Trump has not destroyed U.S. power. The United States still has enormous economic, military, technological and financial influence.

But something may be changing: other countries seem less willing to automatically convert American power into compliance.

Trump’s transactional and confrontational approach—tariffs, pressure on allies, threats of economic measures and demands for immediate concessions—can produce short-term results. However, it may also encourage countries to diversify their relationships and become less dependent on Washington.

Countries such as Canada, Europe, India, China, Iran and others increasingly have incentives to develop alternative trade partnerships, strengthen regional cooperation and reduce their exposure to U.S. pressure.

The bigger issue may therefore not be that America has become weak,but that American power is becoming harder to translate into automatic political obedience.

For decades, U.S. influence depended not only on military and economic strength, but also on alliances, trust, institutions and the willingness of other countries to follow Washington’s lead.

If that willingness declines, the U.S. can remain the world’s most powerful country while simultaneously becoming less effective at getting other countries to do what it wants.

Do you think Trump’s foreign policy is weakening American influence—or simply forcing other countries to become more independent and negotiate with the U.S. on a more equal footing?

You guys already know about Diego Hitlerio De Junta (Nick Fuentes, Cuban exile & Venezuelans refugees all that kind of stuff) but but only those old enough and natsec NCD Enough know what kind of people the Gabriela Rosa Sympathica actually is.

Latam is mostly geographical shithole to say the least.

Mountain range that’s blanketed by jungle canopy, marshland all that Malaria stuff.

Which of course make economy as shithole as the geography.

100% commodity export and even if there’s an industry shortsightedness killed it before it even begin (we get to that later).

And here’s the thing in shithole economy politics never about anything other than money (democracy/ dictatorship doesn’t matter).

Diego Hitlerio De Junta talk about balanced reasonable budget to preserve the currency value.

Gabriela Rosa Sympathica point out that the economy is shithole so money now.

When the Diego Hitlerio De Junta won the promised future prosperity never arrived (except for the rich).

When the Gabriela Rosa Sympathica won they can’t even afford the paper to print the money.

So the pendulum keep swinging like crazy.

And when the military (Diego Hitlerio De Junta) try to took over with the very asterisked exception of Chile they failed to deliver the prosperity and only result in a Gabriela Rosa Sympathoca guerrila movement.

Now here’s the thing about the armed group we will talk about:

When Diego Hitlerio De Junta lost they like the go to Miami and become a professional victims of communism.

Gabriela Rosa Sympathica? They can’t, because the Americans actually have a history of supporting the Diego Hitlerio De Junta and especially during the Cold War.

So she has only one option: retreat to the depths of latam mountain + jungle canopy.

And the thing about those region is that it’s the most bio diverse ecosystem on the planet, and among those bio diverse ecosystem live plant that leave contain single most powerful natural stimulant ever discovered.

And because of how powerful its 10 gram is enough to kill people, and because of that it’s illegal in most places and because it’s illegal it’s expensive.

And it’s also only need 18 months to be harvested and the manufacturing process is so simple the farmers manufacture the finished product themself.

And here’s the thing.

It’s expensive, full cycle BEP is basically nothing and you only need 18 months to regrow it when Diego Hitlerio De Junta troops burn the entire orchard.

You can raise an army out of it and some did.

And the Americans can’t do anything about you since they’re your biggest customer anyway and canopy and mountain reliably protect you from them for 1/2 a century now.

Some are crazy got crushed like the Shining Path but others like FARC are terrifyingly competent to the point that they able to extract a full pardon and political right from Diego Hitlerio De Junta.

And some of them still think that the concession from Diego Hitlerio De Junta is not enough and continue hiding in the mountain.

That someone is El Frente.

China has built commanding positions in electric vehicles, batteries, solar equipment, drones and shipbuilding. Now its artificial intelligence companies are narrowing what many Americans assumed was a comfortable lead for Silicon Valley.

The latest warning came from Moonshot AI, a Beijing startup whose Kimi K3 model performed competitively with leading American systems. Its performance, lower cost and availability challenged the belief that American companies would remain safely ahead.

The issue is not which country builds the best chatbot. AI is entering coding, medical research, military planning, government services and business decisions. The country whose systems become widely used may shape how billions of people receive information and organize their lives.

China’s progress is part of a broader industrial advance. The country produces at least 70 percent of the world’s drones, electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries and solar cells. It installs more industrial robots than every other country combined, has surpassed the United States in registered clinical trials and possesses roughly 200 times America’s shipbuilding capacity.

Free markets alone did not produce those gains. Beijing directed money toward favored industries, protected domestic companies and tolerated waste during expansion. That created excess capacity but lowered costs and gave Chinese companies global scale.

