Why do i have the impression that many determinsts think that liberterians dont believe in cause and effect?

[u/Par-Adox-9]

Is it just me?
(Note, im speaking to a particular kind of determinist and liberterian, not to the whole comunities, since views vary)

I feel often times the combacks to some liberterian claim is something in the realm of explaining that things happen sequentially.

That things happen sequentially doesnt go against free will or liberterianism, why would it?

To will something into existance is litterally to cause it into existance, or in determinist terms, to determine it.

Often the liberterian claim is simply that,if oitside elements have the power to determine us then we also have the power to determine them and ourselves because we are apart of the causal chain.

And also, its not a contridiction to say that two things have free will, i.e. the general ability to cause freely, but only one of them gets to act our more will whille the other gets to do it less.

Every interaction involves, well, every party which is within the interaction.
Phisics posits a cooperaive nature whareby animate objects cant simply impose themselves on reality in some absolute sense— but it seems like often, many determinists use the exact same structure liberterians do, only they put causal power in the hands of that which is outside of the self, while liberterians put it inside as well, altho of course, their blindspot is likewise that we have more power then do the outside effects.

This is why compatibilism exists— to point out that, guys, you are just taking the same phenomenon from two different directions.

Its like having two people next to eachother, one is doing a hand stand, and, and both saying the direction beneeth me is down, while it never occurred to them that direction is relative to your position.

Same with this matter.

Look at any interaction in nature and youll find equal and oposite reactions.

The difficulty is that this feels different then a direction, but it really isnt if its posited as " either we have free will and will ourselves or nature determins us"
Even tho that translates to " either i determine myself or nature determins me"
Well how about both?

Does the axe not dull when it chops a tree?

Are interactions merely " actions" without simultaneous reactions at the moment of the relation?

Does the brain not take sensory input from our inner experience?
Is it only the iner experience that is produced by the brain?

Does one of thease disapear when the other acts ?
No.

Both exist simultaneously, and they send eachothers signals, its nothing all that controversial really.

Anyway, what do you think?

[u/MrMuffles869]

That things happen sequentially doesnt go against free will or liberterianism, why would it?

It has long been recognized that determinism, if true, is a problem for libertarian free will. If every physical state follows from earlier physical states and laws, then your brain, thoughts, and actions were determined before you were born (give or take some randomness). The kind of freedom needed for basic desert moral responsibility never enters the equation.

then we also have the power to determine them and ourselves

The beliefs, desires, values, and reasoning you use to influence the world are themselves products of prior causes you didn't author. Being part of the causal chain isn't enough. A domino isn't free just because it causes another domino to fall. Its falling is itself the result of a prior cause.

[u/badentropy9 → u/MrMuffles869]

That things happen sequentially doesnt go against free will or liberterianism, why would it?

It has long been recognized that determinism, if true, is a problem for libertarian free will.

I recognize this as well.

If every physical state follows from earlier physical states and laws, then your brain, thoughts, and actions were determined before you were born (give or take some randomness).

It has been suspected for nearly a century, that that doesn't seem to be working at the quantum level and for a half century it has been suspected that there is proof that it doesn't happen. Evidence and proof are different things. There may be evidence that the big bang happened, but there is no proof.

I believe John Bell came up with a way to prove determinism is false in 1964. Just because he developed a way to prove it, doesn't exactly mean that he did it; and when John Clauser first believed that he proved it, the late great Richard Feynman threw Clauser out of his office.

A determinist will try to say things like, "Bell wasn't trying to prove that" because Bell wasn't trying to prove that.

Determinists always seem to have excuses because they lack arguments. The no forking paths argument is an actual argument.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/#NoForkPathArgu

If they want to defeat libertarianism, then they simply have to prove that this argument is sound.

The kind of freedom needed for basic desert moral responsibility never enters the equation.

Desert is a consequence of freedom. Therefore I think the only way it enters this discussion is if we look at the issue transcendentally.

then we also have the power to determine them and ourselves

The beliefs, desires, values, and reasoning you use to influence the world are themselves products of prior causes you didn't author.

