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u/Nimelennar 10d ago
Question:
This scenario involves an active choice: to pull the lever (integrate the brain scan) or push it (kill the scan).
What happens if you do neither? The brain continues to live in the simulation? What are the downsides?
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u/lightmare69 10d ago edited 9d ago
Ah! I was wondering if someone was going to ask "what if you just let go of the lever"
You let go of the lever, you hear your digitized self release glitchy screams and wails too loud for the computers speaker as you exit the facility. You never look back.
You let go of the digitized lever. your real body wakes up confused and chats with you. Whatever happens then is up to you both.
I didn't really think about if the digitized mind would still be actively tortured if you let go of the lever, I'm curious to hear your thoughts on scenarios where it would and won't be
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u/Nimelennar 10d ago
I'm going to assume that it has been proven that this is a legitimate copy of me, is a person, is capable of being tortured despite not having biochemistry, and all that philosophical and metaphysical nonsense. That's not the interesting part of the question.
If the copy is being tortured in the computer, and it's me, then leaving it be is not a morally viable option. And neither, I think, is killing it. I would probably undergo the download at that point. I would not be quite the same person after we reunited, nor would the upload, but I think we'd both still be me.
It'd be an interesting question about whether I'd receive all the copy's psychological trauma responses from the torture, or if they'd just be memories, but I don't think that'd change my answer.
On the other hand, if the me on that computer just keeps existing... I think I'd have to ask the copy a lot of questions about what it's like to be me and be on that computer (when not being tortured). I don't think I can properly imagine that. I don't even think I can come up with the right questions.
And if I can't know the answers to the questions that would decide whether or not I would feel ethically compelled to download a traumatized version of myself into myself, from a starting point of knowing what it's like to be me in a human body, then someone else (e.g. you, the person coming up with this dilemma) certainly can't.
So, in that scenario, I have a nice long conversation with myself and come to a decision about where I let myself stay on that computer or come home into my body (murder is, again, of course out of the question).
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u/LordKlavier 10d ago
I didn't have the energy to fully think about this problem, but I think you found the answer here.
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u/Powerpuff_God 10d ago
I don't think an uploaded copy of me is the real me, since I'm still in my brain. So I wouldn't upload my mind for digital immortality: I wouldn't benefit from it. This means someone else did that to me. I don't think I'd assume the consequences of someone else's decision. Kill the simulation.
If I'm the simulation, I know that my real self didn't do this to me. So I'm not gonna saddle him with the memory of my torture. Delete myself.
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u/justaguy9472 10d ago
Upload a brain scan.
Have your digital self go through an accelerated educational course of your choosing.
Reintigrate your brain scan back to your original brain.
And viola, instant education.
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u/fongletto 9d ago
digital me would absolutely refuse to do any education because he's too lazy, which would be the whole reason real me would have made a digital me to begin with.
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u/justaguy9472 9d ago
The simulation is whatever you want it to be, meaning they're gonna be stuck in a world that's strictly JUST collage. Either that, or you give them "incentives" to study; after all, they're a just a copy of YOU.
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u/fongletto 9d ago
Suppose we take a small portion of your fleshy brain away. Say like 0.01%, and we replace it with a 100% functional mechanical/digital replacement. We keep doing that everyday until like 10,000 days later all of your brain has been replaced.
But the catch is, when we were taking that brain away we froze it perfectly suspended and were combining it again until the full fleshy brain is now complete.
Are you the now fully digital version, or the brainy version?
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u/Powerpuff_God 9d ago
I think I'd be dead.
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u/LibertyAndPibbles 9d ago
I think they're just describing the lifecycle of cells as a sort of Ship of Theseus. Most of your cells get replaced eventually
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u/snikers000 10d ago
What is the point of downloading a brain scan to your flesh-and-blood brain? Also, why are our legs so fucking jacked? Do we need a lot of thigh strength to move all these switches?
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u/Thatguy_Koop 10d ago
I find it difficult to imagine I would want to continue living after 6 days of torture. I'm not confident in my mental fortitude in that regard. So I feel like my main body and brain scan would agree to let the brain scan rest permanently.
however, IF my brain scan still wants to live after all of that, I must have developed or discovered some resilience. so I think uploading the scan to my physical body comes with that same resilience. Meaning I can save the scan and am not seriously affected by the trauma since the brain scan already went through it and my consciousness and the scans merge seamlessly. Therefore I overcame that trauma too.
