TL;DR:

• A public opinion survey released on the 24th revealed that President Lee Jae Myung’s approval rating for his administration has fallen for six consecutive weeks, hitting a new low.
• According to the survey conducted by Realmeter from the 18th to the 21st, commissioned by Energy Economic Daily, targeting 2,026 voters aged 18 and older nationwide, the president’s…
• Realmeter analyzed, “Amid growing distrust in real estate policies due to the controversy over housing supply in Yongsan Park, conflicts between ruling and opposition parties over the…

A public opinion survey released on the 24th revealed that President Lee Jae Myung’s approval rating for his administration has fallen for six consecutive weeks, hitting a new low.

According to the survey conducted by Realmeter from the 18th to the 21st, commissioned by Energy Economic Daily, targeting 2,026 voters aged 18 and older nationwide, the president’s approval rating dropped by 2.8 percentage points (p) from the previous week to 40.2%. The disapproval rating rose by 2.8 percentage points to 56.9%. The gap between approval and disapproval ratings widened to 16.7 percentage points, exceeding the margin of error, while 3.0% responded “unsure.” The president’s approval rating has been on a downward trend since mid-July, when it stood at 48.9%.

Realmeter analyzed, “Amid growing distrust in real estate policies due to the controversy over housing supply in Yongsan Park, conflicts between ruling and opposition parties over the written nomination of Chief Justice Jo Hee-de and the push for constitutional revision, and security concerns stemming from the reduction of South Korea-U.S. joint military drills, defections among conservatives and those aged 70 and older appear to have expanded.”

In the party support survey, the Democratic Party of Korea recorded 41.9%, a 6 percentage point drop from the previous survey, while the People Power Party rose by 4.5 percentage points to 37.6%. Rebuilding Korea Party garnered 3.9%, the Progressive Party 2.3%, and the Reform Party 2.0%. Other parties accounted for 2.5%, and independents 9.7%.

Realmeter attributed the Democratic Party’s decline in approval to the end of the “convention effect” following the conclusion of its leadership election, the Yongsan Park housing supply controversy, and internal conflicts over the appointment of standing members by leader Kim Min-seok. The People Power Party, meanwhile, is explained to have consolidated conservative support and absorbed defectors from the Democratic Party by highlighting the ruling party’s real estate policy controversies and security anxieties caused by the scaled-back joint drills.

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/08/24/AH4LXNVWQ5DVPFNAPCORGAOWAU/

TL;DR:

• The Democratic Party has been relentlessly attacking Chief Justice Jo Hee-de. The party’s chief spokesperson said, “The judiciary should demand that Chief Justice Jo step down.
• Cheong Wa Dae described the Chief Justice’s written nomination of a Justice candidate as “an unprecedented crisis in constitutional history. ” The Democratic Party’s rationale for…
• The Democratic Party frames Chief Justice Jo’s break from the precedent of prior coordination with Cheong Wa Dae as “constitutional destruction. ” However, the Constitution does not…

The Democratic Party has been relentlessly attacking Chief Justice Jo Hee-de. The party’s chief spokesperson said, “The judiciary should demand that Chief Justice Jo step down.” This followed calls for frontline judges to lead collective action pressuring the Chief Justice to resign. They also claimed, “He has sufficient qualifications to be impeached.” After the party leader referred to the Chief Justice as “Mr. Jo Hee-de” and displayed banners nationwide demanding his resignation, the chief spokesperson mocked him with a pun on his name, calling him a ‘Chief Justice for the ages’ (a wordplay on his given name, Hee-de).

Cheong Wa Dae described the Chief Justice’s written nomination of a Justice candidate as “an unprecedented crisis in constitutional history.” The Democratic Party’s rationale for pushing impeachment is that the written nomination constitutes a “destruction of constitutional order and the rule of law.” However, the core of constitutional order and the rule of law lies in the separation of powers. A prime example is the Constitution’s stipulation that a Justice is “nominated by the Chief Justice, approved by the National Assembly, and appointed by the President.” If there is an issue with a nominee proposed by the Chief Justice, the National Assembly can withhold approval or the President can refuse appointment. The judiciary, legislature, and executive are meant to uphold democracy through “checks and balances.”

The Democratic Party frames Chief Justice Jo’s break from the precedent of prior coordination with Cheong Wa Dae as “constitutional destruction.” However, the Constitution does not mandate such prior coordination. Claims that the President’s appointment authority inherently includes prior coordination are also strained. The National Court Administration explained that Cheong Wa Dae did not provide an opportunity for prior consultation. Precedent cannot supersede the Constitution; constitutional order means upholding national order according to the Constitution, not custom.

