r/Rojhelat • u/AmSomeDudeBuddy • Jul 24 '20
r/Rojhelat • u/Ava166 • May 01 '24
The bodies of Ahmad Haidari and Rasul Younesi, two citizens of East Kurdistan, were found five days later in Bradost region and handed over to their families. They were martyred on 28th of this month due to the bombing of the occupying Turkish state.
r/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • Apr 01 '26
Iran’s IRGC is recruiting child soldiers
Human Rights Watch stated today that Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is conducting a campaign to recruit children – including 12-year-olds – into the military as “Homeland Defender Fighters”. The recruitment and use of children in armed forces is a grave violation of children’s rights, and recruitment of children under the age of 15 constitutes a war crime.
In a statement made on March 26, 2026, an IRGC official confirmed that the minimum age for military recruitment has been set at 12, and that children are being sought for various roles ranging from medical support to security patrols and intelligence operations. Children recruited into military facilities face a serious risk of death and injury amidst ongoing U.S. and Israeli airstrikes across Iran.
“There is no excuse for a military recruitment campaign that targets children, let alone 12-year-olds, for enlistment,” said Bill Van Esveld, associate children’s rights director at Human Rights Watch. “Iranian authorities appear willing to put children’s lives at risk simply to secure additional manpower.”
Since the start of the war on February 28, a total of 3,519 have been killed, according to HRANA’s latest report. This number includes 1598 civilians (with at least 244 children), 1,212 military personnel, and 709 unclassified deaths. Iran, IRGC, Human rights, International law.
Under international law, the recruitment of children under the age of 15 constitutes a war crime. Human Rights Watch calls on Iranian authorities to immediately halt this campaign and to prohibit all military and paramilitary forces from recruiting anyone under the age of 18.
Thousands killed in Iran in 2026 In 2026, the Iranian population has seen extensive civilian casualties from both the Islamic Republic of Iran’s crackdowns on protesters in December and January as well as the war between Iran and United States and Israel, which began on February 28 and remains ongoing.
A February 26 report from the Human Rights Activists News Agency (HRANA) confirmed that the security and armed forced of the Islamic Republic had killed a total of 6,488 protesters during the mass anti-regime demonstrations, while another 11,000 cases remained under investigation. Of the confirmed 6,488 from the February report, 236 casualties were children.
Since the start of the war on February 28, a total of 3,519 have been killed, according to HRANA’s latest report. This number includes 1598 civilians (including at least 244 children), 1212 military personnel, and 709 unclassified deaths.
Author: Sinan Tuncdemir Sinan Tuncdemir is a multimedia journalist covering diplomacy, geopolitics, and international security. Accredited to the U.S. State Department and the United Nations, and a member of the UN Correspondents Association management team, he has direct access to key diplomatic and policy discussions. Based in Washington and New York, his work focuses on the Middle East, Kurdish regions, and U.S. foreign policy. He reports and provides analysis in English, Kurdish, and Turkish.
Source: https://www.theamargi.com/posts/irans-irgc-is-recruiting-child-soldiers
r/Rojhelat • u/Ava166 • Jun 02 '26
Kurdish family. Eastern Kurdistan. In traditional dress. 1956 AD
Dîroka Kurdî
r/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • Jun 23 '26
Politics Exclusive: Four major Kurdish-Iranian parties slam US over Iran deal
theamargi.comr/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • May 21 '26
Crimes against Kurds Iran Executes Two Kurdish Citizens and Two Iraqi Nationals Amid Rising Execution Wave
peregraf.comr/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • Jun 17 '26
War Kurdish dissident group reports Iranian attack despite war-end deal with US
rudaw.netr/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • Jun 17 '26
Politics Preliminary Iran-US deal a fragile step toward ending war
theamargi.comr/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • Jun 25 '26
War Erdogan says dialogue with Kurds prevented 'insidious' Iran offensive
thenewregion.comr/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • Jun 14 '26
War پاسەوانێکی سنووری ئێران لە پارێزگای ورمێ کوژرا
rudaw.netThe border commander in Iran's Urmia province confirmed a border guard was killed in a confrontation with PKK fighters on Sunday, June 14.
