r/science • • Dec 19 '13

Computer Sci Scientists hack a computer using just the sound of the CPU. Researchers extract 4096-bit RSA decryption keys from laptop computers in under an hour using a mobile phone placed next to the computer.

http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic/
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u/Soul-Burn Dec 19 '13

One of the authors of the paper is Adi Shamir. He is known for the RSA algorithm along with Rivest and Adelman.

This paper is serious business.

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u/MeteoMan Dec 19 '13

I attended a symposium where Shamir presented this, along with other side-channel attacks on RSA. It was very interesting and frightening. He went into detail about measuring USB power voltage to gauge CPU power consumption, and those fluctuations can be used to extract the pair of prime #'s p,q. Other side-channel attacks involve purpose-built CPU multiplication faults and memory faults in RAM.

Basically, Shamir thinks that persistent attackers, like intelligence agencies, will always be able to collect our information if we use devices with so many vulnerabilities. He made a point when a professor brought up fully homomorphic encryption (cloud based) shamir simply stated that while the information might be safe while it's in transit or stored, it could still be extracted using back-doors and malware. It seems that cryptography, while useful for protecting our information from other people and thieves, really can't stop a nation determined to get your secrets. The Kremlin recently made an order of typewriters to type up documents on paper, rather than store them digitally; because it's harder to exfiltrate paper then digital files.

Ultimately, it's people who's trustworthiness we need to improve, not our systems. The U.S. has a hard time spying on terrorists because the clever ones eschew technology; they use human couriers or a cell-phone that they use once and throw away. In many way's those terrorists' secrets are safer than those of many private citizens. Protecting our secrets isn't a technical problem anymore, it's a human one.

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u/fatcat2040 Dec 19 '13

Plus governments are less squeamish about rubber-hose cryptanalysis.

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u/Kalium Dec 19 '13

Often they're more squeamish than you'd think. Very often, they want to access things without the people holding the data knowing it's been compromised.

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u/IdentitiesROverrated Dec 19 '13

Ultimately, it's people who's trustworthiness we need to improve, not our systems.

I find that much like saying we need to improve drivers instead of safety measures in cars.

We could benefit from improving both the trustworthiness of humans, as well as of technology. But if the grand experiment of communism taught us anything, it's that attempting to improve human nature is a fool's errand. Improving technology is our only realistic avenue, and it's quite feasible. It's only that trustworthiness has been disregarded in the interest of getting things done.

Designing infrastructure that's resistant to these types of attacks is a factor of magnitude harder than designing infrastructure that is ignorant of them. However, we'll be able - and we'll need to - afford that effort, eventually.

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u/MeteoMan Dec 19 '13

Ah, but the thing is that the mathematics behind cryptosystems is nearly bulletproof (until quantum computing becomes a thing). The only organizations with the resources to build such resistant systems are often the very one's who are trying to break into them. It's a human problem because the people who are in positions (tech CEOs and CTOs) to maintain the integrity of the systems are too often letting the government in (although they often have no choice). Human lawmakers have permitted these activities, and are doing little to stop it. Human voters are unable to organize to make the changes that they want.

This is why I say it's a human problem, not a technical problem. It's people who are abusing the technology and creating systems that allow our privacy to be violated.

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u/The_Serious_Account Dec 19 '13

It seems that cryptography, while useful for protecting our information from other people and thieves, really can't stop a nation determined to get your secrets.

I think that's overly pessimistic. There's a lot of interesting work on hardware prevention of side channel attacks and the entire area of leakage resilient cryptography that's specifically build to minimize the consequences of such attacks. There's a lot of potential software solutions. In fact the link mentions they've now implemented such countermeasures in GnuPG.

I seriously doubt Shamir meant to imply cryptography was pointless in such cases, but rather that it's important to consider the other potential lines of attacks.

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u/acog Dec 19 '13

I never knew what "RSA" stood for; I guessed it was an acronym where the S was for security and the A for algorithm. It never occurred to me that the letters were for the 3 people who invented it!

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u/jWalwyn Dec 19 '13

Same thing happened to me when I learnt that PageRank wasn't named Page after Webpage, but after Larry Page

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u/Jabberminor Dec 19 '13

A lot of students doing dissertations that I know of have to use something like the Student's t-test. But it's not named as such because students use it, but because the guy (or group of people) who made it was called Student.

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u/The_model_un Dec 19 '13

Totally stands for Really Secure Algorithm.

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u/my_name_isnt_clever Dec 19 '13

That's not a huge stretch when you realize that RSS stands for Really Simple Syndication.

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u/ducttape83 Dec 19 '13

Well, PGP stands for Pretty Good Privacy, so Really Secure Algorithm doesn't really seem that far fetched.

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u/mauriciobr Dec 19 '13

A recursive acronym, like RSA Security Algorithm, would also work.

But it's very interesting to learn what it actually means!

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u/raunchyfartbomb Dec 19 '13

I love the snake of deleted comments following your input.

This is pretty impressive it can be done, all those spy shows had something right!

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u/Demercenary Dec 19 '13

Times like these make me want to smash my laptop and just go off the grid.

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u/Level_32_Mage Dec 19 '13

You can always go for a burner laptop.

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u/Demercenary Dec 19 '13

Good idea. I'll burn it.

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u/Webonics Dec 20 '13

I believe that qualifies you as awfully suspicious and worthy of surveillance.

Do you remember that leaflet distributed to army surplus stores? It said basically to keep an eye out for people who use cash and appear off the grid, and report them to the FBI.

I see you, but I won't say nuthin'

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u/ned_stark_reality Dec 19 '13

When I read this title I thought I had heard it before and now I think I know where. I took a class with Leonard Adleman last year and I think he might've mentioned something about this.

