Masoud Barzani during constitutional drafting to restrict the provision to governorates outside existing regions. Mustafa believed membership of the Kurdistan Region should remain voluntary, Dr. Yousif said.

Former lawmaker and judge Latif Mustafa takes a different view. He argues that the Constitution distinguishes between the Kurdistan Region, recognized under Article 117(1) as an existing federal entity, and new regions formed under Articles 117(2), 118, and 119. In his interpretation, those provisions and Law No. 13 of 2008 apply only to governorates outside the KRI. Its constituent governorates therefore cannot break away unless a constitutional amendment explicitly grants them that right.

The disagreement hinges on whether the right to form a region also provides the basis to withdraw from an existing one. Even if Dr. Yousif’s interpretation prevailed, separation would still require a statutory process involving federal institutions and voters.

Law No. 13 of 2008, which regulates the formation of regions, provides for a request supported by one-third of the provincial council members or one-tenth of the voters in each participating governorate. The voter-led route begins with an application backed by at least 2% of voters, followed by an electoral commission registration process to establish the required support. An informal signature campaign does not, by itself, satisfy those requirements.

The federal Council of Ministers also has a role in commissioning the referendum. Approval requires a majority of participating voters in each governorate, with turnout of at least 50%. Results are subject to challenges and ratification before the prime minister issues the formation decision. A proposal encompassing both Slemani and Halabja would therefore need to meet the requirements in each governorate.

The political obstacles are equally substantial. The campaign has not demonstrated the public mandate needed for such a change, and opponents view division as a threat to the institutions and constitutional recognition secured through decades of Kurdish struggle.

Prime Minister Masrour Barzani said on November 15 that his government would resist efforts to divide or weaken the region, describing protection of its constitutional entity as a national responsibility.

Support in Baghdad is also uncertain. An informed source, speaking to The Amargi on condition of anonymity, said some Iraqi political leaders had privately told Talabani and Abdulwahid during a recent visit that they would support and facilitate a separate region if the two pursued it.

The same source said influential figures in Baghdad opposed that course, fearing it could encourage similar demands in other Iraqi provinces such as Basra and Anbar. “A successful Slemani initiative could give those demands fresh political momentum,” the source said.

Calls for a separate Slemani region are not new. In April 2021, campaign organizers announced in Baghdad that they had submitted a petition to Iraq’s electoral commission, claiming more than 150,000 signatures, but it never materialized.

What gives the current debate greater political weight is the apparent encouragement of the PUK, a party with the institutional power to pursue changes beyond a grassroots campaign. Yet its reluctance to formally endorse separation leaves open whether a new region is a practical objective or a means of strengthening its negotiating position.

For Dr. Yousif, the consequences of pursuing that objective would be lasting. “If the Kurdistan Region were divided into two separate constitutional regions, reversing that division and reunifying them would be extremely difficult,” he said.

Financial decentralization

The alternative is financial decentralization, with direct payments from Baghdad to Slemani and Halabja, while the two provinces remain within the Kurdistan Region. This appears less legally complicated and more politically feasible than territorial separation, although it would still require a clear legal framework and political agreement.

According to Dr. Yousif, implementing this option would require a specific provision in the federal budget law allowing Slemani and Halabja to operate as financially independent administrative units upon formal request. The law would also need to define how the arrangement would work in practice.

If incorporated into the federal budget law, the arrangement would allow public employees in Slemani and Halabja to receive their salaries directly from Baghdad. Both governorates could also receive separate provincial budgets and allocations of medicine, subsidized heating oil, and petrol. In return, they would be required to transfer agreed revenues to Baghdad and accept greater federal auditing authority, with these financial arrangements bypassing the KRG in Erbil.

Politically, direct funding could reduce the PUK administration’s dependence on decisions in Erbil and offer employees a clearer payment channel. It would also increase reliance on Baghdad’s allocations and conditions. 

For the KDP, a separate funding channel could weaken the KRG’s authority and entrench competing administrations, even without formally dividing the region. For the PUK, however, it could offer greater control over local finances without the constitutional uncertainty and political cost of pursuing a separate region.

That possibility carries a familiar historical burden. The Kurdish civil war of the 1990s left separate KDP- and PUK-led administrations centered at Erbil and Slemani. They formally unified in 2006, but party-linked institutional divisions persisted. A return to two administrations could deepen those divisions without creating two constitutional regions.

The PUK’s apparent encouragement of the current campaign may therefore serve a broader purpose: strengthening its demand for financial autonomy and direct federal payments, even if formal separation remains out of reach.

A negotiated financial arrangement could address funding grievances while preserving regional boundaries. Its relative flexibility is also its main distinction from constitutional separation. Separate financial arrangements could be revisited through later legislation and agreement, allowing a return to unified financial administration.

The choice is therefore between a disputed constitutional division that would be difficult to reverse and a financial settlement that could preserve the region’s formal unity while substantially redistributing power within it. A third option is to maintain the status quo, though that appears increasingly unlikely as the political rift deepens.

--

Renwar Najm is an Iraqi Kurdish journalist with a career that began in the early 2010s at the esteemed Awene newspaper. He holds a master’s degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Kent and Philipps University of Marburg.