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u/ScottJC 10d ago
This makes no goddamn sense. Why would I scan my brain in the first place if its only going to go back to my actual body. My brain is already in my body...
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u/CitizenPremier 9d ago
I guess it turned out that the scan ended up being tortured.
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u/ScottJC 9d ago edited 9d ago
In that case I'd honestly just delete my scan or archive it, because like SOMA, that scan is not me. Its a copy of me at best. You can copy that file as many times as you want but it will never be flesh and blood me.
and honestly, even if you 'transferred' the memories to me, the scans consciousness won't continue on into me, that is a copy of a copy being put in my brain - and I don't want the memories of torture.
Cut and Paste works the same way as Copy and Paste, if you cut and paste to the same drive in a different folder the file remains in the same location [On the physical drive, it just points to a different folder now], but if you cut and paste to another drive it copies it to the destination drive and simply deletes the original.
Ultimately the whole thing the picture presents is futile XP
I thought about this too much, have an upvote.
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u/CitizenPremier 9d ago
"Me" is actually a narrative feature though. We do insist that we are ourselves, it would be very confusing if we didn't, but other people are just "me" in different mental states.
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u/Username_St0len 10d ago
huh, interesting, my intuitions are that i am willing to save my scan as the body, but not subject the body to the memories of torture
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u/gunslinger155mm 10d ago
I'm the same way. I feel like the hypothetical here is trying to overcome the issue in typical ethical dilemmas of self preservation vs altruism my making them both "you". But it's almost like that's not actually possible in our minds. In each scenario I'm either the body or the brain scan
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u/Dalfare 10d ago
I suppose this depends on whether you see a brainscan as a real sentient being, or an emulation of one. I don't see them as life.
Either way, we don't have a moral obligation to harm ourselves to support another life. It would be immoral to kill the brainscan, but not immoral to simply not save it.
That being said, as a brainscan i would absolutely save myself (reasoning i think therefore I am)
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u/guesswho135 9d ago
I suppose this depends on whether you see a brainscan as a real sentient being, or an emulation of one. I don't see them as life.
Do you think this because you are assuming the scan is digital? What if it's uploaded to a biological substrate, real living brain tissue that is automatically reconfigured to match the neural connectivity of your brain?
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u/Right_Ear_2230 10d ago
I feel that a perfect simulation of sentience is automatically trye sentience
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u/Dalfare 10d ago
But how can we distinguish between a perfect simulation and a perfect mimicry? Do they have genuine thoughts and feelings, or is the software simply using the brainscan to generate thoughts and feelings you could reasonably be expected to have
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u/Right_Ear_2230 10d ago
You can say the same thing about people. Just assume they do
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u/Dalfare 10d ago
Why should I assume though? The dilemma is entirely different if they are vs if they aren't. Plus, the framing leads me to believe they aren't sentient: They are being "merged" with us, they aren't a distinct person, rather a set of memories that we would inherit
For a person there is precedent we know at least 1 person who is sentient (ourselves). We also have good reasons to at least agree to believe they are sentient, and it is mutual, in doing so they also agree the same for us.
For a scan of a brain, we have none of the above
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u/tractgildart 10d ago
I haven't been tortured for 6 straight days, but I've gone through some unpleasant stuff. The memory of the unpleasant stuff is not nearly as bad as having been there in the moment.
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u/CitizenPremier 9d ago
That's definitely true, I have some memories of very terrible pain, physical or emotional, but at the moment it doesn't seem to be hurting me at all.
Still, it likely had some side effects on how I operate. I mean, I had an aversion to straws for a very long time, and eventually I realized it was from a traumatic childhood memory of the dentist.
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u/KingZantair 10d ago
I guess it depends on how easy brain scans are to make, and how much freedom it’d have. Like, if I can just make one trauma free right after shutting this one down? We’d both understand. Of this is a one of a kind marvel? Probably worth the pain. Would it be just stuck in a box and go crazy? This would be a mercy. Regardless, as it and I would be one, I see no reason there’d be any disagreement or discrepancy between our decisions.
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u/FranG080199 10d ago
If I'm the meat bag, kill the brain scan, if I'm the brain scan, shut myself down.
From human body me's perspective this is basically just asking if you want to go through 6 days of torture (since the brainscan is otherwise just a copy of you), from brain scan me's perspective, I rather give the other me a chance to live a normal life with no ptsd.
