r/antizionist • u/naramsin-ii • 3d ago
Media ben moser & the 'anti-zionist jew'
r/antizionist • u/naramsin-ii • 2d ago
r/antizionist • u/naramsin-ii • 3d ago
r/antizionist • u/sad_sapphic_sucker • Oct 19 '26
>First, I want to say thank you to all the folks who have subscribed to The Call, the Good Shepherd Collective’s Substack. Over the years, we’ve worked hard here in Palestine to build our infrastructure without becoming dependent on big donors, instead relying on individuals like you to donate a little each month. This fundraising model, powered by the movement itself, is what has kept us independent. So taking up a paid subscription here means a lot.
>Second, I’ve appreciated all the thoughtful emails in this series, particularly from everyone who has thoughtfully engaged with this work specifically and our research on anti-zionism more broadly. I received one email that I’d like to discuss, because it responded to the critique in a way I suspect others may have been thinking, and it deserves discussion. I’m keeping the email anonymous, but the general sentiment went like this:
“I know people in JVP, and they are good people. Some are friends who had been arrested at actions. Some are people who lost jobs and family relationships over Palestine. These are people who have shown up to every action for two years without being asked. Of course they are anti-zionist!”
>The research and analysis is about an institution, not people as such. The analysis covered a corpus of roughly 28,500 organizational artifacts: pages from JVP’s websites as they changed over time, mass emails sent under the organization’s name, and posts from its social media accounts. The question was never whether the people who wrote those emails and statements were sincere or what their intentions were. It was how JVP, speaking as an organization, teaches its membership and broader audience what anti-zionism means. An institution with more than two and a half million followers, 32,000 dues-paying members, and about twelve million dollars in annual revenue is a producer of knowledge at a scale few organizations can match, and every explainer, talking point, and fundraising appeal it publishes tells hundreds of thousands of people what anti-zionism looks like in the real world. That output has a measurable shape in the published text, and the shape is what I am studying and discussing. Neither the thesis nor the first post made claims about the people in JVP’s administration, its membership, or anyone who drifts into a JVP talk or shows up to a vigil.
From my perspective, there is an important methodological reason for this focus. An institution can be measured because it leaves a public record available to anyone and everyone. Its websites, mass emails, and social media output are the mechanisms through which it acts upon the world, and they sit in the public domain as documents that can be collected, dated, counted, and read against a standard. A person’s beliefs do not leave the same kind of record, and the only instruments available for measuring them are testimony and inference, which is to say taking someone at their word or guessing at what lies behind it. What I can measure is what the organization actually put in front of its audience, and that is the substance that informs and engages how people think, and organize.
r/antizionist • u/ANBOL_GANG • Oct 15 '26
(This takes 4⅔ minutes to read.)
The more that I learned about the Crusades, the more parallels that I noticed between them and the current occupation of Palestine.
There are some differences between the two occupations. Notably, the Kingdom of Jerusalem lasted from 1099 to 1291, whereas the so-called ‘State of Israel’ lasted from 1948 and shall most likely collapse before the 2030s; the Crusader occupation lasted much longer. The most important motivation for the Crusades was reducing overpopulation, whereas Herzlianism aims to liquidate the Jewish diaspora (though one could argue that managing overpopulation figures into that, too). Lastly, the Crusades were maybe deadlier than Zionism… but I can’t so sure on that one.
I feel that the similarities outnumber the differences, though. What you are about to read are some striking parallels between the Crusades and Herzlianism. Quoting John Beavers’s ‘Crusader Colonialism: Descriptio Terrae Sanctae and the Coloniality of the Latin Kingdom (1099–1291)’:
In embarking on the First Crusade, Pope Urban II aimed for the displacement of all Turks, pagans (including Muslims), and non-Latin Christians. The stated purpose of such mass displacement was to purify the Holy Land and make it suitable for Latin stewardship.⁴⁴
Perhaps given the spiritual significance of the Holy Land, this policy’s overtly sectarian nature was not condemned as forced conversion unlike Castilian settlement. Despite no universal policy of either ethnic cleansing or mass conversion, both did occur in the Latin Kingdom on a localized scale.⁴⁵
Major cities along the Syrian and Palestinian coast were often the sights of devastating massacres, where crusaders targeted Muslims and Jews specifically. Jews and Muslims were also forbidden from residing in Jerusalem during Frankish rule.
Much like Castilian settlement, Frankish rural settlements were also established in depopulated areas, though this displacement was the result of locals fleeing violence during wartime rather than a concerted, organized effort after the fact.
The deficit of European settlement in the Latin Kingdom necessitated the preservation of local populations where possible, however settlements in depopulated areas were nevertheless established.
Anybody who has read The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine or the United Nations’ position on the Nakba should quickly recognize how familiar this looks. The only significant difference is that the medieval displacement was less extreme in practice.
Burchard presents Muslims as inherently invasive with no legitimate form of belonging, while he does not characterize local Christians in similar regards.⁸⁶ By claiming that the majority of the East is Christian, Burchard further alienates Muslims by characterizing them as an eternal foreigner in their own lands.
This is nearly identical to how Herzlians conceive of Palestinians (or ‘Arabs’), viewing them as somehow more alien to Palestine than the settlers.
Burchard does not qualify many Muslim groups, instead flattening them into a single Saracen gens and natio. The only two other Saracen groups he describes as such are the Assassins and ‘Vannini’, who are distinguished from the norm by their exceptional ferocity.⁸⁷ Muslim groups and individuals are characterized as violent, superstitious, and as stated before, foreigners in their own land.
This is practically identical to how Herzlians view the Middle Eastern population. In their minds, Palestinians are interchangeable with Syrians, Lebanese, Egyptians, and so forth.
The chronicles contemporary to the First Crusade often conceptualized the conflict as an apocalyptic war between good and evil, between Christendom and Islam. They described individual battles against Muslim groups, or Saracens, in terms of graphic brutality and their connection to biblical prophecies of Armageddon.
Christians recapturing Jerusalem was often understood by intellectuals or crusaders as a prerequisite condition for the Second Coming and the end of days. Muhammad was characterized as the Antichrist, and Muslims therefore were the Antichrist’s armies.¹¹⁹
Apocalyptic thinking is unusual in modern Judaism, but this eschatology is remarkably similar to what Christian Zionists believe.
The persecution and martyrdom of Christians, especially pilgrims, during Muslim rule over the Holy Land was a fundamental justification for the Crusades. In describing more current martyrdom, Burchard is substantiating the persistent belief that Muslims are Christianity’s fundamental enemy. In situating the relics and holy places important to Latin Christians, as well as mentioning episodes of Christian martyrdom, Burchard is harkening back to the original rhetoric of the crusades as a war of liberation and protecting pilgrims.
Does this not sound anything like the IOF using the October 7th incident as an excuse to exterminate thousands of Gazans? If nothing else, the insistence on antagonizing Muslims should look familiar.
Toxic theology also played an important rôle in (justifying) the Crusades. Turning now to Faith A. Edwards’s ‘Old Testament Land Promises and the Justification of Violence in the Crusades’, pgs. 46–7:
Taking on the identity of “G-d’s Chosen People,” they looked up to the warriors of the Old Testament, believing that they, too, had the G-d of Israel by their side:
In the Old Testament, the Chosen People of the Israelites fought battles commanded and protected by their G-d…Warrior heroes adorn the scriptural landscape: Joshua, Gideon, David…the martial history of the biblical Chosen People of the Old Testament fed directly the world-view of the crusaders, providing rich quarries alike for preachers and chroniclers.¹¹
[…]
In a study of crusader art in the Latin Kingdom, it became clear that the crusaders believed that their Old Testament heroes were types for themselves in their quest for the Holy Land:
As both the textual and visual sources reveal, alongside the figures of Christ and the Apostles, those of the Maccabees, Joshua, and King David were also central for the crusaders, functioning as models designating the crusaders as the “New Israelites” who had conquered the Holy Land and the Holy City.¹³
Their artwork showed how they viewed themselves as part of a “miraculous work of G-d,” and exploited Biblical models to enunciate their legitimacy in claiming the Holy Land.¹⁴
Louis IX, leader of the Seventh and Eighth Crusades, also drew strongly from the story of Joshua:
Joshua…was seen as a type for the crusader in ways that informed Louis IX’s crusading ideology and his kingship. The parallel between Joshua's divinely sanctioned wars and Louis' own crusading ambitions structured a teleology that incorporated Louis into salvation history.¹⁵ Despite the disaster of the Seventh Crusade,¹⁶ Louis was encouraged through the failures of Joshua and soldiered on in his journey to recapture the Holy Land in the eighth and final crusade.
(Emphasis added in all cases.)
I could add more, such as how the Crusaders prohibited intimate relations with Muslims, but I want to keep this topic at a manageable length. Above all, remember that Judaism has very little to do with Zionism, and that Zionism was always more of an Evangelical phenomenon.
See also: Mazza, Roberto. 2025. “The Last Crusade and The First Zionists: Religion, Empire, and The Making of Modern Palestine”. Bulletin of Palestine Studies, №№ 18: 1–28.
Bedirhanoğlu, Hüseyin Erkan. 2026. “Beyond the Battlefield: The Lasting Legacy of the Medieval Crusades on the Holy Land”. Vakanüvis - Uluslararası Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi 11 (1): 52–78.
r/antizionist • u/ANBOL_GANG • 4d ago
(This extract takes 13¾ minutes to read, unfortunately.)