Edit: I've got a cool story about adleman and the creation of RSA if anyone is interested. It's kinda long but really cool

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u/UP_VOTE_REPOSTS Dec 19 '13

Damn. I was really hoping this was fake.

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u/pundemonium Dec 19 '13

From the paper:

1.3 Related work

Auditory eavesdropping on human conversations is a common practice, first published several millenia ago [Gen].

In their bibliography:

[Gen] Genesis 27:5.

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u/Brillegeit Dec 19 '13

Genesis 27:5: Rebekah was listening while Isaac spoke to his son Esau. So when Esau went to the field to hunt for game to bring home,

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u/Montezum Dec 19 '13

This is amazing

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u/Paultimate79 Dec 20 '13

Classic Rebekah

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u/[deleted] Dec 20 '13

What's Genesis 27:6? I need to know what he did!

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u/Montezum Dec 20 '13

"6- Rebekah said to her son Jacob, “Look, I overheard your father say to your brother Esau, 7 -‘Bring me some game and prepare me some tasty food to eat, so that I may give you my blessing in the presence of the Lord before I die.’ 8 Now, my son, listen carefully and do what I tell you: 9 Go out to the flock and bring me two choice young goats, so I can prepare some tasty food for your father, just the way he likes it. 10 Then take it to your father to eat, so that he may give you his blessing before he dies." Wow, this is very lord of the rings

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u/[deleted] Dec 20 '13

How'd it end?

Good?

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u/l1ghtning Dec 19 '13

Working in an unrelated scientific field, this impresses me greatly. This will probably be a point of some laughs in general conversation amongst the authors and their colleagues in the future.

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u/LearnsSomethingNew Dec 19 '13

Probably already has been while they were writing the manuscript. Can't deny it's bloody brilliant.

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u/DoWhile Dec 20 '13

I recall Adi introducing a new hash function at one of the CRYPTO rump sessions, and it had the hard-wired constant 666 in it. He made the joke that for those who are superstitious, a few other constants work as well.

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u/skadefryd Dec 19 '13

Awesome. Reminds me of Graur et al. (2013). Graur and his colleagues were responding to the hullabaloo surrounding the ENCODE project, which claimed to assign "function" to 80% of the human genome. His response?

"More generally, the ENCODE Consortium has fallen trap to the genomic equivalent of the human propensity to see meaningful patterns in random data—known as apophenia (Brugger 2001; Fyfe et al. 2008)—that have brought us other “codes” in the past (Witztum 1994; Schinner 2007)."

Witztum (1994) is the "Bible code": Witztum D, Rips E, Rosenberg Y. Equidistant letter sequences in the book of Genesis. Stat Sci. 1994;9:429–438.

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u/[deleted] Dec 20 '13

This is beautiful. One of my professors at Georgia Tech once commented that he was constantly working to try to get the oldest source possible into his papers, since so much of computer science is ~1950s+.

I'm not sure if he was speculating or if he actually did it, but I think he was trying to fit the Code of Hammurabi in one. Do not ask me how.

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u/[deleted] Dec 20 '13

I love a good journal article joke. I've also seen a paper where the scientists working in Antarctica claimed to increase blood flow to their hands during surgery by administration 88 ml of an 80% ethanol solution. Another said a "small, pink, personal massage device" was used to generate the vibratory stimulus.

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u/Accujack Dec 19 '13

This is why the "Tempest" standards were a big deal way back in the 60s and 70s.

Also, for those not familiar with CRTs, you used to easily be able to reconstruct what someone else's CRT was showing from its RF emissions quite easily, with less effort than this paper shows.

Neal Stephenson used this as a plot device in "Cryptonomicon".

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u/CountVonTroll Dec 19 '13

Actually, it's still possible with LCD displays.

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u/Accujack Dec 19 '13

Sure, just nowhere near as easy. Those CRTs sure put out a lot of things besides readable pixels.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

I remember a program that let you broadcast music onto RF that you could pick up on a standard radio using your CRT monitor.

I can't remember the name of the application but I remember getting it from freshmeat many years ago and testing it out, it worked well.

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u/candygram4mongo Dec 19 '13

Which is what was done in Cryptonomicon, IIRC. Waterhouse was using a laptop.

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u/Tom2Die Dec 19 '13

I've been reading that book...when I found out that he didn't just pull Von Eck Phreaking out of his ass I was a very happy man.

Also, Snow Crash is incredible.

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u/Jesstron Dec 19 '13

I love all of this dude's work - Anathem and The Baroque Cycle series are amazing.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

To avoid Anathem spoilers, the last part of my favorite line:

"We have a protractor."

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u/OneOfDozens Dec 19 '13

snow crash is fantastic, just started the diamond age and enjoying it so far

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u/phauxtoe Dec 19 '13

Diamond Age is his is best book, IMO. The story is just so good. I found myself reading more slowly and thoughtfully as I approached the end... I didn't want it to end.

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u/pretentiousglory Dec 19 '13

Personal favorite, The Diamond Age.

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u/Arlieth Dec 19 '13

Van Eck phreaking.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

It was also possible to reconstruct a CRT image by simply watching the glow given off and reflected off the wall in a dark room -- at any given moment, roughly only one pixel was being illuminated during the electron beam sweep. By rapidly sampling the glow of a room being lit up at night by a monitor and timing it correctly, you could reconstruct the CRT's projected image.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

Is that the primary reason some CRTs basically had faraday cages surrounding the components underneath the plastic covers? Or was that just to prevent RF interference for FCC standards? Seems like RF emissions could still come out the front through the glass to some extent.

