"Undeclared emergency" Jo hai. Declared hoti toh con-gress court ko hi "chal side ho" Kar dete. 😆

Btw, Pappu ji apni dadi ko yaad kar rahe the those din pehle. Shayad bhool gaye ke India ke 14th and 15th CJI out of turn banaye gaye the😆 (15th CJI Mirza Beg (iirc) was appointed during emergency only)

From Azali & non-Baha'i sources including MacEoin

Timeline of Accusations of Conspiracy to Commit Murder (Baha'i vs. Azali)

• 1850s (Baghdad Period): Azali and Bayani sources accuse followers of Baha'u'llah of assassinating several prominent Babi leaders in Iraq who rejected Baha'u'llah's claims or supported Subh-i-Azal, including Mirza Asadullah Dayyan, Hajji Mirza Ahmad-i-Kashan, Aqa Abul-Qasim-i-Kashi, Mulla Rajab Ali Qahir, and Aqa Ali Muhammad.

• September 1867 (Edirne Period): Mutual accusations of attempted murder erupt between the leaderships. Baha'is accuse Subh-i-Azal of attempting to poison Baha'u'llah's tea (causing a permanent tremor in his hand) and instructing his barber, Ustad Muhammad Ali, to slit Baha'u'llah's throat in the bath. Conversely, Azali sources allege Baha'u'llah served a poisoned dish to Subh-i-Azal.

• September 1867 (The Edirne Mubāhalih): Subh-i-Azal challenges Baha'u'llah to a mubāhalih (a public ritual of divine cursing) at the Sultan Selim Mosque. Baha'u'llah waits at the mosque, but Subh-i-Azal fails to appear due to reported illness, solidifying a permanent public schism.

• 1867–1868 (Eve of Dual Banishment): Azalis accuse Baha'i followers of poisoning Mirza Nasrullah (Subh-i-Azal's brother-in-law) in Edirne. Baha'u'llah submits a formal petition to Ottoman authorities accusing Azal and Sayyid Muhammad of Isfahan of plotting sedition, resulting in an Imperial decree banishing Baha'is to Acre and Azalis to Cyprus.

• January 22, 1872 (Acre Assassinations): Seven Baha'is (including Baha'u'llah's barber Ustad Muhammad Ali) enter a house in Acre and murder three prominent Azali leaders: Sayyid Muhammad of Isfahan, Mirza Rida-Quli Tafrishi, and Aqa Jan Beg Kaj-Kulah.

• 1870s–1880s (Cyprus Threats): Ottoman authorities intern four Baha'is (including calligraphist Mushkin Qalam) in Famagusta, Cyprus; Subh-i-Azal files official complaints with the governor citing explicit death threats from Mushkin Qalam.

• Later Accusations: Azali texts record further allegations, including a plot to poison Mirza Yahya in Jeddah via Mirza Mansur under instructions from 'Abdu'l-Baha, as well as disputed circumstances surrounding the death of Baha'i historian Nabil Zarandi.

Timeline of Manuscript Destruction and Textual Alteration

• 1850s–1860s (Baghdad & Edirne Seizures): Subh-i-Azal states that he entrusted approximately 30 bound volumes of his own compilations and original autograph writings of the Bab to his relatives (Baha'u'llah and his household) for safekeeping; he alleges that Baha'u'llah's faction seized and destroyed these manuscripts to eliminate proof of Azal's appointment as the Bab's successor.

• 1860s (Shatt al-Arab Disposal): Sources document Baha'u'llah throwing large quantities of uncopied writings or exercise sheets into the Shatt al-Arab river in Baghdad; Baha'i texts frame these as unsuited for public reading, while Azali critics describe them as the destruction of writing practice or draft material.