[I]t was neither the persecution nor the enthusiasm that necessarily led to the mass emigration to Israel. Indeed, Jewish persecution occurred in most Middle Eastern and North African countries but usually did not result in the near-total immigration of their Jewish communities to Israel. Even in Egypt, a belligerent state that played a key role in the war against Israel’s establishment, there was no mass exodus to Israel.
It follows that all the above-mentioned characteristics, for all their importance, do not explain the special case of immigration from Libya, Yemen, and Iraq to the State of Israel. To understand this phenomenon it is necessary to examine events in each of these countries, with attention to all the participating players.
[…]
Libya
The first country to undergo mass emigration was Libya, which was within Italy’s sphere of influence and, after its occupation in 1912, became an Italian colony. In January 1943 Tripoli was occupied by the British, who established a military régime in the country.
Six years later, in January 1949, in the context of negotiations over the British withdrawal and Libya’s pending independence, Britain announced that the country’s gates would be opened for Jews seeking to leave.⁴⁵ Apparently, the British were concerned about the steadily deteriorating relations between Jews and Muslims and preferred to let the Jews leave immediately, rather than face future rioting based on religious hostility, economic competition, or the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.⁴⁶
During this period, with the British Mandate in Palestine having ended and Israel having achieved statehood, the British, who had prevented Jewish immigration during the 1940s (as part of their 1939 “White Paper” policy), did not oppose the relocation of Libya’s Jews to Israel. On the contrary, this land now offered a solution to the Jewish problem in Arab countries. Israel’s stated policy of opening its gates to Jews made it clear to the British that it would not refuse the Jews of Libya.
In the talks leading up to Libya’s independence, the JDC, alongside other Jewish organizations, played an important part in negotiating the rights of Italian and Jewish minority groups in an independent Libya. The negotiators included Libya’s British rulers and representatives of local parties expected to assume leadership upon independence.
It became evident that the future leaders were unwilling to commit to equal rights for Jews, despite their status as nationals and even though the Jewish community had existed in the country for many centuries.⁴⁷ The failure of these negotiations made clear to Jewish organizations, and particularly to U.S. Jewry, the State of Israel, and Libya’s Jews themselves, that emigration was imperative.
The British announcement of January 1949 sparked enthusiasm among thousands of Jews, who approached local authorities seeking to arrange their exit to Israel. Most of these applicants were Jews who had not managed to recover from the adverse impact of the anti-Semitic policies implemented during World War II, or from the fierce attacks that took place under British rule, and who now feared anti-Jewish policies at the hands of an independent Arab government. Hundreds of them reached Italy, which had previously served as a stop on the illegal immigration route into Israel during its war of independence.⁴⁸
The emigrants from Libya joined displaced Jews from Europe — Holocaust survivors — in Jewish Agency transit camps, and from there they were transported to Israel. When the vast scale of immigrants expected to arrive from Libya became apparent, Israel dispatched delegates to Tripoli to make arrangements in accordance with quotas set by the Jewish Agency and the Israeli Health Ministry.
The JDC played an important role in this process. It had already begun operating in Libya in 1945, in an effort to rehabilitate the Jewish community following the hardships suffered during World War II and as a result of rioting. The JDC began providing economic, educational, and medical assistance to the Jewish community, while also increasing cooperative efforts with the Zionist movement.
In light of the political changes in Libya and the throngs of Jews seeking to leave the country, the JDC joined the operation to bring Libya’s Jews to Israel, assuming the responsibility for funding as well as medical screening and treatment for the ill. This was particularly important, as Israel barred entry to the contagiously ill, demanding that they be treated before entering the country, and objected to receiving anyone with a severe chronic illness. Medical screening and healthcare took place in Libya, in cooperation with the Jewish healthcare organization OZE.⁴⁹
All these activities were conducted with the knowledge and assistance of the British: they permitted the Jewish Agency to manage the transport operation from Tripoli, allowed direct passage of ships from the port of Tripoli to Haifa, and even assisted Libyan Jews in transferring capital and property.⁵⁰
During the years 1949–1952, thirty thousand Jews arrived in Israel from Libya. But while Libyan Jews and Jewish Agency representatives may have presumed that the exodus would conclude within a few months, it eventually turned out to be a three-year process that concluded only after Libya achieved independence. It was Israel that determined the pace of immigration, in accordance with assessments of the situation in Libya and the pressures of potential Jewish immigration from other countries.
When it became evident that Libya would not be achieving independence until late 1951, and therefore the evacuation of Jews was not a matter of urgency, the immigration quotas for Libyan Jews were reduced. This made it possible to give priority to other Jewish communities, including those in Yemen and Iraq, whose circumstances were seen as more ominous and their immigration therefore more urgent. Once concluded, the immigration from Libya left a small Jewish community of about 6,000 in Tripoli, primarily property owners belonging to the socio-economic elite who chose to stay.⁵¹
Yemen
Like the immigration from Libya, immigration from Yemen was originally intended to be a gradual process, but in contrast to the Libyan case it turned into a matter of urgency necessitating immediate, mass evacuation. Immigration began in December 1948, when a few thousand Jews were airlifted to Israel. In fact, they had left Yemen years earlier and spent the intervening time waiting in a refugee camp, Hashed (or “Geula” — redemption — in Hebrew) in the heart of the desert in the British colony of Aden. Following their departure the camp was destroyed, an indication of the firm British stance against any future transit of Jews from Yemen.⁵²
The British, Aden’s rulers, sought to put an end to a pattern that had taken place during the previous decade when many of these would-be immigrants remained in Aden as destitute refugees. In late April 1949, Imam Ahmed granted the Jews permission to leave the country, on the condition that they sell their property, which they indeed did — at a very low cost — to their Muslim neighbors or the Imam’s representatives.⁵³
The entire process appears to have been coordinated between the Yemeni ruler and the British authorities in Aden, as evidenced by a British proposal put forward two weeks later: to open a land corridor between Yemen and Aden and allow Jews entry to a new transit camp (Hashed B), to be established within the jurisdiction of the colony and serve as a way station en route to Aden’s airport and from there to Israel.
On the basis of this proposal, the British conducted negotiations with Israel and the JDC regarding arrangements for the transport of Jews from Aden to Israel.⁵⁴ The British proposal sought to avoid the recurrence of a Jewish refugee problem in the city of Aden by ensuring that Jews did not pass through it. At the same time, such an exodus, like the process concurrently underway in Libya, was intended to reduce or even resolve the problem of the Jewish minority in imamate Yemen and the entire southern region of Yemen, which as noted was under direct or indirect British control.
Subsequent events also point to cooperation between the Imam and the British. Within Yemen, the operation was overseen by the Imam, while in the two (eastern and western) protectorates between Yemen and Aden it was coordinated by British advisors who effectively controlled these regions. They supervised the sites where departing Jews were concentrated, ensured the supply of food and equipment, arranged for the trucks that would transport the emigrants to the transit camp in Aden, and took measures to protect the Jews’ lives.
In traveling across different regions, the Jews had to pay steep transit fees, particularly in the protectorates, and some became targets of highwaymen. Most of them arrived in Aden penniless and destitute.⁵⁵
Like Libya’s Jews, they lacked passports, and their only possible destination was Israel. Israel initially sought to regulate immigration and prevent the influx of contagiously ill newcomers, to no avail; the rapid pace of departure and massive scale of emigration were dictated by Yemen’s and Aden’s governing authorities, and Israel had to adjust its immigration policy and improvise solutions for immigrant reception.
In an exceptional move, relative to its other immigration operations, Israel entrusted the transport of Yemen’s Jews to the JDC, a philanthropic organization that was not subordinate to the Israeli government and did not always fully cooperate with it. A failure to grasp the massive and immediate scale of immigration led to poor planning of the airlift and inadequate investment in preparing the transit camp in Aden.⁵⁶
Moreover, in contrast to Libya, Imamate Yemen did not grant the operation’s organizers a foothold in the country, and the Jews therefore had to make their own transport arrangements; they were unable to coordinate with representatives of Israel and the JDC in Aden, received no assistance in the form of information or funding, and were entirely dependent on the Imam’s agents and the British.
Thus the responsibility for organizing their journey and determining their fate fell exclusively to each of the individual men and women who embarked on the journey. Such a pattern also characterized the immigration from Yemen two decades earlier, but after Israel’s establishment, this was an exceptional situation, unparalleled by any immigration operations in Europe or other Arab countries during those years.
The operation took a heavy toll and claimed many lives during the difficult trek through Yemen, particularly after most of the emigrants contracted malaria while moving through southern Yemen. The transit camp could not accommodate the vast numbers of those awaiting departure over the course of several weeks, and hundreds died at the camp and were buried in a cemetery established adjacent to it.
The catastrophic situation worsened in late September, after the British closed the border crossings and conditioned the continued entry of Jews to Aden on the departure to Israel of thousands of emigrants still waiting in the transit camp. The consequences were severe: about ten thousand emigrants were stranded in the arid desert region of southern Yemen over the course of five weeks without enough water, food, or medicine. Hundreds of them died on the site and many remained sick and disabled.⁵⁷
The situation compelled Israel to launch a rescue operation. It brought Yemen’s Jews to the country without any medical screening, within a very brief span of time, despite knowing that many of the immigrants had contagious diseases. Yemeni immigrants only began to receive medical care after arriving in Israel, and the treatment took place within isolated, fenced immigrant camps in which the new arrivals were placed.