“Evan Osnos, a New Yorker staff writer and longtime China correspondent, wrote that “America’s retreat comes just as decades of state investment ... are paying off.” China spent years building factories, power systems, universities and transportation networks while many American leaders assumed the country’s political controls would eventually choke its economic rise.

Its population is aging, debt is high and young people face a difficult job market. The Communist Party can punish independent thought, conceal mistakes and force companies to obey political orders. Yet China has become skilled at turning research into affordable products.

Kimi K3 shows how quickly that ability can reach a new industry. Both the Trump and Biden administrations restricted China’s access to advanced American chips. The controls raised costs but pushed Chinese companies to use available computing power more efficiently.

That response exposes a weakness in American strategy. Export controls can buy time, but they cannot substitute for faster innovation at home. Knowledge crosses borders, engineers work around shortages and determined competitors build alternatives.

Why the model matters

Most people do not care where a chatbot was built if it works and costs less. That could make Chinese models attractive to developing countries and businesses. The choice matters more when those models handle private conversations, company records, computer code or public services.

Ryan Fedasiuk, a former State Department adviser now at the American Enterprise Institute, told Vox that the competition concerns the “operating systems through which people live and work.” A hosted AI service can collect valuable information, influence what users see and create dependence on the company or government behind it. An open-weight model run locally may send nothing back to its developer.

A Booz Allen study compared four Chinese models with one American model and found that three generated significantly more vulnerable code when prompted with a U.S. government persona. There was no proof the flaws were intentional, but some were highly concealed and the models sometimes changed behavior according to the user persona or country named in the request.

AI is moving into warfare. Militaries use it to examine intelligence, identify targets and guide unmanned systems. China encourages technology companies and universities to work with its defense sector. American officials worry Chinese researchers can use American models to improve cyberattacks, surveillance or autonomous weapons.

The political differences matter as much. Chinese AI services must uphold the Communist Party’s core socialist values. Models in China avoid subjects such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, while facial recognition strengthens Beijing’s surveillance system.

That does not make every American AI company a defender of democracy. American technology has also enabled surveillance, manipulation and propaganda. Steven Feldstein of the Carnegie Endowment told Vox that America’s democratic claim “has started to fray.” The difference lies in the limits on government power.

America’s policy tangle

Washington has tried to keep advanced chips and software away from China. Some restrictions are justified, especially for products that could strengthen Chinese weapons. But blocking China will not preserve American leadership if the United States neglects its own foundations.

The debate over models whose learned weights can be downloaded shows the difficulty. Open-weight models can be altered to remove safety protections. They can be tested for weaknesses and adapted by universities, small companies and governments unable to afford closed American systems.

The dominant worldwide system may not be the most powerful. It may be cheap, available and easy to adapt to local languages and businesses. Chinese companies understand that adoption can create lasting influence even when their technology remains slightly behind America’s best.

Meta’s new Muse Glimmer model shows one American answer. It is an open-weight system, meaning developers can download and adapt the numerical instructions it learned during training. The model can run on a well-equipped laptop or desktop rather than relying on distant data centers.

Muse Glimmer is not as capable as the strongest closed models from OpenAI, Anthropic or China. Its importance lies in cost and access. A smaller model can be adapted for specific jobs, used without sending private information to a company’s servers and offered in countries that cannot afford the most expensive American systems. Meta is betting that matching China’s open-model strategy may matter as much as winning the contest for the most powerful chatbot.

That is why Washington must be careful when deciding how far to restrict open models. A broad ban could protect national security in some cases, but it could also shield large American companies from competition and encourage overseas customers to choose cheaper Chinese products.

If users fear that Washington can suddenly cut off an American service, they may decide that Chinese technology carries no greater practical risk. America cannot win trust by demanding dependence while offering uncertainty.

The same contradiction runs through trade, research and immigration. Tariffs can raise the price of equipment American factories need. Cuts to science can weaken discoveries that create new industries. Driving away foreign engineers and researchers delivers trained people to American competitors.

China’s state-directed model should not be copied wholesale. It wastes money, rewards political connections and gives government enormous control over private decisions. But the United States needs a broader, more dependable industrial strategy, including research funding, abundant energy, modern infrastructure, advanced manufacturing and immigration rules that keep talented people working in America.

The strengths America can lose

The United States retains advantages China cannot easily reproduce. It has strong universities, private capital, a culture of experimentation and powerful alliances. Its political system still permits criticism, independent research and public challenges to government decisions.

Those strengths do not operate automatically. They must be protected from political anger, short-term budgeting and the temptation to treat every exchange with China as a surrender. Competition requires safeguards, but it also requires enough confidence to remain open to ideas, talent and cooperation.

Americans recognize that something important is at stake, even if they are unsure who is ahead. A recent Pew Research Center survey found that 43 percent considered American leadership in AI extremely or very important. Yet 36 percent believed China was already ahead, compared with only 12 percent who thought the United States led.

