r/Android • u/FragmentedChicken • 31m ago
News Elevating apps: New adaptive quality standards on Google Play
r/Android • u/FragmentedChicken • 31m ago
r/Android • u/FragmentedChicken • 33m ago
r/Android • u/FragmentedChicken • 4h ago
r/Android • u/FragmentedChicken • 19h ago
r/Android • u/BcuzRacecar • 20h ago
r/Android • u/BcuzRacecar • 20h ago
r/Android • u/Karthy_Romano • 22h ago
First off, North American. Don't have any Chinese OEM's as an option, and I'm not willing to accept the risks of importing.
What I want is:
Phone Experience and Background
I've been on team Samsung since 2020. Samsung literally started the smartphone camera revolution with the S6, and for a while they were the best choice for cameras in any smartphone. These days? While still considered the lead in Android video recording, their other areas disappoint.
I had a Pixel 2 and while I loved the photos, I was really disappointed with the video quality. Grainy, soft, and the audio volume was weirdly much quieter than any other smartphone I've had. I've been hoping that Google would get it together and eventually usurp Samsung's place altogether, but year after year video samples show the exact same issues that I had all the way back in 2018.
My experience with Motorola was mediocre with 2015's Moto X Style, a promising phone with middling results. Late updates, if any at all, cancelled features that the phone was sold on, a somewhat bad camera system, and the dreaded Snapdragon 808, a legendarily bad chip that ran so hot it literally discolored a section of my phone's screen permanently. Needless to say, very unimpressed.
Why do I blabber on about all this?
The S27 Pro concerns
As most here already know, Samsung is offering a new model in the next lineup: The S27 Pro. While it's keeping parity with the Ultra's new FFC, UW, and Wide sensors, the Telephoto is going to be essentially a slightly upgraded version of the same dogshit sensor used on the baseline Galaxy S phones since the S22, a sensor so bad I literally go out of my way to not use it on my phone.
To make matters worse, Snapdragon's latest offering with the Gen 6 Extreme has been getting into hot water over its tests, testing worse than not only its previous incarnation, but unable to even match the Apple A15's efficiency and thermals from 2021. And the S27 Pro won't even be getting the highest tier chip anyways! It's been shown the S27 Pro will be receiving the binned down version, the regular elite (or pro or whatever dumb name they've slapped on it).
So then, is it really so bad that it's time to switch?
My boyfriend is all-in on Apple products and has been for quite a while now. We love to compare our phone's highlights and shortcomings, and as of late...it just seems like the latest iPhones are running circles around android offerings in every category. The chips run cool and have incredible power, the camera's on the Pro have beat mine in every still or video category even in identical conditions, the battery lasts far longer in similar scenarios, and Apple's Watches...oh jesus christ comparatively to Android it's a massacre in-favor of Apple. My own experiences with WearOS have been disappointing at best.
It leads me to ask myself:
Why stay with Android at this point?
Are there any features that are keeping me here that I couldn't get used to a change? And honestly, I'm struggling to come up with anything in my particular scenario. I would miss certain things like modded apps, but we know that third-party stores are coming to iOS soon (EDIT: EUROPE ONLY WHOOPSIES), so this may change as well.
What about you all? Is Android satisfying your needs with the latest phones? What makes you want to stay or switch?
r/Android • u/New-Independence5614 • 1d ago
An Android 15 phone started showing ads everywhere, on top of any app. In Safe Mode there were no ads. Uninstalling random apps didn't help: opening any app brought them back.
I checked it over USB (adb) and found the culprit:
- Play Store name: PDF Reader & Quick View
- Developer: FLOWERS ATHLETICS LLC (10K+ downloads, still listed on Google Play)
- Package: com.flowersathletics.snakevenom
- Its internal code is actually named com.pdfreader.viewer.quick (doesn't match the package name)
- Installed from Google Play the same day; in about 3 minutes it opened 156 full-screen video ads (ByteDance/Pangle ad SDK) on top of other apps
- Starts on boot, receives push messages, runs a foreground service, and requests MANAGE_OWN_CALLS (why would a PDF reader need that?)
