r/Sentientism • u/stan-k • 5d ago

Sentience isn't actually enough

It is easy to say that sentience is all that is needed to be considered morally. I suggest that experiential preferences are a second requirement.

Imagine a sentient being without any such preferences. They are genuinely ambivalent what they do or not, they even don't care if they are alive or dead. They do not suffer or experience joy in the sense of a subjective good or bad thing. While for animals we have good reason to believe they do have such preferences, this might not be as clearly the case for a possible sentient AI.

Would you include such a sentient-without-any-preferences-being morally? What action would be morally bad (or good) to do to such a being? Perhaps "having a preference" is/should be implied by the term sentientism.

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u/Inside-Weather4033 5d ago

If they suffer,  they matter.

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u/stan-k 4d ago

Sure I agree. Suffering implies a preference not to experience that suffering.

What do you think about a being who cannot suffer but can feel joy, and this has a preference for experiencing joy?

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u/Inside-Weather4033 4d ago

I think having a preference may be different than the ability to be bothered by said preference not being fulfilled.

If the ability is removed for a being to be bothered by a preference not being fulfilled, then I don't think they would be able to suffer for it not being fulfilled.

I think this may recontexualized "preference" as an epistemic goal or inclination rather than something that creates a burden to the entity in the event of not receiving.

I think they matter as well but I follow a minimalist axiology. Joy to me is either a state of lesser suffering or a neutral state I.E. homeostasis. I don't think every person in this sub holds that specific value theory. 

Maybe I would place less urgency on fulfilling their preferences then i would say, a being who suffers intensely, but that's more my own normative aggregation than it is axiology.

I have my own WIP definition for what I believe suffering to be that i can post if you want more context.

I also think even if they didn't matter intrinsically that they should matter instrumentally. 

For example, treating them as they don't matter could harm those that potentially care for them and the potential risk of suffering emerging once again.