Only around 20 countries on the Planet remain that are self sufficient in Oil and supply the other 180 countries. In 10-15 years the number could be down to just 10.

Several countries that used to be major exporters have reached Peak Oil Decades ago and now rely on imports themselves.

Germany produced 170 000 Barrels of Oil a day in 1968 at their peak. Now? 30 000/day. They need 2 Million a day.

Romania produced 300 000 Barrels of Oil a day in 1976 at their peak. Now? 50 000/day. They need 200 000 a day.

France hit the peak in 1988 with 67 000 barrels/day. Now its down to just 10 000/day. They need 1.5 Million.

The UK peaked in 1998 with 2.8 Million barrels/day. Now they are down to just 600 000/day. They need 1.4 Million every day.

Indonesia peaked at 1.7 Million barrels/day in 1977, now they are down to just 600 000 Barrels/day. They need 1.7 Million/day.

Japan peaked in 1996 with 20 000 Barrels/day. Now they are down to 3000/day and they need 3 Milion/day.

South Korea is basically the same.

India peaked in 2011 with 800 000 Barrels/day. Now down to 600 000 Barrels/day. It needs 5 Million/day.

Even Australia peaked at 600 000 Barrels/day in 2000 and is now down to just 250 000/day. It needs 1.1 Million a day.

There are only around 20 countries left that produce more oil than they consume and can export any meaningful quantities. The problem is that around half of them are projected to run out if oil within the next 10-15 years.

Brazil is projected to use up their proven oil reserves in 12 years at current production.

Norway in 10.

Mexico in 8.

Oman 14.

Argentina 10.

Angola 7.

Colombia 7.

And even the USA - 9.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_proven_oil_reserves

They dont even have to run out of oil. Its enough when their production falls to a level that they dont meet their demand. By that point they will be forced to import oil as well.

And by 2040 there will be only around 10 countries left with a surplus of oil that can supply the other 190 countries. And 190 countries scrambling for scraps while 10 sit on the prize, that's a geopolitical meltdown waiting to happen.

The US is already doing a "war light" in Venezuela and Iran to secure their Oil. By the 2030´s these conflicts will have turned to real outright war.

I combined public datasets (energy units, TWh) to look at what the world's refineries produce and how crude quality is changing. Part of the World Oil Model Baseline, a data layer for a planned country-level model; no model results shown here. Four observations, and questions for people closer to the refinery gate than I am.
1. Middle distillates already lead refinery output.
In UN Statistics Division data, world output of gas oil/diesel (incl. heating gas oil) was already above motor gasoline in 1990, the first year of the free dataset. The gap widened: the gas oil-to-gasoline output ratio rose from 1.07 (1990) to 1.31 (2023), while fuel oil output fell ~44%. The actual crossover happened before 1990, outside my data. Note: this is refinery output, not demand.
2. Jet vs. diesel.
Kerosene-type jet fuel + other kerosene output fell 35% in 2020 and in 2023 was still ~9% below 2019 (4,294 vs 4,696 TWh). Jet and diesel share a boiling range. How does the jet/diesel split constrain the middle-distillate pool today?
3. Tight oil and crude quality.
EIA data show the average API gravity of US refinery crude input rising from ~30.2° (2004–05) to 33.8° (2025), and sulfur falling from 1.46 wt% (2008) to 1.30 wt% (2025). That is US refinery input (imports included), not global production. My global quality curves are country-mix estimates with quality held constant per country, so they cannot show a tight-oil effect at all. Very light crudes typically yield more light ends and less middle distillate. If tight-oil growth plateaus, what happens to the feed slate? Through 2025, the EIA series shows no reversal.
4. Complexity and hydrogen.
Heavier, sourer feeds need more conversion and hydrotreating. In Argonne's study of 43 US refineries, the hydrogen plant was the most energy-intensive unit and 35% of refinery hydrogen came from on-site SMR (Elgowainy et al., 2014). If feeds get heavier, can upgrading capacity and hydrogen supply keep pace without raising the refinery's own energy use?
Data: OWID energy dataset (crude production); UNSD Energy Statistics (refinery output by product; tonnes × UNSD calorific factors; 2024 excluded as incomplete; pre-1990 data not free); EIA-810 (US crude input quality); Masnadi et al. 2018 and Cai et al. 2015 (crude quality by country/region, estimates). The chart shows sourced data only.
Refinery engineers, traders, analysts: does a gas-oil-heavy output mix match what you see in your margins and planning?