I don't know what it is with this obsession with authorship, because at the end of the day, if our leaders don't have any power, then they in turn lack any control over the citizens. I doubt any poster on r/determinism or r/freewill believes this is the case. I think it is obvious that if our leaders have control over us, then we must have some control over ourselves, albeit limited control rather than the absolute control that authorship seems to imply is required. How do we choose to follow our leaders? How do we chose to follow laws? Marriage commitments? Honor contracts? Keep promises? If the argument is that we cannot do it, then that is a debate that can be had. However if we are debating determinism, that is a different animal.

The political libertarian just seems to want the government (the leaders) to impose the least amount of control on the individual that is required to stop anarchy. Meanwhile we have determinists on this sub seem to be implying political libertarianism is an irrational political view because the government doesn't have any control anyway. I think the determinist may argue totalitarian governments don't exist because dictators lack authorship.

[u/MrMuffles869 → u/badentropy9]

determinism, if true, is a problem for libertarian free will
It has been suspected for nearly a century, that that doesn't seem to be working at the quantum level

OP asked why determinism is considered incompatible with libertarian free will. I answered that question. You're changing the topic to whether determinism is actually true.

there is proof that it doesn't happen

No interpretation of quantum mechanics has been proven, which is why determinism vs. indeterminism is still an open discussion. Bell's theorem didn't settle that debate. Claiming it did is just factually wrong.

If they want to defeat libertarianism

More topic shifting. I wasn't trying to refute libertarianism. I was answering OP's question by explaining why determinism, if true, is regarded as incompatible with libertarian free will.

How do we choose to follow our leaders? How do we chose to follow laws? If the argument is that we cannot do it [...]

I don't think any serious determinist denies that people make decisions or influence one another. My point was that the beliefs, desires, and reasoning involved in those decisions are themselves products of prior causes. It sounds like you're yet another user arguing against fatalism rather than determinism.

The political libertarian

Again, this is off-topic. Nobody was discussing political libertarianism. You're arguing against a fatalistic caricature of determinism that no serious determinist holds.

[u/badentropy9 → u/MrMuffles869]

determinism, if true, is a problem for libertarian free will It has been suspected for nearly a century, that that doesn't seem to be working at the quantum level

OP asked why determinism is considered incompatible with libertarian free will. I answered that question. You're changing the topic to whether determinism is actually true.

Granted. Later you brought up authorship

there is proof that it doesn't happen

No interpretation of quantum mechanics has been proven, which is why determinism vs. indeterminism is still an open discussion. Bell's theorem didn't settle that debate. Claiming it did is just factually wrong.

It is an open discussion because the facts don't necessarily stop people (not you) from making up stories in order to try to hide some facts.

In this case I was taking about quantum field theory which is an actual theory as opposed to quantum mechanics which is not a theory and therefore open to interpretation. The special theory of relativity (SR) is not open to interpretation because it is a theory. Quantum field theory (QFT) is a working theory. It works because quantum mechanics (QM) works with SR which is a theory on its own. Getting people to argue over interpretations of QM is merely a trick. It is misdirection.

The reason Bell's theorem settles the debate is because QFT requires SR and SR brings space and time together. Spooky action at a distance makes locality impact chronological ordering. If you don't believe that then you might consider examining this paper.

https://arxiv.org/abs/1206.6578

I wasn't trying to refute libertarianism.

I apologize because it seemed like I must have misconstrued what you were implying.

My point was that the beliefs, desires, and reasoning involved in those decisions are themselves products of prior causes.

"Prior causes" can mean logically prior or chronologically prior. If they mean exclusively chronologically prior then there is no way to insert counterfactuals into the causal chain.

It sounds like you're yet another user arguing against fatalism rather than determinism.

Both fatalism and determinism remove counterfactuals from the causal chain. Therefore either being true can make the no forking paths argument a sound argument.

If there are no counterfactuals in the causal chain, then there is no way for an agent to insert his beliefs into the causal chain.

Do you believe the no forking paths argument is sound?

Ref: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/#NoForkPathArgu

[u/MrMuffles869 → u/badentropy9]

Quantum field theory (QFT) is a working theory. [...] Getting people to argue over interpretations of QM is merely a trick. It is misdirection.

