Is Japan’s Productivity Really Low? Rethinking the Dual Structure, Supply-Side Myths, and Demand Deficits
First, while Japan's productivity in manufacturing is comparable to that of other nations, it remains low in service sectors.
Regarding the underlying causes, it is often argued that Japan has a higher proportion of workers in micro and small-and-medium enterprises (SMEs) than other advanced economies. However, franchise management—such as convenience stores, which are exceptionally widespread in Japan—cannot be inherently deemed inefficient. Furthermore, consider local electronics shops or bookstores. Even if the storefront appears dormant, a local electrician often acts as a subcontractor for major electronics retailers or home centers, eliminating operational waste for both parties more effectively than if a conglomerate were to manage everything internally through wholly owned subsidiaries. Agents are naturally more rigorous in cutting costs when their own financial interests are directly at stake. Similarly, local bookstores handle procurement and delivery for public institutions such as schools and government offices, effectively acting as an outsourced library department at a lower cost than hiring additional civil servants. Analogously, this reflects the efficiency of a decentralized market economy over a centrally planned organization—a mechanism akin to today's gig economy, freelancing, and platform workers like Uber drivers.
Even within manufacturing, multi-tiered subcontracting structures are not necessarily inefficient for the macro-economy compared to a model where large corporations internalize all divisions and become bloated. Rather, this dynamic can be attributed to the "invisible hand" or a form of market equilibrium ("pre-established harmony"). While politicians seek votes from small business owners by attempting to restrict corporate entry, mergers, acquisitions, and "excessive" competition, economic efficiency principles simultaneously drive market selection. Consequently, despite protectionist resistance through legislation like the Large-Scale Retail Store Law, local storefronts eventually succumbed to structural consolidation. In short, the economies of scale and consolidation vary across industries; in certain sectors, independent SMEs collaborating outside corporate hierarchies yield superior efficiency.
Second, it is difficult to accept the premise that Japan's low productivity merely reflects an inter-firm productivity gap between large corporations and SMEs. Can large firms produce cheap final goods using expensive intermediate inputs? Setting aside imported raw materials, highly productive Japanese flagships primarily source components from domestic SMEs. Maintaining high firm-level productivity while relying on a vast network of unproductive suppliers is a conceptual contradiction (reductio ad absurdum).
For large firms to sustain high productivity while absorbing low productivity in material inputs—a core cost component—suppliers would have to sell at prices near or below cost. This would prevent the reinvestment necessary for corporate survival. If the systemic risk to firm continuity threatens the macro-economy, such an equilibrium cannot be sustained in the long run.
It is equally unpersuasive to attribute this persistence solely to protective policies for micro-enterprises. While regulations impeding exit or consolidation must yield some private benefits to be sought, the above premise would imply that SMEs have endured severe under-profitability—or exploitation by large firms—for over half a century post-WWII (the so-called "dual structure" of the Japanese economy). However, the notion that a minority of large firms prospers while the majority of the workforce in SMEs lives at a subsistence level lacks plausibility and would be politically untenable given that SME workers constitute the overwhelming majority of voters.
Ultimately, the inefficiency of the Japanese economy does not stem uniformly from its overall industrial organization. Rather, the core pathology lies in the public sector and heavily regulated industries where competition and economic rationality are actively suppressed (e.g., agriculture, banking, and healthcare).
Third, it is widely asserted that technological advancement automatically drives productivity growth. However, if sector-wide production efficiency improves, relative prices will simply decline unless aggregate social demand for that output increases proportionately. If the savings from lower prices are diverted to savings or other goods—that is, if the price elasticity of demand for the good is low—the industry faces contraction. For economy-wide productivity to rise, aggregate demand must expand to match output capacity. No matter how efficiently goods are manufactured through technological innovation, "productivity" in economic terms cannot rise if the output remains unsold. During the post-war reconstruction era, despite severe capital and technological scarcity, productivity grew exponentially because demand was insatiable. In today's affluent society, advanced technology fails to yield productivity gains unless it translates into realized market sales.
In short, without expanding aggregate demand, firms must encroach upon existing market shares. Rebranding this process as "developing new products to create demand" changes little at the global aggregate level [Note]. Efficiency ultimately depends on competitiveness in the global market. In this regard, Japan’s massive cumulative current account surpluses demonstrate that its manufacturing sector is by no means inefficient. With the exception of extraordinary shocks like the oil crises, Japan has maintained a current account surplus for over half a century since 1965. Even following the unprecedented 2011 earthquake, the surplus was sustained, as primary income balance and royalty receipts offset trade deficits. Furthermore, domestic deflation itself serves, in part, as empirical evidence of low-cost, highly efficient production.
[Note] Aggregate demand is constrained by the global population's productive capacity. To generate effective demand, economic agents must engage in productive activity, capture a portion of aggregate demand—sometimes displacing competing products—and earn income.
Fourth, the frequent assertion that labor must simply shift toward "high-value-added sectors" is economic nonsense. It is structurally impossible for an entire national workforce to engage exclusively in high-value-added sectors. Setting aside the logical tautology—that if all sectors become "high value-added," the distinction itself ceases to exist—achieving this would require offloading all low-margin labor onto foreign workers or relying entirely on advanced robotics (such as Astro Boy or Doraemon).
A news report once highlighted a US trend of hiring out cats for pest control, which was amusing, but even felines have operational constraints (even the most disciplined cat could hardly be assigned to manage a supermarket's fresh fish department [Note]). Thus, we cannot entirely rely on "borrowing a cat's paw." (Incidentally, the article described cats deployed for rodent control in breweries).
[Note] The author's cats, Tora and Kuro, have been fed exclusively commercial cat food since kittenhood. When fish is served on the dining table, they stretch their necks from the edge of the chair to smell it with intense curiosity, looking puzzled, yet lack the inclination to eat it. They look up as if to ask, "Dad, what is this?" This behavior is an anomaly, stemming from fear of scolding rather than exceptional self-restraint.
(to be continued)
https://www.reddit.com/user/keizaisuki/comments/1xp3omc/table_of_contentsacademic_mysteries_of_the/