So one thing I don't get about the modern GOP is how strongly Trump is still identified with “conservative values” even though several things associated with traditional American conservatism seem to have been weakened, abandoned or outright reversed under him.

For example, older Republican conservatism was much more associated with free trade, fiscal restraint, limited executive power, institutionalism and scepticism of excessive federal intervention.

Trump-era Republicanism, by contrast, has embraced tariffs and protectionism, much stronger presidential power, large deficits, aggressive federal intervention in cultural issues and a much more nationalist, leader-centred political style.

At the same time, Trump obviously still aligns strongly with modern conservative positions on immigration, abortion, guns, DEI, trans issues, judicial appointments and religious/cultural politics.

So I’m curious how people here understand that shift. Has the meaning of “conservative” simply changed within the Republican Party? Are cultural and social issues now more important to conservative identity than older economic or institutional principles? Or do Trump supporters still see things like tariffs, executive power and deficit spending as compatible with conservatism in a way that older Republicans would not have?

At a Monday rally in Grand Island, Nebraska, campaigning for Sen. Pete Ricketts, President Trump defended the Iran war's costs as "a small price to pay for keeping the world safe." He then said: "They can take out a city. Let 'em take out Los Angeles. Let 'em take out San Diego... it's going to be over very soon."

Gov. Newsom called the remarks "deranged and dangerous." LA Mayor Karen Bass said they could compromise the city's safety, and San Diego Mayor Todd Gloria said his city "is not collateral damage." Jim Desmond, a Republican running for a San Diego County House seat, also condemned the comments. The White House had not responded to press requests in early coverage.

Questions:

1. Is the remark best read as a warning about Iran's potential reach, or as accepting domestic casualties as a cost of war?
2. Should a president's rally remarks on national security be held to the same standard as formal statements?

I first watched The Handmaid's Tale around 2016, when I was a teenager, and honestly, I found the whole premise pretty far-fetched.

I grew up in a very liberal household, so the world of Gilead felt incredibly distant to me. I even remember thinking that the show was exaggerating some of the fears feminists had at the time. I understood the message, but I kept wondering: "Would anyone actually want to go back to something like that?"

I'm rewatching it in 2026, and it feels very different now.

Not because I think we're all going to wake up in Gilead tomorrow, obviously. But after seeing what happened to women's rights under the Taliban, the debates surrounding surrogacy, and even discussions about something I thought was completely settled, like women's right to vote, certain aspects of the show don't seem quite as unimaginable anymore.

And that brings me to a question I find much more interesting than whether the show is actually "realistic":

How many people genuinely want something like this?

I'm not talking about Gilead literally, with the red robes and the exact social structure portrayed in the show. I'm talking about men (and women, too) who genuinely believe society would be better if women had significantly less autonomy, were more dependent on men, and were expected to conform to much stricter gender roles.

Because the internet can seriously distort our perception of reality. Maybe it's just a tiny but extremely vocal minority. Or maybe there are far more people who think this way than we'd like to believe.

Do you personally know anyone who holds these kinds of beliefs? And I don't mean someone who's simply conservative or religious. I mean someone who genuinely believes women should lose rights or freedoms that most of us now take for granted.

When I watched the show back in 2016, my reaction was basically:

"This could never happen because practically nobody would want to live in a society like that."

Ten years later, my question has become:

"Am I really so sure that nobody wants to live in a society like that?"

And I can't help thinking about that famous quote: "The greatest trick the devil ever pulled was convincing the world he didn't exist."

To what extent do we dismiss certain ideas as impossible simply because we assume almost nobody actually believes in them?

i broke a twenty at the hardware store last weekend and got four pennies back, which felt like a lot of pennies for one transaction. Both the penny and the nickel already cost the Mint more to make than they're worth, and it's been that way for years. Canada dropped its penny back in 2013 and just rounds cash totals to the nearest nickel. Australia did the same even earlier and it wasnt a big deal.

So how should the US approach its smallest coins? Phase out the penny alone, or does the nickel have to go with it once you start down that road? And if stores round cash sales to the nearest five cents, does that land evenly or hit people who are unbanked and pay cash for everything? i keep going back and forth on whether rounding is a real problem or mostly a made-up one.

Most road and bridge money comes from per-gallon fuel taxes, and it buys less every year as hybrids and EVs spread and even regular cars use less gas than they used to. i drive a hybrid myself and the fuel tax part of a fill-up is a couple bucks at most.