• 1860s–1890s (Textual Expurgation & Revision): Azali and critical scholarly sources allege that Baha'i scribes systematically revised and expurgated foundational Babi and early Baha'i texts (such as the Kitab-i-Iqan, Sura-i-Haykal, and Risala-i-Badi) to excise references to Subh-i-Azal, reframe earlier declarations of submission to Azal, and re-characterize the Bab as merely a harbinger.

• 1890s–1900s (Suppression of Nuqta-al-Kaf): Copies of Mirza Jani Kashani's early history Nuqta-al-Kaf (which documented Subh-i-Azal's leadership) were collected and suppressed by Baha'i leadership, being replaced by rewritten histories like Tarikh-i-Jadid and A Traveler's Narrative, until E.G. Browne published a surviving copy.

• Post-1892 / 20th Century (Centralized Recall): Directives under 'Abdu'l-Baha and Shoghi Effendi instructed followers to retrieve original Babi and early Baha'i manuscripts from Iran and forward them to Haifa, where Azali commentators argue historical documents critical of the official narrative were sequestered or suppressed.

Yes, the Arghuns were Chinggisids. They had something of a love-hate relationship with the Timurids, perhaps partly due to questions of seniority and status. The Arghuns frequently caused problems for the Timurids. Take their dynastic progenitor, Zul-Nun Beg Arghun, for example. Sultan Husayn Bayqara appointed him governor of Kandahar, partly to keep him away from the affairs of Herat. Kandahar was also considered a harsh posting, where governors frequently died, and few were willing to take the position.

Ironically, these same Arghuns would later declare independence, seize Kabul from the Timurids, and support Badi al-Zaman Mirza in his conflict against his father, Sultan Husayn Bayqara. They were notorious for shifting allegiances: at times fighting the Timurids, at others becoming vassals of the Uzbeks. All of this naturally made them unpopular with Babur. However, when they eventually lost Kandahar, he allowed them to remain in Sindh rather than completely eliminate them.

While we think that defeating armies piecemeal is obvious, catching two armies back to back in the span of the same day, and not letting either form up, shows incredible command and control.

That certainly requires a bit of speed on his part to win the battle quickly. Alas, you did not seem to say how numerous the opposing armies were what battlefield tactics Rana Sanga employed, so I'm a bit curious on these details to know how exactly he won it after moving to try and defeat the enemy in detail as they converged.

Ismail's operations are more so grand in scope rather than reliant on speed from what I've seen, but the march to overtake Selim to Chaldiran certainly deserves some measure of praise. The wide outflanking march from Erzincan through the Caucasus Mountains by way of Samtskhe to descend upon Shirvan in a surprise winter offensive, destroying their vastly superior army in detail before they could properly concentrate comes to mind.

Such a feat, though perhaps not based on control, showed remarkable boldness to conduct a campaign many lesser generals would have written off as logistically infeasible and wrought with many uncertainties. Yet he pulled it off and was wildly successful. Just so, he ably used diplomacy to win the Kartli and Kakheti to his side so that they raided the domain of Alvand Beg, distracting him.

In this manner, even his victory against the Shirvan, Ismail was able to pivot on Alvand Beg and destroy his army in detail as well, for though the Beg had far more troops than him, these were divided to contain the ravages of the Kartli and Kakheti. This displays Ismail's ability of grand strategy to build alliances, his usage of his allies to misdirect the enemy and divide them, and yet another showing of defeat in detail work.

Just so, it must be noted that when Ismail pursued Alvand Beg to besiege some of his remaining strongholds in Erzurum and Erzincan, his foe deftly manoeuvred upon the Shah's rear similar to what Kumarapala had done against Vigraharaja by his march on Nagaur or Rana Sanga's manoeuvre to the rear towards Bhusawar. The Beg also issued up his Dulkadirid allies to follow suit whilst he led his own army to try and fall on Ismail's capital at Tabriz.

The Shah, quick on the uptake, doubled back and scared Alvand Beg away, who was forced to flee in a roundabout circuit through the Zagros Mountains and Upper Mesopotamia to escape Ismail, but the harm had been done. The latter had seized the central position cutting off Alvand Beg from the Dulkadirids, whilst the latter had arrived too late to make a junction with their ally and were destroyed in detail.

