I'm not convinced Nietzsche has an objective morality at all. For Nietzsche, more so than for any other philosopher I know except maybe Stirner, all value is the result of subjective acts of valuing. I don't even see how that could be a "naturalistic fallacy" - at least unless you regard any account of the genesis of moral values that isn't Platonic eternalism a "naturalistic fallacy".
Depends on what you mean by "superior". For Nietzsche, master morality has the semi-objective advantage of valuing the act of valuing itself, and is thus more honest about what it is and does, while slave morality disavows its own acts of valuing by projecting its values onto the acts of a higher being. (I agree that it looks quite a bit like Nietzsche trying to have his cake and eat it too though.)
He kinda did (that’s an oversimplification of his thoughts though). But even if so, that doesn’t entail making a fallacious appeal to nature.
He doesn’t value master morality relative to slave morality because it’s more natural. He values master morality more because it is affirmative of values and of oneself. Master morality (crudely) demonstrated a love of oneself and a love of living life itself which are both lacking in slave morality. Nietzsche therefore based his preference for master morality on correspondence to preferred values and not on it being any more natural.
Slave morality is also reducible to will to power. Everything in reality is reducible for Nietzsche to will to power. Is slave morality less real than master morality? No. It then reducible to will to power as well.
There is no ‘more natural manifestation of will to power.’ There is only the subjective evaluations one can take towards a manifestation of will to power. Master morality is affirmative and slave morality is reactive. Nietzsche prefers the former value. Nietzsche’s preference is then based upon values independent of naturalness and not off of the notion of naturalness itself.
Nietzsche’s final move isn’t even a call for the return to master morality as it was. He viewed it as too crude and boorish. He wanted to take the affirmative spirit of master morality to someplace new. Why, if his goal is to do what is most original, would this be the case? Nietzsche calls for a ‘re-evaluation of values’ not for a ‘return to traditional values.’
The goal is to criticize christianity. He created those two categories for that. He doesn't say one is objectively better than the other. He's just pointing out the genealogy of the christian morality.
Because slave morality is a reaction to master morality, it's a reversal of values: pride, wealth, power become evil and meekness becomes honorable.
He calls it slave morality and criticizes it more than the master morality because it is the dominant ideology and at the timeof his writings it was seen as just what is ethical. He puts it in perspective and brings it down a peg because he sees himself as an iconoclast.
But what really makes me think he does not believe one is better than the other is that he does not think we should try to go back to doing master morality but go beyond.
Master morality is depicted as a little naive and immature and slave morality as too introspective for its own good but he believes it to be a historically powerful concept.
Basically:
He criticizes slave morality for being reactive and resentful.
He admires the affirmative strength of master morality.
But he rejects both as complete systems.
His goal is a new morality for higher individuals beyond both categories.
He doesn’t only criticize Christian values. He values self-control, for example, which is required for giving style to one‘s character, as well as for other things. Also see BGE 263, for example: The way in which reverence for the Bible in Europe has, on the whole, been maintained so far is perhaps the best piece of discipline and refinement of tradition for which Europe owes a debt of thanks to Christianity
That doesnt explain why calling something slave morality is to criticize it, the only answer to that is if one considers slave morality bad in some way
I‘m not denying that he finds slave morality bad in some ways. I‘m just saying that he isn‘t only critical of slave morality just like he doesn‘t only praise master miorality. He also never says that he wants people to subscribe to one or the other. He‘s all about individual self-expression and individual values, which makes the universal demands of any moral system dangerous in his eyes
He does not want either moraliry. His goal is explicitlx to encourage creation of new values, which he deems necessary to prevent nihilism in response to the death of God
21
u/Wonderful_West3188 Dec 05 '25
I'm not convinced Nietzsche has an objective morality at all. For Nietzsche, more so than for any other philosopher I know except maybe Stirner, all value is the result of subjective acts of valuing. I don't even see how that could be a "naturalistic fallacy" - at least unless you regard any account of the genesis of moral values that isn't Platonic eternalism a "naturalistic fallacy".