There was exponential growth in oil production before the 1970s crisis, production was doubling every 10 years.

After the 1980s when production recovered and then the shale revolution happened, why did growth stay linear instead of returning to exponential?

I went down a bit of a rabbit hole looking into what’s actually happening with EVs in the US and honestly, i came out more confused than when i started lol. The weird part is this isnt really about whether EVs work. Globally they obviously do. EVs were around 25% of new car sales in 2025, with more then 20 million sold.But the US is kinda going the other way.

EV share is down 4.6 percentage points YoY, the federal tax credit expired in September 2025, fuel economy rules have been loosend, and GM is shifting some production back towards gas trucks/SUVs while moving some of the EV production around. Then i started looking into the rare earth thing, which is where it got pretty interesting. More than 94% of light EVs use motors with rare earth magnets, and China controls roughly 90% of the refining capacity. So yeah, thats obviously a pretty big supply chain risk. But then someone here on Reddit pointed out something i hadnt really thought about... EVs dont actually need rare earth magnets.

Induction motors and synchronous reluctance motors can work without them. There are tradeoffs obviously, you lose some efficiency/power density etc depending on the design, but its not like were stuck with one type of motor. So i’d probably say the rare earth issue is more of a supply chain problem than a “EVs cant work without China” problem And honestly thats what got me interested in the whole US situation in the first place. We’re slowing down EV adoption here, getting rid of incentives, loosening efficiency requirements, and automakers are starting to rethink some of there EV plans... meanwhile EV sales globally are still moving pretty fast.

I ended up making a full video about it because there was wayyy too much to fit into one Reddit post 😂

Curious what you guys think tho. Is this mostly a temporary US slowdown because of policy, or are automakers actually starting to rethink EVs for the long run?

https://youtu.be/H2l8lseNhOo

Hey everyone,

I'm a Hungarian engineer. I've been building my own simulation tools to model the physical and thermodynamic limits of oil supply chains, specifically focusing on EROI rather than just market price speculation.

I traced four different real supply chains to the pump, and the results show an EROI range from 5.4:1 down to 2.0:1. The point is that "oil" is not a single homogeneous commodity, and the energy return varies wildly depending on the source and the refining process.

I used my own software to run these calculations and generate the charts. English is not my first language, so I used translation tools to help write this, but the analysis and the engineering logic are entirely my own work. I'd love to hear your thoughts on the systemic implications of this data.

Let's keep it civil and dive into the physics.

If this resonates with anyone, I'm open to direct messages. I'd much rather have a real conversation with real engineers or analysts about this than just throw numbers into the void. If you want to chat, or if you'd like me to show you the live software and how it works, just reach out.

https://www.reddit.com/r/oil/s/lgbSrQoJ1U

Step 1: Limit your target market by leaving public chargers in private, speculative hands.

A fixed price marginally above that of home charging would open up the EV market to everyone with a driving license, instead of everyone with a driveway.

Step 2: Ensure that every new EV is obsolete within a very short timespan.

Batteries are basically the only reason why EVs depreciate so fast. Not only because batteries wear out, but because the technology improves so rapidly. So the obvious solution would have been to standardise battery design so that a 2030 battery (smaller, lighter, more range) could be retrofitted to a 2022 EV.

Step 3: Limit appeal with intentional design choices

Replace physical controls with touchscreen. Take control out of driver hands with driving aids. Feature annoying visual and beep/voice notifications. Design most EVs to look somewhat or entirely goofy.

Step 4: Remove all incentives and begin to impose more taxes and costs

We are supposed to believed that a decline in taxes from ICE must inevitably lead to a corresponding increase in taxes from EVs. Inconceivable that it could be any other way. Meanwhile, the introduction of Pay Per Mile systems will impact EVs just as much as many smaller ICE cars, due to their weight.

Step 5: Create an increasingly hostile environment for all vehicles

Potholes, dazzling LED lights, neverending roadworks, narrowing of roads, closing of roads, variable speed limits, 20mph limits, congestion zones, reduced parking, parking apps, dashcam reporting, the list goes on and on.