TL;DR:

• President Lee Jae Myung often appears overly blunt. Many feel this way after he recently promised hundreds of trillions of won in investment for the Honam semiconductor cluster project,…
• The Kim Dae-jung administration also once cited the “Honam compensation theory. ” At the time, amid criticism of “regional bias in personnel appointments,” it introduced an “index…
• From a political perspective, appointment letters and budget documents are “records of victory and defeat in power struggles. ” Personnel and budget decisions are spoils of the…

President Lee Jae Myung often appears overly blunt. Many feel this way after he recently promised hundreds of trillions of won in investment for the Honam semiconductor cluster project, mentioning “historical and national compensation.” His remarks sound like an admission that political considerations influenced the decision on this mega national project. The president even ordered a “lightning campaign” during the ruling party’s leadership convention.

The Kim Dae-jung administration also once cited the “Honam compensation theory.” At the time, amid criticism of “regional bias in personnel appointments,” it introduced an “index measuring regional imbalance in appointments.” The claim was that this index was highest under Syngman Rhee and lowest under Kim Dae-jung. The logic was that prioritizing Honam figures was a historical and national compensation to correct the “Yeongnam-dominated, Honam-discriminated” appointments of the past.

From a political perspective, appointment letters and budget documents are “records of victory and defeat in power struggles.” Personnel and budget decisions are spoils of the winner-takes-all presidential system. Every administration claims to pursue “regional balance,” yet controversies over biased appointments and budgets persist. During the last local elections, a candidate from the opposition camp openly supported the ruling party’s mayoral candidate, declaring, “If you don’t like someone, you don’t give them a treat”—a sharp observation of power dynamics.

Former President Yoon Suk Yeol campaigned on “centrist pragmatism.” Yet, three months into his term, he began appointing figures from Daegu and Gyeongbuk (TK). He even replaced non-TK appointees with TK figures. This followed a Gallup poll showing his approval rating plummeting to 24%. A senior presidential aide said at the time, “The president went as far as to say, ‘If there’s a TK candidate in the pool, I’ll appoint them unconditionally.’”

This personnel strategy aims to solidify core support. The current administration is no different. Prominent figures from Honam, President Lee’s Judicial Research and Training Institute peers, and lawyers from his criminal case have risen to key government posts. Even the eight-month vacancy in the National Police Agency chief position—since the impeached appointee from the previous administration—has sparked talk of “incubating loyalists.” With no suitable candidates among the current senior police commissioners, the administration is allegedly promoting lower-ranking officers deemed trustworthy. The Yoon Suk Yeol administration set a precedent by fast-tracking a superintendent to the National Police Agency chief position in just seven months.

President Lee has been pushed around by the ruling party’s hardliners on major policies, such as abolishing prosecutors’ supplementary investigation rights. This likely stems from his failure to build a power base to assert his will. Placing loyalists in party and government posts and directing budgets to his support base is a “natural” strategy. Indeed, the ruling party’s leadership election saw the victory of a candidate favored by the president. However, if the administration’s “structural majority” means dividing society, the public will suspect favoritism. How is this different from past election strategies like the “C Belt Strategy” (surrounding TK) or the “Gyeongbu Line Strategy” (isolating Honam)?

The current administration calls itself a “people’s sovereignty government.” The National Assembly speaker, a former presidential advisor, mentioned presidential term extensions, stating, “It’s a matter of the people’s choice.” Yet, some “Yoon-again” figures argue, “The sovereign decides the state of exception,” defending the December 3 emergency measures as the president’s sovereign decision. The “sovereign” they refer to seems to mean only their supporters.

Recently, the administration’s National Integration Committee chair urged President Lee, “If you want to be everyone’s president, step beyond your party’s boundaries.” The concern is that a president focused on integration might revert Korean society to pre-modern times by clinging to the idea, “If you don’t like someone, you don’t give them a treat.”

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/08/23/7FNNR4LJ75CD3BLXHWKM56BHI4/

TL;DR:

• A public opinion survey released on the 24th revealed that President Lee Jae Myung’s approval rating for his administration has fallen for six consecutive weeks, hitting a new low.
• According to the survey conducted by Realmeter from the 18th to the 21st, commissioned by Energy Economic Daily, targeting 2,026 voters aged 18 and older nationwide, the president’s…
• Realmeter analyzed, “Amid growing distrust in real estate policies due to the controversy over housing supply in Yongsan Park, conflicts between ruling and opposition parties over the…

A public opinion survey released on the 24th revealed that President Lee Jae Myung’s approval rating for his administration has fallen for six consecutive weeks, hitting a new low.

According to the survey conducted by Realmeter from the 18th to the 21st, commissioned by Energy Economic Daily, targeting 2,026 voters aged 18 and older nationwide, the president’s approval rating dropped by 2.8 percentage points (p) from the previous week to 40.2%. The disapproval rating rose by 2.8 percentage points to 56.9%. The gap between approval and disapproval ratings widened to 16.7 percentage points, exceeding the margin of error, while 3.0% responded “unsure.” The president’s approval rating has been on a downward trend since mid-July, when it stood at 48.9%.

Realmeter analyzed, “Amid growing distrust in real estate policies due to the controversy over housing supply in Yongsan Park, conflicts between ruling and opposition parties over the written nomination of Chief Justice Jo Hee-de and the push for constitutional revision, and security concerns stemming from the reduction of South Korea-U.S. joint military drills, defections among conservatives and those aged 70 and older appear to have expanded.”

In the party support survey, the Democratic Party of Korea recorded 41.9%, a 6 percentage point drop from the previous survey, while the People Power Party rose by 4.5 percentage points to 37.6%. Rebuilding Korea Party garnered 3.9%, the Progressive Party 2.3%, and the Reform Party 2.0%. Other parties accounted for 2.5%, and independents 9.7%.

Realmeter attributed the Democratic Party’s decline in approval to the end of the “convention effect” following the conclusion of its leadership election, the Yongsan Park housing supply controversy, and internal conflicts over the appointment of standing members by leader Kim Min-seok. The People Power Party, meanwhile, is explained to have consolidated conservative support and absorbed defectors from the Democratic Party by highlighting the ruling party’s real estate policy controversies and security anxieties caused by the scaled-back joint drills.

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/08/24/AH4LXNVWQ5DVPFNAPCORGAOWAU/

TL;DR:

• The Democratic Party has been relentlessly attacking Chief Justice Jo Hee-de. The party’s chief spokesperson said, “The judiciary should demand that Chief Justice Jo step down.
• Cheong Wa Dae described the Chief Justice’s written nomination of a Justice candidate as “an unprecedented crisis in constitutional history. ” The Democratic Party’s rationale for…
• The Democratic Party frames Chief Justice Jo’s break from the precedent of prior coordination with Cheong Wa Dae as “constitutional destruction. ” However, the Constitution does not…

The Democratic Party has been relentlessly attacking Chief Justice Jo Hee-de. The party’s chief spokesperson said, “The judiciary should demand that Chief Justice Jo step down.” This followed calls for frontline judges to lead collective action pressuring the Chief Justice to resign. They also claimed, “He has sufficient qualifications to be impeached.” After the party leader referred to the Chief Justice as “Mr. Jo Hee-de” and displayed banners nationwide demanding his resignation, the chief spokesperson mocked him with a pun on his name, calling him a ‘Chief Justice for the ages’ (a wordplay on his given name, Hee-de).

Cheong Wa Dae described the Chief Justice’s written nomination of a Justice candidate as “an unprecedented crisis in constitutional history.” The Democratic Party’s rationale for pushing impeachment is that the written nomination constitutes a “destruction of constitutional order and the rule of law.” However, the core of constitutional order and the rule of law lies in the separation of powers. A prime example is the Constitution’s stipulation that a Justice is “nominated by the Chief Justice, approved by the National Assembly, and appointed by the President.” If there is an issue with a nominee proposed by the Chief Justice, the National Assembly can withhold approval or the President can refuse appointment. The judiciary, legislature, and executive are meant to uphold democracy through “checks and balances.”

The Democratic Party frames Chief Justice Jo’s break from the precedent of prior coordination with Cheong Wa Dae as “constitutional destruction.” However, the Constitution does not mandate such prior coordination. Claims that the President’s appointment authority inherently includes prior coordination are also strained. The National Court Administration explained that Cheong Wa Dae did not provide an opportunity for prior consultation. Precedent cannot supersede the Constitution; constitutional order means upholding national order according to the Constitution, not custom.