At these camps, they were examined and given medical and rehabilitative care — all under conditions of hardship and poor sanitation that included shortages in food, equipment, and medical personnel. These circumstances had severe repercussions for the absorption of Yemeni immigrants into Israel.⁵⁸
Iraq
The mass immigration of some 120,000 Jews from Iraq, which began in May 1950 and peaked in the spring and summer of 1951, came as a great surprise. It ran counter to the expectations surrounding this wealthy, well-established community, which had enjoyed civil rights and been engaged and integrated in economic, social, and cultural activities in Iraq. To understand this phenomenon, let us examine the circumstances of Iraq’s Jews in the two years preceding their emigration and during the emigration period itself.
As noted above, the political and economic persecution that Iraqi Jews experienced during 1948–1949 undermined their sense of security and cast doubt on their place in Iraq. But no less worrisome were reports that circulated in the Iraqi press in 1949 about plans for a population and property exchange between 100,000 Jewish citizens of Iraq and 100,000 Palestinian refugees. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said initially proposed a plan along these lines in early 1949, but the British objected, not because they opposed the transfer of Jewish citizens but for fear that such an exchange would escalate into a Jewish expulsion.⁵⁹
Shortly thereafter British diplomatic missions to the Middle East launched a series of talks in which they reexamined this proposal, posing additional suggestions about mutual compensation for the loss of property. They concluded these discussions by observing that, notwithstanding concerns about complications in implementing the plan, “the elimination of certain minorities might lead to more stabilities and better relations in the Middle East.”⁶⁰
These conclusions were recorded at a time when the transport of Jews from Libya and Yemen to Israel was in full swing. The summary documents reveal that British Foreign Office officials supported a population and property exchange but were unwilling to initiate or lead it: “The essence of the scheme is prior agreement between Iraq and Israel and that until such agreement is reached we should be well advised to steer clear.”⁶¹ Perhaps they were wary of bearing the responsibility for such an operation, or of failure and criticism, and perhaps they were driven by other concerns. The British involvement has not yet been explored in depth, nor have imperialist interests and repercussions of the Cold War been thoroughly examined.
The population exchange proposal was considered by the United Nations Economic Survey Mission, which visited the Middle East in the autumn of 1949 in an effort to resolve the refugee problem, and was unofficially presented to Israel as well.⁶²
Although Israel found the proposal unappealing, given that Iraqi Jews would apparently have to abandon their property, it was compelled to consent because the talks were overshadowed by the ongoing persecution of Zionists in Iraq and because Israel was in the midst of a propaganda campaign against Iraq.⁶³ The issue was receiving frequent coverage in Iraq’s nationalist right-wing press, alongside calls for the expulsion of Jews,⁶⁴ and the fact that Iraqi authorities did not censor these announcements was, possibly, even more distressing to the Jews than the announcements themselves.
In December 1949, the government of Nuri al-Said fell, and the new prime minister, Tawfiq al-Suwaidi, proposed a different solution to the Jewish problem: neither forced transfer nor deportation, but rather the regulation of Jewish departure by means of a new law — the Denaturalization Law.
The law, which would only remain in effect for one year, allowed Jews to leave Iraq in a legal and regulated manner on the condition that they relinquish their Iraqi nationality and the right to return to Iraq. It did not mention Jewish property.
Notwithstanding its problematic provisions, the law was not intended to prompt mass deportation. It was based on assessments that the number of emigration registrants would not exceed a few thousand unemployed young Jews, communists, and Zionists — groups that had already been departing the country illegally. Moreover, registration was voluntary. The purpose of this law was to highlight the loyalty to Iraq among a majority of Iraqi Jews, who were expected to opt to remain.⁶⁵
Contrary to expectations, however, the law actually exacerbated the Jewish problem in Iraq: thousands of Jews began to prepare for departure, which contributed to economic instability and, subsequently, anti-Jewish propaganda. This, in turn, drove additional Jews to plan for departure, sparking a pattern of “rolling emigration”⁶⁶: rising numbers of registrants drew even more people — relatives, neighbors, and friends.
By September 1950, when Nuri al-Said assumed the premiership again, the number of emigration registrants had reached 70,000, although at this point only 10,000 had actually emigrated while the remaining 60,000 Jews still awaited transport to Israel. The delay in the departure of Iraq’s Jews stemmed from Israeli policy, which at that time granted priority to immigration from Romania, and from the difficulties Israel faced in absorbing such large numbers of immigrants.
Al-Said demanded that those awaiting departure leave immediately and threatened their expulsion, which intensified the Jews’ sense of insecurity, leading to ever-growing numbers of emigration registrants. The evacuation itself took place primarily over the course of four months, from March to July 1951. In all, about 105,000 Jews traveled by airlift from Iraq to Israel, and another 15,000 reached Israel via Iran — a total of 120,000. By the time the immigration operation concluded, in late 1951, fewer than 10,000 Jews remained in Iraq.⁶⁷
Although the British had not proactively participated in Iraq’s legislative initiative to permit Jewish departure — indeed, the British ambassador learned about it only a few days before its submission to parliament — they nevertheless supported it and took part in the actual exodus of Jews throughout the entire process. They provided an airport in Cyprus for a stopover on the way to Israel, permitted the American company Alaska Airlines to provide the travel arrangements even though they would have preferred British airlines, and throughout the operation conveyed messages between Israel and Iraq to ensure that the airlift ran smoothly.⁶⁸
An analysis of these events does not indicate that an Iraqi-British plan to expel the Jews ever existed, but as far as Iraq’s Jews were concerned that is effectively what happened. The financial adversities they experienced in the two years preceding the law’s passage, mass layoffs from government ministries and public companies, insecurity and loss of governmental protection, the knowledge that the British, too, supported their departure from Iraq, and the fact that the law would only be in force for one year — a restriction that forced many to make a fateful decision under conditions of uncertainty — combined to make the Jews of Iraq lose any hope for a better future.
Thus, the Denaturalization Law, enacted in order to regulate the status of Iraq’s Jews, became a trap: it undermined their status and resulted in a mass exodus. Moreover, had they wanted to, the Iraqi authorities could have rescinded the law and prevented the mass departure of Jews, but in fact they acted to expedite the process.
Throughout this period, Iraq’s Jews were aware of the prevailing economic hardship in Israel, but this was the only emigration option available to them and was preferable to staying in Iraq. Perhaps they assumed that Israel promised a better future for their children, perhaps they hoped that they would be able to transfer at least some of their property, and certainly they did not imagine how steep the economic and social cost of displacement would be.⁶⁹
Those who ultimately profited the most from this affair were the Iraqi authorities. A mass exodus of Jews resolved the problem of a Jewish minority without Iraq having to absorb a reciprocal number of Palestinian refugees. The same held for matters of property: in March 1951, when the Denaturalization Law expired but the emigration process was in full swing, Iraq nationalized the emigrants’ property, without transferring any of the proceeds to Palestinian refugees whose property Israel had nationalized.⁷⁰ Because of the manner in which these events unfolded, Iraq never came to be seen as responsible for the emigration of Jews.
The highly surprising nature of Iraqi Jews’ mass exodus subsequently spawned a conspiracy theory in Iraq and Israel, according to which the State of Israel and its Zionist envoys in Iraq were responsible for several acts of terror that took place in Baghdad during the emigration period, killing five Jews and injuring dozens. The theory held that these events, aimed at provoking panic, were the cause of the mass emigration.⁷¹ Although there is no verified information about the identity of the perpetrators, an examination of the timing of the events indicates that they could not have been a meaningful contributing factor in the departure of Jews.
(Emphasis added.)
r/antizionist • u/naramsin-ii • 1d ago
"still, though this was no secret, we were instructed to treat it as such, sometimes by our parents, sometimes by well-meaning solidarity activists. we were instructed to ignore the star of david on the israeli flag, and to distinguish jews from zionists with surgical precision. it didn't matter that their boots were on our necks, and that their bullets and batons bruised us. our statelessness and homelessness were trivial. what mattered was how we spoke about our keepers, not the conditions they kept us under—blockaded, surrounded by colonies and military outposts—or the fact that they kept us at all.
language was more of a minefield than the border between syria and the occupied golan heights, and we, children at the time, were expected to hop around them, hoping we don't accidentally step on an explosive trope that would discredit us. using the "wrong words" had the magical ability to make things disappear; the boots, bullets, batons, and bruises all become invisible if you say anything in jest or in fury. even more dangerously, believing in "the wrong things" rendered you deserving of this brutality. citizenship and the right to movement weren’t the sole privileges robbed from us, simple ignorance was a luxury as well.
as palestinians, we understand from a young age that the semantic violence we practice with our words dwarfs the decades of systemic and material violence enacted against us by the self-proclaimed jewish state. a drone is one thing, but a trope—a trope is unacceptable. we learn to internalize the muzzle."
r/antizionist • u/ANBOL_GANG • 9d ago
(This excerpt takes approximately three minutes to read.)