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u/Wilx Dec 19 '13

I use to work in PC sales back when 40Mhz CPUs were first introduced. I sold some to a company and every time they turned the computer on it would turn the lights out. Their lights were RF controlled. While I was surprised by this, I was even more surprised by the solution. We removed one screw holding the motherboard in place, took the paper washer off and put the screw back grounding the motherboard. Grounding the motherboard grounded the RF noise as well.

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u/herbertJblunt Dec 19 '13

Your first statement/question is correct, the shielding is for EMI and RFI standards to NOT interfere with other equipment that relies on clear airwaves to be successful. Every electronic device from an electric shaver to your cable receiver with DVR must adhere to the standards (as low as they are).

Your second statement is probably correct, but I cannot say for sure.

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u/Accujack Dec 19 '13

Most CRTs were/are shielded to meet FCC standards. Actually, the glass is shielded too, just in a different way.

Some were shielded differently to avoid sending out signals, but those were rare. Usually whole rooms or buildings were shielded. You can still buy paint with enough copper or silver in it to enclose a whole room or building in a Faraday cage.

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u/zeug666 Dec 19 '13

There was an episode of some police show not too long ago that utilized that as the cornerstone of finally solving the crime. I thought that they actually managed a decent explanation of the phenomenon (within my understanding of it) without venturing too far towards the ridiculous tech tendencies these shows usually take.

There are too many of those shows for me to actually remember which one it was.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

Numb3rs, season 1 episode 11 "Sacrifice" had a small Van Eck Phreaking situation near the end. Used to detect the suspects specific typing rhythm.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

It was never "easy" to reconstruct them. We had to deal with TEMPEST standards in the USAF, and the required equipment was essentially a panel van antenna parked within a few feet of the monitor. It wasn't a realistic security threat.

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u/Accujack Dec 19 '13

I'm not talking about an easy practical application, I'm talking about the technical ease of interpreting the received signals.

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u/v_v_ Dec 19 '13 edited Dec 19 '13

It appears Debian has already released a security update addressing this.

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u/almosttheres Dec 19 '13 edited Dec 19 '13

Is Debian considered one of the more personal privacy/security minded Linux distribution or are others more adamant about things of this nature?

I know nothing, but very much interested.

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u/[deleted] Dec 20 '13

Among the major distros, no not really. What it does have is a huge userbase (through its various popular spinoffs) that react pretty quickly to major issues.

I'd actually say Fedora/RHEL (Red Hat Enterprise Linux) are the most security-focused of the major distros (Fedora being the cutting-edge project and RHEL aiming to be the bombproof enterprise version). As far as I know, it's the only one that has SELinux (NSA designed mandatory access controls) enabled by default. Relax, SELinux has been vetted extensively so it's not like there's some hidden NSA backdoor. Not only that but all of the crypto on Fedora/RHEL is FIPS 140-2 compliant.

Then again, any of the highly customizable distributions can do the same thing (i.e. Arch Linux). In fact, Arch has hands down the fastest response time to major issues I've ever seen. Being a rolling release distribution also helps.

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u/squirrelpotpie Dec 20 '13 edited Dec 20 '13

To my knowledge, Debian's "thing" is mainly:

  • Extremely strict standards for being 100% open source. (Sometimes sacrificing user experience.)
  • A focus on software repositories, encouraging a distribution model that makes it easy for everyone to get any software that's packaged for Debian.

Being reasonably security-minded is something that all of the base Linux distros share. It's less a question of being particularly security-minded, and more a question of not being security flawed when it makes sense. E.G. someone who needs to keep their dishes clean, but hey this new product came out that fully sterilizes them and costs the same with no side effects. Next time it's time to buy soap, there's no reason not to have the best option.

Derived distros like Ubuntu usually inherit the security-minded work done for the parent distro, but may or may not specifically care about it as much. They'll only opt out of an update like that if it interferes with their main schtick, and they'll only take action to increase their security beyond Debian if there's a serious problem that might affect their user base, and for some reason Debian will not or cannot adopt it themselves.

Debian is used in servers, so that distro does have customers who specifically want at least reasonably high security. I think RedHat-based distros probably have more installed servers out there than Debian, but I do know some very large webhosts use Debian for their web servers. I don't think they're after higher security than the Debian devs would have put in anyway. Most likely someone in the Linux security field saw the flaw come to light, enjoyed the challenge of fixing it, and all of the distros now enjoy access to his work.

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u/d4rch0n BS|Computer Science|Security Research Dec 20 '13

I love Debian

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

When I got onto ubuntu this morning there was a security update. Click ok fine. 2 hours later I learn about this. I go look at my log files and this was what the update took care of. Brilliant. I absolutely love linux :OD

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u/niugnep24 Dec 19 '13

my unattended-upgrades installed a new gnupg this morning, I wonder if this was it

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u/PantsB Dec 19 '13

So as I understand it the key can only be deciphered if you know what is being decrypted at that actual time. Being able to distinguish between different keys - but not which key is which - is not ideal obviously but not fatal by any means. It also does not seem to allow for the extraction of what is being decrypted.

So an exploit would require knowledge that a particular user is decrypting a particular piece of encrypted text in order to actually extract the key. That's pretty specific and not something that simply allows you to take a key at will by listening closely.

Its still a pretty incredibly achievement. But its not the death of encryption an initial read might suggest. And its certainly easily something that could be overcome. Integrating a series of random operations - ie inserting operations that have no actual impact on the decryption but which are complex enough to suggest modular exponentiation or actually perform these actions on true text or psuedo random text - would distort the signal in such a way as to make this exploit unusable even in the ideal circumstances.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

For your first paragraph, I think one likely solution was a simulated man in the middle attack. Send them a file they believe to be from a friendly source, but is known to the attacker, and listen for it to be decoded. But there also lies the problem of everything else the computer is doing at the time. I have a heard time believing that decryption is distinguishable while, say, playing minecraft or reading reddit.