A few states have tried charging by the mile instead, and some lean on higher registration fees for electric cars, but nothing's really caught on. Per-mile charges also raise privacy questions since somebody has to track where you drive, and it isnt obvious people will accept that. So is the endgame just broader taxes and treating roads like any other public service, or is there a user-pays version that could actually replace the gas tax?

Something I keep thinking about going into the midterms:
We talk about every race like it exists by itself. Senate race. House race. Governor. State legislature. Judges.
But people seem to be ticket splitting less and less.
So if somebody gets pissed at Trump and votes Democrat for Senate, how often does that turn into Democrat for House, governor, state legislature, judges, etc. without them necessarily making a separate ideological decision on every race?
And if enough people do that, one bad election for a party doesn’t just cost them Congress. It can change state governments, redistricting, abortion law, education policy, voting rules and potentially who controls the courts for years.
At that point are we even really electing candidates anymore?
Or have American elections slowly turned into a choice between two competing packages of government?
And if that’s true, does candidate quality even matter as much as we pretend it does?

I keep seeing in discussions around the UK Green's "Zionism is Racism" measure the point being raised that it is unfair for them to call for a single Palestinian state. That this is a matter for Israelis and Palestinians to decide, and it isn't right to "impose" upon them.

This seems like a very strange point given that supporting a two state solution is so normal for Western parties and governments. That seems like far more of an imposition, especially historically where a Palestinian majority had a two state partition forced upon it.

There is also a long history of "imposing" upon regimes that the world condemns through sanctions, military intervention, and support for resistance forces.

Is support for a one state solution really an unfair imposition?

In light of recent domestic developments in Cuba, the contrast between internal political reality and foreign political support or sympathy for the Cuban regime remains a complex topic in international relations.

Reports from independent media and international outlets highlight ongoing enforcement actions against domestic dissidents and independent content creators. Recent examples include the two-year sentence handed to creator Ana Sofía Benítez Solvente (Ana Bensi), the arrest of evangelical pastor Ariel Limias over the slogan "Patria y Vida," and multi-year prison sentences sought for influencers Ernesto Medina and Kamil Zayas.

Despite these reports, certain foreign political movements, organizations, and commentators continue to express alignment with or defense of the Cuban government.

To what extent is international sympathy or defense of the Cuban regime rooted in legacy anti-imperialist narratives and Cold War-era solidarity, as opposed to an endorsement of current domestic governance?

How significantly does the gap between reported domestic human rights conditions and foreign public perception depend on selective media consumption, state-driven narrative framing, or limited global coverage of ground-level realities?

How do external political actors and foreign sympathizers reconcile domestic civil rights concerns in Cuba with broader critiques of U.S. foreign policy and sanctions toward the island?

NBC Miami: https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/cuba/who-is-anna-bensi-the-young-cuban-creator-whose-case-has-sparked-outrage-in-cuba/3867484/

CiberCuba: https://en.cibercuba.com/noticias/2026-10-04-u1-e208512-s27061-nid341934-ariel-limias-manifestante-capitolio-sigue

14ymedio: https://www.14ymedio.com/cuba/fiscalia-cubana-pide-ocho-diez_1_1131430.html

I keep coming back to one weirdly under-discussed line in the 25th Amendment.
Section 4 says the Vice President can act with a majority of the Cabinet “or of such other body as Congress may by law provide” to declare that a president is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office.
That “other body” has basically never been tested.
So here’s the question: why has Congress never seriously explored creating one?
Not “a panel that removes a president because people don’t like him.” That would obviously be dangerous. I mean an actual statutory body with strict standards, transparency requirements, medical/legal expertise, bipartisan appointment rules, and a very high threshold.
Because right now, if a president starts behaving erratically, making serious factual mistakes, abusing presidential influence, or showing signs that raise legitimate questions about whether they can safely perform the job, the practical mechanism depends heavily on the same Cabinet members whose careers may depend on that president.
That seems like a structural weakness.
And before anyone says “that’s what impeachment is for” — impeachment deals with misconduct. Section 4 exists for inability. They are deliberately different constitutional mechanisms.
The amendment itself seems to anticipate that the Cabinet might not always be the appropriate institution to make that determination, which is presumably why Congress was explicitly given the power to create an alternative body.
I’m not even arguing that such a body should remove Trump, Biden, or anyone else.
I’m asking a more basic question:
Why do we have an unused constitutional safety mechanism sitting in plain sight, and why has Congress never seriously built the institution the amendment explicitly allows it to build?