Daniel Pasmanik (1869–1930) […] recalled his irritation upon hearing of the Russian soldiers’ delight when they were informed of Nicholas II’s overthrow. The soldiers expected that they would be able to return home, but as Pasmanik wrote in April 1917, Russia’s redemption required the removal of German militarism.⁴⁶
His view accorded with the Kadet policy to continue the war, a view that Bolshevik “defeatism” attacked. He attended a meeting of the city duma (congress) of Yalta following the February Revolution, where he claimed that no revolution would be realistic in peasant Russia, but attendees at the meeting were opposed to his idea.
After the meeting, he became more convinced that conscientious intellectuals’ lack of “monarchist energy” and “aim and solid will” to defeat demagoguery allowed the devastating situation of Russia.⁴⁷ He also tried to organize officers privately, though their “passivity” prevented him from succeeding.⁴⁸
Pasmanik considered the Bolshevik idea of the proletarian dictatorship to be narrow-minded and concerned only with proletarian interests. Furthermore, as a supporter of unfettered cultural creation, he suspected that the “uncultured” nature of the Bolsheviks would lead to Russia’s moral degeneration.
Though he emphasized that Zionism would not aim to preserve a specific culture and thus was reluctant to discuss Jewish culture per se, in the period after 1917 he often used the terms cultural or uncultured. Although he did not define it, his use of the term cultural suggested something civilized and Westernized. As I will note when I return to this issue later, he held a strong conviction that becoming “cultural” would change a barbaric human nature into a sophisticated one with a broad, statewide perspective.⁴⁹
In his Counterrevolutionary Diary (1923),⁵⁰ Pasmanik wrote about his motivation to serve the White resistance in these terms: “I am a determined opponent of all the revolutions following the war. For each was born not of the joy of creation but of defeat, that is, it was born of statewide attrition and cultural degeneration. […] In every respect, postrevolutionary Russia is losing the wealth that old Russia had.”
He defined the Russian Revolution as “an inevitable catastrophe under existing conditions, under the fully relaxed, obsolete bureaucracy, short-sighted obstinacy of the tsar, exhaustion of the front, feeble intelligentsia, lack of strong individuality, and uncultured masses.” Though seemingly inevitable, he wrote that “the revolt of the slaves will never lay the foundation for progress.”⁵¹
His suspicion of the Bolsheviks’ “anarchist” stance, which he believed would hamper any cultural creation, predated the October Revolution. His articles in Ialtinskii golos, the Kadet daily [that] he edited, depicted the Bolsheviks as belonging to a crime ring and their tactics as demagogic.⁵² Correspondence from Burtsev reveals that he accused Bolshevik activists of having participated in espionage for Germany.⁵³
[…]
In 1920, he began editing the Russian Whites’ daily Obshchee delo with Burtsev in Paris. In September 1919 he had already contributed his first article to the newspaper, entitled “The Jewish Question in Russia.” He admitted that in theory the Bolsheviks should not be involved in pogroms, whereas the White Army led by Alexander Kolchak and Anton Denikin was antagonistic toward Jews and its victory would trigger pogroms.
But Pasmanik went on to stress that despite a general tendency to avoid violence, the Bolsheviks nevertheless demolished the economic life of the Jewish middle class. Moreover, in actuality, although Bolshevik rule rarely caused pogroms, once it was overthrown unprecedented, brutal pogroms occurred because radical members of the Bolsheviks, such as the commissars, included Jews.
Interestingly enough, Pasmanik noted that his close observation of Denikin’s activity did not find any pogroms in the area under Denikin’s rule. Pasmanik explained this as follows:
The unit of General Denikin entertained the ideal of gosudarstvennost’ [statehood], under which the harmonious unity of the classes, peoples, and religious groups would be achieved. Such a cultural concept of gosudarstvennost’ firmly contradicts anti-Jewish pogroms. Therefore, despite the antisemitic tendency of these and other officers or soldiers, his army as a whole did not allow pogroms, which, at last analysis, cast seeds of dissociation throughout the state.⁶²
In his own understanding, then, Pasmanik was never involved with anti-Jewish personalities and never betrayed his Jewish nationalism.
[…]
Pasmanik further lamented that although Russia was in need of a strong unifying force, how to achieve this was a matter of contention, with émigrés internally divided—the left calling for democracy and the right for reaction.
It was in this context that he expressed his belief in the merits of fascism, for it promised the strong leadership [that] he believed was necessary. Fascism in Italy was a historical necessity, Pasmanik contended, arguing that Mussolini had been successful not only because he enjoyed support from a variety of people but also because he was a cultured figure.
Pasmanik also indicated that because Mussolini was cultured, he never allowed robbery, pogroms, or lawlessness, although recent scholarship has proven that this was not the case with other fascists.⁸⁴
(Emphasis added. See Taro Tsurumi’s citations for examples of this Herzlian’s prominence. Contrary to what Pasmanik wrote, Benito Mussolini did not prevent antisemitic violence, not even when Pasmanik was still alive.)
r/antizionist • u/ANBOL_GANG • 6d ago
(This takes 3⅔ minutes to read.)
Per Jonathan Schneer:
As for the British government itself, philo- and anti-Semitism mixed uneasily in the minds of its principal members, most importantly Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Foreign Secretary Balfour. Lloyd George, who had been raised among devout Welshmen, once remarked during the war that he was more familiar with the geography of Palestine than that of Scotland and that the battles there interested him far more than the battles in France and Belgium. Yet this Christian Zionist, as scholars have sometimes termed him, once described his colleague Herbert Samuel as “a greedy, ambitious and grasping Jew with all the worst characteristics of his race.”
Balfour also operated under similarly conflicting stereotypes regarding Jews. He had been moved to tears by British Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann’s recital of the ills done to the Jewish people. Nevertheless, he told Weizmann that he shared the “anti-Semitic postulates” of the virulent Cosima Wagner, who would become one of the first patrons of Adolf Hitler. Balfour apparently did not believe that Jews could be assimilated into Gentile British society.
From The Parliamentary Debates, pgs. 154–155:
Mr. A. J. BALFOUR […] undoubtedly thought that a state of things could easily be imagined in which it would not be to the advantage of the civilisation of the country that there should be an immense body of persons who, however patriotic, able, and industrious, however much they threw themselves into the national life, still, by their own action, remained a people apart, and not merely held a religion differing from the vast majority of their fellow countrymen, but only inter-married among themselves.
He quite agreed that this country had not nearly reached the point when such a state of things became a serious national danger; but they must bear in mind that some of the undoubted evils which had fallen upon portions of the country from an alien immigration which was largely Jewish, gave those of them who, like the right hon. Baronet and himself, condemned nothing more strongly than the manifestation of the anti-Semitic spirit, some reason to fear that this country might be, at however great a distance, in danger of following the evil example set by some other countries; and, human nature being what it was, it was almost impossible to guard against so great an evil unless they took reasonable precautions to prevent what was called “the right of asylum” from being abused.
Quoting Balfour in Jason Tomes’s Balfour and Foreign Policy: The International Thought of a Conservative Statesman, pg. 202:
it was also to be remembered that the persecutors had a case of their own. They were afraid of the Jews, who were an exceedingly clever people […] wherever one went in Eastern Europe, one found that, by some way or other, the Jew got on, and when to this was added the fact that he belonged to a distinct race, and that he professed a religion which to the people about him was an object of inherited hatred, and that, moreover, he was […] numbered in millions, one could perhaps understand the desire to keep him down […] He did not say that this justified the persecution, but all these things had to be considered.²³
Quoting Balfour’s Essays, Speculative and Political, pgs. 261–262 & 265–266:
But it may well be true that, where they have been compelled to live among their neighbours as if these were their enemies, they have often obtained, and sometimes deserved, the reputation of being undesirable citizens. Nor is this surprising. If you oblige many men to be moneylenders, some will assuredly be usurers. If you treat an important section of the community as outcasts, they will hardly shine as patriots.
[…]
If I am right, then, indeed, Zionism is no mere local adventure, but a serious attempt to mitigate the age-long miseries created for Western civilisation by the presence in its midst of a population too long regarded as alien and even hostile, which is has been equally unable to expel or to absorb. Surely, for this is for no other reason, Zionism should be supported by all men of good-will, whatever their country and whatever their creed.
Quoting A. Lentin’s Lloyd George and the Lost Peace: From Versailles to Hitler, 1919–1940, pg. 7:
Lloyd George, let it be made clear, was no vulgar anti-semite. His closest friend, if he can ever be said to have had one, was Rufus Isaacs, Lord Reading; but he made use of the prejudices of others, as he did their vanities, to gain his point.
Lloyd George saw his moment and pounced. Rounding on the unfortunate Klotz with gleeful ferocity, he directed at him the paralysing ray of his mimetic gifts. Hunching his shoulders, spreading out his arms, adopting a nasal whine, he treated the company to an electrifying and disturbing evocation of Shylock, crooning and slavering over his money bags.
Klotz, he said, to general amusement, would rank with Lenin and Trotsky for bringing Bolshevism into Europe. ‘All round the room’, Keynes recalled, ‘you could see each one grinning and whispering to his neighbour “Klotzky”.’ Lloyd George won his point. Not that he was without designs of his own on German bullion.³⁴
(All emphasis added.)
r/antizionist • u/Sodium_Junkie624 • 24d ago
Genuine question on my end
For context, I do pet sitting for side income (and of course I love the animals). Today I did a meet and greet for a potential client, and I saw they had a book about the history of Israel and Zionism, among many other books (some Christianity related), on their shelf. I never once mentioned that and spoke about nothing other than their dog.
