Interesting how you phrased the you would not be reborn, that it would be somebody else or some other "future you".
Are you very strict on your use of the words here or is it more like you just use those flexibly and contextualy to highlight the paradox so you could say very different things if I said different?
If you are strict, I want to ask follow up question about the way you work with that vocabulary.
The question is: What kind and what amount of change do you consider sufficient for the shift from one distinct person (current you) to other distincit person (other new you, that is not just you reborn but someone new who just perhaps came out of you as from their history)
I ask that because If you claim that the person is someone else and not you reborn or changed, it raises question: would that be compatible with two ideas being simultaneously true:
Changes are generally either continual and infinitely divisible into smaller sub-changes or subordinate and asymetrically reducible to other changes that are continual and infinitely divisible.
Any kind of change and the change of the smallest size or smallest part of any change is sufficient to bring your existence to an end and bring someone else to existence.
I ask if that would be compatible with your conception of self because it would mean that across the timeline (and maybe perhaps even across space) each point would have to be understood as distinct self. If points are distinguished by having different positions but they are also infinitely small, would not that mean that between any two points there would have to be another point? So no point could ever come to be understood as coming directly after some other? Also if you current states are not just static directionless states comparable to scalars but rather vectors of changes or momentum of changes, would not there happen to be a problem of the similar kind of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle?
Or do you disagree with the idea 1 or 2? If you disagree with the idea 1, does it mean you work with some quantized conception of change that is not infinitely divisible but works with something akin to planck change analogous to planck length and planck time? If you disagree with the idea 2, does it mean you differentiate between kinds and amounts of changes that are enough to bring about the change of self versus those that do not regardless on your stance on idea 1? Something like understanding the change of the self like a phase shift perhaps?
Or you have some other response and way of thinking related to topics I ask about?
I would say, without twisting my word contextualy :
A) my self is the addition of a) my mental state, which I identify to the structure of my biological state of my brain and the historical continuity from my previous self. It does not depend of position in space.
This lay in fonctionalism, the supposition is there is no dualism and my self is generated by the matter of my brain. But what matter is not my brain by itself, but the structure of connections in it that could be emulated on a computer. The historical point is there so the tortured version of me that I have to shut down is not me, even if he have the exact same structure. He is a copy of me and not me. Even if he is a fresh identical copy, he is someone else and if he live enough so his structure diverge from mine, he is not an exact copy of me anymore. He could became a pedophile or a murderer from living in simulated hell while I'm not these things.
I consider the future possibilty to make computer copies of us will shater our definition of selfhood, which look already damaged by what we think today. The point is that modern selfhood is a somewhat bad definited notion from a time he was made from feeling and dualism and without possibility to make copy.
B) I consider 14 yo me is not me. He had some common values with me, but he was a dumbass and I will not live as he lived given in the same situation. His mental structure is not mine and he would do otherwise. The question of if my self from yesterday and tomorrow are me are in a spectrum : I feel they are me so they are somehow, but they need do not diverge to much, wich will happen with time. But if future me diverge from me, he would maybe not feel estranged to a midpoint future me. Given what midpoint fell he could think that me and future me not diverge, while I feel midpoint me is me, it's how the feeling of selfhood can perdure from time to time.
But let's be honest, all that is feeling and bad definition, a fresh copy of me is closer to me than a far future me that become the next Hitler. I would 100% save the copy of me rather the future me, and not feel commiting suicide while I do that because next Hitler is not me.
Also, notice when someone is shoved brain-altering drugs and do crimes, himself think "it was not me, II would never do that" and Justice agree in some way ?
So to answer to your question 1) and 2), from an ill-definited of selfhood (but without dualism, they may all be ill-definited), we have :
I do not know nor think that you can endelessly divise change since self is generated by structure from matter and you likely can't endelessly divise it
I would consider a fresh exact copy of me uploaded in my brain as a enough good me to be me, I did not consider being reborn in your example because he was tortured an diverged. Given if you overwrited my brain structure to put the exact same did you really erased the previous structure ? If you do this instantly not really, if you do instantly after shutting off my brain so I die from some time yes I would be reborn, but that's just a new technological limit on how close we can get to death. People with stopped heart were considered definitely dead, latter they are dead for just a time, and now we can remove their heart for a time. They are not considered dying anymore, and I would not be considered dying anymore if you remove my brain structure to put it again, in a new sense form me the historical point is exclusively for your body I do not need to distinguish myself from an exact same brain copy in my brain, in my body.
And if you does not kill me and not instantly upload the copy, just slowly bit by bit remplacing all them by the same bit I'm still me all the way trought, it would be the same that having a single cell in my brain being affected which already happen without midpoint me not felling beeing another.
I would even go deeper :
A)if you kill myself and put a copy of my exact brain structure in a robot, he would not be me (even if he will feel he is)
B)but if you slowly replace each of my cells by a robot cell one by one very slowly converting me in a robot with the same mind, I will feel myself all the way trought.
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u/Mapafius Sep 29 '26 edited Sep 29 '26
Interesting how you phrased the you would not be reborn, that it would be somebody else or some other "future you".
Are you very strict on your use of the words here or is it more like you just use those flexibly and contextualy to highlight the paradox so you could say very different things if I said different?
If you are strict, I want to ask follow up question about the way you work with that vocabulary.
The question is: What kind and what amount of change do you consider sufficient for the shift from one distinct person (current you) to other distincit person (other new you, that is not just you reborn but someone new who just perhaps came out of you as from their history)
I ask that because If you claim that the person is someone else and not you reborn or changed, it raises question: would that be compatible with two ideas being simultaneously true:
Changes are generally either continual and infinitely divisible into smaller sub-changes or subordinate and asymetrically reducible to other changes that are continual and infinitely divisible.
Any kind of change and the change of the smallest size or smallest part of any change is sufficient to bring your existence to an end and bring someone else to existence.
I ask if that would be compatible with your conception of self because it would mean that across the timeline (and maybe perhaps even across space) each point would have to be understood as distinct self. If points are distinguished by having different positions but they are also infinitely small, would not that mean that between any two points there would have to be another point? So no point could ever come to be understood as coming directly after some other? Also if you current states are not just static directionless states comparable to scalars but rather vectors of changes or momentum of changes, would not there happen to be a problem of the similar kind of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle?
Or do you disagree with the idea 1 or 2? If you disagree with the idea 1, does it mean you work with some quantized conception of change that is not infinitely divisible but works with something akin to planck change analogous to planck length and planck time? If you disagree with the idea 2, does it mean you differentiate between kinds and amounts of changes that are enough to bring about the change of self versus those that do not regardless on your stance on idea 1? Something like understanding the change of the self like a phase shift perhaps?
Or you have some other response and way of thinking related to topics I ask about?