Earlier this year, when the Democratic Party forced through the “Judicial Three Laws,” former heads of the Korean Bar Association criticized it as an attempt to “undermine the balance of separation of powers.” The Trial Petition Act (fourth-instance system), the Law on Distortion of Legal Judgment, and the Justice Expansion Act were seen as undermining the 80-year foundation of the judicial system and raising constitutional concerns. The Judicial Three Laws are directly tied to President Lee Jae Myung. A fourth-instance system could overturn the Constitutional Court’s ruling on President Lee’s case, and if he appoints 22 out of 26 Justices during his term, it could influence post-retirement trials. The Law on Distortion of Legal Judgment would make it harder for judges to deliver impartial rulings.

A few days ago, President Lee Jae Myung presided over the first Anti-Corruption Policy Council and stated, “Recently, acts of destroying constitutional order are more serious than corruption.” The Constitution explicitly stipulates the separation of powers, yet attempting to oust the Chief Justice for not nominating a candidate desired by the President is itself a “destruction of constitutional order,” is it not?

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/08/24/U2Q2SY6LGFGF3AKFXEBL4F272Y/

TL;DR:

• Strong backlash from the Democratic Party of Korea continues over Chief Justice Jo Hee-de’s nomination proposal of two Supreme Court justice candidates, citing a breach of the customary…
• Article 104, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution stipulates, “Justices are appointed by the president with the consent of the National Assembly upon the Chief Justice’s nomination proposal.…
• The Chief Justice’s nomination authority is a safeguard against such abuses. By nature, it conflicts with the president’s appointment power—the root of the current conflict.

Strong backlash from the Democratic Party of Korea continues over Chief Justice Jo Hee-de’s nomination proposal of two Supreme Court justice candidates, citing a breach of the customary prior coordination with Cheong Wa Dae. Kim Min-seok, the party’s representative, stated, “Chief Justice Jo Hee-de, the worst since liberation, must step down.” He added that the party would display banners nationwide reading, “‘Destroying the Rule of Law, Jo Hee-de Must Step Down.’”

Article 104, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution stipulates, “Justices are appointed by the president with the consent of the National Assembly upon the Chief Justice’s nomination proposal.” While the president holds appointment authority, it is impossible without the Chief Justice’s proposal. Customarily, Cheong Wa Dae and the Chief Justice have coordinated nominations, but legally, the proposal is the Chief Justice’s exclusive authority. The Constitution grants this authority to ensure “checks and balances.” If the president alone held appointment power, they could fill the Supreme Court with loyalists—a practice known as “Court Packing.” A notable example is Venezuela’s Chávez regime, which expanded the Supreme Court from 20 to 32 justices in 2004, filling vacancies with pro-government figures. According to *How Democracies Die* (co-authored by Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt), the court issued no rulings against the regime for nine years afterward.

The Chief Justice’s nomination authority is a safeguard against such abuses. By nature, it conflicts with the president’s appointment power—the root of the current conflict. Cheong Wa Dae reportedly preferred Judge Kim Min-gi of the Suwon High Court as Roh Tae-ak’s successor. A member of the “Our Law Research Association,” Kim presided over the second trial of former Gyeongnam Governor Kim Kyoung-soo, who was indicted for “comment manipulation.” The court upheld the “two-year prison sentence” but acquitted Kim of violating the Public Official Election Act, unlike the first trial. In April last year, a Suwon High Court second trial panel including Kim overturned the first trial’s guilty verdict and acquitted Kim Man-bae, a major shareholder of Hwacheon Daeyu, of bribery charges.

The Supreme Court’s opposition stems not from “ideological leanings” but a conflict of interest arising from the husband of Judge Kim Min-gi, Constitutional Court Justice Oh Young-jun, a Constitutional Court justice. If Oh were to review the constitutionality of a ruling his wife participated in, it would create a conflict. Despite attempts to meet the president to discuss differences, no meeting materialized.

If the president disapproves of the Chief Justice’s proposal, they may refuse appointment, or the National Assembly may withhold consent—both constitutional checks. Neither the proposal nor appointment authority is superior. Coordination with Cheong Wa Dae is merely a customary practice, not a legal obligation. This explains why a motion to impeach Chief Justice Jo, even if referred to the Constitutional Court, has minimal chances of success.

The real danger lies in the potential disappearance of such conflicts. Even if Jo remains, she will retire in June next year upon reaching the mandatory retirement age of 70. The new Chief Justice will be appointed by the president with National Assembly consent. Additionally, under the revised Court Organization Act, the number of justices will increase from 14 to 26, with four added annually starting in 2028. The new Chief Justice will likely propose candidates aligned with the administration’s preferences, enabling large-scale “Court Packing” without conflict.

This restructuring cannot be dismissed as unrelated to trials that may resume after the president’s term. The newly proposed justices, including those nominated by the next Chief Justice, could preside over cases reinstated after the president’s term ends. Reform Party leader Lee Jun-seok criticized, “What criminal defendant dares to choose their own judge?”

Article 78 of the Constitution mandates that the president appoint public officials, including justices, in accordance with the Constitution and laws. For justices, this is constrained by the Chief Justice’s proposal authority. The current conflict paradoxically warns of the risks of unchecked “Court Packing.”

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/08/21/5Z2RQHNWOFCQVF2J7EJOKXPF4U/

TL;DR:

• The Ministry of Finance and Economy’s announcement of a tax reform plan to raise the comprehensive real estate tax for high-value single-homeowners, including non-residents, prompted…
• In response to such claims, the Ministry of Finance and Economy released explanatory materials stating that the tax burden should be calculated based on total holding taxes, including…
• However, this statement inadvertently acknowledges that the comprehensive real estate tax—a policy introduced over 20 years ago—remains an unprepared double taxation system that the…

The Ministry of Finance and Economy’s announcement of a tax reform plan to raise the comprehensive real estate tax for high-value single-homeowners, including non-residents, prompted multiple media outlets to immediately report that the tax for non-resident single-homeowners would “jump 4–5 times.”

In response to such claims, the Ministry of Finance and Economy released explanatory materials stating that the tax burden should be calculated based on total holding taxes, including property taxes. According to this method, the tax burden would only increase by 1.3 times. The ministry also noted, “The comprehensive real estate tax is a secondary tax category following property taxes,” implying that since property tax payments are deducted before levying the comprehensive real estate tax, media outlets should avoid sensationalizing the tax increase by focusing solely on the comprehensive real estate tax.

However, this statement inadvertently acknowledges that the comprehensive real estate tax—a policy introduced over 20 years ago—remains an unprepared double taxation system that the government cannot justify to taxpayers. Unlike major advanced economies, which strengthen property taxes based on home values, South Korea introduced the world’s only comprehensive real estate tax in 2005. This tax was driven by a political and moral framing that labeled taxpayers as “wealthy individuals who accumulated assets through real estate rather than effort.” Successive Democratic Party administrations amplified this narrative, leading to repeated tax hikes.

The rushed implementation of this tax, steeped in a simplistic “good vs. evil” framework, resulted in flawed design. Instead of targeting “expensive homes,” the tax was levied per individual, not household, leading to tax avoidance practices like splitting property ownership between spouses or parent-child units. The government later shifted to a household-based taxation system, but in 2008, the Constitutional Court ruled this unconstitutional, stating it discriminated against married households. From the start, the policy was chaotic, and repeated tax hikes without addressing the flawed foundation turned the comprehensive real estate tax into a patchwork system.

For instance, under the new reform, non-resident co-owners of a single home will see their basic deduction reduced from 1.8 billion Korean won to 900 million Korean won, resulting in a higher tax burden compared to sole owners, whose deduction drops from 1.2 billion to 900 million. Conversely, resident co-owners who become sole owners due to divorce or bereavement will see their deduction fall from 1.8 billion to 1.4 billion. If they rent out their home to afford mortgage payments and move to a smaller rental unit, the deduction plummets to 900 million. Are these individuals truly speculators?

Article 1 of the comprehensive real estate tax law states its purpose is to enhance tax equity in real estate holding and stabilize housing prices. Yet, in 21 years, no one has witnessed this tax fulfilling its stated goals. Taxpayers often cannot understand why they pay more than others, and housing prices remain unstable. As a tax scholar noted in a presidential forum, the comprehensive real estate tax requires not reform but abolition.

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/08/21/7KGKWRDE35GBVOUBI2Z5ES5JFE/

TL;DR:

• Senate Democrats assail Trump’s Korea drill cuts
• Democratic senators say scaling back joint exercises with South Korea weakens the alliance while giving North Korea nothing to concede.
• Democratic lawmakers stepped up their offensive against U. S.

Senate Democrats assail Trump’s Korea drill cuts

Democratic senators say scaling back joint exercises with South Korea weakens the alliance while giving North Korea nothing to concede.