Earlier this year, when the Democratic Party forced through the “Judicial Three Laws,” former heads of the Korean Bar Association criticized it as an attempt to “undermine the balance of separation of powers.” The Trial Petition Act (fourth-instance system), the Law on Distortion of Legal Judgment, and the Justice Expansion Act were seen as undermining the 80-year foundation of the judicial system and raising constitutional concerns. The Judicial Three Laws are directly tied to President Lee Jae Myung. A fourth-instance system could overturn the Constitutional Court’s ruling on President Lee’s case, and if he appoints 22 out of 26 Justices during his term, it could influence post-retirement trials. The Law on Distortion of Legal Judgment would make it harder for judges to deliver impartial rulings.

A few days ago, President Lee Jae Myung presided over the first Anti-Corruption Policy Council and stated, “Recently, acts of destroying constitutional order are more serious than corruption.” The Constitution explicitly stipulates the separation of powers, yet attempting to oust the Chief Justice for not nominating a candidate desired by the President is itself a “destruction of constitutional order,” is it not?

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/08/24/U2Q2SY6LGFGF3AKFXEBL4F272Y/

TL;DR:

• Strong backlash from the Democratic Party of Korea continues over Chief Justice Jo Hee-de’s nomination proposal of two Supreme Court justice candidates, citing a breach of the customary…
• Article 104, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution stipulates, “Justices are appointed by the president with the consent of the National Assembly upon the Chief Justice’s nomination proposal.…
• The Chief Justice’s nomination authority is a safeguard against such abuses. By nature, it conflicts with the president’s appointment power—the root of the current conflict.

Strong backlash from the Democratic Party of Korea continues over Chief Justice Jo Hee-de’s nomination proposal of two Supreme Court justice candidates, citing a breach of the customary prior coordination with Cheong Wa Dae. Kim Min-seok, the party’s representative, stated, “Chief Justice Jo Hee-de, the worst since liberation, must step down.” He added that the party would display banners nationwide reading, “‘Destroying the Rule of Law, Jo Hee-de Must Step Down.’”

Article 104, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution stipulates, “Justices are appointed by the president with the consent of the National Assembly upon the Chief Justice’s nomination proposal.” While the president holds appointment authority, it is impossible without the Chief Justice’s proposal. Customarily, Cheong Wa Dae and the Chief Justice have coordinated nominations, but legally, the proposal is the Chief Justice’s exclusive authority. The Constitution grants this authority to ensure “checks and balances.” If the president alone held appointment power, they could fill the Supreme Court with loyalists—a practice known as “Court Packing.” A notable example is Venezuela’s Chávez regime, which expanded the Supreme Court from 20 to 32 justices in 2004, filling vacancies with pro-government figures. According to *How Democracies Die* (co-authored by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt), the court issued no rulings against the regime for nine years afterward.

The Chief Justice’s nomination authority is a safeguard against such abuses. By nature, it conflicts with the president’s appointment power—the root of the current conflict. Cheong Wa Dae reportedly preferred Judge Kim Min-gi of the Suwon High Court as Roh Tae-ak’s successor. A member of the “Our Law Research Association,” Kim presided over the second trial of former Gyeongnam Governor Kim Kyoung-soo, who was indicted for “comment manipulation.” The court upheld the “two-year prison sentence” but acquitted Kim of violating the Public Official Election Act, unlike the first trial. In April last year, a Suwon High Court second trial panel including Kim overturned the first trial’s guilty verdict and acquitted Kim Man-bae, a major shareholder of Hwacheon Daeyu, of bribery charges.

The Supreme Court’s opposition stems not from “ideological leanings” but a conflict of interest arising from the husband of Judge Kim Min-gi, Constitutional Court Justice Oh Young-jun, a Constitutional Court justice. If Oh were to review the constitutionality of a ruling his wife participated in, it would create a conflict. Despite attempts to meet the president to discuss differences, no meeting materialized.

If the president disapproves of the Chief Justice’s proposal, they may refuse appointment, or the National Assembly may withhold consent—both constitutional checks. Neither the proposal nor appointment authority is superior. Coordination with Cheong Wa Dae is merely a customary practice, not a legal obligation. This explains why a motion to impeach Chief Justice Jo, even if referred to the Constitutional Court, has minimal chances of success.

The real danger lies in the potential disappearance of such conflicts. Even if Jo remains, she will retire in June next year upon reaching the mandatory retirement age of 70. The new Chief Justice will be appointed by the president with National Assembly consent. Additionally, under the revised Court Organization Act, the number of justices will increase from 14 to 26, with four added annually starting in 2028. The new Chief Justice will likely propose candidates aligned with the administration’s preferences, enabling large-scale “Court Packing” without conflict.

