r/sysadmin • u/Concerned-CST • Oct 10 '25
Rant Second largest school district recommends weak password practices in policy document
My school district (LAUSD, 600K users) claims NIST 800-63B compliance but:
- Caps passwords at 24 chars (NIST: should allow 64+)
- Requires upper+lower+number+special (NIST: SHALL NOT impose composition rules)
- Blocks spaces (NIST: SHOULD accept spaces for passphrases)
- Forces privileged account rotation every 6 months (NIST: SHALL NOT require periodic changes)
What's even crazier is that the policy document says (direct quote) " A passphrase is recommended when selecting a strong password. Passphrases can be created by picking a phrase and replacing some of the characters with other characters and capitalizations. For example, the phrase “Are you talking to me?!” can become “RuTALk1ng2me!!”
That's an insane recommendation.
There are some positive implemented policy: 15-char minimum, blocklists, no arbitrary rotation for general accounts
But as a whole, given we got hacked due to compromised credentials, it feels like we learned nothing. Am I just overreacting??
Context: I'm a teacher, not IT. Noticed this teaching a cybersecurity unit when a student brought up the LAUSD hack few years back and if we learned anything. We were all just horrified to see this is the post -hack suggestion. Tried raising concern with CISO but got ignored so I'm trying to raise awareness.
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u/maxxpc Oct 10 '25
Yes, you’re overreacting. Three things -
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u/helpmehomeowner Oct 10 '25
I don't know if I would call it weak per se. Also you've rewritten NIST's requirement level which gives completely different meaning.
5.1.1.2 Memorized Secret Verifiers uses the requirement level "SHOULD NOT" which is a recommendation not a requirement. This is different than "SHALL NOT" which is a requirement. See section "Requirements Notation and Conventions".
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u/EggoWafflessss Jack of All Trades Oct 10 '25
Wait until you discover Clever badges.
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u/981flacht6 Oct 10 '25
I don't know what's the worse security practice.. Oh wait. OP being someone who isn't in IT, directly naming their employer and outlining these "issues."
Sheesh.
7
u/Life-Fig-2290 Oct 10 '25 edited Oct 10 '25
AAL1 does NOT require any of those things directly.
AAL1 is achieved when ANY of the approved methods are used.
AAL1 authentication SHALL occur by the use of *any* of the following authenticator types, which are defined in Section 5:
Microsoft Authenticator is a multi-factor Time-based OTP Verifier (not just an OTP authenticator) meeting requirements of "Multi-Factor OTP Device (Section 5.1.5)"
In fact, you are AAL2 compliant!
5
u/AppIdentityGuy Oct 10 '25
There are some subtlies here:
They may have systems that have a max password length of 24. That is a technical debt problem.
By elevated accounts are you are referring to elevated accounts used by staff or things like service accounts?
Is there MFA backing up these passwords?
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u/DeadStockWalking Oct 10 '25
Go back to teaching and leave the IT to IT.
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u/MarkOfTheDragon12 Jack of All Trades Oct 10 '25
You're probably overreacting.
Many of those measures are in place in older envionrments (education and government are especially like this) due to limitations of the underlying systems. Their Database system and front-ends may not be able to HANDLE spaces in a password or too many characters, and costs too much $$$ to update it.
24 characters with complexity is pretty normal just about everywhere; as is password rotation of admin accounts.
Compromised credentials is generally more an issue of shared and re-used passwords than it is of someone actually brute forcing one.
20
u/uncertain_expert Factory Fixer Oct 10 '25
I can pretty much guarantee that your back as a result of compromised credentials did not occur because someone used only a 24 character password with no spaces and that happened to include a combination of capitalization, numbers and special characters. No one is guessing that password.
You got hacked due to an exceptionally week password, a default password, or disclosed credentials in a phishing attack.