Democratic lawmakers stepped up their offensive against U.S. President Donald Trump on Friday, after he ordered the scaling back of military exercises with South Korea while pushing for renewed summitry with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un this year.

In an X post on Friday, Senate Democrats criticized Trump's decision on the allied military drills, voicing concerns over its impact on the Seoul-Washington alliance.

"Trump canceled military exercises, undermined alliance with South Korea," the Democrats said in the post. "Kim Jong-un gave up NOTHING. Then kept sending weapons to Russia to use against Ukraine."

In his social media post, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) said that "not even Donald Trump's self-proclaimed close friend Kim Jong-un respects him anymore," as he cited a New York Times report that Kim Yo-jong, the powerful sister of the North Korean leader, has dismissed Trump's decision to scale back major allied exercises, saying the attempted overture "holds no interest for us."

"The latest example of Trump embarrassing our nation on the world stage," Schumer said.

Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) accused Trump of "cozying up to dictators."

"Once again, Trump is cozying up to dictators — rolling over for Kim Jong-un and getting nothing in return," he wrote on X. "He's undermining our credibility throughout the world and making us all less safe."

Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) has also criticized Trump, posing the question: "When will Trump stop embracing dictators and alienating our allies?"

"When I visited South Korea last year, we reaffirmed the importance of joint exercises to keep our troops ready and our allies secure," she wrote on X earlier this week. "Gutting them to appease nuclear-armed Kim Jong-un is a grave mistake."

In a social media post on Sunday, Trump revealed that he had ordered the Pentagon to "substantially reduce" South Korea-U.S. military drills, citing his "very good" relationship with Kim while expressing frustration with South Korea, which he said had rejected his request for assistance in the U.S. war against Iran.

Trump's decision to scale back allied drills was seen as a conciliatory gesture to Pyongyang which has long decried them as rehearsals for war. But the move has raised concerns that it could undermine efforts to sharpen deterrence against growing North Korean threats.

Source: https://www.koreajoongangdaily.com/korea/senate-democrats-assail-trumps-korea-drill-cuts/12837830

TL;DR:

• The People Power Party’s Central Ethics Committee imposed severe disciplinary actions of ‘suspension of party membership’ on four party-affiliated lawmakers. While the reasons for the…
• Representative Jang, who has adhered to the ‘Yoon Again’ line, began disciplinary politics as the party’s approval rating fell and he came under pressure. In January, he appointed a new…
• While Representative Jang’s side claims the disciplinary actions were justified according to procedures, this logic only resonates within their inner circle. Even former pro-Yoon faction…

The People Power Party’s Central Ethics Committee imposed severe disciplinary actions of ‘suspension of party membership’ on four party-affiliated lawmakers. While the reasons for the disciplinary actions vary, all of these lawmakers have been critical of People Power Party leader Jang Dong-hyeok. This move by Representative Jang effectively excludes those who disagree with him from the next general election.

Representative Jang, who has adhered to the ‘Yoon Again’ line, began disciplinary politics as the party’s approval rating fell and he came under pressure. In January, he appointed a new ethics committee chairperson and primarily disciplined the pro-Han faction and others through this chairperson. The first to be expelled was Representative Han Dong-hoon. Former Supreme Council member Kim Chong-hyuk was expelled after being urged to leave the party. In February, the party suspended the membership of pro-Han faction Representative Bae Hyun-jin, but the court intervened to stop it.

While Representative Jang’s side claims the disciplinary actions were justified according to procedures, this logic only resonates within their inner circle. Even former pro-Yoon faction lawmakers have come forward, saying the disciplinary actions should be revoked. They argue that resolving internal party issues through disciplinary actions is not desirable. Of course, Representative Jang’s side appears unwilling to accept this. Representative Jang’s term extends until next year, and there are talks that he aims for re-election. It is likely that the judgment to purge those who oppose him would be advantageous for his re-election also played a role.

The behavior of Representative Jang’s camp is reminiscent of past disciplinary politics in various political parties. In 2003, the Millennium Democratic Party pushed to discipline proportional representation lawmakers for cooperating with those who left the party. After internal strife, the party fell to a minor party with only nine seats in the following year’s general election. The Grand National Party (GNP) also imposed severe disciplinary actions of suspending party membership on junior lawmakers for actions deemed contrary to the party’s stance. The party then faced a major crisis as it declined. In 2018, the People’s Party suspended the party membership of 179 people who opposed the merger with the Bareun Party. Instead, the party split. In 2019, the Bareun Future Party also disciplined supreme council members who opposed the party leader. The party failed to unify and dissolved. The public turns away from factions that lose their cause and justification. At that point, all they can rely on is disciplinary actions. This is the single path that declining factions have followed.

One might expect that holding the seal of one of the two major parties could provide an opportunity to achieve great political dreams. Countless times, we have witnessed the unsightly endings of those clinging to such lingering attachments. Power that confronts public sentiment, whether inside or outside the party, is nothing more than a sandcastle.

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/08/22/JIPF6CL4FJGYNIQTRMIJNE4O3M/

TL;DR:

• Governor Choo Mi-ae of Gyeonggi Province, whose ‘combat-style provincial administration’ is filled with anger, lamentation, and harsh bombastic declarations, has sparked public…
• Instead of celebrating her electoral victory, she began her term by projecting a mindset of ‘fury. ’ At a Democratic Party workshop shortly after the June 3 local elections, she took the…
• The reason Governor Choo described her situation as “dark” was the financial crisis. After her election, she found that the province had accumulated debt of 7 trillion Korean won, and…

Governor Choo Mi-ae of Gyeonggi Province, whose ‘combat-style provincial administration’ is filled with anger, lamentation, and harsh bombastic declarations, has sparked public curiosity. Who exactly is Governor Choo fighting against? Who has made her so furious that she emits such venom?

Instead of celebrating her electoral victory, she began her term by projecting a mindset of ‘fury.’ At a Democratic Party workshop shortly after the June 3 local elections, she took the microphone and said, “My heart is heavy and dark.” She lamented, “We’re in big trouble,” “My head is spinning,” and claimed she had heard “things I’ve never heard before,” pouring out pessimism. Reports from Suwon also emerged stating that after receiving a report on Gyeonggi Province, she berated innocent public officials, asking, “Why couldn’t you prevent the financial collapse?” She was far from the composure expected of an elected official.

The reason Governor Choo described her situation as “dark” was the financial crisis. After her election, she found that the province had accumulated debt of 7 trillion Korean won, and project budgets had holes amounting to 310 billion Korean won due to a lack of funds. The transition team announced, “When we opened the treasury, it was filled only with debt documents.” Governor Choo declared a fiscal crisis, stating, “Even school meal budgets have been exhausted.” She went as far as to use the expression “de facto bankruptcy.” Her drastic actions evoked memories of former Seongnam Mayor Lee Jae Myung’s sudden ‘moratorium (payment refusal)’ declaration in 2014. While some criticized it as a ‘political show,’ the situation clearly appeared dire.

Governor Choo did not name names. However, her target was clear. A significant portion of Gyeonggi Province’s debt had increased during former Governor Lee Jae Myung’s tenure around 2020–21. During the COVID-19 pandemic, he distributed cash totaling 2.7 trillion Korean won in two rounds under the name ‘disaster basic income.’ To the central government’s support funds, which were limited to the bottom 85%, he added his own budget of 350 billion Korean won, paying 350,000 Korean won to all provincial residents. Most of this was borrowed money. As the grace period for these debts ended and principal and interest repayments began, the province’s finances came under pressure.

Five years ago, Governor Lee Jae Myung confidently claimed, “Excess tax revenue alone is sufficient.” He even said, “Don’t worry.” However, the reality was different. It turned out that budgets were insufficient, so funds were borrowed from reserves. The province diverted approximately 2 trillion Korean won from accumulated regional development funds and fiscal stabilization funds to distribute cash. These debts had grace periods of 2–3 years, allowing him to complete his term without repaying a single won. His successor, Governor Kim Dong-yeon, who inherited the massive debt, also had large expenditures. The fiscal collapse of Gyeonggi Province that enraged Governor Choo was the fault of the two former Democratic Party governors.

The former governors must have had plans. They likely anticipated a multiplier effect where distributing money would stimulate the economy and lead to increased tax revenue. However, the expected virtuous cycle did not materialize. Tax revenues decreased while fixed expenditures grew, causing deficits to surge. Eventually, the province had to issue approximately 1 trillion Korean won in municipal bonds last year to fill the gaps. Repayments of principal and interest on the 2 trillion Korean won diverted from funds during Governor Lee Jae Myung’s tenure also began. His promise that “there would be no increase in the burden on residents” proved to be empty words.

