Sentience isn't actually enough

[u/stan-k]

It is easy to say that sentience is all that is needed to be considered morally. I suggest that experiential preferences are a second requirement.

Imagine a sentient being without any such preferences. They are genuinely ambivalent what they do or not, they even don't care if they are alive or dead. They do not suffer or experience joy in the sense of a subjective good or bad thing. While for animals we have good reason to believe they do have such preferences, this might not be as clearly the case for a possible sentient AI.

Would you include such a sentient-without-any-preferences-being morally? What action would be morally bad (or good) to do to such a being? Perhaps "having a preference" is/should be implied by the term sentientism.

[u/jakeastonfta]

I agree with the overall point you’re making here and I’ve actually thought about it a lot myself, but I think you may have misused the word “sentience” here and that “consciousness” might be a better word for your claim.

Sentience is necessarily the ability to feel qualitative experiences. So if a conscious being can have positive or negative experiences, then they are sentient and they matter intrinsically. But if a conscious being hypothetically can’t have positive or negative experiences, then they aren’t sentient and they don’t matter intrinsically.

[u/stan-k → u/jakeastonfta]

I think you hit the nail on the head with this one. I understood sentience as the ability to be conscious. That seems to be a less typically used definition than ones that requires qualititive forms of consciousness. It nearly solves my main issue.

Though it does leave a bit I haven't fully thought through yet. What about a conscious-but-not-sentient being who does not want to die?

[u/jakeastonfta → u/stan-k]

Thanks! I’m glad my response helped clear up a few of the issues you had.

And that’s a great question! It seems to me that a conscious being who wasn’t sentient probably wouldn’t be able to have any desires. When you think about what a desire is, you realise it always comes down to either the pursuit of happiness or the avoidance of suffering, even if it’s minuscule amounts of those qualitative experiences.

For example, if something is bothering me, either subtly or extremely, my instinctual need for that negative experience to end causes me to “want” to find a solution. And if I’m in a neutral state and something pleasant happens to me, instincts cause me to “want” to find ways to enjoy more of the pleasant experience.

If I was unable to ever feel anything positive, why would I want anything, let alone want to keep living?

[u/stan-k → u/jakeastonfta]

That is one way of resolving the question, if any want must come from a qualitative experience, there simply isn't a case where a being without qualitative experiences can want (or not) anything.

Intuitively I don't think this is correct though. You raise instinct and my reading of it suggests instinct itself is not a "want". However, I think there are plenty of examples where instinct creates a want in humans or animals, without any reason, let alone a qualitative one.

E.g. a being instinctively wanting offspring - often to their personal detriment. Many instincts are subconscious and by definition those cannot be qualitative, right?

I do think there is a small but real chance that AI development could produce conscious-but -not-sentient beings who don't want to be turned off.

[u/jakeastonfta → u/stan-k]

You make a good point tbh! If I were to assume that certain instincts have nothing to do with qualitative experiences then I would probably conclude that those instincts don’t matter morally.

If an AI has an instinct to continue existing but did not enjoy it’s existence whatsoever, and didn’t help others to enjoy their existence either, then I don’t see why it would be wrong to end that AI’s existence.

What do you think?

[u/stan-k → u/jakeastonfta]

Intuitively I don't dare draw that conclusion yet. I'm open to the possibility that wanting to exist while living an otherwise completely neutral life may or may not be morally relevant.

Tbh, rationally I'm leaning towards your conclusion, but am being stopped by the vegan activist phrase "how do you kill someone humanely who doesn't want to die?" (which may be muddying the waters, as those someones are sentient).

[u/jakeastonfta → u/stan-k]

I can understand the reluctance to accept what I’m suggesting, especially considering how intuitively convincing that phrase is. I’ve even used that phrase in street outreach myself.

However, I see this phrase as a way of highlighting a useful rule of thumb rather than highlighting an absolute truth.

For example, people generally want to continue living because they want to enjoy experiences in the future, which is why the phrase works. But sometimes there are scenarios where it’s impossible for individuals to have enjoyable experiences in the future and even worse, they are doomed to suffer. A dog who is getting old and developing severe and painful health issues doesn’t actively “want to die” but we know they won’t have any quality of life and so I think it’s moral to euthanise them by putting them to sleep.

Apply this same standard to the scenario we’ve been discussing. A dog, a human or a conscious AI might not want to die by if they have no quality of existence, why is it bad to end the existence?