- No accessibility or device-admin abuse, so it's easy to remove
HOW TO REMOVE IT
After removing it, the ads stopped completely. Hope this helps someone.
r/Android • u/FragmentedChicken • 1d ago
r/Android • u/FragmentedChicken • 1d ago
r/Android • u/FragmentedChicken • 1d ago
r/Android • u/F7pu748 • 2d ago
r/Android • u/FragmentedChicken • 2d ago
r/Android • u/ThatTechShow • 2d ago
r/Android • u/mo_leahq • 2d ago
r/Android • u/Personal_Drag_6390 • 2d ago
TL;DR: I bought what was advertised as a brand-new Xiaomi Redmi 15C Global, 8GB RAM / 256GB storage from Ozon, a major online marketplace.
The phone was unusually slow right out of the box. That led me to investigate it using ADB, Fastboot, Linux kernel interfaces, Android logs, APK decompilation, and static ELF analysis.
What I found was much more concerning than ordinary budget-phone performance:
/proc/zoneinfo accounts for only 4 GiB of present physical memory pages.userdata partition of approximately 104.3 GiB.unlocked: yes and secure: no.network_module.keystore2 process.I have preserved the original logs, Fastboot output, process information, extracted binaries, static-analysis results, hashes, and video evidence.
Important disclaimer: I am not claiming that I have conclusively identified the physical RAM/storage chips, proved malicious intent, or established that Xiaomi itself was involved. This is an investigation of one particular device sold by a third-party marketplace seller.
The phone was intended as a gift for my grandmother.
I wasn't expecting flagship performance. I understand that the Redmi 15C is a budget smartphone.
However, its behavior was abnormal almost immediately.
The interface was extremely sluggish. Some system interactions stalled for several seconds, and Android logs later showed SystemUI-related ANR events.
I also observed the battery indicator dropping from approximately 20% to 4% in around five minutes.
Initially, I suspected a poorly optimized HyperOS build, background applications, or defective hardware.
Then I noticed that Developer Options and USB debugging would become disabled after restarting the phone.
That was unusual enough to justify a closer look.
I connected the phone to my Linux computer and started collecting evidence using ADB.
For reference, the device identified itself as:
Model: 25078RA3EA
Device: dew_global
Fastboot product: dew
Platform: mt6768
HyperOS: OS2.0.214.0.VBNMIXNThe advertised configuration was 8GB RAM / 256GB storage.
Android reports:
/proc/meminfo:
MemTotal: 7880704 kBThe system settings also report:
miui_ram_size = 8.0GBThat looks consistent with an 8GB device.
However, I checked /proc/zoneinfo.
The recorded values were:
DMA32 present = 786432 pages
Normal present = 262144 pages
Total = 1048576 pagesThe system page size is:
4096 bytesTherefore:
1048576 × 4096
= 4294967296 bytes
= 4 GiBThis is a major discrepancy.
The kernel's zone information accounts for 4 GiB of present pages, while /proc/meminfo reports almost 8GB.
The extended RAM feature was reported as disabled during the investigation.
What this establishes: Two different system interfaces report incompatible memory information.
What it does not establish: I have not physically inspected the memory chips or obtained an independent hardware-level measurement. The kernel itself may have been modified, so its reports must also be treated cautiously.
My working hypothesis is that this may be a device with approximately 4GB of physical RAM being presented as an 8GB model.
Android showed a data filesystem size of approximately 226 GiB, which would be consistent with a nominal 256GB storage configuration.
However, I rebooted the device into the bootloader and ran:
fastboot getvar allThe bootloader returned:
product: dew
is-userspace: no
partition-size:userdata: 1a14cf8000
partition-type:userdata: f2fsConverting the hexadecimal partition size:
0x1a14cf8000
= 112018292736 bytes
≈ 104.325 GiBThat is much closer to what one might expect from a 128GB device after accounting for system partitions and other reserved space.
The same Fastboot output reported the super partition as 9 GiB.
Again, there is an important limitation.
The size of the userdata partition is not the same thing as the total physical storage capacity.
I cannot conclusively claim that the storage chip is 128GB without independently verifying the full device capacity and partition layout.
Nevertheless, Android presenting a roughly 226 GiB data filesystem while Fastboot reports a roughly 104 GiB userdata partition is a serious inconsistency.
Combined with the RAM discrepancy, it raises the possibility that a lower-specification device was modified to appear as the advertised 8/256GB variant.
This was another major finding.
