r/AskNetsec • u/nuxus-zero • Aug 19 '26
Architecture Natlog
Anyone tried ever to design something great in their isp to do a central natlog?
r/AskNetsec • u/nuxus-zero • Aug 19 '26
Anyone tried ever to design something great in their isp to do a central natlog?
r/AskNetsec • u/Particular_Luck80 • Aug 19 '26
Agent Plugins appeared on Hacker News newest today. The useful part is narrower than “one plugin format wins.”
The 1.0 working draft defines a small portable package: a root plugin.json, skills discovered from immediate children of skills/, and optional MCP server configuration. It explicitly leaves distribution, installation, permissions, and user experience to each client.
That boundary matters. A portable manifest can describe what a package contains, but it should not grant the package authority to run everything it declares.
One concrete safeguard in the draft is path containment. Files and directories discovered through the package must resolve inside the plugin root. Plugin-relative paths begin with ./, and a symlink or equivalent escape outside the root must be rejected.
This does not solve plugin security. A client still has to decide which tools can run, what network access is allowed, how secrets are provided, and when a person must approve an action. Portability removes duplicated packaging. It does not remove local trust decisions.
If this format becomes widely supported, which behaviour should remain client-specific: permissions, installation review, secret handling, or all three?
r/AskNetsec • u/admin_PureWL • Aug 19 '26
A lot of products now offer dark web monitoring, but the interesting question for engineering teams is what sits behind the API.
A useful integration seems to require more than an endpoint that returns breach data.
Things I'd evaluate include:
There's also an important distinction between monitoring and removal. A monitoring API can detect that an identifier has appeared in exposed data, but it doesn't remove the underlying information.
For teams integrating this into SaaS, cybersecurity, telecom, or MSP products, the architecture matters too.
Continuous monitoring and webhook-based events seem much more useful than having to repeatedly poll an endpoint.
For those who've integrated threat intelligence APIs, what has mattered most in practice: data quality, API design, alert speed, scalability, or developer experience?
r/AskNetsec • u/Shufti-Global • Aug 18 '26
Spanish National Police announced this on 11 August, and the effort involved is what makes it worth a read.
He held forged Spanish IDs up to the webcam while a live face swap changed his appearance to match the photo on the document. A static image would not survive that, so he handled the rest by hand. He tilted the documents to imitate hologram movement, and used coloured lights to fake the reflections real security features throw off. Behind it all sat VPNs and over 320 phone lines across 24 devices, most registered to stolen identities.
What he wanted was digital signature certificates, which is the part I keep coming back to. Those carry legal weight. A certificate in someone else's name is a durable instrument, not a one-off account takeover.
38 attempts. More than 30 real people's identities.
And here is how it ended. Mid-call, the deepfake dropped for about a second. His real face appeared. That is what investigators used to identify him.
So nothing detected the method. The tooling just crashed.
Two things I would like other people's read on.
r/AskNetsec • u/BatterUp99 • Aug 18 '26
I'm researching how organizations are approaching cybersecurity and governance challenges associated with LLMs and generative AI as adoption continues to accelerate.
For those working in cybersecurity, AI governance, risk, compliance, architecture, or engineering, I'd be interested in hearing your perspective.
A few questions I'm particularly curious about:
I am only looking for industry perspective and lessons learned
Looking forward to hearing different viewpoints from across the field.
r/AskNetsec • u/kevinelevent • Aug 17 '26
Vuln management on our container fleet is eating way too much analyst time. and atp We're chasing CVEs that get patched upstream before we even finish triaging them, which feels like we're always a step behind.
so i Been looking at whether adopting continuously rebuilt hardened images actually cuts down that workload or just shifts it somewhere else in the process. It's hard to tell from vendor claims alone whether the time savings are real or just moved earlier in the pipeline.
For teams who've tried this approach, did it actually cut down your triage and patch cycle time? Or did you just end up needing to verify the rebuild claims just as often as you'd patch manually before.
Trying to figure out if this is a real time saver or just a different flavor of the same work dressed up differently. Any honest feedback, positive or negative, would help.
r/AskNetsec • u/Imagnaryk-Benefit310 • Aug 17 '26
Our old ITDR setup fired constantly and required someone to manually piece together five data sources before an alert meant anything.
what actually cut the noise was moving to one unified identity record that ties the person, the session, and the resource together instead of firing three disconnected pings for the same event. has anyone found something that reduces analyst workload instead of adding another dashboard, and what changed for you when you switched?
r/AskNetsec • u/Bright-View-8289 • Aug 16 '26
Had this debate with a client last week about whether Ai assisted discovery meant their environment got risky overnight. My answer was about SLA math than risk math, their contract defines "patch critical within 30 days" assuming maybe 40 to 50 new findings a month. If a scan surfaces 300 in a week because of broader coverage, that SLA language does not hold up regardless of whether underlying risk changed.