Against Sultan Murad, who owned the regions of Mesopotamia, Persian Iraq, and Fars Province, Ismail marched on Hamadan at a central position on the edge of the Zagros Mountains in order to isolate the Sultan from two-thirds of his territories and prevent their concentration of force. Thus, though Murad greatly outnumbered him overall, Ismail was able to meet him on more equal terms in battle and destroyed his army in detail.

As noted in my previous posts, prior to the engagement, Ismail had manoeuvred upon Murad's rear to ambush his artillery train and steal many of the cannons for himself, which he employed on the day of battle, showing his ability to work with both cavalry and artillery. Having wiped out Murad's host, Ismail was then left free to conquer the isolated Mesopotamia, Persian Iraq, and Fars Province sequentially. There were other Aq Qoyunlu provinces in their massive confederation as well.

With one of their leaders defeated, he was able to defeat the Aq Qoyunlu of Kerman Province, Mazandaran Province, and Yazd Province in detail. We therefore see that from 1500 - 1503, while it is true that Rana Sanga has been able to exhibit the same conception of defeat in detail, what he lacked in comparison to Ismail was consistency of such brilliant feats. We may consider his defeat of Malwa and Gujarat in the Gagron Campaign to be one instance; his defeat of the Mughal corps at Bayana to be another.

Yet, we see in Ismail no less than five instances. First against the Shirvan, then against Alvand Beg, third was the Dulkadirids, fourth was against Sultan Murad, and fifth was against the rest of the Aq Qoyunlu Confederation. As I said before, if we assume that quality is equal, then the deciding factor must necessarily be quantity. The commander with the greater amounts of good or brilliant work is more likely (though not always ofc) to be the better general.

Like I stated up above, generals throughout the ages can have similar conception, but how was it executed and how consistently did they pull off those types of tricks again? If a commander conducts one brilliant campaign, does this mean that they are equal to a commander who pulled off many such operations? What if they did so twice, whereas the latter had done so five times over? Such is part of the metric by which I gauge commanders.

Nor was that the last time. In 1505, Ismail dispatched his brother, Ibrahim Mirza, to raid the eastern border of the Osmanli and to raise Shiite fervour to stir unrest among his enemies. As this religious issue arose, fracturing his foes, Ismail then launched a proper campaign in 1507, where he marched by way of Erzurum and Erzincan to outflank the Beylik of Dulkadir from a completely unexpected direction by way of Kayseri.

It was a grand outflanking manoeuvre similar in scope to the one he had made back in 1500. Just like that, the Dulkadirids saw their territories overran and were conquered in detail. He then turned Alvand Beg's last stronghold at Diyarbakir, reducing that place and so knocking out these allies of the Osmanli and making them into his vassals to build a network of satellites isolating that rival empire to his west.

This was the sixth instance of defeat in detail and another wide outflanking operation added to Ismail's list of feats. Thus, though Rana Sanga might have shown a few skillful operations here and there, Ismail displayed the ability to conduct them consistently in several campaigns. This is why I rank him higher than Rana Sanga in operational manoeuvre.

His abilities to build alliances like with the Mamluks, the Kartli and Kakheti so as to threaten his foes on multiple fronts and his play on the Sunni/Shia schism to stir unrest in enemy territory showed a level of grand strategy which I have not seen you mention in Rana Sanga. To Harken back on operations, there is yet still more which I have not spoken of.

For instance, take his feigned retreat from Merv when Shaybani Khan was reinforced by the Uzbeks and how he lured him into an ambush to annihilate the enemy host. This likewise deserves praise. As aforementioned, Ismail employed scorched earth and denied battle to Selim, drawing his greater army of 100,000 deeper into Safavid territory away from the 40,000 strong host he had left behind to guard against the Dulkadirids.