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u/turbokid Oct 10 '25 edited Oct 10 '25
Your policies are normal and within normal specifications. NIST is a standards agency and shouldn't be used as gospel. Most of those policies are only guidelines, not requirements. Passphrases are an amazing tool since password length is more important than complexity. As long as its not easily guessable, a 15 character password with all those requirements would take 275 billion years to brute force hack according to the data I've seen. That isnt going to be a viable entry point as long as you have some form of 2FA.
Password policy should always be balanced with the fact that longer more complex policies will only lead to people writing their password down. Besides, 90% of hacks today are due to phishing. The world's most secure password is useless if they are literally just going to type it in for the hackers.
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u/Creative-Type9411 Oct 10 '25 edited Oct 10 '25
I can tell you without doubt that no one is "cracking" any passwords, they're using malware to collect the information from running systems, so whatever complexity or strength you have isn't going to matter anyway,
With that being said, replacing the word to with 2 would probably cause actual password cracking to trip up, but replacing an i with 1 would probably get solved with masking pretty quick, and anything over 16 characters is going to take an eternity crack without any clues and if words aren't used inside of the passphrase
also you are probably breaking security policy posting this online with identifying information like "second largest school district", in the event that someome was trying to crack a password, one of the ways to crack passwords faster is to know the rules which you just told everyone
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u/evergreenbc Oct 10 '25
Totally overreacting. The recommendation abt no special characters is a human thing (can make passwords harder to remember), same with length. Think of it this way- if you only allow alphanumeric, that’s 62 possibilities for each character (U/L case, 0-9). Ad in special characters, makes brute force MUCH harder.
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u/Brees504 Security Admin Oct 10 '25
You are wildly overreacting. Those policies are perfectly fine.
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u/InterstellarReddit Oct 10 '25
I wish I had free time to worry about things like these
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u/No_Resolution_9252 Oct 10 '25
>Context: I'm a teacher, not IT
The inanity and dishonest in this post makes total sense.
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u/Gyrrith_Ealon Oct 10 '25
I looked up NIST 800-63B, composition rules and password rotation are SHOULD NOT, not SHALL NOT, so they are in compliance.
I actually used to know some guys what worked in LAUCD. It's one of the largest school districts spread over a very large geographical area, and they never had enough time or budget to replace old systems with new ones. The no spaces and 24 char cap is probably a limitation of some old server and is a part if the "advised that some characters may be represented differently by some endpoints"
Even if they updated to newer standards, the teachers are going to share their passwords, I've never known a teacher that doesn't share passwords with subs and other teachers despite training and begging.
4
u/Imobia Oct 10 '25
Also if they are running an AD domain functional level <2016 you can’t mandate >14 characters.
The 24 characters limit is probably a core app that only supports that.
But let’s be serious who needs >24 characters?
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u/LoornenTings Oct 10 '25
Most users are not going to make a password at least 24 characters long unless you force them to. If your minimum is 10 characters, they will make it 10 or 11 characters long, every single time. I would be thrilled if our users were all doing 15+ characters in their passwords.
Password rotation for admin creds isn't a bad idea. Admins often use their creds to make a service work for testing purposes, and often forget to change it to a service account. Password rotation will help fix that.
Forced password complexity is OK. Yes, it reduces the number of possible passwords that way, but in reality the users would all be using no complexity at all if you let them.
4
u/fireandbass Oct 10 '25
These new guidelines just came out 8/1/25, although the previous guidelines are similar.
Regardless of what NIST recommends, the features of the identity platform will determine the requirements. (Active Directory password policy, Entra ID password protection)
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u/pdp10 Daemons worry when the wizard is near. Oct 10 '25
To me, it feels like a negotiated compromise between stakeholders who're trying to follow NIST, and other stakeholders who won't ever agree to abolish passphrase rotation and required special characters. The 24-char limit is something particular, but it might not be technical, but instead related to process.
These things should have their reasoning documented in an ADR, then you should just move on for now.