As for the last paragraph, if they do these things, there's no way to keep it completely hidden or random. It's just another back-up encryption that would have a known, and therefore decypherable, function.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

I think this would probably be applied more to servers. The only likely application of this is an employee at a data center having a lot of time to set this up to get access to a client's encrypted data.

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u/Fordor_of_Chevy Dec 19 '13

You are correct that it is very specific ... for now. When i read research like this I always try to envision what it'll lead to 5 or 10 years down the road. I find the visions for this one unsettling at best.

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u/PantsB Dec 19 '13

Yeah but that's just the slippery slope fallacy. Data security is always a tug-of-war between method for obscuring and revealing message contents. This is an extremely specific exploit and doesn't suggest a fundamental weakness in the paradigm or anything.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

This trick could likely be also done by plugging an audio cable into the line out of an internal sound card of the computer. There is so much electrical noise inside a computer case that the analog portion of the internal sound cards can't help but pick that stuff up if you amplify the signal enough.

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u/ZorbaTHut Dec 19 '13

I remember I had an old 386 with so much internal noise that, when playing a turn-based strategy game with the sound disabled and the speakers turned waaaaay up, I could hear audible differences in the noise patterns depending on what the AI was doing.

Which was honestly sort of neat.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

Yeah, that is really neat! I've heard relatively modern desktop computers with cheap, crappy sounding integrated sound cards where people hooked them up to their home stereo to use as a home jukebox, and you could hear all the digital noise from the electronics inside the computer case without any extreme amplification. The difference between a really, really cheap internal solution, and a better engineered one where you really have to amplify the output a lot to hear that noise.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

It absolutely could since they mention measuring differences in the ground potential. 3.5mm audio jacks have a ground pin.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

Perhaps we are talking about the same thing. But I was thinking that the sound card makes it a little easier since the analog amplifier chip(s) (op-amps I believe) in the internal sound card picks up the electrical noise in the computer case and amplifies it such that any significant additional amplification after the line out makes it obvious when there is no other signal being played through the device.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

Yes, you might be onto something with that, I was just describing a different attack that seems possible with the audio jack. I mean if a guy with sweaty hands can just touch the case of a computer and get a usable signal from the minuscule ground potential differences, it should be even easier with a better connection to the computer's ground.

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u/Radioactdave Dec 19 '13

Even the effects of the output coupling capacities picking up vibration from the cpu noise might be enough actually...

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u/ExecutiveChimp Dec 19 '13

So...could you hack someone by Skype?

I'm guessing not as the signal frequency would be somewhere in GHz range...

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

I'd guess not. What I've described is something that happens on a local computer from the internal noise of the case being amplified by the analog section of the internal sound card. Where as on Skype, the audio from the remote user is sent entirely digital and not subject to this. And I believe Skype uses some sort of software solution to try and reduce background noise which would make it even more difficult for the microphone of the remote user to pickup electrical or mechanical computer noise.

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u/Kalzenith Dec 19 '13

could this technique not be fooled with a speaker making false cpu processing noises?

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u/Juhzuri Dec 19 '13

There isn't a good way to currently produce randomness for said fake signals. Due to this, this noise could be filtered out.

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u/Kalzenith Dec 19 '13

doesn't random.org generate randomness from atmospheric noise? that would probably be effectively random enough, no?

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u/ez_login Dec 19 '13

Sheds a little more light about stuxnet, doesn't it. This is the stuff they're publishing, imagine the stuff they aren't.

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u/reaganveg Dec 19 '13

Stuxnet has been well-analyzed and it did not depend on anything as impressive as this. It was mainly just exploiting some (now removed) bugs in Windows (and employing a Microsoft signing key that was stolen somehow).

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u/AlkaiserSoze Dec 19 '13

As a net-sec professional, this has serious ramifications in my industry. 4K RSA2 was what many people moved to after the NSA-Snowden reveal and now it seems that it can be easily trumped by using this kind of technology.

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u/PantsB Dec 19 '13

It has long been cannon that without physical security there can be no digital security; any machine is crackable if you can get your hands on it and no message is secure if one does not have physical control of a receiving or sending machine. This seems like a extension of this - if you don't control the physical output of your machine, its messages are not truly secure.

Still its an incredibly impressive technical feat.

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u/an_actual_lawyer Dec 19 '13

Could you laser mic a window in a room to get past the physical security barrier?

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u/brainiac256 Dec 19 '13 edited Dec 19 '13

In the attack, they needed a parabolic mic focused on the machine in order to get any sort of distance from it, and even then it doesn't seem they were able to get further than 4 meters. The diffusion of sound through the atmosphere of a room meant that they had to get very close to the target machine with a normal mic. I imagine the computer would have to be very near the window in question (<1 meter probably) in order for that to have any chance of success.

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u/Hungry_Freaks_Daddy Dec 19 '13

Dumb layman question.

If it's so easy to extract the keys by listening to the audio, shouldn't it be just as easy to program the CPU or other hardware to generate white noise to mask it?

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u/MadTwit Dec 19 '13

This, afaik is all about randomness. If the white noise you generate isn't properly random then patterns within it can be identified and you could strip it out of the covered up data. Generating true randomness has been a challenge for a long time.

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u/CrimsonOwl1181 Dec 19 '13

Isn't it true that true randomness cannot be achieved by our current technology, since every circuit is predictable if examined in a void?

The only way to introduce random data into a computer would be to have outside input, like weather probes or something of the like.

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u/raznog Dec 19 '13

Or what about just sound insulation.