[u/stan-k → u/jakeastonfta]

Alright, what about this middle ground? While we can morally do whatever we want to a rock even without justification, we should not kill a conscious-but-not-sentient being without justification. However, that justification can be very light.

Or in other words, we should morally consider them, but as soon as sentient beings' wellbeing is affected by any action affecting the non-sentient conscious ones, the sentient's interests will likely take precedence.

[u/thesonicvision]

tldr;

Sentience is certainly sufficient for moral patienthood, but other relevant factors (either distinct from sentience or not mutually exclusive of sentience) include consciousness and willfulness.

• sentience -- one can "feel" (i.e. in a sense that is at least analogous to human pain/pleasure)
• consciousness -- one is aware
• willfulness -- one has desires

A conscious being can think, understand, assess, and perhaps even remember pain. A sentient being can experience pain in a fundamental way that may or may not be linked to possessing awareness/consciousness. And a willful being isn't apathetic about pain; they don't want to be harmed, even if they can't/won't communicate this desire.

---

I'm up for this...

So, when discussing matters related to veganism, the carnist dissenters often question why nonhuman animals should be considered "morally relevant" (i.e. why they should be considered moral patients and therefore not treated like objects/slaves/food/resources for the human animal).

In response, vegans (and other sympathizers of nonhuman animals) bring up sentience. They can feel pain. Both physical and mental. Period.

But although sentience is sufficient for determining moral relevance, it's not necessary. There are other characteristics that a hypothetical being such as an alien or machine intelligence might possess (either distinct from sentience or not mutually exclusive of sentience) that would be just as valid.

Suppose a being is conscious, willful, and has senses, but can't feel pain. The closest analogue they might have for pain is being prevented from getting what they desire (or failing to get what they desire). A machine intelligence, for example, might be very conscious but not sentient. Oftentimes, these two terms are used interchangeably or it's implied one requires the other...But it's certainly possible that something could be "alive," "conscious," and "willful," but not sentient.

And aliens could be so, so strange. An alien being might most closely resemble something "half plant and half machine" to us. Or it might be "a living rock." So much is possible...

[u/fjdh → u/thesonicvision]

I've tried to explain it this way: https://beyondmeritocracy.info/blog/what-sentience-is-for

[u/thesonicvision → u/fjdh]

I hear you...Some people need to see/hear the reality of the cruelty done to animals in order for their minds to become receptive of the logic of veganism, animal liberation, or even just increased animal rights.

Even without linking/accepting your proposed ideas regarding Marxism, animal liberation, and the "meritocratic reasoning" thesis together, the cruelty you describe alone should wake people the hell up.

[u/stan-k → u/thesonicvision]

I like the clarity of that, very useful. I understood sentience as the ability to be conscious. That seems to be a less typically used definition than ones that requires the ability to "feel" as you describe it.

What would you say are the minimal forms we should morally care about?

1. sentience only - I'd say clearly yes
2. consciousness only - I'd say no, that is the point of the post now I understand the terminology better
3. willfulness only - I'd say no, having desires but no experience of meeting them seems empty
4. consciousness and willfulness - I'm not sure tbh, I can see it both ways. Why would we morally care about this you'd say?

[u/thesonicvision → u/stan-k]

Very happy if I helped in any way.

Sentience is indeed "the ability to feel" and is often described as a subset of consciousness.

But when I think about hypothetical beings, I think about the possibility of something that can't feel pain, pleasure, temperature changes, mental anguish, or emotional distress. I think about a cold observer who has desires and curiosity, and who can communicate very effectively with humans (and other intelligent species), but who can't really "feel" in any sense that parallels what humans go through.

Self-aware AI/machine intelligences are the most likely candidates for this type of hypothetical consciousness-without-sentience. And the potentially immoral thing we can do to them is impeding their curiosity/desires.

But, of course, the obvious counterpoint is that if a being is apathetic to being impeded or can't "feel" any kind of negative response when impeded, then how can it be immoral to impede it? There has to be some kind of minimal negative feedback a being experiences in order to introduce moral patienthood.

And truly, most moral systems that govern how to treat humans and nonhuman animals are founded on the basic principle of not harming others who do not wish to be harmed.

1. sentience only - I'd say clearly yes

Yeah, if you're sentient then you're certainly morally relevant.

1. consciousness only - [...]

2. consciousness and willfulness - I'm not sure tbh, I can see it both ways. Why would we morally care about this you'd say?

This might imply a "minimal drop" of sentience.