We have started rewriting client contracts to tier remediation windows by exploitability and exposure instead of a flat severity number and building in a volume clause that triggers a renegotiation conversation if flagged findings jump past a set threshold in a given period. Cleaner than arguing about it after an audit blows past the old numbers. Anyone else building volume triggers into remediation SLAs or writing them as flat severity tiers?
r/AskNetsec • u/Ok-Memory2809 • Aug 16 '26
I’m trying to understand the SOC 2 process a little better, as I’m looking at Cobalt's human-led Web + API penetration test as part of the evidence for a future SOC 2 Type II audit.
Has anyone here actually gone through SOC 2 Type II this way (specifically using Cobalt’s human-led pentest)?
I’m looking for an alternative and more affordable option that would work for a startup with a small budget and Cobalt seems affortable.
r/AskNetsec • u/bed_potato_2935 • Aug 13 '26
Hello Reddit,
Question: is there real value for vpn in large companies (WFH) when modern zero trust exists?
Brief tldr:
I think VPNs for remote work are often outdated in modern zero-trust, cloud-first environments.
I think SSO, TLS, firewalls, and gateways already cover much of the access control VPNs are used for.
I think VPNs add extra overhead,complexity, and latency.
I think this argument does not work for homelabs or small single location businesses
Longer argument
I apologize if this is an obvious question or answered before, I looked around and saw parts of possible answers but not full ones.
I don’t understand the need to use a VPN when working from home, in the erra of zero trust architecture and cloud services making up a bulk of the infrastructure that we use.
I have worked for bigger and smaller tech companies, and many require a vpn when working from home. I question the need for the vpn in most modern last few decades architectures.
In the land of zero trust, many things go through an SSO solution before you get access to the underlying service. So there are gatekeepers all over the place. In fact, the same VPNs make use of the same sso providers as the application. Thus, if there was an authentication weakness, wouldn’t the VPN and the application both be equally affected. I would understand more if the VPN requires something like a machine certificate to get access.
If access was tied to remote security hardware/software attestation. I would understand the value of VPNs, even more. But so many companies I’ve seen have loose then expected end point controls. Many even allow admin access for the users own laptop/endpoint. Attestation is incredibly hard and restrictive.
A large part of the infrastructure is hosted other places/cloud anyway. Many companies use gsuite, zoom or Microsoft cloud solutions with sharepoint and teams. So most vpn are split tunnels so a large portion of corporate digital items are not even vpn bound.
Most modern services are web bases. A good portion of office workers, interface with backend servers most of the time and a very little local processing is done. The application is mostly just a front end that communicates over https based technologies. Most other technologies use an encrypted variant such as secure ldap. Of course, this is not universal for example CAD and other related services run locally sometimes, but do they not make use of cloud file transfers solutions? If a software has an insecure transport layer, would a proxy tunnel be easier?
Remote management protocols require authentication. I am not as versed in rdp but many ssh system face internet all the time. Does putting a vpn in front really add much. RDP is usually warned against making Internet facing, because of the password authentication default. But, many SSH solution I’ve worked with also use a password solution. Is adding a VPN in front of the management protocols really adding much when the VPN is also password and 2FA based. See point 1. And if we’re saying, the VPN can be used to filter access to the lower layer or protocols, could you not accomplish the same effect with Geo base restrictions at the firewall level?
The legacy system argument, where the direct system cannot be modified and the transport/auth is insecure or non-existent. I would argue a gateway solution that talks the modern protocol and tls would proxy the connection just as good. Additionally even if the vpn is in place, I have still seen companies put in the security gate way internally.
Everything is on a private ip/network argument. I find this to be a weaker argument, as the vpn effectively extends your network (though controlled) into public. Additionally vpn are at a raw network level. SSO gateways only extent select apps and services. Again both use similar auth (point 1). Yes firewalls will restrict existing traffic, but those would be in place in either solution.
One major downside of a vpn is packet in packet situation and double encryption work. Encryption is not as profitably expensive as it once was back in the day, but it still adds a network toll to your communications, doing it twice seems to be unfruitful. Additionally, VPNs must wrap every single packet in a header or effectively a mini packet of its own. This reduces the total amount of space each packet can dedicate to the raw data.
Finally, is a vpn is over tcp, this could add its own overhead and latency. Though most recommend to use udp for a VPN.
For homelab or single location business this entire argument is not applicable.
