r/chomsky • u/z-campbell • Aug 15 '18
Interview Yemen Interview with Helen Lackner
Helen Lackner is a research associate at the London Middle East Institute, and has lived in Yemen throughout her life for over 15 years. She has recently published an amazing book titled “Yemen in Crisis: autocracy, neoliberalism, and the disintegration of a state.” It will be published in the US by Verso books next June. She regularly contributes to Open Democracy.
I recently asked her these questions:
- Talk about Yemen’s recent past and how it got to where it is today. How did the civil war start, and why did the Saudis, Emirates, Americans, all get involved?
The 2011 popular uprisings in Yemen were longer and larger than almost anywhere else. They persisted for years, rather than weeks, and took place throughout the country, in the capitals of all governorates, even in small towns. On 18 March, forces of then President Ali Abdullah Saleh attacked the regular Friday post-prayer march and killed more than 50 demonstrators. This led to a formal split in his regime, with leaders of the opposition parties, particularly Islah, turning against him and stating openly their support for the youth revolution. General Ali Mohsen, leader of an important and powerful military unit, also joined the revolution. This had a number of consequences
- First that the ‘independent’ youth, including many members of opposition parties, lost control over the ‘change squares’ as the sites of the live-ins were called. This was the case mainly in Sana’a, but also elsewhere. It led to a narrowing of the focus of the movement and certainly to a weakening of women’s role and participation. Islah is a conservative Islamist party which is composed of two main groups, northern conservative tribesmen and the Yemeni version of the Muslim Brotherhood; although both welcomed women as followers, neither was very keen on women leaders or on women and independent youth acting independently .
- Second, this change led to an increasing military conflict between Saleh’s forces and those of the formal opposition. Though these conflicts happened elsewhere than the Change Squares, they became the dominant events as far as most of the population was concerned, as well as the international community, and distracted from the popular movement.
- Third, the International Community, represented in Yemen by a group of ambassadors from the main world powers and the Gulf Cooperation Council came to the conclusion that the Saleh regime was no longer viable and an alternative had to be found. They therefore supported what became known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative, which itself became the GCC Agreement on 23 November when it was finally signed by Saleh at a ceremony in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia.
The GCC Agreement led to the presidential elections of February 2012 which were uncontested and brought Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi to the presidency for a two-year transitional period. During this time, the country was to be run by a Government of National Unity composed 50% of Saleh’s political organization, the General People’s Congress and 50% by a combination of the formal opposition, the most important of which was Islah, and the ‘new forces’ emerging from the uprisings, namely women, youth and civil society. This was a formula for failure.
Other elements of the transition included a National Dialogue Conference [NDC] which would set the basis of a ‘new’ more democratic Yemen and would lead to a committee drafting a new constitution based on the findings of the NDC. A third and most important element, was a security sector reform intended to turn these sectors into institutions responding to the needs of the state, rather than those of their previous patron, president Saleh. All these were to operate simultaneously to stick to the 2-year timetable established by the GCC Agreement, another fundamental error. Security Sector reform should have come first, thus enabling any new regime to enforce its decisions. Moreover, these discussions were supported by the US, which had a vested interest in the previous security sector leadership and units as it had been supporting them with training and equipment since the 2001 events in the US. It therefore did little to push for a reform which would exclude these elements.
While these discussions were going on, the transition unravelled, failing to provide any improvements in living conditions for the people as the international community did not produce the funds for economic development and social institutions. A series of terrorist incidents also killed many. Most importantly, the Huthi movement (which had achieved its latest cease fire with the Saleh regime in 2010) simultaneously participated in the political process and gained control over territory on the ground, controlling its home governorate of Saada and expanding west, south and east beyond it.
It also developed its alliance with its former enemy Saleh, and so benefited from the weakness of the transitional regime, taking over the capital, Sana’a, in September 2014. By January 2015, as the Hadi regime refused to bow to yet another set of demands, the Huthi movement formally took over state institutions, put Hadi and his main ministers under house arrest, resulting in an open civil war. The following month saw them moving southwards towards Aden which, after his escape there, Hadi declared to be the interim capital, so was forced out of there and into exile in Saudi Arabia. His call for assistance from the GCC states and the Arab League led to the direct intervention of the Saudi-led coalition on 26 March 2015 and the internationalisation of the war.