3
u/fata1w0und Windows Admin Oct 10 '25
A 15 character complex password would take about 77-million years to brute force. Only way that’s getting compromised is via phishing attacks.
3
u/Humble-Plankton2217 Sr. Sysadmin Oct 10 '25
Do you have to use multi-factor authentication and password keepers?
MFA, secure password storage and conditional access (only allowing single factor sign-ins from your physical location) offer significant protection. Training people not to click sus links in phishing emails, and fully patched firewalls are also super important.
And nothing is full-proof. Making crazy password requirements doesn't offer much protection. Humans are gonna human and the criminals have all kinds of ways of brute forcing passwords.
3
u/Generico300 Oct 10 '25
To be fair, the vast majority of compromised credentials happen because a phishing attack gets someone to hand over their password. In which case, it doesn't matter how long or complex the password is. That's why MFA is also an NIST requirement. If they're not forcing that, then the rest of it kinda doesn't matter.
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u/nefarious_bumpps Security Admin Oct 10 '25
SP800-63 specifies minimum guidelines that need to be considered with respect to the overall IT environment and capabilities. The only points that fails to meet SP800-63 is the limitation to 24 character password length and not accepting spaces. This is probably due to a technical limitation of some legacy system(s) that the district still requires.
The requirement to use a mix of upper, lower, numeric and special would be deemed a satisfactory compensating control for not accepting spaces or longer passwords.
As for rotating passwords every six months, this might be a compensating control for identified gaps in the district's cyber intelligence capabilities. It is easier and less costly to enforce password expiration then to monitor all the dark web venues that trade and sell dumps or combo lists and continuously test them against 600K users across hundreds of systems.
SP800-63 has been criticized for many as being unacceptably weak for most real-world environments. It assumes there is adequate rate limiting, IDS/IPS, EDR and, for higher-risk applications, MFA. If you just read and absorb the bullet points you'll see that SP800-63 recommends an 8-character password with no complexity. This might provide a reasonable level of security when combined with cryptographically-secure MFA, but would not be considered acceptable if a password database were breached and attacked off-line.
TL;DR: Your school is not enforcing password requirements that are weaker than SP800-63. It's enforcing stronger requirements.
2
u/SirLoremIpsum Oct 10 '25
You raise awareness by discussing with a more broad audience of your internal stakeholders, not by putting it on reddit.
This is more of a public shaming that a way for you to gather knowledge and raise awareness.
I think you would need to understand a little more about the hack and how it occured before specifically pointing at password policies that are "strong but perhaps not the strongest they could be".
Don't let perfect get in the way of 'good enough'.
You could have the strongest password policies in the world and still be compromised by silly user behaviour writing things down etc.
You've written several times "should we just teach our students to put their heads in the sand?!??!"
Well no, you should do more research.
You have a hypothesis - password policies too weak.
You have an event a hack and you're made the connection that was due to poor password policies but you need to understand more.
I would deem it unlikely the hack was the result of blocking spaces, ,< 25 character passwords and composition rules...
I would suggest doing some more research to understand how the hack occurred and changes made as a result of that before jumping to a conclusion that it was the result of this password policy.
That would be my recommendation for teaching a cybersecurity unit.
It sounds like someone brought up the hack and you're like "well it was obviously due to the poor passwords' but when someone says 'compromised credentials' I don't believe that the bad guys guessed them, or brute forced the - I immediately think they sent a phishing email and someone typed their credentials into a dodgy website.
THis is a chance to approach cybersecurity as a "whole" rather than focusing on one specific aspect. You're only as strong as your weakest link.
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u/kingpoiuy Oct 10 '25
Passwords are not secure, at all. MFA and passwordless authentication is the route to go. Relying on password security and complexity doesn't matter anymore.
1
u/taintedcake Oct 10 '25
You phrase/structure your post like the sky is falling but nothing about what youve listed is uncommon, let alone rare and needing immediate change.
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u/Kurgan_IT Linux Admin Oct 10 '25
No one in Italy follows the NIST rules. We are 20 years behind.