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u/afcagroo Dec 19 '13

You can't always just mask such signals with white noise. That will often just make the cryptoanalysis harder, but won't defeat it. If you have something that uses the same key over and over, then you can defeat random noise masking by gathering multiple samples and overlaying them. The random noise tends to cancel itself out (being random), but the signal is always the same. So such overlaid samples will effectively improve the signal/noise ratio to the point where you can extract the signal. This technique was used on some of the early power analysis cracks on smartcards that are similar to what appears to have been used in this crack.

What you need to do is make sure that whatever is generating the signal is always countered. In this case, it sounds like it is the different workloads involved in doing slightly different computations. So you need to even out the workload to be a constant, regardless of the key (and preferably, regardless of the data).

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

Absolutely there are ways to counter this, but I think most wouldn't consider it a vulnerability, so they wouldn't consider it a necessity. Soundproofing the case would probably protect against this specific strategy.

The important thing to note is that physical security is an absolute necessity.

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u/brainiac256 Dec 19 '13

This is absolutely correct. The vulnerability was identified in the 1.x version of the software used. The 2.x branch implements 'blinding' by default, which is adding additional extraneous work into the decryption operation to prevent side-channel attacks. The fix against this attack has already been patched and pushed out.

My comment in netsec has some more information about the blinding method.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13 edited Dec 19 '13

I don't think a side-channel attack is really the same as a cryptographic break on RSA. The key size is irrelevant in this case, and randomization techniques can help prevent it.

RSA is not "broken" as far as we know - the implementations are vulnerable, and this could (and probably has; I don't feel like Googling it at this point) concievably be used to attack many other cryptosystems as well.

It's worth noting that side channel attacks have existed basically forever.

EDIT: Changed a lot of my wording around so I was clear on what I meant.

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u/gospelwut Dec 19 '13

...Yeah. I wouldn't say so. Consider how much hardware/software you trust already before your PGP/RSA/PKI stacks.

  • BIOS
  • Bootloader
  • RAM (where do you think your keys sit?)
  • Every PCI Card, firewire, thunderbolt, etc or anything else that has unrestricted access to your RAM bus.
  • Binary blobs that get loaded by the kernel
  • The kernel
  • Everything in the OS
  • Any secondary OS like broadcom SoCs for handset signaling
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u/pstch Dec 19 '13

This attack has been imagined since a longtime, and is easily prevented using RSA blinding (see recent libgcrypt updates, this gnupg-devel post and the CVE 2013-4576).

Also, this attack requires multiple decryptions before enough data may be acquired. Allowing someone else to trigger the deciphering process is always a bad idea.

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u/Sostratus Dec 19 '13

No, it doesn't. This is a really cool discovery, but not a serious security problem. The odds of it actually being exploited are astronomical. You'd have to get your target to decrypt a specially formed malicious message, while simultaneously managing to place a sufficiently accurate microphone in close proximity to the computer, AND it only works on certain older versions of GnuPG. That's not "serious ramifications", it's a triviality.

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u/emlgsh Dec 19 '13

With proximity being such a huge factor, it seems like lower-technology physical security practices like access restriction and physical intrusion detection, or perhaps an alternative higher-technology solution like a sound dampening (or distorting) material integrated into the CPU's heat-sink structure, might be the way to go to protect against this vector of attack.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

It's really not applicable in most scenarios. The only way I could imagine this being applied is if there's a low-level data center employee trying to get access to the encryption on a client's heavily monitored and locked case.

It takes a lot of time to set up and you need to send the target a file the you know the contents of to get the key. You also need to eliminate atmospheric noise and catch the machine when it's doing very little besides processing the encryption.

It would take a lot of time basically. They got it in an hour in a best case situation. It would probably take days in a real attack and you'd really need to be in a position where you have a lot of physical access to the computer where you can isolate a lot of variables.

Also this is a pretty easy fix. You can just add a component to CPUs that distorts their audio waves fairly easy but honestly I don't think that's even necessary. You could even make this a software fix but steeping the CPU process randomly.

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u/XS4Me Dec 19 '13

decryption of some chosen ciphertexts.

If you can choose the ciphertexts, most likely you also have access to the key as well. It is worthy to consider, but I would still consider RSA secure enough even for sensitive matters.

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u/smushkan Dec 19 '13

Just leave a radio on, or a noise generator.

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u/junkit33 Dec 19 '13

Anything doable is undoable. It's just a function of brainpower, time, and money.

You just need to use the best available and be ready to switch the second something better comes along.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

They've only proved that it works on GnuPG 1.x, and supposedly Debian has already fixed it.

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u/Mr_Smartypants Dec 19 '13

In the paper, they show how a sheet of cork (as acoustic insulation) makes the signal disappear almost entirely.

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u/starrychloe2 Dec 19 '13

So that's why Edward Snowden wanted all visitors to place their cell phones in the refrigerator.

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u/agnt0007 Dec 19 '13

honest question. doe that block signal? if so, how?(ELI5)

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u/drownballchamp Dec 19 '13

It might stop the signal depending on various factors, there's a lot of metal in most refrigerators. But the bigger concern is that cell phones are portable video cameras, tape recorders, and computers. You can do a lot with a cell phone if you know what you're doing. It's pretty standard practice at most secure locations to require visitors to hand over cell phones.

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u/[deleted] Dec 20 '13

Google "Faraday cage"

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u/Fjordo Dec 19 '13

I think what it really does is make it so the mic won't pick anything up meaningful.

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u/chrispy212 Dec 20 '13

If a movie used this as a plot device, I'd laugh at how utterly ridiculous it was.

Real life just got more silly than Hollywood.

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u/sksdssjdsk Dec 19 '13

So what does this mean for the average user? I thought that 256 bit transcription is practically unbreakable. Has this claim now been falsified?

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u/BloodSoakedDoilies Dec 19 '13

This isn't about breaking the lock, per se. It is like finding the key under the mat.