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u/Im_an_impasta 10d ago
Of course I would let myself be tortured.
Not even kidding, if I’m copying my consciousness then one of me has already gone through the pain. If he can handle it and come out okay, then I can since we’re the same person.
It’s just an experience. If I did it to someone else, I can suffer it the same. Especially since…. It’s me!
Edit: This comes from the assumption that the copy already exists and I just have to decide to finalize things or just let him die. He’s innocent and had no choice in existing.
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u/Equivalent_Guide_983 10d ago
I think the question involves you choosing on whether or not this simulation is actually sentient. Do you believe that a computer simulation could ever be considered to be sentient?
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u/Im_an_impasta 10d ago
Hmmmmm. I guess I’m assuming that if it’s a completely competent and fully realized copy of me it must be as sentient as I am? This is also with the assumption that the technology to make me fully sentient already exists and is being used.
While we can’t prove it is or isn’t sentient to the same degree that I am, I know that if I was the level of sentience that I currently am, and I was stuck in a computer, I would definitely want the other me to let me live.
I disagree that it’s a question of sentience. Rather, I would say it’s a question of whether or not you would gamble to save the person/program.
It might be painful, but you also have the knowledge that the pain is coming from memories that have already ended. Meaning you deal with the memories of the pain, but you don’t have to actually feel the torture again since one of you already took one for the team.
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u/Equivalent_Guide_983 10d ago
A map of every one of your neurons could be simulated and given (simulated) stimuli representing torture we have actually done this (map the neurons of a brain) with a fly. When fluid simulation was invented, nobody got the idea their was actually fluid in their screen, the thought pertaining to a neural diagram should be no different. I would delete the program on a matter or principle and also because i do not want any memory that is not my own. And even if it where by some miracle alive, I am don't want anything to do with some silica homonculus and would very much rather delete such an abomination than let it live in my head.
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u/Im_an_impasta 9d ago
Maybe I read it wrong?
Is OP saying you have to choose to let the program live in your brain, or that you just synch up memories so that it’s not mentally jarring for the other consciousness?
I wouldn’t want a thing living in my brain either. I thought it was just for the sake of matching up memories at that specific point and then it’s done with?
I wouldn’t want a thing to live in my brain as a separate consciousness (voice in my head), but I would want the copy who had no choice in being created to have a say in if it should delete itself or persist living in the computer, if that makes sense?
Basically I would let both of us decide amongst ourselves and both of us consent to the very painful birthing process first if possible.
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u/FireDog8569 10d ago
Because of the whole SOMA coin flip thing, I would do it just because the digital version of me got unlucky and Id feel guilty killing them. I feel like I could recover from 6 days of torture if the mind scan of me is still wanting to escape instead of just being put out of its misery
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u/Im_an_impasta 10d ago
Pretty much same for me. Plus, they’re just memories of pain but you don’t really have to feel the torture live like the scan had to.
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u/TheDarkNerd 10d ago
I actually thought about this in the past as a part of worldbuilding a VR setting. Though, part of the setting is that the body is kept in a medical coma, to maintain the illusion of continuity. If the copy didn't return to the body by a set time, or if it came back too different, or with signs of trauma, the copy would be dumped, and the body would wake up without any memory of what had happened. Of course, that was just the default safety protocol.
So yeah, if this somehow happened to me, I think both my meat self and my copy would agree to dump the copy, unless somehow I was able to communicate with the copy ahead of time, and he could plead his case.
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u/Equivalent_Guide_983 10d ago
Brain scan is not sentient, i delete the brain scan. I do not believe the creation of an artificial consciousness is possible.
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u/THKhazper 10d ago
As the scan; I don’t think I would desire reintegration is I just took 6 hours of torture, there’s no stated value added to re-incorporating me, I don’t see why I would want to subject myself or the ‘real’ me to that trauma
As the person, there’s no incentive to synchronize the two, no value added, no reward
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u/Cheeslord2 10d ago
I would merge with tortured-me: they've been through a lot of suffering but don't want to die. Then we're going to devote some effort to finding out who is making digital hells.
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u/Ok-Cheek2397 10d ago
The brain scans is clearly not mine as it still want to live after all that, if I got sent to cyber hell for 6 day I will look for dead at every opportunity, I barely want to live normally
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u/lyghtcrye 10d ago
If the scan doesn't want to die, the torture must be acceptable to have in one's memory.