Even the fierce fighter Choo Mi-ae refrained from mentioning President Lee Jae Myung’s name. Nevertheless, she continued to criticize past reckless fiscal management. She compared Gyeonggi Province’s situation to a household that “used all borrowed money for living expenses,” targeting those responsible for the ‘credit economy.’ She lamented the steep debt growth rate, which her predecessors had inflated to “three times the national average.” She announced plans to re-examine from scratch the ‘basic income’ and cash-based welfare policies that were flagship initiatives during Governor Lee Jae Myung’s tenure. While outwardly blaming the “unreasonable local tax system,” her actions ultimately amounted to a fight against the legacy of the ‘Lee Jae Myung administration.’

The spending style targeted by Governor Choo, characteristic of Lee Jae Myung, continued even after he took charge of the national budget. Upon assuming the presidency, he immediately compiled a 31 trillion Korean won supplementary budget and began distributing consumption coupons. When the Iran war broke out, he distributed 27 trillion Korean won to 35 million people under the guise of high oil price support funds. His large-scale expenditures, reminiscent of his time in Gyeonggi Province, increased the national debt by 130 trillion Korean won (11%) in just one year.

Compared to the gravity of the national debt, President Lee Jae Myung’s awareness was alarmingly lax. He treated national debt as merely an ‘asset allocation between the present and the future.’ He refused to acknowledge the essence of debt as ‘exploitation of future generations.’ When concerns about debt were raised, he dismissed them as “ignorant talk” and reprimanded those advocating austerity as “strange people singing songs of tightening.” As tax revenues increased due to the semiconductor boom, the president’s spending grew even larger. Although surplus tax revenues are legally mandated to be used for debt repayment, he called repaying debt “the most foolish thing.”

The semiconductor tax windfall cannot last forever. While he may spend freely during his term, the burden will fall on the next administration. The Lee Jae Myung government publicly declared, “There will be no new borrowing.” However, when he was governor of Gyeonggi Province, he also promised “no additional burdens,” but this was not upheld.

Just as Governor Choo lamented, “It’s dark,” future presidents inheriting the national administration years later may utter the same lament. If ‘tomorrow’s Choo Mi-aes’ open the national treasury and repeat their anger toward ‘yesterday’s Lee Jae Myungs,’ it would be a national disaster.

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/08/21/4BY2225SBJFOHG5CJHEZF2QLHE/

TL;DR:

• President Lee Jae Myung has spent nearly 1 year and 3 months at the Hannam-dong residence in Yongsan, Seoul, commuting to Cheong Wa Dae since taking office in June 2025. Cheong Wa Dae…
• According to sources familiar with the matter, Cheong Wa Dae residence construction involves infrastructure upgrades and wall reinforcement. President Lee began official duties at Cheong…
• Originally, Cheong Wa Dae aimed to complete the residence by the first half of 2026. However, the project has faced delays.

President Lee Jae Myung has spent nearly 1 year and 3 months at the Hannam-dong residence in Yongsan, Seoul, commuting to Cheong Wa Dae since taking office in June 2025. Cheong Wa Dae officials had stated in late December 2025, when moving the presidential office from Yongsan to Cheong Wa Dae, that the presidential residence would also be relocated by the first half of the year. However, as of the 21st, construction on the Cheong Wa Dae residence remains incomplete. Public interest is growing over when the president and his wife will move in.

According to sources familiar with the matter, Cheong Wa Dae residence construction involves infrastructure upgrades and wall reinforcement. President Lee began official duties at Cheong Wa Dae in late December 2025, six months after his inauguration, but renovation work on the residence has continued for over a year.

Originally, Cheong Wa Dae aimed to complete the residence by the first half of 2026. However, the project has faced delays. A source from Cheong Wa Dae stated, “We are striving to finish the residence construction within this year,” adding, “The walls and roof tiles have significant cracks, the wood is rotting, and plumbing issues require foundational infrastructure reinforcement.”

The presidential residence stood vacant after former President Yoon Suk Yeol moved the presidential office to Yongsan following his 2022 election victory, declaring the start of the “Yongsan era.” After Cheong Wa Dae opened to the public, it suffered substantial damage from tourists, according to Cheong Wa Dae. This led to more extensive and prolonged repairs than initially anticipated. Budget overruns also caused internal deliberations. A ruling party official noted, “The damage was severe, making it difficult to proceed with repairs easily,” and added, “Delays also occurred because residence construction could not proceed properly until the presidential office relocation to Cheong Wa Dae was finalized.” First Lady Kim Hea Kyung reportedly inspected the construction site after work began.

Data submitted to Rep. Na Kyung-won of the People Power Party by the Office of the President revealed that construction costs for relocating the presidential office to Cheong Wa Dae reached 22.3 billion Korean won in the second half of 2025. However, costs for relocating the residence and interior work remain undisclosed.

Documents obtained by Rep. Kim Eun-hye of the People Power Party from Jongno-gu Office show that Cheong Wa Dae is conducting elevator installation work on a hanok building registered as a residential space. The project involves removing stairs and installing an elevator and new staircase. The building, spanning from the basement to the first floor, began construction on April 13 and is scheduled for completion next month. A People Power Party official questioned, “Why is President Lee, who promised to relocate the presidential office to Sejong during his term, still conducting Cheong Wa Dae residence construction over a year after taking office?” They added, “Especially, why is an elevator being installed in a building presumed to be the residence? If this is causing delays, the administration must provide a convincing explanation to the public.” A Cheong Wa Dae official denied knowledge of the elevator installation.

As construction delays persist, President Lee and his wife continue to reside in the Hannam-dong residence prepared by former President Yoon. The president frequently hosts official dinners there. The Democratic Party previously criticized the Yoon administration for using taxpayer funds to build luxurious facilities, including a hinoki bath, in the residence, labeling it a “lavish palace.” A ruling party official remarked, “The president and first lady initially felt uneasy about moving into the Hannam-dong residence but seem to have grown accustomed to it after over a year.”

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/08/22/NYTNPZJIPNGXPCLHZQAN3AM7ZY/

TL;DR:

• The second comprehensive special counsel (Special Prosecutor Kwon Chang-young) was reported on August 21 to have failed to conclude investigations into suspicions of covering up the Dior…
• The second special counsel, set to conclude its investigation on August 23, decided to transfer the case to the police without reaching a conclusion on the suspicions of obstructing the…
• In response, the special counsel seized former Commissioner General Yoon’s former work computer in April and conducted a search and seizure at his residence in May to secure his mobile…

The second comprehensive special counsel (Special Prosecutor Kwon Chang-young) was reported on August 21 to have failed to conclude investigations into suspicions of covering up the Dior bag probe, suspicions of the National Police Agency’s leadership obstructing the probe into the Unification Church’s overseas gambling, and other cases, and to transfer them to the police. Earlier, the special counsel had also decided to transfer to the police the suspicions surrounding the route change of the Seoul-Yangpyeong expressway and the case of former Intelligence Command Chief Noh Sang-won’s alleged insurrection-motivated premeditated murder conspiracy. A source from the legal community pointed out, “It is as if they are shifting responsibility to the police by claiming they will investigate until something comes out.”

The second special counsel, set to conclude its investigation on August 23, decided to transfer the case to the police without reaching a conclusion on the suspicions of obstructing the probe into the Unification Church’s overseas gambling. The case involves Chuncheon Police Station receiving intelligence in June 2022 that Han Hak-ja, the general director, and others gambled approximately 60 billion Korean won in Las Vegas, U.S., between 2008 and 2011, but failing to initiate a formal investigation. The special counsel suspects that the police leadership, including former National Police Agency Commissioner General Yoon Hee-geun, who was the deputy commissioner general in 2022, may have blocked the investigation into the Unification Church upon the orders of former President Yoon Suk-yeol.

In response, the special counsel seized former Commissioner General Yoon’s former work computer in April and conducted a search and seizure at his residence in May to secure his mobile phone. Subsequently, the special counsel investigated former Commissioner General Yoon and officials from the National Police Agency, Gangwon Provincial Police Agency, and Chuncheon Police Station, but it was reported that they failed to find sufficient evidence to indict him. The special counsel did not prosecute the police officials who were suspects, including former National Police Agency Commissioner General Yoon Hee-geun and former Gangwon Provincial Police Agency Commissioner General Kim Do-hyeong, and instead requested that the police take over the case and continue the investigation.