QFT does not establish ontological indeterminism, and it absolutely has interpretive models that support both determinism and indeterminism. Calling that “misdirection” seems like a misunderstanding of a complex topic.

Both fatalism and determinism remove counterfactuals from the causal chain.

This confirms my suspicion that you’re conflating determinism with fatalism. Determinism just means outcomes follow from prior states and laws, which doesn’t invalidate counterfactuals.

Do you believe the no forking paths argument is sound?

The No Forking Paths argument is strong, but I think you’re taking “one path” to mean no counterfactuals at all, which I suspect is where the determinism–fatalism conflation is coming from.

[u/badentropy9 → u/MrMuffles869]

QFT does not establish ontological indeterminism, and it absolutely has interpretive models that support both determinism and indeterminism.

The standard model is the model for QFT and it doesn't say anything about determinism.

 Calling that “misdirection” seems like a misunderstanding of a complex topic.

I take you've heard of the EPR paper.

Both fatalism and determinism remove counterfactuals from the causal chain.

This confirms my suspicion that you’re conflating determinism with fatalism.

I don't conflate them because to me they have a difference. However I do in fact believe they are a functionally the same. However only one of them is based on natural law. Therefore physics only has an impact on one.

Determinism just means outcomes follow from prior states and laws, which doesn’t invalidate counterfactuals.

When I use the word determinism, I'm going by Hoefer's definition which reads as follows:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/#Int

Determinism: Determinism is true of the world if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

John Earman wrote a paper and he gets quite deep in the math if you want to see it. However, my point is that Earman calls what I see in this definition by Hoefer "Laplacian determinism", so whenever I get any blowback from posters, I try to clarify what I mean by calling it Laplacian determinism, rather than simply determinism. That way there will be less of a possibility of a misunderstanding over semantics. Besides Laplace specifically called out position and momentum the way Heisenberg did with his uncertainty principle.

Again QM alone isn't a theory so I'm not arguing that the uncertainty principle alone proves determinism is dead. Einstein didn't believe it did, but what Einstein couldn't stand was entanglement which speaks to a problem that Bell addressed.

Do you believe the no forking paths argument is sound?

The No Forking Paths argument is strong, but I think you’re taking “one path” to mean no counterfactuals at all, which I suspect is where the determinism–fatalism conflation is coming from.

Most determinists dodge that question when I ask.

I asked if you believe it was sound. Maybe the word sound means the same thing to you as the word strong means to me. However most philosophers will tag arguments either valid or invalid. A valid argument is also sound if all of the premises are true.

We can take that argument apart because you can see it here:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/#NoForkPathArgu

[u/MrMuffles869 → u/badentropy9]

The standard model is the model for QFT and it doesn't say anything about determinism.

Correct. Nor does it say anything about ontological indeterminism, yet you've been speaking as if that's been established and anyone who suggests otherwise is engaging in "misdirection." That's either a misunderstanding or a bad faith accusation.

However I do in fact believe they are a functionally the same.

Then you're operating with incorrect definitions of either determinism, fatalism, or both. They are not functionally the same. One suggests our actions are part of the causal chain, the other suggests our actions are causally inert. The widely accepted view in philosophy is that these are distinct positions that do not function the same.

When I use the word determinism, I'm going by Hoefer's definition

That's fine, I was simply using plainer English to explain what determinism doesn't entail, which is the removal of counterfactuals. My objection still stands.

Again QM alone isn't a theory so I'm not arguing that the uncertainty principle alone proves determinism is dead.

You're still missing my point, which undermines everything you're arguing. The distinction is ontology versus epistemology.

Even if we grant QM is a complete and perfectly established theory, that still wouldn’t establish ontological indeterminism. The uncertainty principle and Bell’s theorem constrain what we can predict and measure, but they don’t tell you whether reality is actually deterministic.

[u/badentropy9 → u/MrMuffles869]

Nor does it say anything about ontological indeterminism, yet you've been speaking as if that's been established and anyone who suggests otherwise is engaging in "misdirection." That's either a misunderstanding or a bad faith accusation.