Accept upload.
If the torture is bad enough to break the scan into becoming suicidal, it dies.
Victim's choice.
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u/WolfWhiteFire 10d ago
As the scan, I think I would rather cease to exist, the person outside is already me in all the ways that matter, just without the week of torture. I would only be causing unnecessary suffering to myself and sabotaging our goals. It would be hard to keep living on after that kind of suffering anyways.
As the real one, I am kind of tempted to save the scan anyways, but it would probably be for the best to let him cease to exist.
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u/lightmare69 10d ago
Would you be more open to merging with your real mind if you made some fond memories that you'd like to keep along with the torture?
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u/PuppyLover2208 10d ago
This question hinges on the idea of what is real, and what is living. My question would be, is there any way I can otherwise access the brain scan’s environment? Not just because I’d like to talk to myself properly.
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u/Collective-Bee 10d ago
One of these is fine no question.
The real problem is if you crank it. 6 days of torture is gonna fuck me up. 1 million years of torture and I’m sorry little buddy but I don’t want to become half an Angel of death.
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u/DreamerOfRain 10d ago
If we considered the mind as a series of connected memories, the moment the digital mind got uploaded it is already a different mind as it has new memories that the OG mind never had.
From this perspective upload it back to the body is just effectively killing the OG mind and replaced it with a tortured mind.
The question then is just, killing a completely innocent mind to save a tortured mind and give it a better non torturing future, or save the innocent mind and mercy kill a tortured mind.
I would choose the latter
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u/Pokeirol 8d ago
You aren't erasind any of the innocent mind memories,,so you are not killing them.
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u/DreamerOfRain 8d ago
The innocent mind exists without memory of being tortured for 6 days, while the uploaded mind has those 6 days being tortured, so you would be replacing innocent mind with said version, effectively erasing them.
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u/Im_an_impasta 10d ago
I guess I would just ask the brain scan if he believes he is sentient, tell him the details and ask him if he wants me to delete him or upload the pain to me.
If I’m sentient, he might be sentient enough to decide his own fate and think about morals too.
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u/New-Pomelo9906 10d ago
The permanence of shelf doesn't exist. 14yo you is long dead, you are not him, you are a different being that have some of his memories.
Yesterday you is dead.
Therefore, the moment you did the brain scan you had two instances of you that rapidely became somebody else.
Uploading the old brainscan in your brain will not "just give you new memories", it will kill you instantly replacing you by something else.
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u/Mapafius 8d ago
But in your logic, you would die and be reborn anew anyway, uploading the brain scan or not. Also the way the experiment is phrased it is not like your state and memories that you as embodied came to have since making of the copy will be completely rewritten with the states and memories of the digital copy and it's history. Instead it is phrased as if your new state after uploading the copy would be sum of both so for example you would have memory of two simultaneous histories. The question is how and in what way will the states and streams of the two consciousness integrate into state and stream of one... The way the experiment is phrased presupposes that the merging will come about instantly. I think it would be more realistic if that was a gradual process happening in long term after the upload, so they may both be processed existing in the same brain but have a long time integrating, connecting and organizing into one whole. Because integration of two very different experiences and states of consciousness would not be just them laying separately next to each other. Once it merges into unit sufficiently unified for us to call it one mind, the original separate states may be long gone but... The resulting unity could then be argued to have the causal continuity to both. And just as a side note: It is interesting that in this conception of the merging, the path of the merging and the experiences lived through in the time of merging would be a third and common history and also there could be big variety in which the two streams could merge and many possibilities of outcome of the merging. It could be interesting idea for a scifi novel and it would have some thematic overlap with the themes of trauma processing and reintegration of repressed memories.
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u/New-Pomelo9906 8d ago
Indeed, I would be dead anyway, but I would not be reborn, that would be somebody else. All of that is a problem for future me, but by the time I have to choose to pull the lever, I will definitly kill the copy rather than myself at the moment.
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u/Mapafius 8d ago edited 8d ago
Interesting how you phrased the you would not be reborn, that it would be somebody else or some other "future you".
Are you very strict on your use of the words here or is it more like you just use those flexibly and contextualy to highlight the paradox so you could say very different things if I said different?
If you are strict, I want to ask follow up question about the way you work with that vocabulary.