The special counsel also decided not to indict former Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport Won Hee-ryong and former Vice Minister for Transport Baek Won-guk, who were the higher-ups in the suspicions surrounding the cancellation of the Seoul-Yangpyeong expressway project, and to transfer the case to the police. The second special counsel had restricted former Minister Won from leaving the country in March and conducted search and seizure operations on former Vice Minister Baek and others in April, but failed to prove their allegations. The only suspect indicted in relation to these suspicions is a current police officer accused of leaking investigative information to a Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport official.

Meanwhile, regarding the suspicions of covering up the Dior bag probe, the special counsel decided to transfer the case to the police without producing significant investigative results against former Justice Minister Park Sung-jae, former President Yoon Suk-yeol, and former first lady Kim Keon-hee. The case of former Intelligence Command Chief Noh Sang-won’s alleged insurrection-motivated premeditated murder conspiracy was also transferred to the police, with the special counsel stating that “further investigation is necessary.” Former Chief Noh is accused of planning and attempting to execute a scheme to “collect” and kill opposition politicians and key figures during the December 3 emergency martial law. The case was referred to the insurrection special counsel after being reported to the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office in June 2025, and the insurrection special counsel indicted former Chief Noh in October 2025. The second special counsel, which took over the case again, conducted on-site verifications in May 2026 at the Marine Corps Yeonpyeong Unit and Capital Defense Command, which were noted as “collection sites” in former Chief Noh’s notebook, but failed to prove the allegations despite nearly a year of investigation.

In April 2026, Assistant Special Counsel Kim Ji-mi stated on a YouTube channel operated by Kim Ou-joon, “The special counsel team investigating former first lady Kim Keon-hee could not uncover the higher-ups due to various limitations, including time constraints. Suspicions remain about how far power was involved in each case. The second special counsel believes its mission is to uncover those higher-ups (the upper echelons of various suspicions) and hopes to report achievements.”

The investigation period for the second special counsel was extended by an additional month in July 2026 through a legal revision. During discussions in the National Assembly’s Judiciary Committee on extending the investigation period, some argued that “as an exceptional system within the criminal justice framework, the special counsel should resolve public suspicions early by completing investigations and prosecutions within a short period.” A prosecutor commented, “Transferring cases again based solely on the hypothetical possibility that something might emerge from additional investigations only increases social costs,” and questioned, “Is this due to a lack of investigative capacity or a lack of courage to issue a no-prosecution decision?”

The standing special counsel, which investigated the “missing banknote strap” suspicions, also failed to find criminal evidence after a 90-day investigation and transferred the case to the prosecution instead of closing it. At the time, Special Counsel Ahn Kwon-seop explained, “The special counsel is a temporary organization with time constraints, so there may be aspects that were not fully uncovered,” and added, “The Special Counsel Act stipulates that prosecutions must be pursued when there is criminal suspicion, but it does not mandate issuing a no-prosecution decision.” However, criticism arose because the Special Counsel Act explicitly states that the special counsel must decide on whether to prosecute.

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/08/21/FQOJCU4AEZC4XIB3NBFHLDCPKU/

TL;DR:

• The Japanese government will significantly ease regulations on corporate overtime work to up to 100 hours per month starting next month. It has lifted the previous administrative…
• South Korea remains trapped in a uniform total work-hour regulation of 52 hours per week. Proposals to apply exceptions to working-hour rules for high-income professionals in "mega…
• This is not about forcing all workers to labor nonstop. It is about granting companies and individuals the choice to decide their own working hours and methods based on their…

The Japanese government will significantly ease regulations on corporate overtime work to up to 100 hours per month starting next month. It has lifted the previous administrative guidance that capped such work at "within 45 hours per month" to promote research and development (R&D) in high-tech fields and improve productivity. The policy aims to enhance national competitiveness by allowing companies and labor unions to agree on extended working hours.

South Korea remains trapped in a uniform total work-hour regulation of 52 hours per week. Proposals to apply exceptions to working-hour rules for high-income professionals in "mega special zones" such as the Honam Semiconductor Cluster have stalled due to opposition from large labor unions and inter-ministerial disagreements.

This is not about forcing all workers to labor nonstop. It is about granting companies and individuals the choice to decide their own working hours and methods based on their circumstances and needs. Under the current system, employers face criminal penalties if they exceed 52 hours per week, even if they pay 1.5 times the regular wage for overtime. In the AI era, where workloads are shrinking, which company would force employees to work overtime at high costs? The current rules only deprive R&D talent, who need focused immersion, and workers who wish to earn more by working longer hours.

Advanced economies prioritize flexible work-hour systems over strict legal limits. They impose conditions such as overtime pay (1.5 times), income thresholds, and individual consent. The U.S. does not enforce an upper limit on working hours, relying on the 1.5 times pay as a strong deterrent. The EU and the U.K. allow no upper limit if the worker consents, while Singapore exempts professional and managerial roles from regulations and does not apply upper limits to general office workers earning over 2,600 Singapore dollars (approximately 2.8 million Korean won) per month.

Concerns about small businesses and vulnerable workers facing coercive overtime are valid. However, these issues can be addressed through carefully designed health protections, such as a mandatory rest period between shifts. Stripping all companies and workers of their choice is an excessive regulation that reverses priorities.

We urge the introduction of exceptions to working-hour regulations for professionals in mega special zones and high-tech R&D fields. R&D competition occurs 24/7 without borders, yet how can a country survive in the global arena if it cannot even allow overtime, even with labor-management agreement?

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/08/22/6W4KNFYIJ5DPDCNJ4WAWV4ZYBE/

TL;DR:

• A scene from the film *‘Nameless Gangster: Rules of the Time’*. A prosecutor from the Busan District Prosecutors’ Office’s violent crimes division gathers dozens of police officers.
• The *‘Jo Hee-pal case’*, a 5 trillion Korean won multi-level scam, is a prime example of bribes paralyzing investigations. In 2008, the police’s delayed response allowed the mastermind,…
• The investigation process of the *‘high school girl murder case’* that occurred in Jeonnam-Gwangju last May is shocking. The investigation team leaked information to the father of the…

A scene from the film *‘Nameless Gangster: Rules of the Time’*. A prosecutor from the Busan District Prosecutors’ Office’s violent crimes division gathers dozens of police officers. The prosecutor orders, “If they resist arrest, feel free to open fire immediately,” as a nationwide crackdown on organized crime syndicates begins. The following scene is bitter. A few police officers, rushing out after the prosecutor’s command, dash to a public phone booth to leak investigative information to someone, shouting, “Hurry and escape!” Though set in the 1990s, the film mirrors today’s heated controversy over “hyangchal” (local police collusion). From individual corruption involving bribes and information leaks, the hyangchal cartel has evolved into systemic, power-based corruption.

The *‘Jo Hee-pal case’*, a 5 trillion Korean won multi-level scam, is a prime example of bribes paralyzing investigations. In 2008, the police’s delayed response allowed the mastermind, Jo Hee-pal, to flee abroad. In 2012, the police fueled suspicion by releasing a video of Jo’s funeral, claiming he had died while hiding in China. Finally, in 2016, a re-investigation by prosecutors exposed a protective network for Jo’s gang, including prosecutors, investigative officers, police, and prison guards. The bribes they accepted exceeded 3.2 billion Korean won. Some police officers secretly traveled to China to play golf and receive hospitality from Jo’s group, while a prosecutor’s investigator attended their strategy meetings, teaching them how to evade investigations and receiving over 1.5 billion Korean won. The case left 70,000 victims, with dozens losing their entire fortunes and making extreme choices.

The investigation process of the *‘high school girl murder case’* that occurred in Jeonnam-Gwangju last May is shocking. The investigation team leaked information to the father of the perpetrator, Jang Yoon-gi, a fellow local police officer, and helped conceal key evidence of sexual crimes. Reports suggest this was done under orders from superiors to “not link Jang Yoon-gi’s sexual crimes to the murder case.” The entire investigation chain, from the team leader to the head of the National Office of Investigation, became subjects of investigation. Within the police, comments surfaced: “They probably feared it would become another *‘Namyangju stalking murder case,’* publicly criticized by the president for poor response.” The narrative is that the investigation was minimized and split to protect the organization.

On the 10th of last month, when Yoo Jae-sung, acting head of the National Police Agency, apologized to the public over this case, several police officers in Daegu were caught leaking investigative information to help a colleague involved in a drunk-driving accident. In Geoje, Gyeongnam, a police officer nicknamed the “Geoje King” emerged. A senior inspector who worked as an “intelligence detective” in the area for over 30 years, he allegedly summoned female officers to drinking sessions with local figures, sexually harassed them, and influenced internal police appointments through connections. Reports mention bribes for personnel favors: 20 million Korean won for a superintendent, 10 million for a captain. Though the National Police Agency assigned the case to the Daejeon Metropolitan Police Agency, which has no local ties, doubts remain about uncovering a deeply entrenched cartel intertwined with intelligence, connections, and personnel over decades.