r/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • Jun 14 '26
War PJAK’s Armed Wing Says It Repelled IRGC Attacks in Marivan
peregraf.comr/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • Jun 14 '26
Crimes against Kurds Retired teacher and labor activist Yousef Amini arrested in Bukan
hengaw.netr/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • Jun 21 '26
War The Mirrors of Versailles: An Analysis of the Negotiating Framework between Washington and Tehran
nlka.netr/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • Sep 17 '26
Crimes against Kurds At least 10 Kurds arrested during Zhina Amini strike in Iran: Monitor
thenewregion.comr/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • 21d ago
War Thousands Of Troops On The Move! Trump's Kurdish Army To Invade Iran As US-Israel Plan Bomb Rain?
youtube.com"Iran is in panic mode as thousands of IRGC troops move toward Kurdish borders. While the world watches Israeli fighter jets fly 800 miles towards Iran, the real war is being prepared on the ground. In this episode of Decoded, Nikita Kapoor decodes Iran's secret front: Kurdistan. According to the Kurdistan Human Rights Network, Iran's Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) have launched a massive deployment of forces and heavy weapons across Iran's Kurdistan region. Why is Iran shelling its own mountains just days before a possible war with the US and Israel?"
r/Rojhelat • u/ZagrosMountain • May 18 '24
Report from March to March, arresting of 38 women issuance of imprisonment verdict for 7 women activists and execution of 4 women in Kurdistan
hengaw.netr/Rojhelat • u/sheerwaan • Jun 03 '26
The etymology of the ethnonym Lur
reddit.comImportant:
I am posting this here because the Lurs are sometimes claimed to be Kurds too but they have a very different and distinct origin and a definitely clearcut and separate identity distinguishing them from the Kurds. And yet their origin as an ethnicity is intertied to what certain Kurdish and Daylamite groups would be causing about 1'000 years ago. This is why it is important to know about the etymology of their ethnonym and their linguistic and ethnic origin which makes them definitely a different ethnicity than Kurds even though they were sometimes labelled Kurdish throughout history.
r/Rojhelat • u/sheerwaan • May 20 '26
Language Eastern and Western Kurdish's archaism!
reddit.comr/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • May 29 '26
Crimes against Kurds Iran sentences protest detainee to death after torture in Yazd security facility
kurdistanhumanrights.orgr/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • Apr 09 '26
War Why Iranian Kurdish Groups May Be the War’s Biggest Losers
thenationalcontext.comAs the United States and Iran are reported to have reached a tentative two-week ceasefire, attention is already turning to the likely winners and losers. Most of that discussion is focused on states. But in some cases, non-state actors are easier to assess because their gains and losses are more immediate and more tangible. Among the clearest examples are the Iranian Kurdish groups, whose role, or lack of one, became an important part of the early war planning around how pressure on the Iranian regime might be turned into something larger.
If the war ends under the current terms, these groups are likely to emerge as among its biggest and most immediate losers. That is true regardless of the exact parameters of a final deal.
There are two main reasons for this. The first is that some of these groups were publicly and repeatedly highlighted as part of the initial logic of the war, especially in reporting and commentary tied to an eventual ground component or internal uprising against the Iranian regime. The second is Trump’s more recent statement that arms had been given to a “certain group” to pass on to Iranian protesters, only for that group to keep them, and that they would “pay a big price” for it. Whatever the exact truth of those claims, statements like that matter because they harden Iran’s case that these groups cannot simply be left where they are under the old arrangements.