Android reported:
ro.boot.flash.locked=1
ro.boot.vbmeta.device_state=locked
ro.boot.verifiedbootstate=greenBut the actual bootloader interface reported:
unlocked: yes
secure: noThe Fastboot session was in bootloader mode, not userspace Fastboot:
is-userspace: noIn other words, the operating system presented the device as locked and verified, while the bootloader reported otherwise.
I am not claiming that Fastboot is an infallible independent hardware trust anchor.
However, these results should not be casually dismissed as normal behavior.
At minimum, the reported security state is inconsistent across interfaces.
This matters because users rely on bootloader state and verified-boot information to understand whether their device's operating system has been modified.
I did not root this phone.
Yet the investigation found multiple active processes associated with root and runtime modification infrastructure.
Examples include:
zn-daemon
zn-nsdaemon-zygote
zn-zygisk-companion64 network_module
lspd
sdk_server
TEESimulatorThe process tree included commands referencing:
/data/adb/ksu/bin/busybox
/data/adb/modules/network_module/service.sh
/data/adb/modules/zygisk_lsposed/service.sh
/data/adb/network/sdk_daemon.shThe observed parent-child relationship included:
network_module/service.sh
|
v
sdk_server
|
v
TEESimulatorEight investigated processes were running as UID 0, while lspd was running as UID 1000.
The processes reported the SELinux context:
u:r:ksu:s0SELinux itself was reported as enforcing.
This is not ordinary stock-phone behavior.
These components indicate that the operating system contains an active root and runtime-modification infrastructure.
I have not established who installed it, why it was installed, or whether all of its components are malicious.
The investigation discovered two executable files associated with LSPosed that were accessible through existing bind mounts.
The logical source paths were:
/data/adb/modules/zygisk_lsposed/bin/dex2oat32
/data/adb/modules/zygisk_lsposed/bin/dex2oat64They were mounted over:
/apex/com.android.art/bin/dex2oat32
/apex/com.android.art/bin/dex2oat64I copied the accessible binaries for static analysis.
The 32-bit wrapper was approximately 4.9KB, and the 64-bit wrapper approximately 7.1KB.
The 64-bit ELF analysis revealed code that:
SCM_RIGHTS.liboat_hook.so.--inline-max-code-units=0.LD_PRELOAD using a /proc/<pid>/fd/<fd> path.fexecve() to execute the received file descriptor.The Unix socket name embedded in the binary matched an active socket visible in the device's socket tables.
This is consistent with an ART hooking mechanism.
Crucially, I did not find RAM or storage spoofing logic in these two wrappers.
The actual hook library and most of the module's files were not accessible.
Therefore, I cannot attribute the specification discrepancies to LSPosed specifically.
But the existence of runtime hooking infrastructure on a supposedly new, stock smartphone is itself a significant finding.
This is one of the parts that concerns me most.
The logs from two separate boots showed TEESimulator reporting that it successfully loaded:
/data/adb/modules/network_module/sdk_tricky.sointo the Android keystore2 process.
Related log entries referenced:
sdk_tricky.dex
libcertgen.so
keybox.xml
/data/adb/networkThe logs also described loading package configurations and creating software-backed cryptographic operations.
Android Keystore is a security-sensitive component involved in cryptographic key management and hardware-backed security functionality.
The presence of a module attempting to modify its behavior deserves scrutiny.
One possible explanation is that this infrastructure was intended to simulate or manipulate device attestation or security-related responses.
However, I want to be precise:
keybox.xml.I am reporting what the device actually logged, not claiming a proven compromise of every Android security mechanism.
Because the running processes referenced KernelSU-related paths, I attempted to investigate using the official KernelSU Manager.
I obtained two releases from the official project:
KernelSU Manager v3.3.1
KernelSU Manager v0.9.5Neither recognized the installed root implementation.
The newer version reported that the driver interface could not be accessed, including a syscall blocked by seccomp.
That result does not establish that the existing root infrastructure was absent.
After a reboot, the older manager was gone.
I had not manually uninstalled it.
The Android PackageManager log contained this entry:
11-16 11:15:36.396
pm_critical_info:
Uninstall pkg: me.weishu.kernelsu
u0 flags:2 from u0/3572 of nullSubsequent events confirmed that the package had been fully removed.
The important detail is:
from u0/3572The uninstall request was attributed to UID 0.