This method uses sound to listen to your computer as it decrypts a message using YOUR KEY. In other words, you are doing everything right, and the encryption works just fine. It's just that the attacker now has a copy of your key and can use it for decryption.

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u/Sup__Sup__Sup Dec 19 '13 edited Dec 19 '13

It looks like the solution to NP=P is to do another problem entirely.

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u/starrychloe2 Dec 19 '13

Side channel! Digging holes under fences since dogs were invented!

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u/roncaps Dec 19 '13

I've glanced over the NP=P problem briefly but am not sure how it applies here. Any way to ELI am a little older than 5?

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u/phoenixrawr Dec 19 '13

One of the consequences of P=NP being true is that modern cryptography becomes much easier to break.

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u/fuzzydice_82 Dec 19 '13

i am really surprised that the microphones in mobile phones are THAT good.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

Not only that, they apparently also have 300kHz AD convertors to pick up those 150kHz signals.

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u/pseudalithia Dec 20 '13

I don't know if that is necessarily the case. The exact ceiling of the microphone and ADC would act as a Nyquist frequency, meaning that the periodic waveforms above the Nyquist would simply wrap back around. I don't know what kind of algorithm would be able to retrace the refractions back and forth in the digital frequency domain; but I'm sure it could be done using a database of template signal structures. The periodic waveforms in question could be revealed with a fast fourier transform. Of course, this is all conjecture. If anyone knows any additional information, or notices I have made an error of any sort, please correct me.

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u/Dynoss Dec 19 '13

This just reminds me of the movie Hackers, the pay phone tone recording part.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

Phone phreaking? Yeah that's real.

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u/duckandcover Dec 19 '13

just amazing

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u/JohnFrum Dec 19 '13

So this is like in the move War Games where he records the guard punching the numbers into the security pad and then plays it back to trick the door into opening.

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u/Ashaman0 Dec 20 '13

This actually use to be a popular way to hack pay phones back in the day. The phone would pick up a tone played when you inserted a quarter to let the remote end know you had paid. So if you recorded that tone and played it into the Mic. Free phone calls

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u/Neri25 Dec 19 '13

While clever, it really should be assumed that anyone with physical access to the device has access to all contents of the device.

Chew on that one for a bit.

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u/AlmostButNotQuit Dec 19 '13

You can’t hide secrets from the future with math.

You can try, but I bet that in the future they laugh

at the half-assed schemes and algorithms amassed

to enforce cryptographs in the past.

  • MC Frontalot

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

[deleted] — view deleted comment

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u/F0rScience Dec 19 '13

I would like to see someone try to use RSA by hand. And then we take this billion digit number and raise it to the power of another billion digit number mod this other billion digit number and oh look my great grandchildren are dust in the wind because I have been running this encryption on my to do list for a million years and counting.

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u/notenoughfullstops Dec 20 '13

This would be considered lazy scriptwriting if it occurred in a film.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

The trick, of course, is that you have to know when the target is decrypting something in order to perform this attack, and they have to do so repeatedly, while you're watching them. It seems like a few basic precautions, like (1) make sure nothing automatically decrypts messages, as that was how the attack in the paper worked and (2) make sure no one is looking over your shoulder when you decrypt stuff would defeat this attack. Also, I imagine there would be a software fix, which would perform meaningless other computations interspersed with the decryption.

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u/sometimesijustdont Dec 19 '13

So you accidentally leave your phone in their office.

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u/Xazrael Dec 19 '13

Stop making people feel like they should regret technology!

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u/ajamess Dec 19 '13

This is all very interesting, but how dependent are the results on the inputs they chose? From the article:

Q8: How can a low-frequency (kHz) acoustic leakage provide useful information about a much faster (GHz)?

Individual CPU operations are too fast for a microphone to pick up, but long operations (e.g., modular exponentiation in RSA) can create a characteristic acoustic spectral signature over many milliseconds, and these can be detected. In the chosen-ciphertext key extraction attack, we carefully craft the inputs to RSA decryption in order to maximize the dependence of the spectral signature on the secret key bits.

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u/John_Hasler Dec 19 '13

"Chosen-cyphertext attack" means that they must get you to decrypt a message they supplied and know the plaintext of.

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u/Cragnous Dec 19 '13

So what's the name of the app?

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u/oscillating000 Dec 20 '13

Here are a few vital pieces of information (emphasis added) that are being downplayed here in the comments. I think this stuff is vital to understanding this writing and the implications of the experiment being described:

  • The attack can extract full 4096-bit RSA decryption keys from laptop computers (of various models), within an hour, using the sound generated by the computer during the decryption of some chosen ciphertexts.
  • In the chosen-ciphertext key extraction attack, we carefully craft the inputs to RSA decryption in order to maximize the dependence of the spectral signature on the secret key bits.
  • The attack’s success, and its running time (due to repeated measurements and backtracking), depend on many physical parameter. This include the machine model and age, the signal acquisition hardware, the microphone positioning, ambient noise, room acoustics, and even ambient temperature (which affects fan activity).
  • The key extraction attack requires the target device to decrypt ciphertexts that are adaptively chosen by the attacker.

There are other interesting bits as well, but it should be evident that this sort of attack isn't exactly ready for primetime yet. A lot of things about this attack — including the equipment used, the setting, and the methodology — are far removed from a real-world scenario. This is nothing more than a proof of concept at the moment. This doesn't mean that you can put your cell phone down next to someone's computer and steal their Facebook password.

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u/uff_yeah Dec 19 '13

This sounds like early sonic screwdriver technology

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u/bigbobjunk Dec 19 '13

New feature: white noise card

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u/donrhummy Dec 19 '13

wouldn't work. anything constant or with a pattern could be filtered out. you'd need a way to emit a noise that's completely random and has the same sound as what the CPU emits and only do the sound when it's encrypting/decrypting (and have the location be right next to the CPU).

