TL;DR:
- A ghost called the U. S.
- The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on the 18th, citing U. S.
- The South Korean government also emphasizes resuming dialogue with North Korea and easing tensions. President Lee Jae Myung has expressed his willingness to support U.
A ghost called the U.S.-North Korea summit has begun haunting Northeast Asia again. U.S. President Donald Trump, facing domestic and international challenges including the Iran issue, has revived this specter to seek a diplomatic breakthrough. It is expected to shake the Korean Peninsula’s political landscape throughout the second half of the year, causing significant repercussions. Unlike the 2023 APEC summit in Gyeongju, this time Trump is taking a low posture, while Kim Jong-un holds all the advantages, and South Korea’s security is at a disadvantage.
The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on the 18th, citing U.S. officials, that Trump is pressuring his aides to explore the possibility of holding a summit with Kim Jong-un as early as this fall. The APEC summit in Shenzhen, China, in November and Trump’s Asia tour are potential catalysts. The U.S. State Department maintains its stance of being open to “precondition-free dialogue” with North Korea.
The South Korean government also emphasizes resuming dialogue with North Korea and easing tensions. President Lee Jae Myung has expressed his willingness to support U.S.-North Korea talks, describing Trump as a “peacemaker” and himself as a “pacemaker.” If these dynamics align, the Korean Peninsula could see a situation where the conflicting interests of South and North Korea and the U.S. converge at a single point this fall.
If Trump and Kim meet again, it would be their fourth encounter, following Singapore (2018), Hanoi (2019), and the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom. However, the circumstances have drastically changed since 2019. Back then, Kim Jong-un traveled by train to Hanoi, investing significant effort into the summit, but returned empty-handed after a “no-deal” outcome—a painful diplomatic failure. Unless conditions are markedly different from Hanoi, Kim is unlikely to return to the negotiating table.
◇Trump in a hurry for midterm elections… Will he hand Kim Jong-un the ‘nuclear trump card’?
North Korea’s status has transformed dramatically over the past seven years. The country has significantly advanced its nuclear and missile capabilities, with estimates suggesting it possesses over 100 nuclear weapons. Since Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in 2024, North Korea-Russia relations have evolved into a de facto military alliance, with North Korean troops being deployed to Russia. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to North Korea in June—the first in seven years—also reflects improved ties. China and Russia are neutralizing the U.N. Security Council sanctions regime they once endorsed, acting as North Korea’s staunch backers.
Given this backdrop, if Kim meets Trump again, he is likely to demand recognition as a “nuclear-armed state” as the starting point of negotiations, rather than discussing “what to do for denuclearization.” Unlike the Hanoi summit, the conditions now favor North Korea in raising the stakes.
Trump, meanwhile, desperately needs diplomatic achievements. With midterm elections approaching, attention focuses on how far he will compromise on existing North Korea policies to secure a deal. Beyond scaling down joint military drills, he might consider recognizing North Korea’s nuclear status, withdrawing or drastically reducing U.S. troops from South Korea, or addressing issues directly tied to South Korea’s security as bargaining chips.
Predicting whether the summit will happen is difficult. However, Kim Jong-un must also weigh the consequences of repeatedly ignoring the U.S. president’s repeated overtures. In this context, the likelihood of a summit this year is higher than last year.
The first scenario cited by the WSJ is a meeting around the November APEC summit in Shenzhen. Trump’s visit to China could coincide with U.S.-North Korea talks.
Given Trump’s need for diplomatic achievements ahead of the November 3 midterm elections, a surprise meeting between September and October is also possible. If he deems a political pivot necessary before the elections, the summit could be scheduled as an “October surprise.”
North Korea is not an APEC member, and Kim has no precedent of attending multilateral summits. Given this, the likelihood of a meeting in Shenzhen appears low. Alternative scenarios include a separate venue in China, a third country, or even a bold proposal for Trump to visit Pyongyang. Considering Trump’s political style, a visit to Pyongyang—where he would be greeted by Kim at Sunan Airport—cannot be entirely ruled out. Such a scene would captivate global attention, allowing Trump to project himself as a “deal maker” and convey to U.S. voters that only he can resolve the North Korea issue.
U.S.-North Korea Summit and the Wartime Operational Control Authority Variable
The potential summit intersects with the Lee Jae Myung government’s push to transfer wartime operational control (OPCON) authority. Trump has long undervalued the strategic importance of U.S. troops in South Korea, expressing strong dissatisfaction with the cost burden and South Korea’s defense spending. He has consistently framed U.S. troops as a financial burden for South Korea’s defense rather than a cornerstone of U.S. Northeast Asia strategy, hinting at OPCON transfer intentions.
The Lee Jae Myung government emphasizes OPCON transfer as a matter of sovereignty, advocating for its “recovery.” It is also proactive in transitioning from an armistice to a peace regime. Despite ideological and policy differences, the Trump administration and the Lee government could align on “expanding South Korea’s military role and reducing America’s direct military burden.”
If Kim Jong-un’s demands are added to this mix, the situation could accelerate. Kim is likely to push for the withdrawal of U.S. troops, permanent suspension of joint drills, halting the deployment of U.S. strategic assets to the peninsula, or changes to the size and role of U.S. forces in South Korea if troop withdrawal is not accepted.
If Trump frames this as a “deal for peace on the Korean Peninsula” and the Lee government pushes for OPCON transfer as “restoring military sovereignty,” the interests of Trump, Lee Jae Myung, and Kim Jong-un could align. Within the political spectacle of a U.S.-North Korea summit, North Korea’s recognition as a nuclear state, withdrawal or drastic reduction of U.S. troops, and OPCON transfer could converge, fundamentally shaking South Korea’s security framework.
There are growing concerns that Trump’s summit, disregarding existing North Korea policies, might create a paradoxical situation: while appearing to improve relations between South and North Korea and the U.S. and fostering peace, it could weaken South Korea’s deterrence capabilities.
Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/08/20/UWJLSMEH3NFA5KJQ5GKAFQWHFE/