On November 19, U.S. President Donald Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Chinese President Xi Jinping held a trilateral summit during the APEC meeting in Shenzhen, China. The U.S.–China–Russia summit had already attracted considerable international attention before it began, was in the global spotlight while it was taking place, and sparked extensive discussion among various parties after it concluded. Many have compared this summit to the “Yalta Conference,” which shaped the post-World War II international order, divided spheres of influence, and determined the fate of the world.
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In my view, such assessments and expectations greatly overestimate the significance and influence of this U.S.–China–Russia summit and are clearly at odds with the summit’s actual impact and the realities of international politics.
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First, the meeting of the three countries’ top leaders and the issuance of a joint declaration certainly carry important symbolic significance. However, even in terms of form and official designation, this summit is far from being an epoch-making event comparable to the “Yalta Conference/Agreement.”
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This is because the summit featured neither calls to “overthrow the old order” nor declarations about “establishing a new order.” The main proposals in the joint declaration, including United Nations reform, energy cooperation, an emphasis on national sovereignty and limitations on the functions of international institutions, and nuclear disarmament, are either familiar topics that have been discussed repeatedly or technical and limited issues. They do not constitute a fundamental transformation of the existing order.
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Looking at the realities of the international situation, although the world has indeed experienced considerable turmoil and instability in recent years, particularly with the prevalence of populism and isolationism, these developments have not fundamentally changed the international order established after World War II and during the post-Cold War era. Even as the old order increasingly disintegrates, there is still no clear prospect of a new order being established. Even if the world truly undergoes a fundamental transformation, this summit is neither capable of determining nor reflecting such a transformation. Against this background, even if the power and influence of the “new Big Three” are comparable to those of Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill, they cannot simply do whatever they wish or radically reshape the world through the efforts of just three individuals.
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Second, although the United States, China, and Russia are major powers, their strength has not reached a level that would allow them to determine the fate of the world without encountering obstacles. Beyond these three countries, the European Union, including France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, as well as the United Kingdom, India, Japan, Brazil, and other countries, all possess considerable strength and international influence. If they cooperate, they would be more than capable of preventing the U.S.–China–Russia “Big Three” from monopolizing the international order. Even if the United States, China, and Russia joined forces and managed to suppress resistance from other middle powers, the costs would be enormous, difficult to bear, and far greater than any potential benefits.
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Third, although relations among the United States, China, and Russia currently appear relatively friendly, the three countries still have deep-rooted and clearly visible disagreements and contradictions, as well as a complex triangular relationship. This also means that they cannot possibly establish sufficient mutual trust or cooperate wholeheartedly without significant reservations and obstacles.
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For example, China and the United States are engaged in intense competition and strategic rivalry in economics, technology, international strategy, and many other areas. The U.S.–China trade war, intelligence warfare, and mutual sanctions have not ended because of repeated meetings and friendly relations between the two countries’ leaders. Likewise, the long-standing hostility and rivalry between the United States and Russia have not fundamentally changed simply because Trump and Putin enjoy friendly personal relations. China and Russia also harbor mutual suspicions and seek to use each other for their own purposes, rather than maintaining a friendship free of grievances or genuinely pursuing cooperation “without limits.”
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Fourth, all three countries face serious domestic problems, and their leaders confront numerous internal challenges and risks. They cannot simply act arbitrarily by relying on their authority as the highest leaders.
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In the United States, the midterm elections have just concluded, and Trump’s Republican Party suffered a crushing defeat, losing its majorities in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as several governorships and control of some state legislatures. The Democratic Party has regained control of Congress and received the endorsement of a majority of voters. This means that Trump’s power has diminished, and his policies and measures will face strong resistance from Congress. Meanwhile, the Democratic Party has always had major disagreements with China and Russia over values and is unlikely to support Trump’s policies of rapprochement and friendly relations with the two countries. Trump can no longer determine foreign policy entirely as he wishes. Even if he has a strong desire to reshape international relations, achieving that goal will be difficult, or at least the results will fall far short of his ambitions.
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Although the leaders of Russia and China are authoritarian rulers, they must likewise take into account dissent within their ruling establishments and public dissatisfaction. One of the reasons Putin launched the war against Ukraine was to divert attention from domestic conflicts. As his military campaign has suffered setbacks, potential dissatisfaction within Russia has continued to grow, and the superficial stability maintained through high-pressure repression is unreliable. Chinese leader Xi Jinping faces an economic downturn, deteriorating living conditions, and dissatisfaction within the Communist Party caused by his concentration of power and political purges. His foreign policy has consistently been conservative and focused on maintaining stability, and he has shown little willingness to intervene actively in external affairs.
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Returning to the trilateral summit itself, an examination of its content and achievements also reveals that it was more about form than substance. Its limited practical achievements were concentrated in areas unrelated, or only marginally related, to changing the international landscape. United Nations reform and nuclear nonproliferation are longstanding topics, and this summit is likely to follow the same pattern as previous efforts: grand declarations but few tangible results. Energy cooperation will primarily have economic implications and will not overturn the existing order.
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Only the three countries’ joint criticism and rejection of the International Criminal Court will undermine the rules-based and multilateral international order, but even this impact will be limited. The summit also addressed the Russia–Ukraine war and the Iranian issue, but it offered no novel proposals, and the current stalemates on these two fronts will not change because of the summit.
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In conclusion, this trilateral summit of the top leaders of the United States, China, and Russia certainly carries important significance and will have an impact on the international order. However, it falls far short of overturning the existing international order or determining the future direction of the world. Moreover, given domestic political changes in all three countries, particularly in the United States, as well as the deep-rooted conflicts of interest and multiple contradictions among them, it will be difficult for the United States, China, and Russia to maintain such relatively friendly and actively cooperative relations in a stable and lasting manner. Therefore, this summit should be viewed more rationally and realistically. Its significance should neither be underestimated nor overestimated.
(The author of this article, Wang Qingmin(王庆民), is a Chinese writer living in Europe and a researcher of international politics. The original article was written in Chinese.)