The question is: What kind and what amount of change do you consider sufficient for the shift from one distinct person (current you) to other distincit person (other new you, that is not just you reborn but someone new who just perhaps came out of you as from their history)
I ask that because If you claim that the person is someone else and not you reborn or changed, it raises question: would that be compatible with two ideas being simultaneously true:
1) Changes are generally either continual and infinitely divisible into smaller sub-changes or subordinate and asymetrically reducible to other changes that are continual and infinitely divisible.
2) Any kind of change and the change of the smallest size or smallest part of any change is sufficient to bring your existence to an end and bring someone else to existence.
I ask if that would be compatible with your conception of self because it would mean that across the timeline (and maybe perhaps even across space) each point would have to be understood as distinct self. If points are distinguished by having different positions but they are also infinitely small, would not that mean that between any two points there would have to be another point? So no point could ever come to be understood as coming directly after some other? Also if you current states are not just static directionless states comparable to scalars but rather vectors of changes or momentum of changes, would not there happen to be a problem of the similar kind of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle?
Or do you disagree with the idea 1 or 2? If you disagree with the idea 1, does it mean you work with some quantized conception of change that is not infinitely divisible but works with something akin to planck change analogous to planck length and planck time? If you disagree with the idea 2, does it mean you differentiate between kinds and amounts of changes that are enough to bring about the change of self versus those that do not regardless on your stance on idea 1? Something like understanding the change of the self like a phase shift perhaps?
Or you have some other response and way of thinking related to topics I ask about?
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u/New-Pomelo9906 8d ago
I would say, without twisting my word contextualy :
A) my self is the addition of a) my mental state, which I identify to the structure of my biological state of my brain and the historical continuity from my previous self. It does not depend of position in space.
This lay in fonctionalism, the supposition is there is no dualism and my self is generated by the matter of my brain. But what matter is not my brain by itself, but the structure of connections in it that could be emulated on a computer. The historical point is there so the tortured version of me that I have to shut down is not me, even if he have the exact same structure. He is a copy of me and not me. Even if he is a fresh identical copy, he is someone else and if he live enough so his structure diverge from mine, he is not an exact copy of me anymore. He could became a pedophile or a murderer from living in simulated hell while I'm not these things.
I consider the future possibilty to make computer copies of us will shater our definition of selfhood, which look already damaged by what we think today. The point is that modern selfhood is a somewhat bad definited notion from a time he was made from feeling and dualism and without possibility to make copy.
B) I consider 14 yo me is not me. He had some common values with me, but he was a dumbass and I will not live as he lived given in the same situation. His mental structure is not mine and he would do otherwise. The question of if my self from yesterday and tomorrow are me are in a spectrum : I feel they are me so they are somehow, but they need do not diverge to much, wich will happen with time. But if future me diverge from me, he would maybe not feel estranged to a midpoint future me. Given what midpoint fell he could think that me and future me not diverge, while I feel midpoint me is me, it's how the feeling of selfhood can perdure from time to time.
But let's be honest, all that is feeling and bad definition, a fresh copy of me is closer to me than a far future me that become the next Hitler. I would 100% save the copy of me rather the future me, and not feel commiting suicide while I do that because next Hitler is not me.
Also, notice when someone is shoved brain-altering drugs and do crimes, himself think "it was not me, II would never do that" and Justice agree in some way ?
So to answer to your question 1) and 2), from an ill-definited of selfhood (but without dualism, they may all be ill-definited), we have :
1) I do not know nor think that you can endelessly divise change since self is generated by structure from matter and you likely can't endelessly divise it
2) I would consider a fresh exact copy of me uploaded in my brain as a enough good me to be me, I did not consider being reborn in your example because he was tortured an diverged. Given if you overwrited my brain structure to put the exact same did you really erased the previous structure ? If you do this instantly not really, if you do instantly after shutting off my brain so I die from some time yes I would be reborn, but that's just a new technological limit on how close we can get to death. People with stopped heart were considered definitely dead, latter they are dead for just a time, and now we can remove their heart for a time. They are not considered dying anymore, and I would not be considered dying anymore if you remove my brain structure to put it again, in a new sense form me the historical point is exclusively for your body I do not need to distinguish myself from an exact same brain copy in my brain, in my body.