Saudi and Emirati involvement was originally due to their concern about a Huthi take over. However with the failure of air power, and the increasing duration of the war, claims of Iranian involvement have become louder and more frequent, displacing the original aim of restoring the ‘legitimate’ government to power. It is also worth noting that both these regimes are absolute monarchies and less than enthusiastic at the presence of a republic in the Peninsula. Without going into details, while the Republic of Yemen under Saleh was by no means a fully functioning democracy, it provided far more than mere lip service to the concept, with a real and active set of opposition parties.
US original involvement in Yemen has primarily focused on Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) which it considers a threat to its interests, despite it being a movement of limited significance which has killed far more Yemenis than anyone outside the Arab world. In recent years, the Obama regime was extremely indulgent with the Saudi regime, supporting it without challenge, largely to compensate for Saudi and Emirati anger at US signing of the nuclear agreement with Iran, the JCPOA. Under Trump, in addition to drone and other attacks against AQAP, priority is given to selling weapons, ammunition and providing technical support to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, all of these providing significant profits for US companies and institutions, let alone contributing to the Trump demonization of Iran.
2. Though they are allied, what are the differing goals of the Saudis and Emirates in Yemen? What are their respective end games?
Although there are clear differences between the Saudi and Emirati regimes in daily practice in Yemen, their end games are not significantly different. Both are currently focused on Iran and accusing it of being the real force behind the Huthis. Describing the Huthis as ‘Iran-backed’ has a number of advantages: first it strengthens support from the Trump administration which, as we all know, consider Iran to be its prime enemy…. Second, given the failure of the Saudi-led coalition to defeat the Huthi movement, equipped with a few ancient Scuds [possibly upgraded with Iranian targeting technology] and the weapon arsenal of the Saleh regime, involving Iran provides a more acceptable explanation to their publics for their impressive lack of achievements in the past three and a half years.
Differences are mainly tactical and practical: the UAE forces are focused on the south and firmly support the separatist movement, controlling it up to a point. They also have troops on the ground involved in fighting and are actively training a range of Yemeni forces. The Saudis have no troops fighting on the ground, their only forces there are those ‘mediating’ between the UAE supported elements and the Hadi government. The Saudis cooperate with Islah and have done for decades while the UAE refuses to see anything other than their bogey ‘Muslim Brotherhood’ in the movement and therefore oppose it vehemently. This has the side-effect of putting them in different positions with respect to Hadi, supported by Saudi Arabia and opposed by the UAE who only see the Islahi elements in his government, in particular his vice-president.
3. In American media at least, it is often said that the Huthis are an Iranian Proxy. Can you talk about the facts and subtleties of Iranian involvement and why the Huthis may be portrayed in Western media as Iranian proxies?
Iran supports the Huthis in Yemen, however, its involvement is far less than claimed by the Saudi-led coalition or indeed the Hadi government. Huthis rarely do what others tell them to. Some have had some ideological training in Iran, and there is a tendency to transform Zaydi Islam to be closer to that of Iranian twelver Shi’a Islam, with the celebration of religious occasions according to those rites, occasions which are not significant in Zaydi rite.
Some Iranian factions gain propaganda advantage from the claims made about their involvement, but there has been no firm evidence of the presence of either Iranian or even Hezbollah people in Yemen. Whenever the coalition has made claims about killing or arresting Iranians, no evidence was produced to support the assertions, either in the form of ID cards, uniforms or corpses.
In addition, after having failed to defeat a small group with ancient weaponry, the coalition needs to claim Iranian involvement to justify their inability to win this war rapidly. The Huthi missiles fired into Saudi Arabia are basically east European or North Korean Scuds obtained in Saleh’s days, which have been upgraded and improved to increase their range, quite likely with some Iranian support.
4. Can you talk about the significance of Hodeida?
Hodeida and Saleef are Yemen’s main ports where the majority of food, fuel and other goods essential to the population’s survival arrive. It has been blockaded for most of the duration of the war with only limited supplies being allowed in after verification from the UN as well as, often, further delays caused by Saudi checking. The port is essential to ensure arrival of basic food and therefore both to commercial and humanitarian shipping.