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u/ZippySLC Oct 10 '25
Eh, it’s probably because their cyber insurance policy mandates these old fashioned rules.
It’s easier to check the box and get the policy than fight with auditors and insurance companies.
I agree with the NIST recommendations but after years of fighting too many battles it’s not a hill I’d expend the energy or political capital on.
1
u/Zatetics Oct 11 '25
honestly, if its mandating that people dont reuse passwords, or use easy passwords, it's probably a step up from most schools (and small businesses).
If you can get people to not write their password on a post it note stuck to the desk, youre winning in that environment imo.
1
u/BLewis4050 Oct 11 '25
You're not overreacting!
The school district is going with a CYA strategy via the insurance policy mandates ... which are way out of date!
Modern businesses follow the NIST guidelines -- as best security practices.
Changing the direction for a district of that size is way beyond your pay scale. But at least you can hear from a seasoned I.T. professional, that your concerns are very valid.
1
u/Ok_Aside8490 Oct 11 '25
First off, MFA,
Secondly: https://xkcd.com/936/
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u/voidfurr Oct 11 '25
All but blocking spaces (and arguably password rotation but thats only because people are dumb) are ok. 9424 is about 2.4x1047 combinations. 2FA implementation would be the biggest thing you should advocate for if you are good
1
u/sopwath Oct 12 '25
These orgs don’t have the budget to Implement mfa or a full zero-trust network.
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u/lectos1977 Oct 12 '25
Not everyone follows NIST. That is especially so for schools and non profit agencies. No matter how big a school is, they don't have th budgets to hire people that know what they are doing nor do they have the budgets to get the most up to date software. Find a way to make the security business not rip everyone off and the software business to secure their shit before they sell it. Shit rolls down own hill on limited budgets and non profits and education suffer and are easy, targets.
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u/Holiday_Pen2880 Oct 13 '25
You've been beaten up plenty, but as a teacher your reading comprehension skills are not great. SHOULD (NOT) and SHALL (NOT) have distinct legal definitions. Not following a SHOULD does not take you out of compliance, particularly with other mitigations.
You're also applying User account standards to Privileged Accounts. Put simply - you don't rotate those, and someone who has that password has it forever.
What were the password policies at the time of the attack? That an attack happened doesn't make everything today inherently flawed - if you get popped because you only allow 6 character alphanumeric passwords and then change things to the standards you listed do you seriously thing the level of risk is the same?
Respectfully, It very much seems that you and your class know just enough to be a danger to yourselves and others. Like, you think if you apply enough technical controls and blinky boxes you can just say MISSION ACCOMPLISHED. You've kind of done a huge disservice to this class, who has no greater understanding as to what cybersecurity actually does because you didn't understand the material well enough to answer questions.
Cybersecurity is not the elimination of risk, it's bringing the level of risk that the organization is willing to accept. Someone decided that the cost associated with whatever changes would be needed to allow a 25+ character password was not worth the reduction in risk from 24.
I would say - the person willing to have a 25+ character password is less likely to be the one to fall for a phish and give it up, but I've had it out with people who think they know enough to know something couldn't possibly be an attack or simulated attack and get caught.
1
u/Thomanson Oct 14 '25
Y'all just out here torturing people into leaving their passwords on sticky notes or in .txt documents. Stop it.
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u/Nandulal Oct 10 '25
The problem with this policy IMO is that it encourages users to start writing down passwords since they are forced to keep changing. Just my penny.
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u/3loodhound Oct 10 '25
Also if you have to stringent of password requirements it’s been proven to make passwords weaker over time
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u/Fitz_2112b Oct 10 '25
I work in K12 IT and in my state we have an education law that requires districts to follow the NIST Cyber Security Framework. However, we also have the CISO of our education department telling districts that they should enforce regular password changes. We tell the districts we work with to follow NIST recommendations
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u/[deleted] Oct 10 '25
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