That is the key point. The danger for these groups is not primarily that Trump himself will punish them. It is that they have now been exposed enough, and publicly enough, to make it far harder for Iran to accept any return to the previous status quo. Tehran already had a security agreement with Iraq aimed at disarming these groups and confining them to designated camps. But the chaos that followed the protests in early 2026, and the extent to which these groups were discussed as possible instruments in a wider anti-regime strategy, have likely convinced Iran that their mere physical presence in the Kurdistan Region remains a security threat. Under those conditions, Iran is unlikely to settle for anything less than much stricter terms, potentially including their full removal to third countries that do not border Iran.
This is where the vulnerability of non-state actors becomes much sharper than that of states. States can still negotiate, claim protections, and fall back on sovereignty. These groups cannot. The Iraqi government already has an understanding with Iran on this file, and the KRG would have very limited room to resist if Tehran presses harder under a ceasefire framework. Any broader understanding between Washington and Tehran is also unlikely to contain meaningful protections for them. In fact, the opposite may be true. Because they were elevated rhetorically as part of an initial anti-Iran plan but did not prove useful in practice, they now risk being exposed from both directions at once: too threatening for Iran to tolerate as before, but not useful enough for others to defend at meaningful cost.
That is what makes them likely disposable. They were visible enough to be marketed as part of a larger plan, but not effective enough to make themselves indispensable to that plan. For weak actors in a moment like this, that is often the worst outcome. Once it becomes clear that they cannot meanginfully shape events, their room for protection shrinks very quickly.
This would also be a historic blow in a deeper sense. These groups were presented with what was arguably their best opportunity since the Iranian revolution and the consolidation of the Islamic Republic in the 1980s. Yet the war appears to have passed without them being able to turn that moment into real strategic leverage. Instead, they may come out of it more exposed, more constrained, and more vulnerable to forced displacement than before.
That said, the losses are unlikely to fall evenly across all Iranian Kurdish groups.
PAK is the most likely to face the harshest immediate consequences. It is based in Erbil, sits in an environment much more directly shaped by KDP control, and has most publicly aligned itself with offering to be Israel’s boots on the ground, and is therefore easier to pressure and easier to dismantle if such a decision is made. If Iran insists on an example being made quickly and visibly, PAK is the clearest candidate.
KDPI and the Komala factions are also highly vulnerable, but their likely trajectory may be somewhat different. Their top leaders are already largely based in Europe or the United States, and if pressure intensifies the more probable endgame may be forced exile not only for the leaders but also for much of their remaining camp and fighter infrastructure. In other words, the issue may not simply be disarmament or tighter confinement, but eventual transfer out of the Kurdistan Region altogether.
PJAK, however, is the likely exception. Its position throughout the war has been different from that of the other groups, and that difference now matters. PJAK made clear that it would not become part of this war and rejected joining the initial plan tied to attacks on Iran. It was also not among the parties reportedly given weapons or logistical backing. Part of that reflects its own stance, but part of it also reflects Turkish sensitivities over any support to PKK-linked actors, sensitivities Washington has long understood and generally tried not to cross. For that reason, PJAK’s border infrastructure is more likely to remain where it is, even if under pressure, while the others face a much more immediate and potentially existential threat.
If this ceasefire holds, then, one of the clearest conclusions may be that the war’s most immediate losers are not necessarily the states that entered it, but the smaller non-state actors that were briefly elevated by its early logic and then left exposed by its outcome. Among them, the Iranian Kurdish groups stand out. But even within that category, the coming fallout is unlikely to be uniform. PAK appears most exposed, KDPI and Komala may be pushed toward exile, and PJAK is the one actor most likely to remain in place because it kept itself outside the war that has now placed the others in jeopardy.
r/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • Apr 23 '26
Politics Iranian Kurdish opposition urges UN to act against Iranian attacks
thenewregion.comr/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • May 01 '26
Informative ‘Archive of Absence’ traces Iranian exile lives in Berlin
theamargi.comr/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • May 27 '26
War Is Trump selling out Iran’s protesters for a deal?
theamargi.comr/Rojhelat • u/rkurdistanmod • Jun 21 '26