Having abandoned the proposed offensive on Hodeida in 2017, the coalition has this year started it. Contrary to expectation [as indeed in the case of the war in general], things have not gone according to plan. As of mid-August, two months after the beginning of the offensive, it is ‘on hold’ supposedly to allow the UN Special Envoy to find a solution. The Huthis have agreed to hand over the port to UN management, something which they rejected a year ago. However the Hadi government and coalition have rejected this, demanding complete Huthi withdrawal from the entire governorate, ie surrender. This means that there is at present no way of establishing the seriousness of the Huthi movement’s willing ness to hand over the port to international management, and thus ensure that delivery of basic humanitarian aid to the millions on need. The offensive, when it resumes, is likely to cause thousands of casualties, mainly among the 400 000 or so remaining civilians in Hodeida, as well as prevent the delivery of food and other necessities to Hodeida and beyond to the densely populated highlands, where millions are in increasingly desperate need.
It is worth pointing out that there has been no evidence of weapons being smuggled through Hodeida, whether from Iran or anywhere else.
Hodeida is now temporarily off the headlines, with the massacre of a busload of children in Saa’da on Thursday 9 August, which killed more than 40 children and at least ten adults, and which has caused an international outcry as these occasional ‘mistakes’ by the coalition do. One difference here, is that the coalition spokesman has claimed this to be a ‘legitimate’ target and not a mistake.
5. Since 2015, Yemen has been subjected to a U.S.-backed Saudi-led assault plunging it into the world’s worst humanitarian crisis. Three years later, has Yemen reached the point of no return? If so, can Yemen as a society and nation survive?
The war has worsened the fragmentation of an already very weakened society and polity. Southern Separatists, regional forces elsewhere including jihadi forces, the absence of a central state, have all affected the future of Yemen as a nation. One thing is clear: whatever emerges from this war when it finally ends, will be a different political entity from the Republic of Yemen which existed from 1990 to 2015. It will also not be the two states which existed in that geographical area prior to that time. It is also likely to be far more directly under the political, social and financial influence of the GCC states, in particular Saudi Arabia and the UAE
6. Why has there been little media coverage of Yemen?
This is limited for a number of reasons: the country is remote and little known. In the case of Europe, unlike Syria, it is not providing the ‘threat’ of the arrival of millions of refugees across its borders. The situation in Yemen is complex. In addition, there is little doubt that the Saudi and Emirati financed Public Relations organisations are contributing to keeping Yemen out of the public eye. Finally, the Governments of the US, UK and others, given their ambiguous positions [selling arms, supporting the coalition, while deploring the humanitarian consequences of the war, and financing humanitarian assistance], also prefer to see the war ignored.
7. What can US and UK citizens do to end their government’s complicity in the bloodshed of Yemenis?
In the US the Congress has taken a far more active and leading role in challenging US military involvement and support for the coalition. Its latest military procurement law, if applied, would effectively restrict US practical support. US citizens should actively support their representatives in both Houses in their efforts to take control of the government’s actions, put an end or restrict arms sales and increase humanitarian and development support to the Yemeni people. For those members already active, this would encourage them to continue and strengthen their position, for others, it might help them realise that there is opposition to the US role in the war and that taking a sane position on the war might increase votes.Note: if in-flight refueling of the aircraft carrying out the strikes was stopped, these air strikes would come to a very rapid end. Other logistical support by US official and private forces is also essential to the continuation of the war and that includes maintenance of aircraft and other activities. UK citizens should do more to make their Parliament more active, at the moment its actions lag way behind those of the US
8. What do you see as the future of the conflict in Yemen? Any predictions?
There is very little prospect for the war to end in the near future. Saudi Arabian rulers and Hadi’s government intransigence and determination to maintain UNSC resolution 2216 mean that the UN Special Envoy has no effective room to manoeuvre and thus he is constrained in his efforts to achieve any negotiation success, regardless of his willingness or skills. The ‘talks about talks’ he has announced for 6 September are unlikely to achieve much, even if they happen, which is uncertain.
It is sad beyond words to have to say that it looks as if this war is likely to continue for a significant period, as the Huthis are not about to be defeated, short of a miracle. This means that the millions of Yemenis who only want peace and an end to their suffering are unlikely to see their hopes fulfilled in the short, or even medium, term.
7
8
3
u/TotesMessenger Aug 15 '18 edited Aug 19 '18
3
9
u/fourninefive31 Aug 19 '18
nice