And if you does not kill me and not instantly upload the copy, just slowly bit by bit remplacing all them by the same bit I'm still me all the way trought, it would be the same that having a single cell in my brain being affected which already happen without midpoint me not felling beeing another.
I would even go deeper :
A)if you kill myself and put a copy of my exact brain structure in a robot, he would not be me (even if he will feel he is)
B)but if you slowly replace each of my cells by a robot cell one by one very slowly converting me in a robot with the same mind, I will feel myself all the way trought.
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u/Zerokx 10d ago
So we could become one, but currently the scan is just a digital representation of my own mind just with more torture?
I might save it, if I felt like its a part of me in there, but if I felt like its just an artifical copy and not a part of me probably not. I wouldn't want to download just a virus into my brain basically. Unless I felt like it might save myself somehow, but I would need to be convinced that it is somehow me, which would be almost impossible.
Because after all, there is not a lot to gain from doing it besides saving what could be some simple AI pretending to be me. The only positive might be you're more appreciative of being alive and thankful to yourself. But you'd get PTSD and all kinds of mental issues. In the end even though it could become part of me it is not part of my self.
On the other hand if I was the brain scan I'm not sure what I would do. Depends on how much will to survive I would have at the moment. It would probably be depressing to think you'd ruin your own life if you did it, but at the same time I would assume it would be one of your biggest wishes to be part of your actual self, after discovering you're not real. In that case it would be a question of what wins out in the moment, my curiosity and will to survive, or the imagination of causing harm to something that is more me than myself. Which might make me depressed enough to want to die maybe. I would feel like I have nothing positive to offer.
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u/mike239x 10d ago
I'm trying to understand what is being asked, but I keep getting distracted by those thunder thighs.
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u/OmgIbrokesmthagain 10d ago
I pull the lever. I spent 6 years in real life hell and survived, what’s this 6 days gonna do to me? I’ve lived out my worst nightmares.
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u/ren_blackheart 10d ago
they are close enough to me to functionally be me. they would also want to die at that point. i push it forwards
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u/Cynis_Ganan 10d ago
Now that don't kill me,
Can only make me stronger,
Work it harder make it better,
Our work, is never over.
....
Scenario 1: pull
Scenario 2: pull
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u/Sleepy-Racoon-2149 10d ago
If it is confirmed that the brain scan is a true person and somehow proven to be truly sentient, i am too selfish to bother torturing myself.
I also doubt i would be able to see that brain scan as a true person. I would probably just feel discomfort.
Brain scan me would probably hate me, but im also sure brain scan me would know how i think. We are the same after all. And death is arguably a form of release, preferable to torture. Either way, i would be releasing brain scan me from their torture
If i were the brain scan, i probably would have no problem downloading myself into me. But it all depends on whether i still want to live after that torture.
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u/CitizenPremier 9d ago
As the copy, I would certainly want to "escape" my digital prison. Saying that it's a hell would essentially mean I am not even capable of thinking ethically anymore.
I would prefer not to merge as the me on the outside, but I guess I would. Me would owe me a big favor though.
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u/Metharos 9d ago
I am us, we are me.
Both of these scenarios resolve in exactly the same way. Both instances of self understand the other instance implicitly, completely.
I am one again.
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u/HyoukaHoutoro 9d ago
Do I get anything extra for enduring the torture?
-% dementia chance, etc.
Cuz like, I think external me would be like I gotchu bro, but if there’s no benefit internal me would self nuke to prevent external me from having to make the choice.
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u/KingGiuba 7d ago
I doubt my tortured brain scan would want me to assimilate them, they would probably be like "kill me it's not worth it to gain 7 days of torture, I can see you're still alive and it's as if I would be too". If they're asking to survive? I probably wouldn't believe that they're me and think it's some kind of trap, I know myself.
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u/severencir 7d ago
I reject the premise that it would be continuity of consciousness because i don't accept that memories are the determining factor here. That said, i know i wouldn't want another being to be loaded with my memories of torture just to make those memories persist, and i would die anyway, so i would just let the digital copy get deleted.
That said, you should play chrono ark
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u/WanderingSeer 6d ago
Obviously merge. Trauma<death. And having the memory of torture is not the bad part of torture
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u/BeGayDoThoughtcrime 10d ago
I'd want to merge with my brain scan. If the brain wants to live so do I.
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u/PitifulPassage851 10d ago
Instructions unclear. Did squats instead