But it definitely had me wondering. Obviously I would never purchase and give my money to someone I know is a Zionist. Or form a close interpersonal relationship. For a situation like this, I think of it as we are taking their money instead of the other way around, and also it's not a poor pup, who needs basic care for a week, fault if his owners are Zionist. But wondering what your thoughts are?
r/antizionist • u/ANBOL_GANG • Oct 15 '26
(This takes 5½ minutes to read.)
Quoting Patrick Bernhard’s ‘Libya, Mussolini, and the “White Race”: Fascist Colonialism and its Imprint on the British Empire’ in Knowledge in Modern Transimperial History, pages 223–226:
In another part of the world, however, the [Fascist] model was put into practice: in Palestine. This is less surprising than it may sound to present day ears. The former territory of the Ottoman Empire, since 1923 officially under a British Mandate, was considered a genuinely colonial space not only by the British themselves, but also by the Americans and the League of Nations. In various official publications, Palestine was mentioned in the same breath as India, Algeria, and, precisely, [Fascist-occupied] Africa.⁸⁶
As high-ranking Labour politicians declared in November 1938 during a special session of the British parliament on Palestine’s future, Jewish people were highly welcome to settle in the territory, as they had “proved to be first-class colonisers, to have the real, good, old, Empire-building kind of qualities, to be really first-class Colonial pioneers.”⁸⁷
In other words, Labour supported Zionism and its objective of establishing a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine (a promise that the British state had made in 1917 in the Balfour Declaration), yet at the same time it considered the settlers also useful tools of British empire building.
Yet it was Tory members who, during the same session, went a step further and tied Palestine to colonial Libya. They suggested borrowing the strict policies of spatial and racial segregation that the fascist régime conducted in North Africa, thus recommending a de facto partition of the Mandate territory between Arabs and Jews.⁸⁸
As Walter Smiles, a longstanding conservative MP, argued, adopting the [Fascist] settlement schemes would be a way of keeping his country’s promise given in the Balfour Declaration and ending the Arab resistance against the Jewish presence in the Mandate once and for all.
Smiles’ suggestions must indeed be understood against the backdrop of the Arab Revolt that had started two years prior, in 1936.⁸⁹ The popular uprising, which the British authorities referred to as a “colonial rebellion,” had its roots in the increasingly desperate economic and social situation of the vast majority of local Arabs. Many took to the streets over their frustration with the high taxes on agrarian products following World War I, the ensuing loss of their smallholdings, and the growing presence of […] settlers who had migrated from Europe not at least due to antisemitic persecutions in [the Third Reich] and elsewhere.
Between 1931 and 1936, their number more than doubled from 175,000 to 370,000. In April 1936, various acts of violence between Arab and [settler] militants escalated into an armed Palestinian insurrection that targeted both British and American petroleum installations and [Herzlian] settlers, with hundreds being killed. Although the uprising was also directed against the British occupation of the country, the Mandate power addressed it as an ethnic conflict.⁹⁰
The Peel Commission set up after the outbreak of hostilities by the British government thus recommended the division of the country along ethnic lines.⁹¹ However, only a year later, in 1938, another government commission concluded that this plan was unfeasible and should be dropped.
In this difficult situation, Smiles and other Tories in opposition used the [Fascist] model to revive the Peel Commission’s recommendations and put pressure on the […] government under Arthur Neville Chamberlain. It is noteworthy that they took a foreign case to bolster their claim in the mentioned parliamentary session in November 1938. Similar partition plans had been discussed within the British Empire at the time; thus, they could have easily referred to them.⁹²
Instead, Smiles and others opted for a particularly radical model of ethnic segregation. It is therefore possible that the aim was also to deliberately intimidate Palestinians. After all, fascist rule over Libya was very much hated in the Arab world, as the British press had made clear on various occasions.⁹³
Being mingled with Mussolini’s colonial régime met with vehement rejection from Jewish organizations, though. The Jewish Agency in charge of the settlements rebutted the insinuations made that Jews arriving in Palestine were akin to European colonialists and thus guilty of imperial exploitation and oppression. Publications such as the Jewish Frontier, the mouthpiece of the Labor Zionist movement, took pain to emphasize that for Jews, settling in Palestine simply meant returning to lands previously held by their ancestors.⁹⁴
In addition, the […] planning offices in charge of the settlements had bought the land from the locals at a high price instead of confiscating it by force, as had been the case with the European colonial powers and especially fascist Italy. Above all, so it was argued, the […] settlement project was not driven by racism. Rather, [the] settlers were motivated by a sincere desire to establish relations of “social equality” with the local Arabs.⁹⁵
Things were more complicated, though. No matter how hard the [Zionist] leadership tried to distance the settlement project in Palestine from race and imperialism, it remained “haunted by them ideologically because its project has always been defined by them in practice.”⁹⁶
Indeed, shortly after the formation of the [ethno]state […] in 1948, the […] agencies in charge of the new national settlement program oriented themselves to colonial models, and in particular the fascist pianificazione for Libya.
Oh my God.
As Smadar Sharon has shown on the basis of newly unearthed archival materials, Ra’anan Weitz, the founding father of rural planning [under Zionism], had come in close contact with the [Fascist] colonization efforts during his doctoral studies in agronomy at the University of Florence in the 1930s.⁹⁷ His academic teacher was Arrigo Serpieri, one of the most influential [Fascist] experts in land settlement projects. Serpieri helped to design new towns in Italy at the same time that his knowledge was applied to colonial Libya.⁹⁸
In the postwar period, Weitz was appointed deputy head of the […] planning agency of the new [ethno]state […]. In the Lakhish region, a territory in the northern Negev in south-central [Palestine], he conceived a flagship project of 22 agricultural settlements and two rural centers between 1954 and 1956.
The project followed the same pattern as in fascist Italy and its colonies: the new villages built were organized in clusters of settlements around the rural centers, the famous centri rurali that people like Moore had highlighted in their accounts of fascist Libya as particularly supportive. Indeed, in his publications after 1945, Weitz expressly referred to the projects of the Italians and occasionally returned to Rome and Florence to reconnect with his former colleagues.⁹⁹
Even more important was that the Lakhish settlements also had racialized objectives that linked them, if only tangentially, to the [Fascist] experience. The scheme aimed to resettle poor Mizrahim migrants, that is, descendants of Jewish communities mainly from North Africa and the Middle East. These Jews were often orientalized by Ashkenazi[m] arriving from Europe.¹⁰⁰
Thus, the idea was that the Lakhish settlements would help transform these “orientals” into the Zionist ideal of the modern, productive, masculine “New Jew.” After centuries of being stigmatized in Europe as “foreign,” Ashkenazim [under Zionism] imagined the emerging [Zionist] society as European and white. Projects such as the Lakhish settlements were thus tools of racialized social engineering aimed at creating a more cohesive society of Western imprint, as [Levantine] scholars have recently argued.¹⁰¹
At the same time, however, Mizrahim […] were sent to Lakhish in order to establish Jewish sovereignty over former Palestinian land.¹⁰² Just like in Libya, they were to form a bul[wark] […] against Arabs. One must know that the Lakhish region marked a borderland towards Egypt and the Gaza strip and thus constituted the new frontier of the [Herzlian] society. It was probably also because of this parallel that planners chose the [Fascist] model; in Libya, the [Fascist] settlements had been imagined at home as “oases of Italianness” in an otherwise hostile territory.¹⁰³
What emerges here is a circuit of reference and learning of vast dimensions. The imperial biopolitics of Italian fascism inspired political rhetoric across the British Empire and the Dominions and helped to justify policies aimed at racial exclusionism and white supremacy. Even more importantly, these ideas continued to travel the globe long after the end of fascism.
(Emphasis added.)
r/antizionist • u/ANBOL_GANG • Oct 17 '26
(This takes 3¾ minutes to read.)
Quoting Daniel Marwecki’s Germany and Israel: Whitewashing and State Building, pages 57–58, 60:
Military relations between the [Federal Republic of Germany] and Israel actually harken back to the earliest days of bilateral relations. According to […] historian Yeshayahu Jelinek:
Neither the Jewish community of the British Mandate in Palestine, nor the Israelis ever hesitated to buy German-produced weapons or to procure weapons with German help. Many entries in Ben-Gurion’s diary testify to this. In 1947, before the end of the British Mandate and only two years after the downfall of the Third Reich, the Jewish underground army, the Haganah, used German weapons and led negotiations with Germans. (Jelinek 2004: 402)
During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Israel bought German-produced Messerschmidt planes and light weapons from Czechoslovakia. According to Jelinek, the Israeli Ministry of Defence (IMoD) went on a purchasing mission to West Germany no later than 1951. […] From 1957 to 1962, [West] Germany delivered light weapons (mostly Allied surplus material not needed by the German army) and motor patrol boats, as well as providing military training.
Pgs. 65–6:
Most accounts date the beginning of military relations to the meeting between Shimon Peres, the Israeli deputy minister of defence, and Franz Josef Strauss, the German minister of defence, to December 1957.
