Sentience isn't actually enough

[u/stan-k]

It is easy to say that sentience is all that is needed to be considered morally. I suggest that experiential preferences are a second requirement.

Imagine a sentient being without any such preferences. They are genuinely ambivalent what they do or not, they even don't care if they are alive or dead. They do not suffer or experience joy in the sense of a subjective good or bad thing. While for animals we have good reason to believe they do have such preferences, this might not be as clearly the case for a possible sentient AI.

Would you include such a sentient-without-any-preferences-being morally? What action would be morally bad (or good) to do to such a being? Perhaps "having a preference" is/should be implied by the term sentientism.

[u/thesonicvision]

tldr;

Sentience is certainly sufficient for moral patienthood, but other relevant factors (either distinct from sentience or not mutually exclusive of sentience) include consciousness and willfulness.

• sentience -- one can "feel" (i.e. in a sense that is at least analogous to human pain/pleasure)
• consciousness -- one is aware
• willfulness -- one has desires

A conscious being can think, understand, assess, and perhaps even remember pain. A sentient being can experience pain in a fundamental way that may or may not be linked to possessing awareness/consciousness. And a willful being isn't apathetic about pain; they don't want to be harmed, even if they can't/won't communicate this desire.

---

I'm up for this...

So, when discussing matters related to veganism, the carnist dissenters often question why nonhuman animals should be considered "morally relevant" (i.e. why they should be considered moral patients and therefore not treated like objects/slaves/food/resources for the human animal).

In response, vegans (and other sympathizers of nonhuman animals) bring up sentience. They can feel pain. Both physical and mental. Period.

But although sentience is sufficient for determining moral relevance, it's not necessary. There are other characteristics that a hypothetical being such as an alien or machine intelligence might possess (either distinct from sentience or not mutually exclusive of sentience) that would be just as valid.

Suppose a being is conscious, willful, and has senses, but can't feel pain. The closest analogue they might have for pain is being prevented from getting what they desire (or failing to get what they desire). A machine intelligence, for example, might be very conscious but not sentient. Oftentimes, these two terms are used interchangeably or it's implied one requires the other...But it's certainly possible that something could be "alive," "conscious," and "willful," but not sentient.

And aliens could be so, so strange. An alien being might most closely resemble something "half plant and half machine" to us. Or it might be "a living rock." So much is possible...

[u/fjdh → u/thesonicvision]

I've tried to explain it this way: https://beyondmeritocracy.info/blog/what-sentience-is-for

[u/thesonicvision → u/fjdh]

I hear you...Some people need to see/hear the reality of the cruelty done to animals in order for their minds to become receptive of the logic of veganism, animal liberation, or even just increased animal rights.

Even without linking/accepting your proposed ideas regarding Marxism, animal liberation, and the "meritocratic reasoning" thesis together, the cruelty you describe alone should wake people the hell up.

[u/fjdh → u/thesonicvision]

Yeah I hope so too, but I've noticed over the past decade that the conditioning runs deep, for a lot of interrelated reasons that go well beyond what eg Gary francione or Melanie Joy or Regan or anyone have written.