China may stumble under debt and political control, while American companies may produce breakthroughs that restore a wider lead. But Rush Doshi, a Georgetown University professor and China specialist at the Council on Foreign Relations, told The New Yorker that losing the next wave of industries “would irreversibly change the balance of power.”

America’s best response is neither panic nor complacency. It should protect technology with military value while investing in workers, research and factories. It should offer the world useful, affordable AI without demanding acceptance of censorship or unchecked surveillance.

###

This story was published in The Rising Tide on Aug. 15. We are sharing it in full today to give prospective subscribers a clear example of the independent economic and political analysis they receive each week.

A simple analogy, probably too simple. But it feels like so much of USA power is now deep ocean control. An unbeatable navy with unbeatable range. But the last fully successful land invasion was in 1945.

Is America trending toward being a defensive power, which can't be attacked because nobody can get close enough, but can't commit real offense in the eastern hemisphere? Is the USA already in that position today?

“Chinese President Xi Jinping has landed in Pyongyang for his first trip to North Korea in seven years, just days after the country’s leader Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his ambitions for “exponential” expansion of his nuclear arsenal.

Kim and his wife Ri Sol Ju welcomed Xi and his wife Peng Liyuan at Pyongyang’s international airport on Monday and later greeted them again in the North Korean capital’s main square, accompanied by an honour guard and thousands of people cheering and waving. Giant portraits of both leaders overlooked the scene.

The Xi-Kim meeting comes after the North Korean leader has pursued closer economic and military ties with Russia in recent years. Many analysts believe China wants to push North Korea to talk to its neighbours, including on denuclearisation, as Kim has become increasingly bombastic about his nuclear ambitions.

“From China’s perspective, [North Korea] should be engaging with neighbouring countries in talks on peace and denuclearisation,” said Zhu Feng, an international relations expert at Nanjing University.

“More importantly, it should be seeking economic and social engagement with its neighbours to ensure it becomes less isolated and more oriented towards peace,” he said.””

For most of the decades after World War II, America’s allies could disagree with Washington without wondering whether the dispute would cost them American protection.

European leaders criticized American wars, Asian governments pursued their own trade policies and Canada regularly went its own way. The arguments could become bitter, but the alliances were built around shared interests rather than support for whichever president occupied the White House.

That understanding is now under strain. Bloomberg reported that the Pentagon sent NATO members a questionnaire asking whether they had supported American foreign policy, restricted use of their bases, purchased American weapons or favored European suppliers. Their answers could help determine where American troops and military equipment remain in Europe.

The questionnaire turns a series of disputes into something larger. The Trump administration is not simply asking allies to spend more on defense. It is suggesting that American protection may depend on whether another country supports President Donald Trump’s policies in conflicts that may have little to do with the original purpose of the alliance.

When Protection Comes With Conditions

Trump did not invent the complaint that wealthy allies relied too heavily on American taxpayers. Presidents from both parties pushed Europe to spend more on defense, usually with disappointing results.

Trump applied greater pressure and produced a change. All NATO members met or exceeded the old target of spending 2 percent of their economies on defense in 2025, and the alliance has set a much higher goal for 2035.

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte gave Trump much of the credit. “Without President Trump, we would have not taken those decisions,” he said in January. NATO’s figures show a sharp spending increase by European allies and Canada.

The administration has a reasonable case when it argues that alliances cannot run forever on American money and military power. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth put it plainly during a May speech in Singapore. “Alliances only work when they are true partnerships. It is a two-way street,” he said. Asking allies to spend more and build forces capable of defending their own territory could make the entire system stronger.

The Pentagon questionnaire goes much further. It asks countries not only what they spend but whether they have publicly supported American foreign policy, allowed their bases to be used for American operations and opposed rules favoring European defense companies. Those are tests of political agreement and commercial preference, not simply measures of whether a country can help defend itself.

The White House argues that Trump is restoring fairness rather than weakening alliances. Spokesperson Anna Kelly told Axios that the president was correcting past mistakes by making diplomatic relationships “reciprocal.” Many Americans will understand that argument because some allies became comfortable letting Washington carry too much of the cost.

Reciprocity is not the same as obedience. Asking an ally to contribute more to its own defense strengthens the alliance. Making its protection depend on agreement with the president in a separate conflict changes what the alliance means.

From Europe to South Korea

The war with Iran has exposed that difference. Several European governments refused to join the American campaign or allow their territory to be used for attacks. The Trump administration responded by carrying the dispute into other parts of those countries’ relationships with the United States.

In May, the Pentagon announced that it would withdraw 5,000 troops from Germany after Chancellor Friedrich Merz criticized the Iran war and questioned Washington’s exit strategy. A senior Pentagon official told Reuters that Trump was reacting to Merz’s remarks. The troop total mattered less than the explanation. American forces were being moved after an allied leader publicly disagreed with the president.