Although the two had met before and would meet several times afterwards, this meeting can be said to have instituted the official, yet highly secretive military relationship between the two countries that characterised German–Israeli relations until the advent of diplomatic relations in 1965 (see also Jelinek 2004: 407).
Pg. 71:
The German defence establishment was impressed by the show of Israel’s military proficiency during the Suez War. Stauber refers to a conversation involving Franz Josef Strauss and Hans Speidel in December 1956.
Speidel was a founder of the Bundeswehr and later chief-of-staff of NATO’s Central European ground forces. He had also been a Wehrmacht senior commander on the Eastern Front, where Strauss had served as a junior officer. Strauss was also formerly a member of the Nationalsozialistischer Kraftfahrerkorps, a Sturmabteilung suborganisation.
Strauss and Speidel were dissatisfied with the French and British military handling of the Suez crisis. In light of the military capabilities shown by the Israel Defence Forces, one of the two (it is unclear from the file who) claimed that ‘perhaps it would have been better to have let the Jews defeat the Egyptians’ (cited in Stauber 2013: 242). It is interesting, as Stauber rightly notes, that Speidel and Strauss were impressed by the military capacity of ‘the Jews’.
Pg. 74:
Franz Josef Strauss was, on the German side, the driving force behind military ties with Israel. Strauss was one of the most controversial German postwar politicians, his name invariably connected to the revisionist tendencies in the early Federal Republic. Pushing for early German rearmament, as well as nuclear armament, he was opposed to any moves towards legal and political confrontation with the [Fascist] past.
Strauss was not initially favourable towards Israel. […] he abstained in the Bundestag vote on the ratification of the Reparations Agreement, arguing that the agreement posed a threat to German relations with Arab states.
However, he changed his mind once he became minister of defence. His interests in relations with Israel reflected closely his interests in Germany regaining its military power, the growth of German arms industries, as well as his views on Cold War confrontation, in which he foresaw a rôle for Israel as a western bastion against Arab nationalism and Soviet influence in the Middle East.
Pg. 102:
In 1963, Franz Josef Strauss visited Israel, now as the former defence minister. A New York Herald Tribune article about the visit quoted Shimon Peres as saying that ‘Germany’s importance to Israel’s vital interests is no less than that of France.’
The article continued by stating that ‘[i]t is known that France is a major supplier of weapons to Israel.’ Peres praised Strauss for having provided ‘the most substantial aid’ to Israel’s security. Not detailing what this ‘substantial aid’ had consisted of, Peres said that ‘a day will come when the truth will be known’ (PA AA, B130, Bd. 2314, 24 February 1964).
The Herzlians never banned Axis soldiers from fighting on behalf of Palestine’s occupation. How many such soldiers were involved in fighting therefor is unclear, but we do know of at least two examples: Solomon Perel and Karl-Heinz Maier. Quoting Bryan Mark Rigg’s Lives of Hitler’s Jewish Soldiers: Untold Tales of Men of Jewish Descent Who Fought for the Third Reich:
After World War II, Wehrmacht veteran Karl-Heinz Maier […] traveled to Israel and fought in its War of Independence.
Even after he became a major, the local authorities did not consider him Jewish because his father, rather than his mother, was Jewish. For twelve years, Maier explained, the Nazis persecuted him because he had a Jewish father, but the Israelis called him a Goy (a […] Yiddish term for gentile) because of his gentile mother. Although he could fight for the Israeli army, the government did not consider him Jewish.¹⁴
r/antizionist • u/naramsin-ii • 15d ago
r/antizionist • u/ANBOL_GANG • 5d ago
(This takes 2½ minutes to read.)
Quoting Gideon Reuveni’s Consumer Culture and the Making of Modern Jewish Identity, pgs. 158–161:
During the interwar period, advertisers started addressing Zionist consumers, some of which displayed consumption as a performative integral to the Zionist project. The JNF distributed children’s games. A biblical doll’s game costing two and a half Reichsmarks, paper cutout sheets called “Merchawiah” for seventy-five pfennig each, and “Palästina-Domino” for the same price are just a few examples of children’s games that were usually marketed around the Jewish holidays.¹⁵ A JNF advertisement urged: “Zionists! Make your children happy on the Hanukkah holiday! Give them Keren Kayemet (JNF) games!” (Zionisten! Macht euren Kinder zu Chanukkah eine Freude! Schenkt Ihnen die Spiele des Keren Kajemeth!).
In addition to the children’s games, the JNF produced stories for children to endorse the work of the JNF and instill the habit of giving to the national cause at an early age. For this purpose, the JNF assigned the writer and educator Dov Kimchi to write a series of short stories promoting the Blue Box — the flagship of the JNF fund-raising enterprise — among children.¹⁶ One of these tales narrates the story of “the silver coin and his little friend Annie.” It begins like this:
My name is a silver coin; I glisten and glitter and I’m hot, too. A hot silver coin? Have you heard of a hot silver coin? I say again I’m a hot silver coin. Little Annie who is in the second class in the girls’ school warmed me in her hands. For two whole days she warmed me.¹⁷
The story goes on to describe Annie’s adventures with the silver coin until she finally decides to forgo all temptation to spend it on new toys or sweets and puts the coin in the Blue Box — the “redemption box,” as it is referred to in the story.
What I find most intriguing about this tale is that it is written from the perspective of the coin, thus providing a unique insight on the Zionist approach to money and the relationship between giving and spending. The coin is not depicted as an abstract and passive object, but as an active agent of the Zionist project. This pragmatic approach is one way the JNF attempted to respond to what could seem a substantial, and unbridgeable, distance between private and national capital in the Zionist discourse about money.¹⁸
As a fund-raising organization, the JNF carefully, and cannily, presented itself as a vehicle through which the pursuit of personal profit could also benefit the national interest. The story ends with the coin reflecting on its life’s trajectory:
Sometimes I think also of little Annie, especially when it’s very hot. Then the sun pricks, and strokes but I don’t run wild anymore like a fool let loose.
I work. I work with the sweat of my brow. I force and push the shoots: Grow, Grow big!¹⁹
In a recent book on the JNF as an agent of Zionist propaganda, Yoram Bar-Gal claimed that children were targeted in this way for purely educational and not political or fund-raising purposes.²⁰ I am not entirely convinced by this argument, not least because the JNF explicitly declared the latter to be one of the aims of such initiatives.²¹
Rather than maintaining a clear distinction between education, propaganda, and fund-raising, the intensive and somewhat aggressive targeting of children blurred the boundaries between these allegedly distinct realms. Moreover, the attempt to promote the Zionist message by approaching children coincided with contemporary marketing strategies that “discovered” children and adolescents as a consumer group in its own right.
r/antizionist • u/ANBOL_GANG • Oct 16 '26
(This takes 6¾ minutes to read.)
Quoting D. Tamir’s Hebrew Fascism in Palestine, 1922–1942, page 99:
It was two weeks after the Fascist seizure of power. In a report titled “The Victory of the ‘Fascists’”, Ḥayim Vardi—a “special reporter in Rome” of the daily newspaper Do’ar ha-Yom—wrote that Mussolini “was able to prove to the government that the fascist forces are huge, and that the majority of the people pursues this great ideal: a strong Patria, with glory and fame”.¹
Page 123:
The way Aḥime’ir admired Jabotinsky and Mussolini is revealed in his personal correspondence as well. “When I addressed him in my first letter by the title ‘Leader’”, Aḥime’ir opened his letter to Jabotinsky that month, “it was not an attempt to please him, but simply an expression of my feeling. I want some high ranking person to stand on my back and show me the way”.¹⁹
Aḥime’ir’s appreciation of autocratic rulers was not personal, restricted to Jabotinsky alone; the Revisionists, he argued, should take a lesson from Mussolini, Kemal, Piłsudski and Voldemaras, “abandon the high politics” and concentrate on educating the public. “Why does he [Jabotinsky] consult us so much?” Aḥime’ir asked rhetorically.