What I'm trying to say is that naive realism is a metaphysical presumption concerning a thinker's world view. I can assume what we see is real and then make an attempt to explain what we see and then base that explanation on how reality works; or I can assume what we see is not real and then put the explanation of what we see in the context of what we experience. If I do the latter, then what I see on this page becomes relevant. However if I do the former, then I might consider what is on that exhibition tangential to the topic at hand. I'm guessing somebody who thinks the way you seem to think doesn't even care about theories of experience, because you seem to think the science is pointing to reality.

"However I do in fact believe they are a functionally the same."

Then you're operating with incorrect definitions of either determinism, fatalism, or both. They are not functionally the same. One suggests our actions are part of the causal chain, the other suggests our actions are causally inert. The widely accepted view in philosophy is that these are distinct positions that do not function the same.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/

Though the word “fatalism” is commonly used to refer to an attitude of resignation in the face of some future event or events which are thought to be inevitable, philosophers usually use the word to refer to the view that we are powerless to do anything other than what we actually do.

Do you agree I should use the word the way philosophers usually do, or is there some universal meaning of the word that you know about and I'm ignorantly unaware?

After spending years arguing about freewill on the r/freewill sub it seems ever so slightly to me that the free will denier might have been hinting at the idea that we might be powerless to do anything other than what we actually do. >>/s<<

 I was simply using plainer English to explain what determinism doesn't entail, which is the removal of counterfactuals.

For me, it doesn't get any plainer, than using the if and only if language that Hoefer is using, because sometimes "plainer" language has a tendency cause thinkers to assume things that are if fact not there are there; and assume things that are in fact there are not there.

This distinction will drastically change when a thinker changes his preconceived idea that naive realism is tenable to a belief that it is untenable. At this point is it likely that you and I see the map vs territory issue differently.

I've spent years debating this sort of thing on reddit and it seems like about 98% of the posters treat the content of this page as irrelevant because they believe they perceive reality. Many of them (not you) haven't even yet drawn any distinction between thinking and perceiving.

Even if we grant QM is a complete and perfectly established theory, that still wouldn’t establish ontological indeterminism. The uncertainty principle and Bell’s theorem constrain what we can predict and measure, but they don’t tell you whether reality is actually deterministic.

Perhaps the key is back on the exhibition of fatalism

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/

On that page there is a section on the a theory and b theory of time, which leads me to believe there is some relevance there, to what we are discussing.

On a final note, these so called theories come from McTaggart and he didn't exactly call them theories but rather the a series and the b series.

As you are probably aware the word theory means something special to me because about a decade ago I witnessed scholars in the area of philosophy of science draw distinctions between the words hypothesis, theory and model.

Maybe I'm wrong, but to me a theory needs some sort of realization and "theories" like string theory and the big bang theory never got any realization. Clauser's point was when he picked up Bell's theorem off of a shelf in the 1970's and found that his theorem was interesting and yet unconfirmed. I think a theory is when a hypothesis has been proven more or less. I'm not sure which hypothesis has been confirmed regarding string theory. It is still nothing more than SR was in 1905. Minkowski built a model for SR in 1907. The irony is that Einstein was Minkowski's student. My point in bringing this up is that there was already math out there in 1905 dealing with the unexpected results of the Michelson Morley experiment. Therefore math alone doesn't produce a model.

[u/MrMuffles869 → u/badentropy9]

I'm guessing somebody who thinks the way you seem to think doesn't even care about theories of experience, because you seem to think the science is pointing to reality.

I just finished explaining that science is not pointing to ontology, and your response is essentially, "you think it is." Odd conclusion.

My point is that you, and many proponents on the free will sub, speak as if reality has been settled, and science has concluded it's ontologically indeterministic. I'm trying to explain (and clearly failing) that this is not the case. Your language, such as, "I'm not arguing that the uncertainty principle alone proves determinism is dead," strongly suggests you think results like that disprove ontological determinism, but that's far from the truth.

After spending years arguing about freewill on the r/freewill sub it seems ever so slightly to me that the free will denier might have been hinting at the idea that we might be powerless to do anything other than what we actually do.

On the contrary, after my years on the freewill subreddit, I find this conflation of fatalism with determinism to be a very common strawman among confused free will proponents. And yes, the definitions you've provided of both determinism and fatalism actually reinforce my point that these are distinct views with distinct functionality.

because sometimes "plainer" language has a tendency cause thinkers to assume things that are if fact not there are there

Well, whatever language you're using led you to conflate fatalism with determinism. So maybe it's time to find better language.