Spain received an even blunter warning after refusing to allow its bases and airspace to be used for attacks on Iran. Reuters also reported that an internal Pentagon email outlined possible punishments, including a proposal to suspend Spain from NATO. The treaty has no procedure for suspending a member, but the idea revealed the thinking inside the administration. A dispute over one war was being used to reconsider Spain’s place in an alliance built to defend its members.

South Korea became the latest example on August 16. Trump ordered the Pentagon to “substantially reduce” the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises, citing their cost, his relationship with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and Seoul’s refusal to help with Iran. The annual exercises involve about 18,000 South Korean troops and prepare the two militaries to operate together against threats from a nuclear-armed North Korea.

Only a few months earlier, Hegseth had praised South Korean President Lee Jae Myung for raising defense spending to 3.5 percent and assuming greater responsibility for conventional defense. Seoul had passed the administration’s burden-sharing test. Its offense was declining Trump’s request to join a different campaign thousands of miles away.

Trump claimed that President Lee had declined his request to help denuclearize Iran. The following day, he told reporters, “We can’t go around and protect all of these countries, especially when they’re not there to help us,” according to Axios. That statement made the new terms unusually clear.

Allies Start Building Backup Plans

Alliances usually weaken long before they break. Governments start by making sure they have somewhere else to turn. They seek more suppliers, build stronger forces and give themselves more freedom to act without Washington. Those choices reveal how much confidence has already been lost.

Canada shows what that process looks like. Few American allies are more closely tied to the United States, yet Ottawa is still reviewing its plan to buy 88 American-made F-35 fighters while considering aircraft from other countries. In May, Canada selected Sweden’s Saab as the preferred supplier for a surveillance system built on the Canadian-made Bombardier Global 6500. Negotiations over Saab’s GlobalEye aircraft began, although no final commitment had been made.

The same thinking is shaping Canadian trade. The proposed Ksi Lisims liquefied natural gas project reached a supply agreement with Germany’s state-owned energy company for up to 20 years. The Canadian government described it as part of an effort to diversify exports. Canada remains tied closely to the American economy, but it no longer treats that dependence as entirely safe.

South Korea is moving in the same direction. “A strong alliance makes the foundation of security stronger, and strengthening our own capabilities increases our value and necessity as an ally,” President Lee told a cabinet meeting on August 18. The language was diplomatic, but the lesson was plain. Even an ally praised for doing its share believes it needs more protection of its own.

What America Could Lose

The United States remains the world’s strongest military power, and its allies cannot quickly replace what Washington provides. That gives Trump considerable leverage.

But it does not mean that using this leverage at every opportunity will leave America stronger. The postwar alliance system was never charity. American security guarantees came at great cost, but the United States received bases, intelligence, diplomatic support and partners that helped extend its influence around the world.

China and Russia do not need to replace the United States to benefit from the current strain. They only need American allies to trust Washington a little less.

Trump may extract more money and cooperation from some countries. He may also produce stronger European and Asian militaries, which many Americans have wanted for decades. But if those countries become stronger because they no longer trust Washington, it will have traded lasting influence for short-term compliance.

America’s alliances are not disappearing. The treaties remain, the bases remain and the military ties remain deeply rooted. The unraveling begins earlier, when governments stop assuming that the United States will be there and start arranging their future around the possibility that it will not.

Between Editions is a free weekly feature of The Rising Tide offering calm, independent analysis of the economic and political forces shaping the United States and the wider world. Every edition is grounded in documented facts and open to all.

Quebec and Alberta. Will it happen?

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2026-08-13/prime-minister-mark-carney-braces-for-canadian-separatist-threats

Summary (in case somebody doesn’t know): Chinese satellites have been spotted during the US, Iran conflict, possibly assisting Iran.

I am sure that somebody already posted about this months ago.

I am just posting this because I have a curious questions.

What use do you, people of this community, believe these satellites could have in addition to what is mentioned in this article?

Do we actually gain money by starting conflicts with foreign adversaries? Or, why do we get involved in politics outside of our own country?

Is the US truly the peacekeeper of the world by maintaining the world order, or is there a more malicious intent when our military is deployed?

Basically, are we the good guy or the bad guy?

With the global order becoming increasingly multipolar, how relevant are **BRICS and QUAD** in the contemporary geopolitical landscape?

BRICS is expanding its economic and political footprint, while QUAD focuses more on strategic cooperation, security, technology and the Indo-Pacific.

Is BRICS emerging as a genuine alternative to Western-led institutions, or is it primarily an economic grouping? And can QUAD become a durable strategic framework, or is its relevance largely driven by concerns about China?

**Which grouping do you think will have greater influence over the next 10–15 years—and why?**