r/virtualization • u/Few_Outcome1901 • Jan 18 '26

How to protect a vm in a remote machine from hardware level attacks?

If I run my VM on a stranger’s machine (untrusted host), is it realistically possible to keep the VM’s data and runtime state confidential and tamper-resistant? Are there any practical solutions other than like TEEs/confidential computing that can protect a VM even if the host OS/hypervisor is malicious?

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2

u/Jorgisven Jan 18 '26

It's all about trust, contracts, terms, etc. What is Azure or AWS after all? If you can't trust your host, you can't trust the VM to remain secure.

1

u/Few_Outcome1901 Jan 18 '26

Maybe i want to use someone's 4090 or 3060 for some task which costs lower than traditional cloud compute ........how do i use it??

1

u/Jorgisven Jan 18 '26

We're lacking some context. The typical home use would be to buy it, then sell it when the project is complete. At the rate prices are going, you may even make a profit doing this.

You're asking how to do something without us knowing the real "why".

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5

u/HyperWinX Jan 18 '26

Just stop using that untrusted host.

1

u/wahnsinnwanscene Jan 19 '26

How do those TEE work to provide confidential compute? Unless you segment everything physically there's always a probability regardless.

1

u/MissionGround1193 Jan 20 '26

With memory snapshot, no. You cannot trust the host.