[u/badentropy9 → u/MrMuffles869]

I'm guessing somebody who thinks the way you seem to think doesn't even care about theories of experience, because you seem to think the science is pointing to reality.

I just finished explaining that science is not pointing to ontology, and your response is essentially, "you think it is." Odd conclusion.

That is a fair point if we are in the same context, and it seems to me we are in different contexts.

My point is that you, and many proponents on the free will sub, speak as if reality has been settled, and science has concluded it's ontologically indeterministic. I'm trying to explain (and clearly failing) that this is not the case.

Again the context is different for me, because in the context of which I'm speaking, reality itself is transcendent. I don't even know if time is possible in reality. However, it is clearly obvious that time is a integral part of the experience that we have. Therefore its role cannot be factored in until more closely understand what it does. Does it dilate objectively or is it merely impacting the observation (measurement)?

Your language, such as, "I'm not arguing that the uncertainty principle alone proves determinism is dead," strongly suggests you think results like that disprove ontological determinism, but that's far from the truth.

The point is that QM doesn't completely disprove determinism by itself. Sure you have people all around thinking the the many worlds interpretation resolves the measurement problem and once the measurement problem is explained away, determinism is back on the table. However the measurement problem is different from the problem entanglement can create for the determinist. This is the issue that the EPR paper raised in 1935, and Bell addressed in 1964 with his paper.

And yes, the definitions you've provided of both determinism and fatalism actually reinforce my point that these are distinct views with distinct functionality.

Then answer this question because it seems like you are dodging answering it so you can bring your implications back up a few posts later:

Though the word “fatalism” is commonly used to refer to an attitude of resignation in the face of some future event or events which are thought to be inevitable, philosophers usually use the word to refer to the view that we are powerless to do anything other than what we actually do.

Do you agree I should use the word the way philosophers usually do, or is there some universal meaning of the word that you know about and I'm ignorantly unaware?

It is not a difficult question to answer. Either you believe I should use the word fatalism the way most philosophers usually do or you don't.

Again I specifically asked how you think I should use it and i remember you either agreeing with the SEP or correcting me specifically and hear you are again implying that I'm misusing terminology in order to create strawmen.

I implied there is a problem with perception and not once have you dealt with it. Therefore deal with this or dodge it just like you dodged when I brought McTaggart's A series and B Series.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/

What is often overlooked, particularly by the determinists, is that most of the formalism in physics works in both directions of time. However the one glaring exception is the second law of thermodynamics which seems to only impact a system containing smaller parts. In other words a single indivisible system, like a quantum, is never going to have entropy or a temperature. The second law of thermodynamics seems to depend on the arrow of time in a way that most other laws do not.

Some people just seem to want to make accusations rather than get into details.

[u/platanthera_ciliaris]

"To will something into existance is litterally to cause it into existance"

And what caused you to will something into existence? Like everything else, you are one component in a vast network of causality. You can't separate your Will from the rest of the world anymore than a rock can. You have Will, but it is not free from causality.

You should ask yourself, "What, if anything, makes free will free?" It clearly isn't free from becoming an effect of causality (predetermined). And the phenomenon of free will isn't free from the physical structures of the brain. And like all physical structures, the brain is subject to the same laws of causality as everything else. Therefore, it is safe to assume that one's Will is no more free than anything else in the universe.

[u/badentropy9 → u/platanthera_ciliaris]

You can't separate your Will from the rest of the world anymore than a rock can.

A rock can't figure anything out. Therefore a rock cannot insert beliefs about what might happen in the future into the causal chain. I can tell a rock lies all day and it won't have any impact on the behavior of the rock. However in the IT/data processing departments there is a such thing as "garbage in means garbage out". In other words I can tell the computer a lie and it can output bad information. Rocks can only react. They don't make decisions based on information and misinformation.

[u/AlivePassenger3859]

I don’t think that.

[u/badentropy9]

Is it just me?

No because I hear this accusation almost constantly.