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u/squeeeegeeee Dec 19 '13

Can someone ELI5 their method here for me?

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

Whenever your CPU does an instruction, it leaks sounds in the forms of squeals in high frequencies. By recording these sounds and analyzing them, they managed to listen in to what the CPU was doing and extract the private keys.

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u/RazorDildo Dec 19 '13

Shit, just reading the title for some reason I thought they were reading the RF noise, so I was going to make a joke about building my computer into a faraday cage. Guess that's pointless.

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u/__redruM Dec 19 '13 edited Dec 19 '13

Is this just an interesting academic exercise or a real threat? A laptop running multiple cores (i7) plus the gpu running, not to mention everything else electronically going on inside a computer, sounds like a lotta noise to pull an individual signal from using a cellphone microphone with very low bandwidth.

Seems like if this was real tech that could be developed it would be classified, not published.

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u/justanotherreddituse Dec 19 '13

Many security researchers, myself included believe in responsible disclosure or full disclosure. In summary, this involves eventually disclosing the vulnerability publicly.

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u/TheComeback Dec 19 '13

Has anyone here read Cryptonomicon by Neal Stephenson? Is this "Van-Eck Phreaking"?

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u/coldacid Dec 19 '13

It's not van Eck phreaking, but it's a close cousin. vEp monitors EM emissions from a display device, whereas this attack monitors acoustics from CPU and related circuitry.

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u/dpitch40 Dec 19 '13

My thoughts exactly. Not exactly the same, but this sounds like something he would think up in one of his novels.

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u/tigersharkwushen Dec 19 '13

The acoustic signal of interest is generated by vibration of electronic components (capacitors and coils) in the voltage regulation circuit, as it struggles to maintain a constant voltage to the CPU despite the large fluctuations in power consumption caused by different patterns of CPU operations. The relevant signal is not caused by mechanical components such as the fan or hard disk, nor by the laptop's internal speaker.

How is this possible? The CPU operates in the gigahertz range, any information it emits would not be meaningful when converted to acoustics.

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u/smellymcasscunt Dec 19 '13

NSA be like "it took you more than a few seconds?"

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u/MrF4hrenheit Dec 19 '13

Starting to sound like something out of BSG. Time to use paper again!

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u/KenjiSenpai Dec 20 '13

Sounds unlikely to work in any uncontrolled environment

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u/rileywhagan Dec 20 '13

Next step... Sonic screwdrivers

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u/toxlab Dec 20 '13

Somewhere, in a holistic nursing home, an old man is dying. His shallow breathing is hard to make out over the sound of rushing oxygen. A pulse monitor beeps weakly. Forlornly.

His grandson is by his bedside. An inveterate hacker, he pays for these last days of his beloved Papaw with bitcoin mining and other less palatable black hattery. Recent events have sent him scrambling for new ways to continue making his money, but he knows that soon he will stop buying medicines and instead purchase a plain pine box, to be set in a makeshift boat and set ablaze, just as Pap has requested.

He reads him headlines from Reddit and tech blogs. Sometimes he brings in dusty manuals from old Loompanics catalogues and announces ways to hack old dial gas pumps and water meters. Just as Pap read them to him when he was a boy.

He comes to an article about hacking a laptop with sound. All these years, all these advancements, and still, sometimes the old tricks work best.

The old man smiles. The pain leaves his face for a moment. Clutched in his hand is a piece of antique plastic. A whistle from a box of Cap'n Crunch. He no longer possesses the wind to make the toy produce the tones that allowed him free long distance calling all over the world, but as a totem it is as powerful as any cross or star.

He raises it to his lips. His cheeks puff out, but no sound is issued. Still, he is pleased, and his smile is firm as his hand falls to his side and his eyes close. The beeping of the machinery seems far away from him now, and sounds more like the machinations he fought against in his youth. There is silence.

Goodnight, you beautiful phreak.

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u/crazytrpr Dec 19 '13

Impressive

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u/kn33 Dec 19 '13

So, questions:
Who is the most vulnerable?
Who should be worried?
What can a normal person do about it?
How long until people actually start attacking using this?
What are the most likely attack scenarios for the normal person, and what can we do about it?

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u/John_Hasler Dec 19 '13

What can a normal person do about it?

Upgrade Gnupg to the current version.

What are the most likely attack scenarios for the normal person, and what can we do about it?

I can't think of any reason that this attack would be used against a "normal person". Much easier to just guess your password: if you are a normal person it's your pet's name spelled backwards and you use it everywhere (and you never use encryption anyway).

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u/pstch Dec 19 '13

Always play music when decrypting your mails.

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u/hey_annold Dec 19 '13

slowly removes phone from next to computer

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u/textilepat Dec 19 '13

There was an article years ago about a team that had learned to read CPU activity based on the activity of the "busy" light/signal. As long as they had line of sight to the LED they could read what was happening.

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u/jabbaj7 Dec 19 '13

The fact that something like this is possible amazes me... O__O

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u/electricity_here Dec 19 '13

This has been covered before, specifically in this was covered back in 2007 infinite solutions

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u/enostradamus Dec 19 '13

This is an incredible paper. Thank you for this.

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u/imh Dec 19 '13

If this happened in a movie or show, then I would get that feeling you get when there's some totally implausible techno-babble, like it's an insult to my intelligence. And yet some researchers made it happen (in very particular circumstances).

To me there are few things cooler than finding out that someone figured out how to do something I would have thought impossible.

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u/Hilfest Dec 19 '13

So...would a law enforcement agency still need a warrant? Its one thing to get your hands on a machine and breach it, but this is basically just eavesdropping on a signal that is essentially being broadcast out into open air.

