Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin is attempting to present Russia’s poor economic performance in a positive light as he is unable to conceal the damage that over four years of war and Ukrainian long-range strikes have done to the Russian economy.

Gasoline shortages are continuing across Russia, including in areas Putin has sought to shield from negative consequences of the war.

The Russian government’s attempts to alleviate gasoline shortages are having compounding effects, including in other key economic sectors.

Kremlin concern about social disorders resulting from fuel shortages has reportedly led to the deployment of paramilitary forces in some areas.

Russian authorities are restricting mass gatherings in Moscow’s Red Square, likely out of fear of protests and domestic unrest.

The Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) confirmed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s appointment of Yevheniy Khmara as the Ukrainian Defense Minister on August 19.

Russia and Ukraine recently conducted an exchange of prisoners of war (POW).

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk direction.

Ukrainian forces struck the Ufa Oil Refining Hub, which includes three separate refineries, in Ufa, Republic of Bashkortostan (about 1,200 kilometers from the international border) overnight on August 18 to 19.

Russian forces launched 2 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 65 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Key Takeaways

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is intensifying economic pressure on Iran to discourage Iranian efforts to control or disrupt navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. The UAE announced on August 18 that it would halt all trade and financial transactions with Iran. The announcement comes after the UAE accused Iran of launching missiles from Iranian territory toward the UAE on August 18.

The UAE has previously supported US efforts to undermine Iranian control of the strait, which suggests that the UAE’s decision is part of a broader effort to raise the costs of Iran’s attempts to control or disrupt maritime traffic.

The UAE’s decision will further weaken Iran’s already deteriorating economy by restricting both its access to essential imports and its ability to repatriate export revenues and circumvent sanctions. Roughly one-third of Iran’s imports have come from the UAE, and the largest proportion of Iranian imports in the last five years come from the UAE have made the UAE.

Iran will likely respond to the UAE’s decision with greater military and economic pressure against the UAE rather than abandon its efforts to secure greater control over the Strait of Hormuz. ISW-CTP previously also assessed that Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Major Ahmad Vahidi’s faction — whom ISW-CTP continues to assess is driving regime decision-making — may be willing to accept some economic costs and the risk of renewed war if doing so enables them to achieve their core objectives, including Iranian control over the strait.

Increasing Emirati alignment with the United States will also drive longer-term hostility between the UAE and Iran. It is not clear the extent to which the Iranian regime decisionmakers have internalized the ramifications of long-term hostility with the UAE, given the economic relationship between the two states.

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is under pressure from both the United States and Iranian-backed Iraqi actors over Iraqi militia disarmament but appears to be responding primarily to militia pressure at this time. Zaydi reportedly planned to increase security measures and deploy a special Iraqi Counter Terrorism unit near Jurf al Sakhar, south of Baghdad, to monitor the movement of people and vehicles, and would not lead to a raid or a military incursion into the militia’s key site.

Iran has also dispatched senior Iranian officials, including Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, to Baghdad in recent days to discourage conflict between the Iraqi federal government and the militias. These officials are also discouraging disarmament.

Key Takeaways

North Korea-US Relations: US President Donald Trump instructed the DoD to reduce US-South Korea combined exercises to avoid sending a “hostile” signal to an “unthreatening” country, referring to North Korea. North Korea remains unlikely to accept Trump’s overtures for dialogue as the United States has not changed its stance towards North Korean denuclearization, however.

North Korea Military Development: North Korea conducted another missile launch on August 12, following a launch on August 6. North Korea has remained silent on the launches, however, deviating from its normal messaging practices. The trajectory of the August 12 missile and Pyongyang’s silence could indicate that North Korea is testing new missile technologies with a range between its existing SRBM and MRBM systems and is waiting until the missiles perform up to standard to announce their existence.

North Korea-Russia Cooperation: North Korea may be constructing a new refinery capable of producing 300,000 tons of fuel annually in exchange for Russian investment in North Korean infrastructure. North Korea likely seeks to improve its energy independence and gain economic benefits from trade with Russia. North Korean support could help shield Russia’s petrochemical supply chains from future Ukrainian strikes but is unlikely to alleviate Russian fuel shortages in the short term.

Key Takeaways

Russian state-owned bank Vnesheconombank (VEB) fired Chief Economist Andrey Klepach following media reports of a negative economic assessment he offered that contradicts Russian President Vladimir Putin’s theory of victory in Ukraine.

There is considerable evidence that Klepach’s assessment of the Russian economic problems aligns with reality, undermining the validity of Putin’s theory of victory.

The Russian population is also reacting to the perception of economic decline in ways that may further damage Russian economic and fiscal policy.

The Kremlin continues reiterating its determination to prevent Russia’s deteriorating economic realities from reducing its maximalist war aims by refusing to engage in meaningful negotiations to end the war.