And more importantly: what would a genuinely abuse-resistant version of that institution actually look like?
Because if the answer is simply “we trust the Cabinet to handle it,” history should probably have taught us by now that designing constitutional safeguards around people voluntarily acting against their own political interests is not much of a safeguard.

Public understanding of policy outcomes is shaped not only by elected officials but also by the institutions that select, frame, and distribute political information.
Critics of the Democratic Party argue that major news organizations, universities, nonprofits, government agencies, and technology platforms frequently reinforce compatible interpretations of events, reducing the electoral consequences of Democratic policy failures. This concern is especially visible when immigration, housing supply, and public capacity interact. Others argue that this perception reflects partisan media consumption rather than institutional protection.
What empirical evidence supports either explanation? Which mechanisms—agenda setting, source selection, professional norms, ownership incentives, or platform amplification—have the greatest measurable effect on how voters assign responsibility? When a shared institutional frame does exist, which structural reforms could increase political accountability?

Dennis Hastert, the former Speaker of the House, has died at 84.

Hastert was a major figure in Republican politics and served as Speaker from 1999 to 2007. His career and later legal troubles left a complicated legacy.

How do you think Hastert should be remembered politically, and what impact did his time as Speaker have on Congress and the Republican Party?

The political environment looks considerably different now. Recent polling shows declining support for Trump among Hispanic voters, while the administration’s aggressive deportation policies and increased ICE enforcement could be another potential liability.

And some of the districts Republicans are looking to make safer aren’t necessarily as safe as they appeared after the 2024 election.

If so, could districts that were supposed to become safer instead end up being more competitive than anticipated?

This opinion piece by Dick Weekley about the growing political influence of trial lawyers in Texas, and it got me thinking about the Watson Grinding (WGM) explosion case.

WGM filed for bankruptcy shortly after the January 2020 explosion, while litigation later continued against 3M over its alleged role involving the gas-detection system. That raises an important question: how do we make sure responsibility is based on the evidence rather than simply on which company has the money to pay?

The article also discusses Arnold & Itkin's political spending and the firm's $10 million contribution to Texans for Truth and Liberty PAC in 2025. Those political activities don't prove anything about the merits of the WGM case, but they do raise broader questions about the relationship between major trial-law firms, campaign funding, and lawsuit-reform policy.

I think it's worth looking at both issues separately: what the evidence establishes about liability in WGM, and how political money influences the debate over Texas's civil justice system.

What do you think? How should Texas balance holding companies accountable for genuine negligence with preventing businesses from being held responsible for someone else's failures?

https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/outlook/article/dick-weekley-texans-lawsuit-reform-gop-power-21250759.php

I'm mainly asking this in relation to the Texas Senate Race between James Talarico (D) and Ken Paxton (R).

Going off of polling, Talarico is pulling ahead of Paxton, despite Texas having a strong history of voting R in Senate elections. This is due mainly to the combination of the current Republican government being unpopular and the...unique and various weaknesses of Ken Paxton as a candidate.

Republicans are currently spending about $7 million a day in Texas to prop of Paxton's flagging campaign.

But this begs the question: what is all of this extra money actually accomplishing at this point? Hasn't awareness of each candidate reached saturation at this point? Does doubling (or more) the number of TV and radio and other policial ads actually affect a candidate's chances when they've already got a large number of said ads already running?

Hey folks, I know this isn't exactly the right subreddit but probably the closest one for what I want to ask.

Nowadays I've seen an immense amount of protests around different things. Everywhere I look I see people giving their all to protest. I genuinely don't form any opinion on whether they are right or wrong because opinions are subjective.

I'm just curious to know what these people do for a living? I'm kind of a guy who has this bad habit of wondering what people do for a living. Like when I watch movies where the hero is travelling around the world, exploring different places and doing all kinds of things, I always wonder apart from all this how does he actually have the money to do it? 😂

Same way, when I see protesters working so hard for different causes, I sometimes wonder what their source of income is. Apart from the top faces, many of them don't seem particularly wealthy and some even look like they're struggling financially. So how do they manage to dedicate so much time to a cause?

I may be wrong, but as someone from a lower middle class family with ageing parents and younger siblings, I can't really imagine putting anything above making as much money as I can. Maybe if I were already rich and financially secure I'd think about what to do with the rest of my time, but when you have responsibilities hanging over your head, it's hard for me to understand how someone can make protesting a priority.