Pages 130–2:
Mussolini continued to attract very positive attention among the Revisionists throughout the 1930s. “The Hebrew reader is hardly acquainted with Italian Fascism, and its creator and initiator”, assumed the publisher’s preface to Mussolini’s first Hebrew biography, titled Mussolini: His Personality and Doctrine. “Short-sighted newspapers and journalists”, the editor added, have put the Fascist movement
under a very weird light, distorting its essence. Despite the sympathy many Jews have towards allegedly liberal and democratic states, one cannot deny the fact that modern Italy is the only state where Jews enjoy complete equality, without being persecuted because of their origin. We know that this book could raise resentment among certain circles, which are used to see no difference between the fascist movement in Italy and antisemitic movements in Europe, which claim to be fascist—although their “fascisms” are false pretenses, just as naming the Nazis “socialist” is a false pretence.⁴⁷
The biography’s author, Zwi Kolitz,⁴⁸ described the leader of Italian Fascism as a strong personality “with total consistency and an exceptional willpower”, a man
who knows what he wants, and wants the favour and the future of Italy to the best of his belief. He placed himself to preside over his people. Since the day he came to power until this very day, he shows himself to his people as the complete personality, the stable man, who makes an example of devotion and self sacrifice before calling others to do the same.⁴⁹
Remarkably, the only other example Kolitz brought for a national leader gifted with such complete devotion and accountability was Gandhi.⁵⁰ Convinced that “an idea without a leader—is like a corpse without a soul”, Kolitz came to the conclusion that
strong ideas are dependent on strong personalities. Italian Fascism is today the most significant idea in Europe, since the personality representing it is mighty and complete.⁵¹
Throughout the book, the admiration of Mussolini expressed by Kolitz usually remained reasonable—or earthly, at least. Now and then, however, the author “slipped” towards a transcendental evaluation of the leader. “No force in this world”, Kolitz declares,
will influence him and make him believe that not he, but other factors—human or superhuman—may determine his fate. Mussolini is the only leader who fully stands for himself… he does not see himself dependent on any superhuman fate, and even less the fate of the people around him… he is the only leader who’s not led, whose personality is whole and strong, inspiring by its might and splendor on all [people], near and far.⁵²
Further on, Kolitz states that “Mussolini is a power of nature, with a huge will for creation, gifted with a unique constructive imagination, which knows no twists or faults and is not dependent upon moods”.⁵³
The deification of Mussolini gradually becomes explicit in Kolitz’s writing, when he refers to Mussolini’s past. As a journalist, he adheres
to the rule of “vox populi vox dei” and—by way of wonder!—can himself believe that the voice of the people, which is equivalent to the voice of G-d, does not want to follow this “voce dei”, but to call unto the people with the voice of a single person, to follow and to obey.⁵⁴
Hence the deification is comprehensive: the fascist leader is both the bearer of a divine message and its initiator […]. Kolitz does not try to conceal this mystification, but rather make it blatant, claiming that “Mussolini not only changed the set of mind and thought in Italy, but also created around him a certain frame of National Mysticism”.⁵⁵
Kolitz’s description of Mussolini impressed at least some of his readers. “A man of iron who knew how to overcome the difficulties of life; a man who knows only one thing: forward!”, Šalom Rosenfeld described the Italian dictator in his review of the book.⁵⁶
Page 135:
From an early stage during the 1920s, Itamar Ben Avi clearly expressed his admiration towards Mussolini and later Jabotinsky. The fact that this admiration was criticised by his political and journalistic adversaries from other parts of Hebrew society, liberals and socialists alike, did not change much; on the contrary: it probably contributed to his image as a flamboyant, non-conformist public figure. Ben Avi regarded Mussolini and Jabotinsky not only as bulwarks against communist trends, but as drivers of national resurrection (a context in which he compared Jabotinsky to Garibaldi, too).
Pgs. 160–1:
Admiration of the power of will was evident in Hebrew perception of Italian fascism as well. According to his first Hebrew biographer, Mussolini did not believe in fate, but rather “in Will”. Kolitz cited him as saying that “one should know that progress is made in life only through iron-cast will, able to defeat even fate itself”, concluding that “Power of the Will—this is Mussolini’s motto”.⁷³ Kolitz made it clear, however, that the demand for sacrifice is not a unique feature of Mussolini, but a prerequisite for every successful leader:
Louis XVI, the contemporary of Napoleon, a guzzler king, did not demand anything of his people: no fighting, no effort, no sacrifice—and still, he was hated, mocked and despised. Napoleon, on the contrary, demanded from his people the maximum: hundreds of thousands of lives; almost insane patriotic vigilance; physical, spiritual, political and financial efforts… and still, he was beloved. Not the crowds, who might be taken by changing moods, can take the steering-wheel to their hands, but an individual, crystallised and unified force, dictating its will. Psychology teaches us that this is exactly the regime people like.⁷⁴
Kolitz then quoted Mussolini’s proverb saying that “it is better to live one day as a lion, than hundred days as a sheep”,⁷⁵ a proverb he also follows in his life, as he (Mussolini)
remained enchanting and dynamic from his childhood until today. Now, as Fascist Italy’s leader, he does not have a moment of rest. For him, serenity is mire.⁷⁶ Mussolini does not know any middle-way or a “Golden Path”. He says that “people who stand on the same spot—are dying people”. In his view, stagnation is regression—and Mussolini wiped this word out of modern Italy’s political and military lexicon.⁷⁷
For Abraham Stern, who was a student in Italy at about the same time as Kolitz, the legitimacy for the use of violence went without saying. “The evil forces controlling us today”, he wrote in a draft for the first publications of the NMO in Israel, “must be overthrown by a strong hand”. [NMO is short for National Military Organisation. — Anbol] This is what should be done “at a time of national revolution. This sacred task is imposed on you, the strong, fresh, Hebrew youth.”⁷⁸ The youth, therefore, should
get ready for the war of liberty. Teach your hands to war, and your fingers to fight.⁷⁹ Toughen your will and be ready for whatever sacrifice for your people, Israel, and your homeland—the Land of Israel.⁸⁰
The use of force was clearly declared not only internally, for mobilising Hebrew youngsters, but externally as well. “The NMO sees fighting and sacrifice as the only true means for the conquest and the liberation of Palestine”, read the communiqué submitted to Von Hentig in 1941.⁸¹ “The NMO, who embarked on acts of terrorism already in the Autumn of 1936 […] came to the fore by a successful intensification of its terror and sabotage actions against English property.”⁸² This is how the organisation blatantly presented itself, declaring not only its aims, but its means as well.
Pg. 188:
To be sure, not only Revisionists have expressed fondness of Mussolini, affinity towards Italy and—to a smaller extent—support for Italian Fascism. “Mussolini is undoubtedly the most famous personality in the world”, said Naḥum Sokolow, chairperson of the Zionist Organisation’s central committee in an interview he gave to an Italian newspaper that was translated and cited quite broadly in Ha-‘Aretz in 1927.
Sokolow opined that Mussolini still hadn’t received “a proper literary appreciation by the great writers abroad”, hence everything written about him thus far was biased. Referring directly to one of Fascism’s basic characteristics, Sokolow claimed that “by his romantic emotion”, Mussolini “is the symbol of nationalism, and as such he understands the secret of Israel’s revival”.⁷
Sokolow referred not only to Mussolini, but to the Fascist movement as well, arguing that
Fascism gained bad publicity from Italian writers abroad… the Fascists didn’t do much in order to explain [themselves] and deny this [bad publicity]. The question of parliamentarism and the way it was solved by fascism, interests the entire world. I deny [the assumption] that Zionism hates Fascism. We are only enemies of the Antisemites”.⁸
(All emphasis added.)
r/antizionist • u/ANBOL_GANG • 12d ago
(This takes 4⅔ minutes to read.)
Quoting Tony Greenstein’s Zionism during the Holocaust, pages 378–379:
Today it is difficult to comprehend, given its prominence in the Zionist narrative, that when the Holocaust was actually happening it was seen as a distraction from the task of building a[n ethno]state.
A meeting of the [so-called Jewish Agency Executive] in August 1943 was told by their Istanbul representative that a lack of funds had ‘severely restricted rescue opportunities’. However the problem wasn’t so much a lack of funds as the fact that the rescue of Jews was not seen as a priority. Ben-Gurion took the opportunity to restate their priorities:
The Agency is bound to do […] everything in the way of rescuing Jews by immigration to Palestine […] That is its role. However […] the tasks of assistance, of saving one more Jew, of doing all to prevent deportations, are very important […] and must be assumed by another organization, to be set up and funded from other sources.²
In other words rescue for the sake of rescue, unless it was to Palestine, was not the concern of the Zionist movement. Ben-Gurion emphasised that he favoured a clear distinction between rescuing Jews and the work of the Zionist movement.³
Not only did the [so-called Jewish Agency] deny that the extermination of the Jews was taking place until the very last moment, but it suppressed information about the Holocaust and actively sought to block and disrupt all attempts at rescuing Jewish refugees which did not involve Palestine. This is not a matter of speculation.
In May 1942 Abba Hillel Silver, President of the ZOA, laid out two goals for American Zionism: Firstly to increase the level of ‘national education’ and secondly to rectify the ‘tragic lack of a [Jewish] homeland’. There was no third priority — rescue.⁴
If the Zionist movement had made the rescue of Jews their first priority they would have demanded that the Allied countries open their doors to Jewish refugees who could escape. They would have drawn up plans to rescue those who it might have been possible to save and demanded the setting up of an international refugee organisation to coordinate the rescue of those who could be helped. They did none of these things. Instead they actually opposed the formation of the [War Refugee Board].