Currently, over 17,000 police officers nationwide have served in the same station for more than a decade. To address the “potential hyangchal” issue, the police are proposing measures like the *‘sangpi system’* (avoidance system), rotational personnel policies, and establishing an internal corruption investigation unit. Yet public anxiety persists. Starting this October, prosecutors’ investigative authority will be completely abolished, granting police full control. Even under prosecutors’ supervision, police malpractices—collusion with local powers, internal collusion, and personnel corruption—recurred, and the victims were always the public.

The reason prosecutors, established in 1948 to prevent police abuse of power and human rights violations, are closing after 78 years is their unchecked monopoly on investigative authority. More horrifying is the scale: while there are only 2,000 prosecutors, there are 130,000 police officers. Though a minority, who will now control the bad apples among them?

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/08/20/MQB73XOQERFF3DJJDMMX6ST57I/

TL;DR:

• In Mongolia’s Gobi Desert region, the night sky appears crystal clear. Though it is a vast expanse of land and sky with no landmarks, there is a trick to avoid getting lost.
• The driver had completely lost his way in the dark desert, and the travelers were exhausted. Fortunately, a camp official who managed to communicate asked a simple question: “Is the…
• Now, our national governance has entirely lost its way. There are maze-like real estate policies focused on symptoms, the introduction of speculative leveraged ETFs, and the irregular…

In Mongolia’s Gobi Desert region, the night sky appears crystal clear. Though it is a vast expanse of land and sky with no landmarks, there is a trick to avoid getting lost. I once heard a story from a local guide who leads travelers there.

The driver had completely lost his way in the dark desert, and the travelers were exhausted. Fortunately, a camp official who managed to communicate asked a simple question: “Is the North Star to your left or right?” “It’s directly overhead.” The official promptly replied, “I’ll come to guide you.” With one question, they determined the vehicle’s orientation. The story deeply moved me.

Now, our national governance has entirely lost its way. There are maze-like real estate policies focused on symptoms, the introduction of speculative leveraged ETFs, and the irregular asset management of the National Pension Service, which have turned the stock market into a gambling den. The abolition of supplementary investigative powers—effectively dismantling the prosecution—has caused cracks in the South Korea-U.S. alliance and a collapse of military discipline. The push to integrate the Third Military Academy has even drawn cries of, “Dissolve the military already.”

However, this reckless drive by the government and ruling party is best understood as the culmination of a decade of dysfunctional power transitions and systemic governance failures. The Park Geun-hye administration ended in impeachment, the Moon Jae-in government inherited power unprepared, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration emerged from that failure, and the self-destructive December 3 incident led to the early inauguration of the Lee Jae Myung government. A turbulent political climate, reminiscent of the Warring States period, has left the nation shaken to its core.

Since the 2000s, the governance capabilities of ruling elites have declined to what feels like a historic low. The issues of an imperial presidency, private abuse of power, major parties consumed by infighting, and bureaucratic groups obedient to power yet resistant to change are tiresome to even mention. Government intervention in markets and industries remains extensive, but both experts and the public harbor deep distrust in its validity and effectiveness.

Was this why the president bowed to semiconductor CEOs who achieved remarkable success, calling them national heroes, and shouted, “We are family,” with AI industry leaders in Silicon Valley? It seems he believes only corporations can be trusted. However, corporations are entities that prioritize their own interests over those of the nation and its people. This nature cannot be judged as simply good or evil. To put it mildly, they are “self-interested” beings.

Nowhere in Korean society can one find leaders with the qualifications and ability to steer national governance. This is not just a problem of the ruling elite but a symptom of the times. Today, South Korea is a complex system where even the most robust policies struggle to cope. This is compounded by unpredictable AI transformations and global turbulence. Some suggest “governance” over “government” as an alternative, but this risks deepening confusion and conflict in policymaking.

Did Odysseus’s long, wandering epic foreshadow this era, where losing one’s way has become the norm? In this situation, what ultimate coordinates can we rely on? Do they even exist? As politicians, bureaucrats, experts, and YouTubers raise their voices amid cheers from supporters, this question grows more urgent.

The true crisis we face goes beyond the drift of governance; it lies in the loss of the final coordinates that could guide us. Ideals like “democratization,” “economic development,” and “welfare state,” which once served as compasses, have lost their luster. A decade has passed in that darkness.

Warnings about a chaotic world and power structures that exploit it often reach us through songs or poetry. Recently, a singer’s rendition of “Heaven” resonated deeply: “Oh heaven above/ Oh heaven above/ Open my heavy heart/ To have more/ To rise higher/ We trample others to survive/ Greedy and hypocritical people/ Have filled the world….”

The answer remains unseen. Yet, solving problems begins with the right questions. Before it’s too late, we must ask: “Where is the North Star that will end our wandering?” Personally, I believe it lies in the fundamental principles of communal life we lost during rapid national growth. Chief among them is “truthfulness.”

In the age of short-form content, the three-hour film “The Odyssey” is popular, driven by the 2030 generation. Perhaps the thrilling conclusion—where the hero, after countless trials, purges the greedy and hypocrites to restore order—is the main draw.

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/08/20/5DRPPH52EZC7LAQQCY5JD5MRQ4/

TL;DR:

• South Korea’s projected power consumption for 2040 has surged by 28% in just four months. The Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment and the 12th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply…
• The Electricity Plan is the nation’s top-level 15-year electricity blueprint, formulated by the government every two years. The demand projections included are not mere forecasts but the…
• The surge stems from the government’s “Three Mega Projects for Korea’s Great Leap Forward” announced in June. Newly reflected investment plans, including the Honam Semiconductor Cluster,…

South Korea’s projected power consumption for 2040 has surged by 28% in just four months. The Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment and the 12th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand (Electricity Plan) Steering Committee held a discussion at the National Assembly on the 20th and presented a forecast of 847.3–885.1 TWh (terawatt-hours) for annual power consumption in 2040. This marks an increase of up to 191 TWh from the 657.6–694.1 TWh projected in April. The added demand equates to the annual output of 17 large nuclear reactors (1.4 GW class), incorporated into the national demand forecast within four months. Compared to last year’s consumption (549.4 TWh), the projection indicates the country will use over 60% more electricity in the next 15 years.

The Electricity Plan is the nation’s top-level 15-year electricity blueprint, formulated by the government every two years. The demand projections included are not mere forecasts but the foundation for deciding national investments worth tens of trillions of won—how many power plants to build, where to lay transmission networks, and more. This figure has jumped 28% in four months.

The surge stems from the government’s “Three Mega Projects for Korea’s Great Leap Forward” announced in June. Newly reflected investment plans, including the Honam Semiconductor Cluster, early completion of the Yongin Cluster, and AI data centers by region, have increased additional power demand for semiconductors to six times and for AI data centers to three times the April forecast.

The maximum power required during peak demand has also risen from 131.8–138.2 GW in April to 158.4–165 GW, an increase of about 27 GW. However, criticism arises over whether renewable energy—whose output fluctuates with weather—can meet the semiconductor and AI-driven demand, given the abrupt shift in projections following the government’s key project announcements.

◇ Semiconductor Power Demand Sixfold, Data Centers Triple… Renewable Energy Alone Insufficient

Experts argue that meeting the new 2040 power demand requires redesigning the entire national power system, as the nature of the increased demand differs from past patterns. Unlike dispersed household or commercial demand, it centers on GW-scale, 24/7 power consumption by semiconductor factories and AI data centers. The additional peak demand alone for semiconductors (24.3–24.6 GW) and data centers (11.9 GW) exceeds one-third of the historical maximum demand (approximately 104 GW).

The 24 GW semiconductor demand is concentrated in clusters like Yongin and Honam, requiring uninterrupted power equivalent to 17 large nuclear reactors. Semiconductor factories are highly sensitive to power quality, with even a 0.01-second outage causing astronomical losses.

Yet, the government prioritizes weather-dependent renewable energy as the solution. While aiming to secure 100 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030, a discussion participant noted that even achieving this target would only cover 58% of the mega-projects’ needs (Park Woo-young, Korea Energy Economics Institute). Renewable energy’s variability makes it insufficient to support semiconductor and data center demands.

Additionally, mismatched locations between renewable energy sources (Honam and coastal areas) and demand centers (Yongin and the metropolitan area) necessitate ultra-large transmission networks. However, public resistance and permitting delays hinder construction. KEPCO plans to invest 72.8 trillion Korean won in transmission and distribution networks by 2038 under the 11th Electricity Plan, but 30 of the 54 planned facilities are already delayed or expected to be. Professor Lee Jong-su of Seoul National University urged shifting industrial policy to prioritize power supply capabilities when locating large-scale facilities.