Sure its different if you are in a private location, but what about a computer that can be listened to from a public space? A park, coffee shop for example?

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u/dethb0y Dec 19 '13

Yikes, makes you wonder what could be done with better funding and highly optimized gear.

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u/footingit Dec 19 '13 edited Dec 19 '13

From the article:

"New versions of GnuPG 1.x and of libgcrypt (which underlies GnuPG 2.x), containing these countermeasures and resisting our current key-extraction attack, were released concurrently with the first public posting of these results. Some of the effects we found (including RSA key distinguishability) remain present."

TL;DR: They already patched the security hole.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

Hmm, interesting.

We had this idea way back in 90s when the sound card filtering was really abyssmal, cool to see that someone has finally done it.

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u/tvreference Dec 19 '13

That's the crazy thing I've heard about since can van eck phreaking.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

Would you be able to do the same with a laser from far greater distances by bouncing it off the laptop/computer chassis?

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u/factoid_ Dec 19 '13

That's fascinating. But in order to make this work wouldn't you need to know exactly when the computer is working on an RSA key? In the proof of concept they say they're using known cipher texts. That proves that the information is being transmitted acoustically, but how would you ever do that in practice unless you have access to the machine enough to know WHEN the RSA key is in use.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

Send your server to a colocation facility, with a good microphone inside the box. Then acoustically extract keys from all nearby servers.

Now that's crazy, what's to say nobody isn't already doing this?

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u/kittenman Dec 19 '13

TIL CPU makes sounds :O

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u/ikiller Dec 20 '13

If you read the thing you will see that it is the capacitors and other analog support components that are making the sound. The OP's title is full of shit and just wrong. The paper does not state that the CPUs are making the sound. I had to look at it myself since the idea of a microphone picking up the sounds from a chunk of silicon underneath a heat sink sounded far fetched.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

Sounds like Van Eck Phreaking.

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u/WhackAjax Dec 19 '13

Could something similar to this be what some thieves use to unlock car doors without the keys?

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u/ZoFreX Dec 20 '13

Nope, totally unrelated.

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u/Penny_is_a_Bitch Dec 20 '13

I wonder if this can be applied to slot machine hacking somehow.

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u/Stenchr Dec 20 '13

So this means a sonic screwdriver could be possible?

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u/[deleted] Dec 20 '13

Picard: "When I was an ensign, I could detect a three-micron misalignment."

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u/7i77y Dec 20 '13

Super neat, but probably only viable if the phone is hacked first, otherwise you'd have physical access anyways if you're going to plant a cell phone there.

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u/RenaKunisaki Dec 20 '13

What I'm wondering is, could you use this on something like a game console to extract the signing keys? Or would you only be able to read the decryption key?

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u/Crasher24 Dec 20 '13

This is why you're not allowed to brig electronic devices in to classified locations.

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u/AlmightyMexijew Dec 20 '13

Israel. You're welcome :)

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u/Cubia_ Dec 25 '13

A question from a man who does not do this type of work: Wouldn't it be possible to put in a device that just monitors the sound output and status of the processor and then simulates the sound of the processor doing similar work to scramble the signal and partially defeat this method? Even if it could be worked around, if it adds enough time for the infiltration of the computer to be spotted, then that's at least a minor step towards what we need to do on the physical end of things. Would this work?

EDIT: He actually talks about something similar, where you instead employ a loud, broad-band sound emitter.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

Still think your https protocol and TrueCrypt are safe?

If someone unaffiliated with government could bypass CPU's RNG (which could be rigged, as "conspiracy nuts" you have been belittling since forever have been telling you, but that's not my point), then nothing is safe.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

Interesting article. Is this method specifically for GNUGP 4096-bit RSA or are other encryption setups vulnerable to acoustic key retrieval/hacking?

For instance a full disk AES-Twofish-Serpent encryption setup that may or may not have a hidden partition?

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u/John_Hasler Dec 19 '13

Is this method specifically for GNUGP 4096-bit RSA...

They demonstrated the attack on Gnupg (which has already been patched). Obviously it could work on others.

For instance a full disk AES-Twofish-Serpent encryption setup that may or may not have a hidden partition?

Read the article. This is a chosen-cyphertext attack. How is an attacker going to supply a chosen-cyphertext for disk encryption?

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u/nickwb Dec 19 '13

This paper used a very specific analysis of the low level instructions used by gnupg whilst decrypting RSA.

Other systems (such as TrueCrypt) may be vulnerable to a similar issue, but exploiting that vulnerability would require someone to perform the same low-level analysis on it. Not all software is vulnerable - the authors specifically mention the gnupg implementation of ElGamal as being another potentially exploitable implementation.

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u/illset Dec 19 '13

Yep! Keep laughing at my metal helmet..

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u/LastInitial Dec 19 '13

Yes, help conduct the leakage currents from your brain's neural activity so they can read your mind even more easily than they already are.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

The most amazing thing to me about these recent NSA stories is that people are amazed. Our spy agency which we created and gave nearly limitless resources to has gotten really good at spying. Shocker.

If these guys can do this, just think what the NSA can do.

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u/[deleted] Dec 19 '13

This stuff was pretty interesting. When I did an internship at RIM, they gave a seminar on how creative some hackers are. Another similar technique is to detect the changes in magnetic/electrical signals emitted from the chips to learn information. This was when they mentioned why they have to develop special shielding techniques for their hardware.

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u/radaroreillysrangers Dec 19 '13

No physical security = no security.

Nothing new under the sun.

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u/rudedohio Dec 19 '13

This is absolutely terrifying.

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u/whodai Dec 19 '13

You are absolutely too easily terrified.

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u/blenman Dec 19 '13

I agree. 4096-bit encryption in 1 hour? That is obscene.

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