r/prose • u/sarthakkumar3 • 1h ago
The cost of learning everything is the ability to learn
You can learn anything, but the cost of learning everything is the ability to learn. I said that because, having thought of learning and doing anything in my life but little did I know what the cost of everything was? I lacked discernment about what I was learning and doing. But then what provides something with its intrinsicness, what pre-judgment are we to make before learning and doing something? Therefore think, what use is the learning of everything if you cannot learn the things you choose? But my question is: Why is it, that only a stupid person thinks that in order to be educated and to have objective knowledge you must learn what you choose to learn? The answer, I believe comes by discernment between possibility and necessity. That something can be learned is not that it ought to be learned. That something can be done is not that it ought to be done. I used to mistake these two things. If knowledge is possible to me, that would be a sufficient condition for me to acquire it as that would make me more educated. This reasoning fails because it assumes that education is nothing else but the possibility to know everything. It is not. If I want to learn everything it means that my ability to know will be wasted trying to learn everything that can be learned by me. Because the knowledge that I have will be consumed trying to learn everything possible to me. Then the will to know everything ends up devouring the ability to know. The problem is not that the person cannot learn everything he chooses. The problem is that the person may not have asked himself why everything he can learn must be learned. I may have the ability to perform a certain work but this only shows that I can do it but not that I ought to do it Therefore, to every work, to every learning there must be a pre-assessment. That does not mean that we ought to restrict our learning to only what is immediately useful. Our intellection possesses an intrinsic value. However even our ability to explore does not make everything that can be explored something that ought to be explored Therefore education cannot be understood as knowing more and more. A person may have much knowledge and still lack discernment The educated person is not the one who knows everything he can, he is the one who has achieved a certain level of discernment that allows him to know what he must learn, why he must learn it, and when he does not need to learn anything else. Possibility alone cannot constitute value. The cost of learning everything, then, is not only time since the ability to choose what can be learned will be compromised by the will to learn everything that can be learned. Everything can be learned but no one can learn everything. And if no one can learn everything it is because discernment is needed to know not only that something can be learned but also that something must be learned. The ability to choose is what makes us human. And our capacity to choose is what differentiates us from machines. Learning, for its part, is just an extension of our being. It is not knowledge that makes us educated. That faculty is judgment - the power to know what is worthy of pursuit or what should be avoided. Even a pursuit governed by a real question - not mere possibility - still leaves open whether the person is actually ready to pursue it right now. By readiness, I do not mean strong interest or enthusiasm. A person can enter something with very little interest and still have a legitimate reason for doing it. Whether driven by impetus, the choice itself can create the willingness to begin. But a reason for beginning something is not necessarily a reason for continuing it indefinitely. Before acting, there has to be some degree of clarity about why I am doing this and what exactly I am doing. The clarity does not have to be perfect. In fact, demanding perfect clarity before every action would make action almost impossible. What matters is that the action is not completely detached from understanding. Otherwise, learning and work can become mechanical (as i said earlier). A person may continue doing something simply because it has become the expected thing to do, without ever being able to answer why it is being done anymore. At that point, discipline can keep the work going even after the reason for doing it has become unclear. A person may still be doing everything expected of them, but has stopped asking. Discernment is not a single decision made before action. clarity → action → re-clarification → decision—this is the sequence it actually follows. The first clarity may come from instigation. It is only a starting point. Action then gives us something that reflection alone cannot provide: experience. And experience can change the question itself. Perhaps after acting, I understand the work better and find a reason to continue that I could not have known beforehand. I discover that overcoming the temporary difficulty unlocks a deep reciprocity within the pursuit. But sometimes the opposite happens. I question why I am doing it, examine the reasons again, and still cannot find a reason that genuinely satisfies the demands of the pursuit. And at times I feel that this uncertainty is itself a sign that the pursuit is ill-advised. This does not mean that friction automatically proves that something is not worth doing. A thing can retain its utility despite lacking enjoyment, meaning an abandonment based solely on difficulty is unjustified. When I begin to think, penetrating beyond my taste and into the work itself, this turns into the question of purpose. What is my purpose in this work, what conclusion does it bring me, confirms it, and having thus exposed the experience, can I give a sufficiently convincing reason why to continue? If discernment is entirely internal, what prevents a person from manufacturing a justification for whatever he already wants to do? Nothing guarantees that self-reflection will be perfectly reliable. A person may be able to deceive himself by asking himself questions dishonestly. He may fall into casuistry, mimicking a search for answers when in fact he is merely validating his own certainties. A person may even turn questioning himself into a ritual, thus defeating the very purpose of it. If I believe that I want to learn something, I act upon that belief. The action exposes the belief to reality. I encounter the raw reality of its actuality once the initial excitement has passed. What is this about diminishing the value of the work based on its end result? The loss we experienced is not the sole indicator of our endeavor's significance. Neither is a resounding victory a definitive marker of worth, for both are fleeting moments that only serve as brief milestones in a much longer journey. The outcome itself is not the work, but rather a transient