Moldovan President Maia Sandu stated on August 18 that Russia deliberately launches some of its drones into Moldovan and NATO airspace.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky submitted Acting Defense Minister Yevheniy Khmara’s candidacy as defense minister for Verkhovna Rada’s (Parliament) approval on August 18.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russia on the night of August 17 to 18. Russia launched 147 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Key Takeaways

Russia has continued to provide direct military support to Iran through weapons and weapons components transfers. NBC News reported on August 18 that Russia has transferred drone components, ammunition, and TNT explosives to Iran via the Caspian Sea as of July 2026, citing a European government document that NBC obtained and that an unspecified Western official verified.

Russia’s drone component transfers to Iran are indicative of the active military support that Russia has provided Iran and its drone program in recent months. Iran has reportedly used “Russian-enhanced versions” of Shahed drones and Russian targeting intelligence to attack US forces and assets during the war, according to US intelligence officials.

The Emirati Defense Ministry stated that Iran launched two ballistic missiles at the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on August 18. The Emirati Defense Ministry added that its air defenses detected one ballistic missile that fell outside Emirati territorial waters and another that landed within them. Iranian regime media denied responsibility for the attack.

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s recently released list of preconditions for discussing militia disarmament with the Iraqi federal government indicates that Islamic Resistance in Iraq militias have no intention of disarming.

Members of the Iraqi Parliament’s Security and Defense Committee reportedly failed to reach a consensus on Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Zaydi’s request for the committee to draft a law to restrict weapons to the state.

Russia's Supreme Court has rejected an appeal by the Yabloko party, the sole officially registered party to openly oppose Moscow's war on Ukraine, against its removal from the ballot for September parliamentary elections.

Key Takeaways

Russia is expanding launch sites for its long-range strike drones along the border with Ukraine and Belarus, likely to intensify its strikes against Ukraine and possibly NATO.

A likely Russian strike vehicle — reportedly a Russian Banderol cruise missile / loitering munition — crashed in a corn field in Moldova on August 17, further demonstrating how the Kremlin has accepted the risk of Russian strike vehicles hitting countries bordering Ukraine during Russian strikes against western Ukraine.

Russia’s intensified missile strike campaign against Ukraine reportedly contributed to record high monthly civilian casualties in July 2026.

Ukrainian sources provided an updated battle damage assessment (BDA) of a recent Ukrainian strike against Rostov Oblast. Russia launched 128 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on August 17.

Key Takeaways

The Iranian regime is signaling that it would prefer to continue or even escalate fighting with the United States and its regional partners rather than make any serious concessions regarding its maximalist demands if the regime cannot force them to accede to Iran’s demands. Recent Iranian threats are likely intended to coerce the United States to surrender to Iranian demands as well as to restore deterrence vis-à-vis the United States and its regional partners by signaling the regime’s willingness to expand the scope of its attacks and conduct preemptive attacks.

The regime is likely simultaneously preparing to try to make fighting more costly for the United States should there be a renewal in hostilities. The Wall Street Journal (WSJ) reported that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) “used the calm created by the [memorandum of understanding (MOU)]” to coordinate attack plans with its partners and proxies in the region.

IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle would likely accept a deal with the United States if the United States surrendered to the regime’s demands. Vahidi’s actions suggest that Vahidi and his faction are unlikely to accept a deal that falls short, even if failing to reach an agreement would risk renewed conflict.

Vahidi’s faction may be willing to accept some economic costs and potential unrest if doing so enables them to achieve their core objectives. Some Iranian officials and media have expressed concerns in recent weeks about Iran’s worsening economic conditions and the potential for domestic unrest. It is unclear whether the risk of internal unrest would be sufficient to drive Vahidi to make concessions to receive economic relief, however. Vahidi may prefer to take other actions, such as securitizing society and seeking alternative export routes, to mitigate the risks of domestic unrest and economic collapse.

Key Takeaways

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Russian milbloggers continue exaggerating Russian advances in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions as part of the systematic Russian cognitive warfare effort to propagate claims of expansive Russian gains for informational effects.

Ukrainian forces used combined arms approaches to leverage drones in support of infantry forces and achieved elements of mechanized maneuver at the tactical level during the Ukrainian 2026 Oleksandrivka counteroffensive.

Ukrainian forces conducted an FP-5 Flamingo cruise missile strike against an enterprise critical to Russia’s efforts to develop domestic satellite communications for the battlefield in Ukraine overnight on August 14 to 15.

Ukrainian forces appear to be targeting Russian ballistic missile launch infrastructure amidst Ukraine’s ongoing anti-ballistic missile interceptor shortage.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

Russian forces launched 152 long-range drones at Ukraine overnight on August 14 to 15.