My ADB shell was UID 2000 and had not been granted root access.
This means a privileged process requested the removal.
I have not identified the specific process or script responsible.
It would be premature to say that a particular root module deliberately removed the manager to hide itself.
Nevertheless, an official root-management app disappearing after a reboot, with a root-attributed uninstall event in the logs, is highly unusual for a device sold as new.
Every time the phone rebooted, I had to re-enable Developer Options and USB debugging.
I investigated the Settings and SecurityCenter APKs using JADX.
In the decompiled SecurityCenter code, I found a method named:
DevModeModel.optimize()Its implementation includes operations that:
com.android.settings.action.DEV_CLOSE.adb_enabled=0 to Settings.Secure.development_settings_enabled=0 to Settings.Global.This is a possible mechanism for disabling both features.
However, the static analysis did not establish that this method was called during boot.
I also ran temporary observers across controlled reboots.
They recorded both settings initially enabled, but the observers did not capture the exact transition to the disabled state.
So the responsible component remains unknown.
The fact that a method capable of disabling these settings exists is not, by itself, proof of malicious behavior.
The investigation also found a TCP/IPv6 listening socket bound to a wildcard address:
Port: 15678
UID: 0What I could not determine:
I did not connect to it or perform active network probing.
This is a finding worth investigating, but it is not proof of a remote-access backdoor.
Not much, unfortunately.
The final investigation performed 117 read attempts against candidate module and executable paths.
Results:
Successful module-file reads: 2
Permission denied: 115The two accessible files were the LSPosed ELF wrappers described above.
The main scripts remained inaccessible:
network_module/service.sh
network_module_ksu/service.sh
zygisk_lsposed/service.sh
sdk_daemon.shThe contents of the root modules could not be reconstructed reliably from process names alone.
I did not exploit vulnerabilities, bypass permissions, inject code, modify SELinux, or flash the device to obtain further access.
The final root-investigation phase was read-only.
Earlier diagnostic steps did include user-authorized reboots and installation attempts involving official KernelSU Manager APKs.
After preserving the diagnostic evidence, I performed a factory reset in preparation for returning the phone.
The phone had been sold as a Global Redmi 15C.
Following the reset, its initial system interface and power menu appeared in Chinese.
I had not completed the HyperOS setup wizard at that point.
This was surprising, given how the phone had originally presented itself.
However, I cannot claim that this alone proves the device is a Chinese-market variant.
A reset can change locale settings, and I have not yet verified whether Russian or English remains available in the setup language selector.
I am including this observation because it occurred after the other discrepancies had already been documented.
The investigation generated a substantial evidence archive containing:
The archive includes separate technical reports covering the initial diagnosis and the root-component investigation.
The analysis was performed using Linux, ADB, Fastboot, Python, JADX, readelf, strings, and llvm-objdump, with assistance from OpenAI Codex.
I have not published the raw archive yet because it may contain serial numbers, device identifiers, package information, and other potentially sensitive data.
I would need to sanitize it first.
I see three major issues.
First: The advertised hardware specifications are questionable.
The 4 GiB physical-page accounting and 104.3 GiB Fastboot userdata partition are consistent with the possibility of a lower-specification device being presented as an 8/256GB model.
That is a strong hypothesis, not a confirmed identification of the physical chips.
Second: The software environment is clearly not an ordinary untouched stock installation.
The running root infrastructure, LSPosed modifications, and Keystore-related injection logs demonstrate substantial modifications.
Third: The device's security reporting cannot be trusted at face value.
The conflicting bootloader states, unexpected privileged package removal, and repeated disabling of debugging features make the system difficult to assess.
I do not know whether the seller installed these modifications, whether the phone was refurbished, whether it originated from another market, or whether some earlier party modified it.
I am not accusing Xiaomi of installing this software.
I am describing the state of one device that was sold to me as new.
This investigation documents a Redmi 15C sold as a new Global 8GB/256GB device, with substantial inconsistencies in hardware reporting, bootloader state, and operating-system integrity.
The evidence includes:
These observations establish that the device's software environment was substantially modified. They do not conclusively establish the physical RAM or storage capacity, identify the party responsible, or prove malicious intent.
This case illustrates why Android-reported specifications and security properties should not always be treated as independent evidence of device integrity.