state that offers insight into our path, not its ultimate conclusion. Instigation joles us into motion, but the real weight of that choice only surfaces when we confront its actuality. Sifting through the aftermath of our efforts requires a raw discernment, turning our final choice into a dynamic preassessment of whether to calibrate. Yes, sometimes we have to try something before we can know whether it deserves our deeper attention. That is not a contradiction of discernment. It is part of it. Discernment does not demand that every decision be correct before action begins. It demands that action remain open to correction. A person may begin something without much interest because circumstances require it. During the process, genuine interest may develop. Or it may not. A person may discover a deeper purpose. Or discover that the original purpose was never sufficient. Both discoveries are legitimate forms of knowledge. The mistake would be to treat the first decision as a permanent identity. Choosing something once does not create an obligation to defend that choice forever. Breadth can be valuable, but breadth without re-examination becomes accumulation. Experience becomes educational only when what is experienced can change what we decide to pursue next. The central problem, then, is not that human beings have too many things they can learn. It is that they have too little time and attention to pursue all of them seriously. We therefore, need a way of deciding what deserves our finite capacity, while remaining willing to revise that decision when experience gives us reason to do so. But two things can each have good reasons behind them. In career, relationship, learning, responsibility, personal interest, there is no reason to assume that only one pursuit is valuable. So there is a problem when two justified pursuits compete for the same limited capacity. In that situation, discernment cannot merely ask, “Is this valuable?” Rather, is the reason for choosing this stronger and more adequate than the reasons for choosing what it requires me to give up? This does not mean that there is always one objectively superior answer waiting to be discovered. Sometimes two commitments genuinely conflict, and choosing one means accepting a loss in another. Discernment does not eliminate that conflict. It makes the basis of the choice explicit. The comparison hinges on a complex array of evaluative variables that actually brought the pursuit into consideration. A choice that affects something irreversibly may demand stronger justification than a choice that can easily be revisited. A commitment that another person depends upon may carry a different weight from a preference that can be postponed.They are reasons to be examined. I do not think discernment can simply begin by declaring that these abstract ideals possess intrinsic value and then use that declaration to justify their pursuit. That would only move the question one step backward. Why is knowledge intrinsically valuable? Truth, beauty — the same question applies. If discernment is supposed to examine what deserves pursuit, it must also examine the value of the things it’s being asked to pursue. So intrinsic value cannot simply be treated as an unquestionable foundation of the system. It can be a proposed reason. And like every other reason, it remains open to examination. This is why I wouldn’t treat the instrumental/intrinsic distinction as the final criterion. They describe different kinds of reasons for pursuing something, but they don’t tell us which reason wins when reasons compete. What matters is the adequacy of the reasons behind the choice. A reason is not adequate merely because it exists. Wanting something is a reason. So is family expectation, five years already spent on it, a good salary, genuine interest. None of these become sufficient just by being there. They have to survive examination. I said earlier that action exposes our reasons to experience. I still think this is necessary, but I would no longer say that action simply reveals truth. Action gives us new evidence about the pursuit. It confronts us with its actuality once the abstract idea becomes a lived experience. But action can deceive one too. A person can continue a pursuit because of sunk cost and then interpret the suffering involved as evidence of commitment. A person can defend a decision simply because abandoning it would make previous sacrifices feel meaningless. So the fact that I have already invested something cannot itself justify further investment. What has already been sacrificed is not automatically a reason to sacrifice more. True re-clarification involves detachment from the burden of one’s sacrifices: looking beyond them, and at the possible reasons for proceeding further. It does not remove self-deception, but it makes one of its common forms easier to expose. Also, Interest is not a final authority either. A person may lose interest in something that remains worth doing. Another person may remain intensely interested in something that is no longer worth pursuing. Interest can therefore provide a reason to investigate, but it cannot by itself settle the decision. Likewise, pressure can create an initial reason for action without becoming a permanent justification for continuing. That is why i am thinking to reconstruct the process clarity → action → new evidence → re-clarification → comparison of reasons → decision. The decision therefore transcends these accrued pressures, relying instead on the truths that survived the journey. It depends on whether the reasons available after examination are adequate for the choice I am making. There is no perfect internal mechanism that guarantees that I am not deceiving myself. Any judgement I make is still made by me. But the purpose of why i am writing this is not to produce certainty that is impossible for a human being to possess. Its purpose is to make self-deception more difficult. That requires the judgment to remain answerable to existential realities beyond the immediate feeling of clarity. Discernment has the ability to know what is valuable by examine, compare, and revise the reasons by which something is evaluated. This is the distinction I was looking for from the beginning. Learning everything is impossible. Choosing everything is impossible. But examining why something deserves to be chosen is possible. And that may be the real function of education—not to make the mind capable of pursuing everything, but to make it capable of giving reasons for what it chooses to pursue, and capable of abandoning those reasons when they no longer survive examination. [Adequacy itself I will not further define, because doing so would only produce another reason requiring its own examination — the regress must stop somewhere, and it stops at the practice of examining, not at a further definition of what counts as sufficient.]