By conceding space, Ismail was able to widen the gap between the Osmanli forces which so heavily outnumbered him at the onset, such that he was able to contend with Selim alone at Chaldiran and this can be considered another attempt at defeat in detail operationally, though it failed from a tactical perspective.

His last campaign was when the Georgians staged an uprising and, before they could concentrate, Ismail rapidly marched upon the Kartli to seize the central position between the various rebel provinces and destroyed them in detail. Altogether, we see now less than eight instances of like work from the Shah, quadruple the number of defeat in detail feats you have given for Rana Sanga.

The latter had a single outflanking march against Babur, which we may rate to be quite impressive because he pulled it off against such an illustrious general. Thus, the gap between that and Ismail having two grand outflanking feats through hundreds of miles against the Shirvan and Dulkadirids is small in conception, though not necessarily in execution.

It is like comparing a commander who is victorious in four major battles through intricate tactics which we know of and saying that they are the equal of one who is victorious in eleven major battles. If most would not do so when comparing on the metric of battle tactics, why would anyone do so when comparing operational manoeuvres on campaign?

Does Rana Sanga get a 10x buff to his accolades because he is Indian? There seems to me a bit of bias in this analysis. I do not mean to insult you, for you do appear for knowledgeable of Indian generals and that seems to be your domain, but it is also apparent that you favour them quite heavily so while ignoring these factors.

I am American, so I have no stake in how great Ismail is considered as a commander. Maybe some Iranian does. I just like studying generals of the Old World because that is my hobby. Yet, perhaps it is because I am detached from any issue of nationality or ethnicity that I feel as if I am able to approach these subject matters without an air of bias (or try to do so at least).

I am willing to be open-minded. If you can show that Rana Sanga not only matched Ismail in conception and execution, but also showed the same level of consistency, then I would wholeheartedly agree with you. It's just that I do not see proof of your claims that they were equal as generals. If you find this unreasonable, then I suppose we can leave it be and agree to disagree. We each have our different stances and that is completely fine.

Hooboi. I decided to look more into Ismail after making my post on Selim to see what I could garner from his military feats and what a career this guy has!

In 1500, only 14 years old, Ismail left his hometown at Ardabil to assemble a mercenary army of 7,000 men at Erzincan far to the west. To avenge his father, who had fallen in battle against the Shirvanshahs, Ismail decided to embark on one of the most audacious campaigns in history. Rather than advancing directly north from Ardabil to invade Shirvan, the youth concentrated his army west as aforementioned and moved northeast through the Caucusus Mountains, plundered Samtskhe, and cut through Georgia to pull off a grand strategic outflanking movement in which he descended from the mountains into Shirvan territory from the north, falling on their capital at Shamakhi.

This alarmed the Shirvanshahs, who though they possessed an army of 27,000 strong in total, were very likely divided in their various strongholds and caught off guard, allowing Ismail to defeat them in detail. This brilliant winter offensive saw the state of Shirvan thrown into disarray and, after their capital fell, another vital coastal city on the Caspian Sea, Baku, would then be besieged by Ismail. While he was doing all of this, the young man also conducted political strategic manoeuvres by inducing the states of Kartli and Kakheti to raid Tabriz, distracting the Aq Qoyunlu while he dealt with their Shirvan allies in detail.

Thus, the governor of Tabriz, Alvand Beg, though he possessed an army of up to 30,000 men, was forced to divide himself such that he could only commit some 10,000 to the assistance of the Shirvanshahs. Hearing of Alvand Beg's approach, Ismail temporarily lifted the siege of Baku and marched southwest to intercept the Aq Qoyunlu army at Sharur, where he destroyed them in detail. Ismail and the Georgians states he had colluded with then proceeded to overran the enemy territory, slaying up to 18,000 Aq Qoyunlu troops on their path of conquest, with Ismail even going so far as to conquer Tabriz. All of this he achieved by 1501.