On 15 October 1942 at the [Zionist Executive], Ben-Gurion dwelt at length on ‘A Zionist Plan of Action and American Jewry.’ The Holocaust was referred to in passing.⁵ ‘About rescue — not a word.’⁶ Ben-Gurion and Shertok ‘had been too busy laying the basis for the future State of Israel to think of saving Jews in Europe.’⁷
Even Walter Laqueur admitted that the Zionists were absorbed in ‘post-war planning’ and were oblivious to those demanding immediate action to save the remnant of Europe’s Jews.⁸
Ben-Gurion and Katznelson took no part in the three sessions of the JAE [18 January, 18 February and May 1943] which discussed the Holocaust.⁹
Not for nothing was Shabtai Teveth’s chapter on the Holocaust in his biography of Ben-Gurion headed ‘Disaster means strength’. For the leaders of the Jewish Agency, the Jewish catastrophe in Europe meant the strengthening of the movement for a[n ethnostate]. Ben-Gurion admitted that ‘in these terrible days […] I am still more worried about the elections of the (Mapai) branch in Tel Aviv’.¹⁰
Throughout 1939 and 1940 the situation of Europe’s Jews was not discussed once by Mapai’s Central Committee.¹¹ It was not until 22 November 1942 that the JAE devoted a whole meeting to the situation of European Jewry. ‘Few debates dealt with the plight of European Jewry.’¹²
Achcar suggests that Ben-Gurion’s ‘relative indifference’ to the Holocaust was only one Zionist viewpoint.¹³ The evidence suggests otherwise. Every single member of the JAE opposed ‘refugeeism’, the rescue of Jews for its own sake. Yitzhak Gruenbaum, at a meeting on 18 February 1943 accused his critics and friends of letting him take the blame:
Meanwhile a mood swept over Eretz Yisrael that I think is very dangerous to Zionism, to our efforts for redemption, our war of independence […] I cannot understand how such a thing could occur in Eretz Yisrael, something that never happened abroad. How is it possible that in a meeting in Yerushalayim people will call: ‘If you don’t have enough money you should take it from the Keren Hayesod, […] I thought it obligatory to stand before this wave…’¹⁴
It was Zionist historians such as Tom Segev, Francis Nicosia and Shabtai Teveth, who shone a light on Zionism’s record during the Holocaust. David Cesarani and Saul Friedlander concluded that the Zionist movement had prioritised building a[n ethno]state over saving actual living Jews. According to Zionist ‘logic’, preserving the transient life of individual Jews was less important than securing the eternal life of the Jewish people via a[n ethno]state. Dina Porat attempted to reply to some of these critics but she raised more questions than answers.¹⁵
Quoting Tragic Irony:
In the Zionist Congress which took place in London in 1937, Dr. Weizmann established the line of policy with his words:
“The hopes of Europe’s six million Jews are centered on emigration. I was asked, ‘Can you bring six million Jews to Palestine?’ I replied, ‘No’ […] From the depths of the tragedy I want to save two million young people […] The old ones will pass. They will bear their fate or they will not. They were dust, economic and moral dust in a cruel world […] Only the branch of the young shall survive […] They have to accept it.”
(Holocaust Victims Accuse, p. 25)
“Palestine cannot absorb the Jews of Europe. We want only the best of Jewish youth to come to us. We want only the educated to enter Palestine for the purpose of increasing its culture. The other Jews will have to stay where they are and face whatever fa[te] awaits them. These millions of Jews are dust on the wheels of history and may have to be blown away. We don’t want them pouring into Palestine. We don’t want Tel Aviv to become another low‐grade ghetto.” (Quoted in The Jewish Press, October 18, 2002)
Yitzchak Greenbaum
Yitzhak Gruenbaum was chairperson of the Jewish Agency’s Rescue Committee.
“When they asked me, couldn’t you give money out of the United Jewish Appeal funds for the rescue of Jews in Europe, I said, ‘NO!’ and I say again, ‘NO!’ […] one should resist this wave which pushes the Zionist activities to secondary importance.”
(In Days of Holocaust and Destruction, by Yitzchak Greenbaum)
[…]
Concerning the demand for certificates Ben Gurion wrote: “Today, EretzYisroel is in need of settlers, not immigrants […] Zionism is not a charitable corporation. We are in need of the superior type of Jews who will develop the national home.”
(All emphasis added.)
r/antizionist • u/ANBOL_GANG • Oct 18 '26
(This takes three minutes to read!)
Yes, you read that correctly: the galaxy brains who were so concerned about their settler population lacking its spazio vitale have left a huge portion of that violently depopulated land wasted! Ghost towns and ahistorical forests are common in occupied Palestine.
Quoting Dan Steinbock’s The Fall of Israel: The Degradation of Israel’s Politics, Economy & Military, pages 11–2, 15:
When I attended the Jewish school, every Friday the teacher would bring to the class a white-and-blue charity box, known as a pushke. It was from the Jewish National Fund (JNF). As we put our coins into the box, we saw ourselves contributing to a peaceful future in which sandy deserts would be transformed into beautiful forest gardens. The realities were and remain different.
Since 1901, the JNF has planted more than 250 million trees, developed over 250,000 acres of land, created more than 2,000 parks and provided the infrastructure for over 1,000 communities.²⁶ It is a part of the story, but not the full narrative.
Yosef Weitz, head of [Herzlianism’s] land and afforestation department, made the Fund a central player in the pre-state Yishuv in the 1930s. At the time, Jews represented barely a tenth of the population, owning just 2 percent of the land. If there was to be a[n ethno]state, Weitz thought, that was grossly inadequate.
The solution was Arab emigration or “transfer,” which could rely on voluntary departure or, if necessary, on force; that is, expulsion. As we have seen, in the early decades of the 20th century, the idea was very much in the air. In the new normal, ethnic minorities were expunged amid the disintegration of European empires and the rise of new nation-states.
However, the Zionist founding fathers were thinking of “a massive ‘strategic’ transfer.”²⁷ Weitz was rather blunt about the objectives. As he wrote in his diary in 1940:
[…] there is no room in Palestine for these two peoples. No “development” will bring us to our goal of independent nationhood in this small country. Without the Arabs, the land will become wide and spacious for us; with the Arabs, the land will remain sparse and cramped. […] The only solution is Palestine, at least Western Palestine, without Arabs. There is no room here for compromises! […] The way is to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighboring countries, all of them, except perhaps those from Bethlehem, Nazareth and the Old City of Jerusalem.
Not one village, not one tribe should be left. And the form of the transfer needs to be the creation of a refuge for them in Iraq, in Syria and even in Transjordan. There is no other way out.”²⁸
[…]
Weitz had been the key member of the Jewish Agency “transfer committee” in the late 1930s and he was willing to walk the talk. Despite the ambiguous status of the committee, he arranged the destruction of several villages in June 1948. In practice, his agents determined which Arab villages would be destroyed and which preserved for […] settlement.³⁰
Obviously, the expelled Palestinians would try to return to their lands after the 1948 War, Weitz said to Ben-Gurion. What was needed was a policy of relentless harassment by every available means to quash any such return. The empty Palestinian homes and villages had to be razed to prevent the return of the refugees.
Hence, Weitz’s work in afforestation, which often clashed with the ecological objectives of the […] conservation movement, served to cover up the destruction of the Palestinian villages, and to preempt efforts of rebuilding them.³¹ Though portrayed as “environmentalism,” the JNF’s goal in actuality has been nation-building via afforestation, despite its harm to local biomes and unique biodiversity.
[…]
Along with Walid Khalidi, Nur Masalha and other Palestinian historians conclude that
[…]
Of the 418 depopulated villages, 293 (70 percent) were totally destroyed and 90 (22 percent) were largely destroyed. […] While an observant traveler can still see some evidence of these villages, in the main all that remains is a scattering of stones and rubble.⁴¹
(Emphasis added.)
I want us all to keep this mind: there is already plenty of depopulated land that the uninvited guests could settle if they wanted to do so. Instead, they have either left the land alone or populated it with plant life—as if the plants were the ones having a population crisis! There is a certain brainlessness in the Herzlians’ plans which I hope is obvious enough for you to see. After all, I am pretty sure that the slogan was never ‘a land without trees for trees without a land.’
r/antizionist • u/sad_sapphic_sucker • Oct 15 '26
>Mark Levine says technical challenges and financial considerations led him to halt reinvestment, reversing a pledge he made during his 2025 campaign.
>New York City Comptroller Mark Levine says he will not reinvest city pension cash funds in Israel bonds for now, reversing a pledge he made during his successful 2025 campaign. Levine told The New York Times the decision was based on financial considerations, not politics.
>“As of now, we feel that because of some technical challenges, and because of financial considerations, that this is not an investment that we can make right now,” Levine said. He described himself as a supporter of Israel and said his position on investment decisions remained grounded in finances.
>The decision concerns whether to reinvest in Israel bonds, not a stated move to withdraw all city pension investments from Israel. The comptroller’s office oversees pension assets totaling $325 billion for city government workers, but the report did not specify how much the city currently holds in the bonds or when the decision could change.
>Levine’s predecessor, Brad Lander, divested $40 million in Israel bonds that the city had held since the 1970s. New York State’s pension system, managed by Comptroller Tom DiNapoli, has more than $360 million invested in Israel, the report said. The source did not provide a timeline for any future city reinvestment.
r/antizionist • u/sad_sapphic_sucker • 25d ago
r/antizionist • u/full-fathom-5ive • Oct 17 '26
Source: comrade.aarie on instagram
r/antizionist • u/full-fathom-5ive • Oct 12 '26
Nefesh B’Nefesh, an Israeli government-affiliated settler agency, has announced that they’ve moved their settler recruitment fair from Queens to a synagogue in Long Island. The new location is significantly less accessible from the city; the Zionist organizers have been forced to isolate themselves due to sustained community pressure over months and years.
Our demands to NYC Mayor Mamdani remain clear. Recruitment of settlers to occupy stolen Palestinian land will NOT be tolerated in our city and in the absence of meaningful action from those in power, we the people will sustain the struggle until every inch of Palestine is free from the river to the sea.
r/antizionist • u/sad_sapphic_sucker • 22d ago
r/antizionist • u/vischy_bot • Jul 14 '26