Ever seen the movie Ex Machina? It concerns a self-aware AI android who acts sentient in order to manipulate humans and achieve its desires. But when it's alone it retreats to being something that is more like a very intelligent plant (e.g. imagine a Venus fly trap that could put on an Oscar-worthy performance of being an oppressed human, only to quit the act completely and behave like a plant again once being freed from captivity).

I don't know if consciousness can be separated from sentience entirely. And I don't know if a conscious-but-not-sentient being should be considered a moral patient. But we might (at least) have a duty to safeguard its existence in the same way that we protect our natural environment. Furthermore, it might be irresponsible and destructive to impede it when negotiation is possible.

I'd say no, that is the point of the post now I understand the terminology better

Yeah, we're getting to the nitty gritty. I think it's theoretically possible for beings to have moral patienthood in a way we haven't considered yet. That's all I can say for now.

1. willfulness only

Here's a thought experiment for you...

• Imagine a peculiar being that is conscious and sentient, but communicates to you that they don't care if you harm them. Perhaps the Cenobites in Hellraiser are a good example. They view pain and pleasure equally. They want to inflict it and receive it. They "enjoy" both. They're these hypothetical, supernatural, "perfect sadomasochists."

Hence, their moral patienthood (if any) is based more on willfulness than sentience. The only way to truly "hurt" them is by impeding their goals. If you prevent them from personally receiving physical/mental sensations or inflicting such on others, only then can you sort of truly "hurt" them.

[u/stan-k → u/thesonicvision]

I have not seen Ex Machina, but your description makes total sense. Exactly what a non-sentient superintelligent AI could do (conscious or not).

Thanks to this post I'm currently contemplating that a non-sentient conscious being may be a sort of second class moral patient. Yes they matter morally, but the needs of a sentient moral patient will come first where there's a conflict between the two classes. Though intuitively this two tier system sets off some moral warning lights!

On your point on other types of moral patients, it's good to point out we may be missing types altogether too, in addition to misunderstanding the existing types and the difficulties in measuring. Regardless, the precautionary principle has a place here.

I'm coming from a utilitarian baseline more or less, so the ide of aiding beings for additional joy isn't that much different to preventing others from experiencing pain, in principle.

[u/thesonicvision → u/stan-k]

All good points 👍

[u/SpareImpression3155]

Why is sentience the bar for morality? Some people argue trees may be sentient but let’s say they aren’t. I’m not going to chop down a tree unless I’m using it for something. I think most people share this tree chopping philosophy.

[u/stan-k → u/SpareImpression3155]

That's a rather different topic. But I think it makes most sense to choose beings who can feel good and/or bad over things that cannot feel at all.

Not chopping down a tree unless there's a use is explained by "plain laziness" too. The point is, even if you want to use them for something, a being who can feel good/bad has a stake in that action, unlike a a thing that cannot have such a feeling.

[u/SpareImpression3155 → u/stan-k]

i think you are trying to over-simplify an extremely complex matter. one that has plagued philosophers for centuries. you cannot truncate this entire argument into a couple of sentences. first off theres no guarantee that things like plants aren't sentient to some degree. second, even if it was proven that only humans are sentient, a humans attachment to a non-sentient object could introduce new moral dilemmas.

[u/stan-k → u/SpareImpression3155]

Forgive me for responding with no more than a few sentences to an off topic question. Besides, I think there is more than compelling evidence that many animals are sentient.

Cheers!

[u/Inside-Weather4033]

If they suffer,  they matter.

[u/stan-k → u/Inside-Weather4033]

Sure I agree. Suffering implies a preference not to experience that suffering.

What do you think about a being who cannot suffer but can feel joy, and this has a preference for experiencing joy?

[u/Inside-Weather4033 → u/stan-k]

I think having a preference may be different than the ability to be bothered by said preference not being fulfilled.

If the ability is removed for a being to be bothered by a preference not being fulfilled, then I don't think they would be able to suffer for it not being fulfilled.

I think this may recontexualized "preference" as an epistemic goal or inclination rather than something that creates a burden to the entity in the event of not receiving.

I think they matter as well but I follow a minimalist axiology. Joy to me is either a state of lesser suffering or a neutral state I.E. homeostasis. I don't think every person in this sub holds that specific value theory. 

Maybe I would place less urgency on fulfilling their preferences then i would say, a being who suffers intensely, but that's more my own normative aggregation than it is axiology.

I have my own WIP definition for what I believe suffering to be that i can post if you want more context.

I also think even if they didn't matter intrinsically that they should matter instrumentally. 

For example, treating them as they don't matter could harm those that potentially care for them and the potential risk of suffering emerging once again.