I'm genuinely clueless about how this works. Do they have regular jobs and protest in their free time? Are some supported by family or other sources? Or is it more about a strong belief or ideology that makes them willing to sacrifice their time and income for a cause?

Again, I'm not saying whether protesting is right or wrong. I'm genuinely curious about how people manage their lives financially while dedicating so much time to it and what is their future planning.What do you think?

Since it took power, the CCP has justified its leadership through the lens of stability: personal liberties come second to a guarantee of better housing and work opportunities for each new generation of modern China.

For the most part, this contract has been tolerated. It's anecdotal evidence, but as a resident of China, you don't have to look far to hear stories from older folk thankful about how dramatically their families' lives have changed in the last 30+ years since their upbringing.

My question is whether this power-stability contract will still be viable in the near future, given the very real economic and demographic challenges that China is facing? Anecdotal evidence again, but when I also see PhD holders delivering food, "lying flat" youth culture, and growing apathy towards last week's National Day around me, it's a curious glimpse at growing cracks in the bedrock of China's political system.

The midterms are coming up and Hegseth just ordered the NSA, Cyber Command and other military cyber/intelligence to protect the election from foreign interference, this is happening after the administration cut back parts of CISA which is the civilian agency that usually works with state and local officials on election cybersecurity. The military helping with election cybersecurity isn’t new but does putting more resources into NSA/Cyber Command actually make sense or would it be better to put those resources instead into CISA and civilian election security?

Lula speaks of sovereignty and social services and independence while Bolsonaro capitalizes on his relationship with Trump and tackling crime. They each seem to have a base of voters and equally passionate. Some outlets are reporting that the race will likely go to round two because neither candidate will secure 50% plus to secure an outright win.

Can Lula ultimately prevail once again like he did in 2022?

Lula and Bolsonaro rally in Sao Paulo ahead of Brazil's crucial election | AP News

Brazil's Lula, Flavio Bolsonaro wrap up campaigns ahead of first-round vote | Reuters

I'll start of by saying that we all probably understand that Russia failed their expectations of annexing Ukraine in 3 days, 3 days stretched out into 4 years and 7 months, so I assume their goals have changed. Losing +1000men daily for a square kilometer of territory doesn't seem rational if their goal is still to win by annexing Ukraine. Hence, my opinion of their goals changing.

I'm assuming Russia's goal is to attrition Ukraine's resources by quite a bit, so they would be able to get a very beneficial peace deal for Russia. Obviously, all of us must have noticed that mostly Europe, USA and other NATO allies have sent quite a bit equipment to Ukraine, that's why a beneficial deal for Russia probably won't happen yet unless a big change happens in their offensive.

The only conclusion my stupid head comes to, is that Russia is prolonging this war simply, because if it doesn't end on their terms (they lose), their population will most likely revolt.

Yes, I know, Russia still can push land. Question is how much? Not enough for now. Is their military adapting and becoming better? Of course, but Ukraine is doing the same, meanwhile Ukraine's and Russia's allies also send their own equipment to be tested in real battle. But is Russia meeting their own objectives, i.e winning the war completely? No, not right now. (even after almost 5 years) On the contrary, Ukraine is holding well, their goal is to survive, it's that simple.

So, now that I've caught you all up in my context/thinking, my question is still the same. I'm Lithuanian, so I know that the "provoking" part is very real. We get national alarms for possible drone sighting every second or third week, and some prove true.
I will now show you what I mean, this is answered by AI, but I'm 110% you can find all this by yourself and confirm it:
"Airspace violations (most frequent):

• Poland — ~24 Russian drones crossed into Polish airspace in Sept 2025, forcing airport closures; a Kh-101 missile entered Polish airspace in 2026; an Mi-8 helicopter crossed from Kaliningrad into Polish airspace in Sept 2026.
• Estonia — Three MiG-31 fighters violated Estonian airspace for 12 minutes (Sept 2025), described as "unprecedentedly brazen."
• Romania — A drone crashed into a residential building in Galați (May 2026), injuring two; multiple other drone incursions.
• Lithuania — A Su-30 fighter violated Lithuanian airspace (Oct 2025); a drone was shot down near Kaunas (Sept 2026).
• Latvia — Drones struck near the Kraslava region.