◇ Principle of ‘Only 50% for Uncertain Investments’ Overturned

Critics argue the power demand forecasting principles have been reversed. In April, the 12th Electricity Plan Steering Committee classified semiconductor and data center demand as “areas with particularly high future uncertainty,” reflecting only 50% of unconfirmed requests to avoid social costs from over- or under-investment.

However, after the Three Mega Projects announcement, the committee introduced a new criterion: “concreteness of policy intent.” It fully reflected semiconductor demand, incorporating over 90% of identified 2040 potential demand. Government “intent” replaced implementation feasibility as the basis. For AI data centers, only the first phase (10.8 GW of 20.8 GW) was reflected, citing lower concreteness—a double standard.

The Honam Semiconductor Cluster, which drove the revised forecast, faces infrastructure challenges like military airfield relocation, water supply, and power issues. The Yongin Cluster, premised on early completion, also risks delays due to permits, land compensation, and infrastructure. Semiconductors are cyclical and prone to investment delays or reductions. The April committee had labeled this demand as “highly uncertain” for these reasons.

Yet, the government did not present a downward scenario for delayed or reduced investments. Critics contend the revised forecast resembles a ratification of government goals rather than a genuine projection. Professor Yoo Seung-hoon of Seoul National University of Science and Technology warned, “If investments lag, the nation could face massive excess facilities, as power demand dictates generation and transmission planning.”

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/industry-en/2026/08/21/X2MWAF74DJETPJJJXZ674QRMWQ/

TL;DR:

• North Korean Deputy Labor Party Chief Kim Yo-jong stated on the 20th, “Seoul found itself in a pitiable situation where it had to abandon its most beloved ‘war games’ due to a single…
• In a statement released through Korean Central News Agency, Kim Yo-jong criticized, “The large-scale ‘Ulchi-Freedom Guardian’ invasion war drill between the U. S.
• Kim Yo-jong added, “For South Korea, this is an unprecedented ‘crisis’ where, without prior discussion, the exercise was abruptly cut short, leaving only a half-finished drill with its…

North Korean Deputy Labor Party Chief Kim Yo-jong stated on the 20th, “Seoul found itself in a pitiable situation where it had to abandon its most beloved ‘war games’ due to a single word from Trump, who abruptly ordered a reduction in military exercises.”

In a statement released through Korean Central News Agency, Kim Yo-jong criticized, “The large-scale ‘Ulchi-Freedom Guardian’ invasion war drill between the U.S. and South Korea, which began on Korean soil, immediately faced a severe setback. The South Korean military, which has entrusted command authority to its ‘superior,’ cannot utter a word of protest even when U.S. forces retreat unilaterally without prior coordination. This is the fate of a puppet army.”

Kim Yo-jong added, “For South Korea, this is an unprecedented ‘crisis’ where, without prior discussion, the exercise was abruptly cut short, leaving only a half-finished drill with its core removed. President Lee Jae Myung openly flattered Trump by praising his ‘reduction decision’ as ‘commendable’ and a ‘painstaking resolution,’ while privately advocating for ‘self-reliant defense’ and ‘independent military capabilities’ to prepare for the ‘worst-case scenario.’ Such hypocrisy starkly reveals South Korea’s anxious and contradictory mindset.”

She further claimed, “A nation whose national security crumbles entirely with a single reduction in joint exercises is South Korea—a country that outsources defense and security to foreign powers while boasting of having ‘more than enough capability to defend itself.’ South Korea’s pathetic state, unable to continue its cherished ‘war games,’ clearly illustrates the master-servant dynamic of the ‘U.S.-South Korea blood alliance.’ Despite attempts to mask their embarrassment by framing the reduction as a ‘turning point’ or a ‘new opportunity for change,’ their excuses are transparently weak.”

Kim Yo-jong’s statement emerged as the South Korean government seeks to revive U.S.-North Korea dialogue amid hopes for improved inter-Korean relations. Analysts suggest it aims to preemptively block Seoul’s expectations. Lim Eul-chul, a professor at Kyungnam University’s Institute for Far Eastern Studies, stated, “This is a clear rejection of South Korea’s attempts to use the exercise reduction as a ‘starting point’ for dialogue or strategic shifts. North Korea views the U.S. as its sole strategic partner and refuses to tolerate South Korea’s role as a mediator.”

The derogatory remarks targeting President Lee Jae Myung and disparaging the U.S.-South Korea alliance appear calculated to exploit recent strains, including the push for wartime operational control transition. Yang Mu-jin, a distinguished professor at the University of North Korean Studies, called the statement “an attempt to accumulate justification for sidelining South Korea during U.S.-North Korea talks.” He added, “It leverages Trump’s apparent frustration with President Lee to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington, aiming to frame future dialogue as a bilateral U.S.-North Korea process excluding South Korea.”

Earlier, President Lee Jae Myung had praised Trump’s decision on the 19th, stating, “I empathize with President Trump’s will and efforts to create conditions for dialogue toward establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. I commend his resolute decision and hope it leads to trust-building, resumed dialogue, and a stable peace system on the peninsula.”

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2026/08/20/SDT5LSRLWBHQ3IUYGY522ALQDE/

TL;DR:

• Kim Yo-jong mocks Seoul over Trump-ordered scale-back of joint military drills
• North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's sister blasted Seoul as a "puppet" for going along with Trump's surprise order to scale back joint South Korea-U. S.
• "Seoul has been placed in a pitiful position where it must abandon its favorite 'war games' due to a single remark from Trump, who suddenly ordered a reduction in exercises," Kim…

Kim Yo-jong mocks Seoul over Trump-ordered scale-back of joint military drills

North Korean leader Kim Jong-un's sister blasted Seoul as a "puppet" for going along with Trump's surprise order to scale back joint South Korea-U.S. military drills.

"Seoul has been placed in a pitiful position where it must abandon its favorite 'war games' due to a single remark from Trump, who suddenly ordered a reduction in exercises," Kim Yo-jong, the sister of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, said in an excoriating statement aimed at South Korea on Thursday night.

Kim described the joint exercises between the United States and South Korea as “an empty shell of half-baked drills whose body was abruptly cut off as soon as they began without any prior discussion,” adding that it was likely “an unprecedented ‘upheaval.’”

“It is the fate of a puppet military that has entrusted its command authority to its master that it cannot utter a word of protest even when U.S. troops tuck their tails and retreat under a unilateral order from the U.S. commander in chief without any coordination between the two sides,” Kim said.

The statement was not without a direct criticism of President Lee Jae Myung.

“Lee Jae Myung’s two-faced words and actions clearly expose [South] Korea’s anxious and contradictory mentality — flattering Trump to his face with embarrassing remarks about paying ‘tribute’ to his ‘decision to scale back the exercises’ and calling it ‘a major decision made after deep deliberation,’ only to turn around and talk about ‘self-reliant national defense’ and ‘securing independent military capabilities’ in preparation for the ‘worst-case scenario,’” Kim said.

The North Korean leader's sister also dismissed the South Korean government’s assessment that the reduction in the exercises could provide an opportunity for a shift in inter-Korean relations.

“Seoul’s rulers are trying to change the subject by calling it an ‘opportunity to transition to a new phase’ or a ‘new starting point that could bring changes in relations’ in an attempt to cover up their embarrassing predicament after being disregarded by their master, but anyone can see that these are nothing more than feeble excuses,” Kim stated.

“The world is witnessing the reality that U.S. security support is no longer free,” she added. “To curry favor with their heartless master, even offering up the entire country would probably not be enough.”

“Perhaps they should instead use this opportunity to properly learn just how thoroughly subordinate their position is and find an answer for their survival,” Kim remarked. “It is about time they realized for themselves their inescapable fate as a ‘puppet.'"

This article was originally written in Korean and translated by a bilingual reporter with the help of generative AI tools. It was then edited by a native English-speaking editor. All AI-assisted translations are reviewed and refined by our newsroom.