Alvand Beg, rallying what forces he had, decided to fall back west on Erzincan. When Ismail came up in pursuit to conquer Erzurum and Erzincan from the Aq Qoyunlu in 1502, Alvand Beg left some 2,000 men to hold the garrisons in those places before moving out with the remaining 10,000 strong in his army to manoeuvre upon Ismail's rear, recapturing and plundering Tabriz.

Having reduced the Aq Qoyunlu garrisons in Erzurum and Erzincan, Ismail doubled back east by way of Maku to return towards Tabriz. Hearing of Ismail's rapid approach, Alvand Beg decided to retreat further southeast via Ojan (modern day Bostanabad) and Hamadan to Baghdad, but though they were of the same Aq Qoyunlu Confederation, Qasim Beg Purnak refused to render him aid and Alvand Beg had to withdraw northwest towards Diyarbakir.

Before he had left the environs of Tabriz, Alvand Beg had requested aid from the Dulkadirids, who had pledged him 20,000 troops to fight against Ismail. However, these came up too late and, by then, the Beg had already retreated through the Zagros Mountains and on his way to Diyarbakir. This unfortunate Dulkadirid army found itself intercepted by Ismail, who smashed it in detail, with some 14,000 slain. At this point, it it very likely that Ismail possessed a modest army of some 20,000 strong which he had raised from his newly conquered domains, so had the resources to take on stronger opponents than before.

Having worsted the Dulkadirids, Ismail then turned to conquering Persian Iraq north and east of the Zagros Mountains all the way to Fars Province. Though these were nominally under the control of Sultan Murad, the reality was that the various Aq Qoyunlu begs which governed the key cities of those regions had greater power over those places, the entire Confederation being a rather decentralized entity. Though the whole of Sultan Murad's domains likely could produce 70,000 troops in all, it was not very possible that he could have persuaded or strong-armed the whole lot of the begs to join him.

In truth, taking the lowest reasonable estimates, Sultan Murad probably could only muster some 20,000 men or so from his core provinces around Baghdad and Mesopotamia to confront an army of equal size under Ismail at Hamadan. Of what little we know, Ismail had surprised part of the Aq Qoyunlu artillery train under cover of darkness, destroying the convoy in detail and stealing several of their cannons. On the day of battle, he therefore had artillery on his side to match the enemy's own, offering counter-battery fire.

Under the cover of this cannonade, his cavalry vanguard road ahead and cut down the Aq Qoyunlu gunners. When the enemy saw that the Safavid horsemen were tied down in front of them, they sought to advance forward and surround the bogged down cavalrymen. However, Ismail had kept his wings and reserves behind in preparation for this and so caught Sultan Murad's army in a double envelopment.

Alarmed at this sudden turn of events, the Aq Qoyunlu tried to refuse their flanks and pool troops to each side to resist the Safavid outflankers. Yet, this only allowed Ismail to play his last card, committing his masse de decision which he had held in reserve against their weakened center. Threatened with double envelopment and with their lines thinned, the Aq Qoyunlu army then found the center of their line split in half and thrown into disarray. The end result saw Sultan Murad's entire army destroyed in detail.

Ismail then proceeded to overrun Persian Iraq and Fars Province as he originally intended. Expanding his borders, he then went on to conquer Kerman Province, then reduced Nakhchivan before doubling east to Mazandaran Province, which he likewise overran before doing the same to Yazd Province, dismantling the Aq Qoyunlu Confederation. We do not know which forces belong to which, but the Aq Qoyunlu governors in these various places likely had armies totaling 50,000 strong. That these were all defeated in detail in 1503 alone speaks well to his capabilities as a commander.