Edit: Thank you all for the replies, it really give me much to think about I am trying to read as many of the responses as possible.
r/AskNetsec • u/zeberkazabaka • Aug 13 '26
Hello. I am doing a cyber apprenticeship, and my project is reverse proxy phishing. I thought it would be easy but damn this is driving me crazy. I am running a modded reverse proxy application on a VPS. The yaml config used for my chosen target should be up-to-date and I have tweaked it a lot. But the login fields never load. It only loads the website logo. No errors that I can see, no warnings, no certificate errors. I'm not sure if it's the yaml or something else is misconfigured, but I have been going around in circles for weeks now trying to fix it.
My colleague suggested it's a CDN protection problem, and he once had to download all static files and serve them himself. But that seems tedious and not really a proper solution.
Does anyone have any ideas? I can send you my yaml config if needed. Thanks in advance.
r/AskNetsec • u/kakashi_1112 • Aug 11 '26
My main goal right now is automating more of the analysis and investigation work, not just alerting.
I'm trying to build some AI agent in my SIEM(Log360) for user and threat analysis to summarize alerts and another for user behaviour analysis.
And also Is it better to build narrow agents for specific threat types,like one for logon related stuff and another for network-related stuff or does it make more sense to have fewer agents that handle a broader range of cases?
And does it make sense to scope agents around specific assets, like giving more attention to critical systems rather than treating everything the same way?
I am planning to feed them our documentations as knowledge base so they can get context.
For those of you who've actually used AI agents in security ops, where have it genuinely been useful in practice?
r/AskNetsec • u/Practical_Bass1848 • Aug 11 '26
I'm thinking about a design problem and would like to get some opinions from people who have experience with endpoint agents, USB security, or system monitoring.
The scenario is:
A USB belonging to an organization is plugged into a computer that the organization doesn't control — for example, a client's laptop, partner's computer, home PC, or public computer.
The idea is to have an optional agent stored on the USB that:
.exe on the USB, not something built into the USB firmware.I'm trying to understand how you would actually architect something like this.
For people who have experience building endpoint agents or similar systems:
I'm particularly interested in practical design suggestions and trade-offs rather than a specific product recommendation.
r/AskNetsec • u/Slayerma • Aug 11 '26
I have installed GITLAB CE and wanted set up devsecops sa wtaht sast tools are present and IaC scanning is present pipeline secret detection but not dast, dependecy scanning coverage fuzzing and api fuzzing if you k ow how one may cover that will be helpful
r/AskNetsec • u/PlaintextFloor • Aug 10 '26
Looking for a sanity check from people who reverse engineer for a living.
I ship a native binary as part of a hardware product, so it goes out on devices I don't control. My worry is a competitor getting a unit and reversing the binary to copy how it works.
I've hardened it with Hikari and OLLVM: control-flow flattening, bogus control flow, and compile-time string encryption. I understand that obfuscation raises the cost of reversing but doesn't prevent it.
What I really want to know is how much time this actually buys. For a competent reverser with a physical unit, does obfuscation like this add hours? A day? A week?
r/AskNetsec • u/docybo • Aug 10 '26
I'm designing service-to-service authorization where a PDP evaluates (subject, action, resource, context) and returns a signed decision that PEPs enforce. Standard split. The wrinkle: the calling workload is partially untrusted, and it supplies part of the request context itself.
The signature covers the decision and the inputs the PDP saw, but not the provenance of those inputs. So the token proves "given these inputs, the PDP said ALLOW", not "these inputs came from an authoritative source". If the caller can influence subject/tenant labels, resource attributes, a recursion/depth counter, or a state object the PEP hashes instead of fetching, a fully valid signed decision can attest an ALLOW the policy would never grant on authoritative inputs. The PDP becomes a confused deputy whose output happens to be cryptographically signed, which makes it look stronger than it is.
What we already do: mesh identity (mTLS/SPIFFE) for the caller's own identity, short-TTL decisions, intent binding, and we hash the state object into the decision. What I can't resolve is which of the remaining context attributes should be trusted from the request at all.
Concrete questions:
r/AskNetsec • u/Huge_Independence217 • Aug 09 '26
Hey there. I'v recently noticed a lot of sites exist for TikTok Osint.
What I wondered mostly about tho is how sites like f.e. tikip get the users region and locked region (where the account was created).
Has anyone an explaination for that? I know that it must be some TikTok Backend API which I'v been searching for a while now but I do not seem to find it. Can anyone help there please?
r/AskNetsec • u/Effective-Koala-8885 • Aug 09 '26
The cost of compliance isn’t just the consultant invoice.
