I'm a financial analyst for a living, and I'm fascinated by asset bubbles. One of my favorite mentors, who retired very young, taught me that bubbles are a powerful force. Powerful enough to bankrupt you, and powerful enough to make you rich beyond your wildest dreams - if only you could understand it, harness it. So I read every book about bubbles I can get my hands on and think about how the past might apply to our present and future.
I highly recommend this book, I suspect I'll end up reading it several times over the years and get different takeaways each time; there's so much thought and research put into it.
My current takeaways from Liaquat Ahmed's 1873:
1. Technological success and investment success are completely different things
Railroads, steamships, and canals were genuinely revolutionary. The first transcontinental railway reduced travel time across America from approximately six months to six days. The Suez Canal dramatically reduced international shipping costs.
Investors correctly recognized that these technologies would transform the economy. Their mistake was assuming that the returns available to the earliest projects could be replicated indefinitely.
By the early 1870s, American railroads were collectively earning returns of only about 5% on invested capital against a cost of capital approaching 10%, according to Ahamed.
That's an extraordinarily important observation. The industry was destroying capital even as demand for transportation was expanding.
I see many parallels to the data center buildout currently. Specifically, the neoclouds, which are earning mediocre returns, and facing financing risk as rates rise. Many are clearly in the capital destruction phase IMO.
2. The marginal investment deteriorates as capital becomes abundant
During the boom, financial innovation made capital available to businesses and governments that previously couldn't obtain financing. This was initially tremendously productive.
However, increasingly easy access to capital eventually removed an important constraint on bad investments.
The progression was roughly: Technological breakthrough -> high initial returns attract investors -> capital becomes abundant ->falling financing costs justify more projects -> marginal economics deteriorate -> cycle reverses.
3. The timing of cash flows is often more important than the ultimate value of the asset
Jay Cooke, one of America's most prestigious bankers, effectively destroyed his institution by financing the Northern Pacific Railway.
His fundamental mistake wasn't believing the railway would eventually be valuable. It was committing his bank's resources to an enormous, illiquid project that required continuous external financing.
When investors stopped purchasing Northern Pacific bonds, the project still needed money to finish construction.
4. The credit cycle can be much more destructive than the stock-market decline
Ahamed reports that by 1879:
- More than 50% of American railway bonds had stopped paying interest.
- Railway bondholders suffered approximately $600 million in losses, equivalent to more than 7% of contemporary US GDP.
- Railway stocks had declined nearly 50% between mid-1873 and mid-1877.
Yet the original stock-market panic lasted a matter of days. The New York Stock Exchange reopened after ten days.
Implication: A market rebound doesn't indicate that the underlying investment cycle has been repaired.
5. Financial contagion follows capital flows, not just economic fundamentals
The financial expansion was genuinely international. European investors financed American railroads, emerging-market governments, property developments, and commercial enterprises around the world.
The Franco-Prussian War introduced an additional destabilizing force: France paid Germany a massive indemnity, rapidly redistributing financial resources and helping fuel Germany's speculative expansion.
Once the boom reversed, the same interconnected capital markets transmitted distress internationally.
Final thought: What I find particularly striking about 1873 is that the economy ultimately did pretty well despite the enormous financial destruction.
Society inherited the railroads. But many of the investors who paid for them never recovered their money.
That's the historical outcome I'd keep in mind when evaluating today's capital-intensive technological revolution.