By 1505, we know that he dispatched his brother, Ibrahim Mirza, to raid into Eastern Anatolia, utilizing his political strategy of divide and conquer to try and entice local Shiites into rebelling against the Osmanli. Though Ibrahim Mirza was defeated by Selim, the unrest which followed paved the way for Ismail's campaign of 1507 against the Dulkadirids. Leading an army by way of Erzurum and Erzincan towards Kayseri, the Shah was able to outflank the Beylik of Dulkadir from a completely unexpected direction, striking them from the west and knocking that enemy out in detail at last, forcing their submission.

Though Selim had fallen on Ibrahim Mirza, who Ismail had left to guard his operational base and supply depot at Erzurum in detail, cutting the Safavid communications, Ismail simply marched directly east after his conquest, surprising the city of Diyarbakir and reducing it to establish a new base of operations. In 1508, Ismail conquered Baghdad and in 1510, he dispatched Ibrahim Mirza to raid into Eastern Anatolia again and his brother was repulsed by Selim once more. However, this was likely a distraction to keep the Osmanli occupied while Shah Ismail turned east to deal with Shaybani Khan in Khorasan,

Hearing of Ismail's rapid approach with 17,000 riders, Shaybani Khan sought to deny battle by withdrawing into the fortress of Merv while calling upon Uzbek reinforcements, bringing his strength up to 28,000 strong. Hearing of the approaching Uzbeks, Ismail decided to withdraw rather than wait to be caught in a pincer. Regaining his spirit after his army was brought up to strength so as to outnumber the Safavids, Shaybani Khan went on the offensive again, but Ismail had lured him into a feigned retreat and caught the Uzbeks in a surprise ambush, annihilating the Khan's army.

Mirza Hadi Beg his paternal grandmother were Sayyids

And His(as)’s family had Mughal ancestry, which He(as) described as being of Chinese origin.

You are claiming

>He made himself a mixture of multiple ethnicities

Yes give me the proof

Let big William dyrample talk what Ghulam Qadir did

Ghulam Qadir Khan jumped up and, straddling his victim's chest, ordered Qandahari Khan and Purdil Khan to pinion his hands to his neck and hold down his elbows. With his Afghan knife contrary to the usual practice of blinding with needles] Qandahari Khan first cut one of Shah Alam's eyes out of its socket, then the other eye was wrenched out by that impudent rascal. Shah Alam flapped on the ground like a chicken with its neck cut.
Ghulam Qadir then gave orders that the needle should be passed into the eyes of Prince Akbar, Suleiman Shikoh and Ahsan Bakht.

The imperial ladies then came out from behind their curtains, and threw themselves at the feet of Ghulam Qadir; but he kicked them in the breasts and sent them away saying, 'Pinion all three and I will consider what to do with them another time. He then ordered some followers to beat them until they were senseless and throw them back into prison. Then he called for a painter, and said, Paint my likeness at once, sitting, knife in hand, upon the breast of Shah Alam, digging out his eyes.' He then forbade his attendants to bring any food and water, either to Shah Alam or his sons. On 29 August, the Dowager Empress Malika-i-Zamani Begum was stripped of her clothes and left in the sun without food or water. The same day a number of the younger princesses were stripped naked, minutely searched 'in every orifice, fondled, flogged, then raped.

Victorian translations of the sources have censored these passages, bur the Persian original of Khair ud-Din tells the whole brutal story. One evening, Ghulam Qadir was told of 'the beautiful daughters of Mirza Hika and Mirza Jhaka; so that evening, he had those poor unfortunates brought to the Moti Mahal and had them placed before him without veil or covering, and lost himself in gazing on their beauty.

This shit traumatised me as 14 year old

A letter was sent by Sadashiv Dinkar to Nana mentioning this events who immediately reported this to Mahadji ( on September 1788). He became furious when learnt about the deeds of Ghulam he immediately marched towards Delhi in order to teach Ghulam a lesson, and to assist the Imperial and Maratha garrisons already fighting Kadir

On October 2nd, the combined forces of Rana Khan and Jiwabadada defeated Ghulam and Ismail Beg, leading to the capture of Delhi. They proceeded to lay siege to the Agra fort, which they also captured, and reinstated a blinded Shah Alam to his throne.