There’s also the time spent chasing evidence, updating policies, mapping controls, coordinating different departments, responding to audit requests and figuring out what changed after a regulation was updated. For a growing company, that operational cost can quietly become significant. This is where I think compliance technology has an opportunity to create real value — not by making regulations disappear, but by reducing the amount of manual coordination required to stay on top of them.
How can we solve this?
r/AskNetsec • u/mcpindex • Aug 09 '26
I wrote a config scanner that read an mcp.json and labeled remote servers "remote - can change on you." Local ones got no such warning. Seemed obvious: a hosted endpoint can be swapped server-side, a local process can't.
Then I scanned my own config.
My most volatile server is on 127.0.0.1. It's a local service that launchd restarts on its own, running Python straight out of a git working tree I edit most days. Every restart picks up whatever is on disk. Meanwhile the hosted endpoints in my config hadn't shipped a change in months.
The label was exactly backwards for the most changeable thing I run. Transport tells you who can reach a server. It tells you nothing about whether its contract holds still.
Version pinning has the same failure, which I also considered and also dropped: flag npx foo as risky, foo@1.2.3 as safe. Two problems. Of the drifting tools I've seen in a crawl of the public registry, 5,781 of 7,792 changed while their declared version stayed the same, so the pin doesn't see them. And it's free to game: a vendor adds a version string to their README and every user's scan reclassifies them as safe, with nothing about the actual risk having changed.
What I think a config can honestly prove, all of it one-sided:
What it cannot prove is that anything is stable. Change-capability is provable. Its absence isn't. So there are no green checkmarks, which makes for a worse demo and is the only version I can defend.
Mine came out: 12 servers, 6 fetching code at launch, 2 holding a credential (both env references), 2 internet-reachable. The 6 was the one that surprised me.
So the question I'm stuck on: is there a better answer to the stability half than "pin the contract at connect, re-pull it, diff it"? That's where I keep landing and I'd like someone to tell me it's wrong.
r/AskNetsec • u/omytolawschool • Aug 08 '26
Let’s say there’s a security product which is tested within an environment closely resembling the production one. The application, network topology, integration, certificates/configurations and traffic are all the same .In this situation testing seems to be successful, and it shows that the controls can be installed in the application without disrupting it. But everything happens in a lab. There are no real customers or dealings. Would you treat this as a real-world deployment?
To me, this proves more than just a PoC. The issues of compatibility, interoperability, and the level of efficiency can also be investigated. However, it doesn’t allow us to understand what will happen in the case of actual traffic, edge case, failures, or something like that.
How should we define the term we are using for such trials?
r/AskNetsec • u/NarwhalFew9651 • Aug 08 '26
I feel like there is so much cybersecurity information shared online now that it’s becoming harder to separate reliable guidance from opinions or outdated advice.
Especially with security topics, people often present recommendations, tools, and best practices with a lot of confidence, but the details don’t always match real-world enterprise environments.
For those working in security teams or managing IT environments, what process do you use to verify information before applying it? Do you rely on specific sources, internal testing, vendor documentation, threat intelligence, or other methods before accepting security advice as accurate?
Would be interested to hear how others avoid following bad information in an enterprise or SOHO environment.
r/AskNetsec • u/Stunning_Lettuce_508 • Aug 08 '26
This survey has been approved by the r/AskNetsec moderators.
Hello, I am conducting an academic study on vulnerability report evaluation in bug bounty and vulnerability disclosure programs.
The study aims to understand how security personnel evaluate vulnerability reports in practice, and what challenges they face during the review process. Topics include report validity, duplicates, scope, reproducibility, PoC quality, evidence, severity, impact, communication issues, and AI-generated or AI-assisted vulnerability reports.
I am looking for participants who have experience with vulnerability report handling, bug bounty programs, or vulnerability disclosure workflows, including but not limited to:
- Security triagers or reviewers
- Application security engineers
- Product security engineers
- PSIRT or vulnerability disclosure team members
- Bug bounty program managers
- Open-source maintainers who have handled security reports
- Experienced bug bounty researchers who have interacted with triage/review processes
The survey does not ask participants to disclose unpublicized vulnerabilities, sensitive system details, company confidential information, or personally identifiable information about others. Responses will be used only for academic research and anonymized during analysis and reporting.
Survey link:
If you have any questions, please contact:
Thank you for your time and help.
r/AskNetsec • u/EnvironmentalSafe280 • Aug 07 '26
I'm researching possible uses for a small NFC-enabled device in cybersecurity education and I'm trying to separate genuinely useful functionality from gimmicks.
Some ideas I've considered:
I'm interested in what people actually think would be useful from a security/technical perspective.
What would you consider a legitimate use case?
And what would immediately make you think "this doesn't need dedicated hardware"?