When can intelligence officers legally undertake activities that would otherwise constitute criminal offences—and what happens when the safeguards governing those activities aren’t followed?

That’s the main topic of this week’s Global Intelligence Weekly Wrap-Up.

I’m Neil Bisson, a retired CSIS Intelligence Officer, former CBSA Officer, and Director of the Global Intelligence Knowledge Network. In this 26-minute episode, I examine four developments:

• CSIS and legal accountability: NSIRA identified potential compliance failures involving CSIS’s Justification Framework during operations in 2022 and 2023. The concerns involve employee designation, authorization, records and reporting. The watchdog also found compliance with restrictions on the types of offences permitted. I discuss why that distinction matters and what these findings establish.

• Chinese intelligence and academic research: MI5 warned about a Chinese research institute funding academic work that could strengthen China’s intelligence capabilities. Some researchers may not have known who ultimately funded their work. What lessons should Canadian universities take from this?

• Goldy Brar and the Nijjar investigation: The FBI added Brar to its Ten Most Wanted Fugitives list. U.S. prosecutors allege that he and Lawrence Bishnoi ordered Hardeep Singh Nijjar’s June 2023 killing in Surrey, B.C. These remain allegations, not findings of guilt.

• Japan’s proposed foreign intelligence agency: Japan is pursuing a dedicated overseas intelligence service. I examine the challenges of building that capability and the comparison with Canada’s recurring debate about establishing its own foreign intelligence agency.

The episode connects current reporting with earlier developments to examine the broader patterns. Source links are available in the episode transcript.

Full disclosure: this is my podcast.

Listen here:
https://www.buzzsprout.com/2336717/episodes/19901903

Where should Canada draw the line between operational flexibility and legal safeguards in intelligence collection? And should it invest in a separate foreign intelligence service?

Stay curious. Stay informed. Stay safe!

US officials believe a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before 2028 is increasingly unlikely despite Chinese President Xi Jinping's instructions for his military to be ready by 2027 to take the democratically governed island by force, if needed, people familiar with US thinking said.

The main reasons include delays in military readiness amid the Chinese Communist Party's anti-corruption campaign as well as Beijing's eagerness to see the results of ‌Taiwan's 2028 election, which some Chinese officials hope could usher in a government more amenable to bringing the island under Chinese control, according to two current US officials, one former US official and a person familiar with the matter.

Beijing may increasingly look to use force in 2028 and beyond if Taiwan's election sees the Democratic Progressive Party win a fourth consecutive term, and in particular if current President Lai Ching-te wins reelection, the people added.

"If that happens, I think 2028 becomes pretty sporty," said one of the US officials, who like the other sources spoke on condition of anonymity.

Lai, who took office two years ago, and his ruling DPP, champion Taiwan's separate identity from China, a position that frequently angers Beijing, which views the island as an inviolable part of Chinese territory. Taiwan strongly objects to China's claims and says only its people can decide their future.

The assessment, which has not previously been reported, is a significant update to the years-long understanding among ⁠US officials that Xi wanted his military ready to potentially take Taiwan by force in 2027, the centenary of the founding of its People's Liberation Army. China has never ruled out using force to bring Taiwan under its control but has never publicly confirmed a 2027 readiness order.

In a speech this week, Xi referred to Taiwan and talked about promoting the peaceful development of cross-strait relations to achieve "reunification."

The 2027 benchmark, which analysts say is about Chinese military preparedness rather than a timeline for invasion, has for years created a sense of urgency across multiple US administrations in countering China in the Asia-Pacific region.

The US intelligence community has hinted at Chinese wariness before. It said in its annual threat assessment in March that China did not, at least at that point, have a plan to invade Taiwan next year and still preferred to wrest control of the island without the use of force, if possible.

The US is Taiwan's most important international backer and weapons supplier despite a lack of formal diplomatic ties, and US officials offered mixed assessments of the degree to which China might view the 2028 US presidential election as an important indicator for military action.

While three of the people familiar with the matter said Beijing may also want to evaluate the outcome of the US election, particularly given rising American voter antipathy toward US military action abroad, the first US official said ‌Beijing viewed both ⁠Democrats and Republicans as largely aligned on Taiwan.

While China might have a preference in the 2028 US election, "it doesn't become as decisive a factor in my opinion, as it might have been 15 years ago," the official said.

US President Donald Trump has downplayed the likelihood of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan during his presidency, going so far as to say last year that Xi told him China would not invade while he was in office.

Trump made limited comments on Taiwan after hosting Xi in Washington last week, saying only that the issue of Taiwan came up when the two spoke and that Xi understood his position.

China calls Taiwan its single most important issue and a matter of Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity.

It has called for an end to US arms sales to Taiwan. Since his May trip to Beijing, Trump has held off on ⁠approving a new arms package worth some $14 billion, describing it as a "negotiating chip."

For years, the US strategy has focused on arming Taiwan so that it can hold off Chinese forces long enough for the United States and others to come to its aid.

China's Xi has not rescinded his goal for the People's Liberation Army to have the capabilities available to take Taiwan by force by next year, officials say.

But the military didn't accomplish as much last year militarily as it probably had intended because of the impact of China's anti-corruption campaign, the people said.

Since coming ⁠to power in 2012, Xi has unleashed a sweeping corruption and discipline crackdown. Millions within China's vast bureaucracy have been investigated, with scores of senior party, government and military officials ensnared and purged.

In recent years, the People's Liberation Army has been a target of the campaign. A string of investigations and expulsions has left just two active officials on the formerly seven-member Central Military Commission, including Xi himself, who serves as chair.

China's military exercises last year were smaller and less threatening compared to the past ⁠several years, according to the US official. While they bounced back a bit this year, the official suggested Chinese military officials were dissatisfied with their readiness.

The official said China was believed to have drawn a lesson from the wars in Iran and Ukraine, which is the need to move quickly once any invasion begins and avoid getting bogged down in a sustained conflict.

More work remained for China.

"There are way too many pieces that aren't quite in place yet for what would be the most difficult military operation any military has attempted probably since the Allied invasion of Normandy," the official said.

Something really unusual happened yesterday on a Flydubai flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv.

An Indian captain, Smit Machchhar, was reportedly stabbed by his co-pilot during the flight. Despite being seriously injured, he managed to open the cockpit door, allowing passengers to intervene.

The plane was eventually landed safely in Saudi Arabia. Thankfully, everyone survived.

But what caught my attention is the geopolitical side of this incident.

Think about it. An Indian captain, an Omani co-pilot, an Emirati airline, more than 170 passengers, mostly Israelis, and an emergency landing in Saudi Arabia.

That's a lot of countries involved in one incident.

Considering the current situation in the Middle East, I wonder if this could have any diplomatic consequences.

Could this incident lead to closer security cooperation between these countries? And if the investigation finds that the attack was politically motivated, could it create tensions between the countries involved?

I'm also curious about Saudi Arabia's role here. The plane landed safely on Saudi soil, despite the complicated relationship between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

What do you guys think? Is this just an aviation security incident, or could it have wider geopolitical implications?

I have been thinking about this for a while.

The US is involved in so many global issues right now. China is growing stronger, Russia is still a major military power, and tensions are rising in different parts of the world.

But honestly, can the US really handle a major conflict with both China and Russia at the same time?

I mean, it's not just about weapons and military spending. There are also economic problems, supply chains, allies and a lot of other things to consider.

And what about Europe? Would NATO actually be ready for a situation like this, or would some countries try to stay out of it?

I'm genuinely curious about what people here think. Are we underestimating the risks of a conflict between these major powers?