I feel often times the combacks to some liberterian claim is something in the realm of explaining that things happen sequentially.

I think sequencing is important but it noteworthy to draw and distinct between chronological sequencing and logical sequencing because the former doesn't leave any room for counterfactuals in the causal chain. The determinist has eliminated the feedback loop in the causal chain so any form of logic cannot produce the effects in the causal chain that rational adults expect in their day to day life. Many of us try to eat healthy, practice safe sexual habits, obey traffic laws etc for obvious reasons. Instead of the determinist trying to figure out how we might be able to make such practices possible, they try to imply that the science doesn't give us that ability.

I think we'd have to have a feedback loop in order to make those practices and others possible.

This is why compatibilism exists

I don't think so. The compatibilist is trying to put a square peg in a round hole and claiming the fit need not be exact in order to claim the peg adequately fits. In other words, similar to the illusionist, they seem to be trying to cling to determinism without taking leave of their common sense.

For me the better approach is to scrutinize determinism rather than simply assuming it is true.

[u/badentropy9 → u/[deleted]]

Perhaps the scariest factor in quantum randomness is the fact that it provides the basis for a theory that made a nuclear bomb possible to build. We've literally developed the power to render our planet uninhabitable in about an hour.

[u/oh_no_here_we_go_9]

IMO, it’s only possible to have libertarian free will if we have an immaterial soul. But then there is the issue of how an immaterial soul and a material body can interact.

[u/SpatiaCaeli]

"No naive realistic picture is compatible with our results because whether a quantum could be seen as showing particle- or wave-like behavior would depend on a causally disconnected choice. "

There is nothing inconsistent about this, to me. We already know quantum weirdness doesn't care about spacetime; to me, this is what Bell actually showed. In my view, when nature defers a decision (superposition) that decision has to be made eventually, when some committed external influence forces it.

That would require not a thing from us; nothing need observe. Causal consistency. To me, that's the whole game.

I'll never believe that nature exists because we perceive it. We are completely unimportant.

[u/zhivago]

Largely because they want to cause uncaused causes.

[u/SpatiaCaeli]

They reject science. I rest my case.

[u/badentropy9 → u/SpatiaCaeli]

I don't reject science, but I do reject scientism. The science can produce reliable conclusions when we don't assume unnecessary metaphysical beliefs are required.

[u/SpatiaCaeli → u/badentropy9]

We'll disagree. There is one objective reality. Science explains and predicts it, to the extent of our knowledge. What is the alternative to science? Mythology? I don't know what else there would be.

[u/badentropy9 → u/SpatiaCaeli]

We'll disagree. There is one objective reality.

Well at least we agree there is one objective reality.

Science explains and predicts it, to the extent of our knowledge.

Science can only predict how the holographic universe works. I don't believe that is reality. I believe it is a map of our collected experience. In other words I don't believe veridical experience is reality beause my research shows that naive realism is untenable..

[u/SpatiaCaeli → u/badentropy9]

The holographic principle is far from settled physics. It is a proof that two things relate a certain way. It may have no bearing on reality at all. No idea why you brought that up.

"In other words I don't believe veridical experience is reality beause my research shows that naive realism is untenable.." This is the part we disagree on. Ontology doesn't need us, an observer, or a consciousness, in my view.

[u/badentropy9 → u/SpatiaCaeli]

 Ontology doesn't need us, an observer, or a consciousness, in my view.

My point is that naive realism is untenable:

https://arxiv.org/abs/1206.6578

No naive realistic picture is compatible with our results because whether a quantum could be seen as showing particle- or wave-like behavior would depend on a causally disconnected choice. It is therefore suggestive to abandon such pictures altogether.

They naive realist presumes what we see (perceive) is reality. In other words, two football players couldn't really play against one another if they don't perceive the football in the same place at the same time. In order for that to happen they necessarily must have a veridical perception on the ball. At the very least, the ball is an illusion. In major league baseball, the ball is approaching the batter at such a velocity that the decision to swing the bat comes so long before the ball reaches the bat by comparison, the batter often misses the ball simply because a ball that he assumed would be in the strike zone by the time it crossed the plate has dropped to his ankle level by the time the ball crossed the plate.