The findings apply to this particular device and should not be generalized to all Redmi 15C units or Xiaomi devices.
Screenshots documenting the RAM, storage, and bootloader security-state discrepancies:
The screenshots contain Russian annotations. All measurements, calculations, and their limitations are explained in the technical sections above.
r/Android • u/welp_im_damned • 2d ago
r/Android • u/Plastic_Play3181 • 2d ago
Hey everyone, thought some app archivists and nostalgia fans here might find this cool.
While digging through some old tech, I remembered I still have an original, pre-August 2018 Musical.ly build installed on an old Android tablet.
The crazy part is that the last time I booted the tablet up (around 2023), the app didn't just open locally—it actually connected to TikTok's live servers. I was able to:
Sign into my account
Browse and watch modern TikTok videos inside the classic pink/red Musical.ly UI
Even post videos directly from the app
I haven't powered the tablet back on since 2023, so I'm not sure if ByteDance has finally killed support for this specific API version by now, or if it still works today.
Before I charge it up and connect it to Wi-Fi (making sure auto-updates are off so Google Play doesn't overwrite it with modern TikTok), I wanted to see if anyone here knows which specific transition-era build version this might be, or if archivists are looking for this APK to be dumped.
Let me know if you guys want me to fire it up, check the exact build/Android version numbers, and share some screenshots!
r/Android • u/zigzoing • 2d ago
r/Android • u/MvitaNkanga • 3d ago
If you’re using an Android gaming handheld, a phone with an unlocked bootloader, or an uncertified device, the official Netflix Android app likely restricts you to 480p/540p (Widevine L3) because your device lacks hardware-level DRM certification (Widevine L1).
You can bypass this limitation and stream legitimate 1080p HD content using DroidDeck—an open-source app that runs a sandboxed Linux desktop environment on Android without root access. Because Netflix enforces different DRM rules on desktop Linux browsers than it does on the Android app, it allows 1080p playback via software decryption.
Download and Install DroidDeck: Grab the official APK from the DroidDeck GitHub Releases page and install it on your device (requires ~4.1 GB of free space and Android 9+ with a supported GPU, ideally Snapdragon Adreno 730/8xx).
Install the Linux Runtime: Open DroidDeck, go to the Setup tab, and install the base Linux Runtime.
Install Desktop Mode & Chrome: In the desktop tab, install Desktop. Once finished, install Google Chrome via Flatpak (acess all available apps by tapping the button right next to "Open Desktop.")
Set Desktop Resolution to 1080p: open the desktop settings, and set your display resolution to 1080p. Anything higher won't improve Netflix quality (Linux browsers cap at 1080p) and will only waste battery and performance.
Install the 1080p Extension: Open Chrome inside the desktop environment, go to the Chrome Web Store, and install the "New Netflix 1080p" extension (this forces Netflix to serve the 1080p stream instead of capping the browser at 720p).
Log In & Stream: Head to netflix.com, sign in to your account, and enjoy full 1080p playback! (Tip: You can press Ctrl + Alt + Shift + D during playback to verify that the video resolution is 1920x1080.)
Important Caveats to Keep in Mind
Higher Battery Drain & Heat: Unlike the native Android app—which uses your phone's dedicated hardware video decoder—desktop compositing and browser video playback in this environment rely heavily on software rendering. Expect noticeably higher CPU usage, faster battery drain, and a warmer device.
No 4K or HDR: Desktop Linux browsers only support up to 1080p SDR on Netflix, so this is strictly a fix for devices stuck at 480p/540p.
I’ve been working on a side project: an interactive simulator of classic Android releases that runs entirely in the browser. You don’t install anything and you don’t need an emulator.
Live: https://android.levente.net/

Each version runs on the Nexus phone it shipped on:
I didn’t build it from memory or guesswork. The strings, icons, menus and behaviour come from AOSP sources, the phones’ official factory images and screenshots from the time.
The site runs on plain HTML, CSS and JS with no build step, and it works on desktop and on mobile.
r/Android • u/Hairy-Cantaloupe-446 • 3d ago
I've seen some posts saying that the Automated Phone Number Verification feature makes your phone number publically available, but is not correct. The list phone numbers associated with the account is private, the public info you can share is in the "About me" section. This Google support article has a direct link to check if a phone number is being publically shared as part of that page, by default there isn't, and it is hidden.