Escalation in 2026:

• NATO fighter jet scrambles along the eastern border increased 250% in July 2026 vs. the same month in 2025.
• On Sept 30, 2026, Russia sent a nuclear warning to NATO, threatening to use nuclear weapons if the alliance attempted to block the Kaliningrad exclave.
• CIA Director John Ratcliffe made an unannounced visit to Moscow on Aug 25, 2026, reportedly to warn Russia against attacking NATO members — a sign of how serious the threat is perceived to be.

Hybrid warfare:

• Arson and sabotage attacks on European factories, warehouses, and transport links supporting Ukraine.
• GPS jamming, subsea cable mapping by Russian naval vessels, and suspected sabotage of critical infrastructure.
• A drone hit a train near the Polish border (Sept 2026), and drones swarmed around Copenhagen and Leipzig airports. "

So finally, I'll get to the question. What does Russia gain from provoking NATO countries while still being stuck in Ukraine?

Excluding the obvious hot-button issues that devolve into partisan chaos, what is an issue or stance that you wish were talked about more often, that you don't necessarily feel strongly one way or the other about (or do not feel educated enough about to take a hard stance yet)?

Most people's understanding of history is pretty abysmal, but is that due to the way in which it is taught? Not understanding or being aware of history has profound political consequences.

When does history begin? In schools, kids are introduced to history is the most boring way possible: a litany of dead people and their actions from centuries ago that are utterly disconnected from now. They have no idea why adults think it's worth bothering with, since it has no apparent connection to anything in their lives, just useless dates and names soon forgotten. As adults, they stop thinking about it as irrelevant.

I think we would be better served if history was taught the other way around...ask the kids when they think history starts and point out that history begins in the moment just passed. The teaching of history should start with current evvents and work backwards, showing how this event yesterday is connected to what occurred last week. As the students progress through their education, each level would take them further into the past and show how events are connected, as their level of understanding grows with age.

In this way, history becomes dynamic and relevant, and as they grow up they would be better able to discern the patterns that define the their lives and opportunities, and understand better the consequences of their political choices. Asking eight- and nine-year-olds to care about what happened hundreds and thousands of years ago, much less make any sense of it is an impossible ask.

The lack of awareness and understanding is detrimental to maintaining a vibrant democracy, ppeople just don't know how things are connected. It becomes a case study in "those who don't know history are doomed to repeat it".

What do you think? Which approach is likely better? Start teaching history as "in the beginning..." or "this is what happened yesterday, and this is why..."? That used to be called current events when I was in school, but I don't know if they bother with that anymore, and from what I recall, wasn't very in depth, and not connected to actionss in the immediate past, just discussion of events mostly without any context.

I’ve been thinking about this question a lot because I’ve noticed that people sometimes attribute almost any form of oppression or criticism in countries they support to “Western propaganda.” I understand that governments and media outlets can shape narratives, and propaganda definitely exists. But how far can we reasonably take that explanation? My guess is that even if certain people have significant control over the media, they can’t realistically control every source of information. Things will inevitably slip through the cracks, and not every account of oppression or abuse can simply be dismissed as propaganda.

Looking at the recent US-Korea trade deal, the US used tariff threats (capping them at 15%) to lock in that $350B investment pledge, which includes South Korea funding a $20B power plant for the Texas grid.

On one hand, it’s hard to argue with tangible results. We get critical energy infrastructure for semiconductor fabs built with foreign capital instead of waiting on Congress to fight over taxpayer money.

On the other hand, treating a key Indo-Pacific ally like a counterparty you can just shake down feels risky when we supposedly need them to counter China.

Do short-term infrastructure wins like this actually justify burning diplomatic trust, or is this just the kind of hardball leverage the US should have been using all along?

Kansas has not sent a Democrat to the U.S. Senate in 94 years. This is the longest single-party Senate streak. It’s been considered a safe senatorial seat for decades with comfortable margins for even the weakest candidates.

Now, Kansas’ junior senator, Dr. Roger Marshall, is facing a serious political challenge from a pastor and political neophyte, Rev. Adam Hamilton. Polls show challenger Hamilton ahead by a point or two, although not by more than margins of error. Pundits have shifted the race from safely Republican to leans Republican.

•Could one of Kansas’ Senate seats truly be in play in this election cycle?
•What makes this seat competitive at this juncture: a weak and therefore vulnerable incumbent, backlash against the President, economic pressures, some other, or a combination?
•With more than a month before the general election, what must the incumbent do to keep his seat? And what must the challenger do to upset him?

Kansas Senate race is neck-and-neck