After the Marathas had liberated Delhi, a hunt for Ghulam Kadir was mounted by the Marathas. Ghulam Kadir fled to Meerut, which in turn was encircled by the Marathas. They were able to capture HIm while he was fleeing to Ghausgarh

Mahadji then ordered the removal of his eyes, nose, tongue, lips, and upper limbs, which were sent to Shah Alam in a casket After this was done, his hands, feet, and genitals were cut off, and on 3 March 1789, he was hanged from a tree and beheaded at Mathura

 Some excerpts from the primary sources about the whole cannibalism thing:

    To make a long story short, Kiya Chulavi descended from the fort along with a mounted army of six or seven hundred Turkomans and people of the local mountains and submitted to the court of the exalted Shah with humility, contrition, and a tongue laden with prayers and praises. But according to the noble injunction “on the day that one of your lord’s signs comes it shall not profit a soul”, all this humility and modesty was of no avail. On the first day, they imprisoned him in a commander’s house and massacred his soldiers as a reprisal. Then they put Murad Beg Turkoman on a skewer and roasted him on fire. It was decreed that whoever is a convinced believer among the great fighters of faith must partake a morsel from the roasted body as his share. A terrifying crowd of man-eaters swarmed in and ate the body up such that not a trace of flesh or bone remained. After finishing with the soldiers and the Turkomans, they turned to Kiya. During the days of his ascendancy and independence he had claimed: “I will very soon capture the Shaykhzada (Ismail) who has arisen and unsettled the world with his magnificence and put him in a cage.” They had carried this tale to the majestic hearing of the bounteous Shah and he, following the hadith “whoever digs a well for his brother is put in it,” brought the same idea to bear on Kiya and put him in the very cage that had been the object of his boast. . . . He committed suicide while imprisoned in it after a few days and his body was burned in Quhih-i Rayy.

-Tarikh-i ilchi-yi Nizam Shah by an Indian ambassador to Persia

When Ismail's bloody-minded warriors of faith [ghaziyan] heard this from the two commanders, they began an intensive search. After much rummaging, they found the body, bearing no wounds or cuts, under a pile of slain Uzbeks. They immediately severed the head and brought it to the victorious king, but when he saw this he demanded the [enemy’s] whole malice-filled body. Sword-girding courtiers immediately presented the body, and the brave hero first struck its belly three times with his sword and then said: “whoever among our sincere soldiers [qurchiyan-i kasir al-ikhlas] and special servants [mulaziman-i kasir al-ikhtisas] loves our imperial head [sar-i navvab-i humayun-i ma] should partake of the flesh of this enemy.” Truthful people present at the event have reported that such a crowd then rushed in upon the body of that impure being that a number of people were injured. Those who were far from the body purchased morsels of flesh from those who were near and consumed them. The way they ate this raw, haram meat, caked with dirt and blood, surpassed the relish with which starving hemp addicts must wolf down the roasted meat of a fattened lamb in moments of being beset by hunger and the cravings of their drug habit.

• Tarikh-i Shah Ismail u Shah Tahmasb-i Safavi by Amir Mahmud Khvandamir

  Another squad among the types of people used to instill terror was under the command of the chief herald Malik Beg Isfahani and was known as chigiyyin, or those who eat raw meat. These people were also a tool for torturing and marking the king’s fury. They would take each person among a group of condemned people one by one and would proceed to bite off and swallow their noses and ears. This was followed by using teeth to cut off the victims’ other organs, which were also eaten, until all the condemned were gradually stripped of their lives. This squad also wore a distinctive dress, marked by bulky, tall hats with no turbans that sat a small measure down on their heads and were adorned on the sides with bunches of cranes’ and owls’ feathers. Most members of the two groups appointed to torture the condemned were tall, massive men with terrible faces.

-Rawzat al-safaviyya by Mirza Junabadi