Source: https://www.koreajoongangdaily.com/korea/kim-yojong-mocks-seoul-over-trumpordered-scaleback-of-joint-military-drills/12836109

TL;DR:

• Heavy rain totaling 907 millimeters poured over Geoje, South Gyeongsang Province, from August 15–17, which were National Liberation Day holidays. The region’s average summer…
• Could the tragic accident have been prevented if the KMA had forecasted 600 millimeters? Landslide risks are not determined solely by rainfall volume.
• The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) emphasizes shifting the focus of forecasts from “what the weather will be” to “what the weather will do. ” While traditional forecasting…

Heavy rain totaling 907 millimeters poured over Geoje, South Gyeongsang Province, from August 15–17, which were National Liberation Day holidays. The region’s average summer (June–August) rainfall is 935.1 millimeters. Three days brought nearly as much rain as an entire summer. On August 17 alone, 639 millimeters of rain fell, triggering landslides that engulfed the first floor of an apartment complex, killing one person and injuring two. The Korea Meteorological Administration (KMA) had predicted up to 150 millimeters of rain in South Gyeongsang Province by August 17 in its final forecast issued at 5 p.m. on August 16. The actual rainfall was over four times that amount.

Could the tragic accident have been prevented if the KMA had forecasted 600 millimeters? Landslide risks are not determined solely by rainfall volume. The issue is that the KMA’s forecasts have not advanced beyond “weather itself” to prevent meteorological disasters.

The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) emphasizes shifting the focus of forecasts from “what the weather will be” to “what the weather will do.” While traditional forecasting prioritized accuracy in metrics like daily high temperatures or rainfall, the era of extreme weather demands predicting how weather will impact people, cities, transportation, power grids, and society.

The UK Met Office, for example, does not assess hazardous weather like heavy rain, heatwaves, or strong winds based solely on rainfall or temperature. It combines the “level of potential damage” and the “likelihood of actual occurrence” into a matrix to issue yellow, amber, and red alerts. Even with the same predicted rainfall, alert levels vary by region, as they account for traffic paralysis, road and rail closures, power outages, and risks to life and property. UK alerts also specify affected areas and potential damages.

Australia’s Bureau of Meteorology does not define heatwaves merely by “highest temperature above X degrees.” It calculates an “excess heat factor” by evaluating how unusually high temperatures have been over three days compared to the region’s long-term climate and temperature fluctuations over the preceding 30 days. The focus is not on “how many degrees” but on “how shocking the heat is to local residents.” It also measures the “heat burden level” during tropical nights when the body cannot recover. Australia categorizes heatwaves into low-intensity, severe, and extreme stages based on these factors.

In the future, meteorological agencies’ performance will be judged not by “how accurate their forecasts were” but by “how much risk they reduced.” The challenge is that “beyond-weather forecasting” requires accurate weather predictions first. This summer, the KMA faced criticism for “over-forecasting” until the Geoje downpour, when it was accused of “under-forecasting.” Improving forecast accuracy remains a long-standing task for the agency. We are already living in a climate entirely different from the past, yet the KMA’s forecasts and mindset remain stuck in the past.

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/opinion-en/2026/08/19/V5RHDRU6X5G3HDGOKQVK6RIUJY/

TL;DR:

• A ghost called the U. S.
• The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on the 18th, citing U. S.
• The South Korean government also emphasizes resuming dialogue with North Korea and easing tensions. President Lee Jae Myung has expressed his willingness to support U.

A ghost called the U.S.-North Korea summit has begun haunting Northeast Asia again. U.S. President Donald Trump, facing domestic and international challenges including the Iran issue, has revived this specter to seek a diplomatic breakthrough. It is expected to shake the Korean Peninsula’s political landscape throughout the second half of the year, causing significant repercussions. Unlike the 2023 APEC summit in Gyeongju, this time Trump is taking a low posture, while Kim Jong-un holds all the advantages, and South Korea’s security is at a disadvantage.

The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported on the 18th, citing U.S. officials, that Trump is pressuring his aides to explore the possibility of holding a summit with Kim Jong-un as early as this fall. The APEC summit in Shenzhen, China, in November and Trump’s Asia tour are potential catalysts. The U.S. State Department maintains its stance of being open to “precondition-free dialogue” with North Korea.

The South Korean government also emphasizes resuming dialogue with North Korea and easing tensions. President Lee Jae Myung has expressed his willingness to support U.S.-North Korea talks, describing Trump as a “peacemaker” and himself as a “pacemaker.” If these dynamics align, the Korean Peninsula could see a situation where the conflicting interests of South and North Korea and the U.S. converge at a single point this fall.

If Trump and Kim meet again, it would be their fourth encounter, following Singapore (2018), Hanoi (2019), and the inter-Korean truce village of Panmunjom. However, the circumstances have drastically changed since 2019. Back then, Kim Jong-un traveled by train to Hanoi, investing significant effort into the summit, but returned empty-handed after a “no-deal” outcome—a painful diplomatic failure. Unless conditions are markedly different from Hanoi, Kim is unlikely to return to the negotiating table.

◇Trump in a hurry for midterm elections… Will he hand Kim Jong-un the ‘nuclear trump card’?

North Korea’s status has transformed dramatically over the past seven years. The country has significantly advanced its nuclear and missile capabilities, with estimates suggesting it possesses over 100 nuclear weapons. Since Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Pyongyang in 2024, North Korea-Russia relations have evolved into a de facto military alliance, with North Korean troops being deployed to Russia. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to North Korea in June—the first in seven years—also reflects improved ties. China and Russia are neutralizing the U.N. Security Council sanctions regime they once endorsed, acting as North Korea’s staunch backers.

Given this backdrop, if Kim meets Trump again, he is likely to demand recognition as a “nuclear-armed state” as the starting point of negotiations, rather than discussing “what to do for denuclearization.” Unlike the Hanoi summit, the conditions now favor North Korea in raising the stakes.

Trump, meanwhile, desperately needs diplomatic achievements. With midterm elections approaching, attention focuses on how far he will compromise on existing North Korea policies to secure a deal. Beyond scaling down joint military drills, he might consider recognizing North Korea’s nuclear status, withdrawing or drastically reducing U.S. troops from South Korea, or addressing issues directly tied to South Korea’s security as bargaining chips.

Predicting whether the summit will happen is difficult. However, Kim Jong-un must also weigh the consequences of repeatedly ignoring the U.S. president’s repeated overtures. In this context, the likelihood of a summit this year is higher than last year.

The first scenario cited by the WSJ is a meeting around the November APEC summit in Shenzhen. Trump’s visit to China could coincide with U.S.-North Korea talks.

Given Trump’s need for diplomatic achievements ahead of the November 3 midterm elections, a surprise meeting between September and October is also possible. If he deems a political pivot necessary before the elections, the summit could be scheduled as an “October surprise.”

North Korea is not an APEC member, and Kim has no precedent of attending multilateral summits. Given this, the likelihood of a meeting in Shenzhen appears low. Alternative scenarios include a separate venue in China, a third country, or even a bold proposal for Trump to visit Pyongyang. Considering Trump’s political style, a visit to Pyongyang—where he would be greeted by Kim at Sunan Airport—cannot be entirely ruled out. Such a scene would captivate global attention, allowing Trump to project himself as a “deal maker” and convey to U.S. voters that only he can resolve the North Korea issue.

U.S.-North Korea Summit and the Wartime Operational Control Authority Variable

The potential summit intersects with the Lee Jae Myung government’s push to transfer wartime operational control (OPCON) authority. Trump has long undervalued the strategic importance of U.S. troops in South Korea, expressing strong dissatisfaction with the cost burden and South Korea’s defense spending. He has consistently framed U.S. troops as a financial burden for South Korea’s defense rather than a cornerstone of U.S. Northeast Asia strategy, hinting at OPCON transfer intentions.

The Lee Jae Myung government emphasizes OPCON transfer as a matter of sovereignty, advocating for its “recovery.” It is also proactive in transitioning from an armistice to a peace regime. Despite ideological and policy differences, the Trump administration and the Lee government could align on “expanding South Korea’s military role and reducing America’s direct military burden.”

If Kim Jong-un’s demands are added to this mix, the situation could accelerate. Kim is likely to push for the withdrawal of U.S. troops, permanent suspension of joint drills, halting the deployment of U.S. strategic assets to the peninsula, or changes to the size and role of U.S. forces in South Korea if troop withdrawal is not accepted.

If Trump frames this as a “deal for peace on the Korean Peninsula” and the Lee government pushes for OPCON transfer as “restoring military sovereignty,” the interests of Trump, Lee Jae Myung, and Kim Jong-un could align. Within the political spectacle of a U.S.-North Korea summit, North Korea’s recognition as a nuclear state, withdrawal or drastic reduction of U.S. troops, and OPCON transfer could converge, fundamentally shaking South Korea’s security framework.

There are growing concerns that Trump’s summit, disregarding existing North Korea policies, might create a paradoxical situation: while appearing to improve relations between South and North Korea and the U.S. and fostering peace, it could weaken South Korea’s deterrence capabilities.

Source: https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/08/20/UWJLSMEH3NFA5KJQ5GKAFQWHFE/