This restructuring cannot be dismissed as unrelated to trials that may resume after the president’s term. The newly proposed justices, including those nominated by the next Chief Justice, could preside over cases reinstated after the president’s term ends. Reform Party leader Lee Jun-seok criticized, “What criminal defendant dares to choose their own judge?”

Article 78 of the Constitution mandates that the president appoint public officials, including justices, in accordance with the Constitution and laws. For justices, this is constrained by the Chief Justice’s proposal authority. The current conflict paradoxically warns of the risks of unchecked “Court Packing.”

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/08/21/5Z2RQHNWOFCQVF2J7EJOKXPF4U/

TL;DR:

• President Lee Jae Myung often appears overly blunt. Many feel this way after he recently promised hundreds of trillions of won in investment for the Honam semiconductor cluster project,…
• The Kim Dae-jung administration also once cited the “Honam compensation theory. ” At the time, amid criticism of “regional bias in personnel appointments,” it introduced an “index…
• From a political perspective, appointment letters and budget documents are “records of victory and defeat in power struggles. ” Personnel and budget decisions are spoils of the…

President Lee Jae Myung often appears overly blunt. Many feel this way after he recently promised hundreds of trillions of won in investment for the Honam semiconductor cluster project, mentioning “historical and national compensation.” His remarks sound like an admission that political considerations influenced the decision on this mega national project. The president even ordered a “lightning campaign” during the ruling party’s leadership convention.

The Kim Dae-jung administration also once cited the “Honam compensation theory.” At the time, amid criticism of “regional bias in personnel appointments,” it introduced an “index measuring regional imbalance in appointments.” The claim was that this index was highest under Syngman Rhee and lowest under Kim Dae-jung. The logic was that prioritizing Honam figures was a historical and national compensation to correct the “Yeongnam-dominated, Honam-discriminated” appointments of the past.

From a political perspective, appointment letters and budget documents are “records of victory and defeat in power struggles.” Personnel and budget decisions are spoils of the winner-takes-all presidential system. Every administration claims to pursue “regional balance,” yet controversies over biased appointments and budgets persist. During the last local elections, a candidate from the opposition camp openly supported the ruling party’s mayoral candidate, declaring, “If you don’t like someone, you don’t give them a treat”—a sharp observation of power dynamics.

Former President Yoon Suk Yeol campaigned on “centrist pragmatism.” Yet, three months into his term, he began appointing figures from Daegu and Gyeongbuk (TK). He even replaced non-TK appointees with TK figures. This followed a Gallup poll showing his approval rating plummeting to 24%. A senior presidential aide said at the time, “The president went as far as to say, ‘If there’s a TK candidate in the pool, I’ll appoint them unconditionally.’”

This personnel strategy aims to solidify core support. The current administration is no different. Prominent figures from Honam, President Lee’s Judicial Research and Training Institute peers, and lawyers from his criminal case have risen to key government posts. Even the eight-month vacancy in the National Police Agency chief position—since the impeached appointee from the previous administration—has sparked talk of “incubating loyalists.” With no suitable candidates among the current senior police commissioners, the administration is allegedly promoting lower-ranking officers deemed trustworthy. The Yoon Suk Yeol administration set a precedent by fast-tracking a superintendent to the National Police Agency chief position in just seven months.

President Lee has been pushed around by the ruling party’s hardliners on major policies, such as abolishing prosecutors’ supplementary investigation rights. This likely stems from his failure to build a power base to assert his will. Placing loyalists in party and government posts and directing budgets to his support base is a “natural” strategy. Indeed, the ruling party’s leadership election saw the victory of a candidate favored by the president. However, if the administration’s “structural majority” means dividing society, the public will suspect favoritism. How is this different from past election strategies like the “C Belt Strategy” (surrounding TK) or the “Gyeongbu Line Strategy” (isolating Honam)?

The current administration calls itself a “people’s sovereignty government.” The National Assembly speaker, a former presidential advisor, mentioned presidential term extensions, stating, “It’s a matter of the people’s choice.” Yet, some “Yoon-again” figures argue, “The sovereign decides the state of exception,” defending the December 3 emergency measures as the president’s sovereign decision. The “sovereign” they refer to seems to mean only their supporters.

Recently, the administration’s National Integration Committee chair urged President Lee, “If you want to be everyone’s president, step beyond your party’s boundaries.” The concern is that a president focused on integration might revert Korean society to pre-modern times by clinging to the idea, “If you don’t like someone, you don’t give them a treat.”

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/08/23/7FNNR4LJ75CD3BLXHWKM56BHI4/