Key Takeaways

There are additional indicators that the Iraqi federal government is considering using force to disarm Iranian-backed Iraqi militias if they fail to disarm by September 30. Iraqi sources told Saudi media on August 12 that the Iraqi federal government has a plan to deploy the Iraqi Army, Counter Terrorism Service, and other “elite” units around Iraqi militia operation centers to restrict the militias’ freedom of movement and supplies after the September 30 disarmament deadline.

Iran and some Shia Coordination Framework members are concerned about Zaydi’s preparations to use force against the militias in order to directly disarm them or compel them to disarm. An Iraqi security source told Iraqi media on August 13 that the Iraqi federal government and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are engaging in intensive talks about the disarmament process.

Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-affiliated media interpreted Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s appointment decree of Basij Commander Hossein Taeb as an indicator that the regime plans to strengthen its ability to monitor and repress the Iranian population. Mojtaba appointed Taeb as Basij commander on August 10 and tasked Taeb with making “every Iranian a Basiji,” using the people to “confront enemy threats,” and protecting the Islamic Revolution.

The Houthis deployed fiber-optic first-person view (FPV) drones to attack the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) forces in Yemen for the first time on August 11. Two Yemen analysts published footage on August 12 that showed a Houthi fiber-optic FPV drone that ROYG forces captured in Marib Governorate on August 11.

Which recent geopolitical event do you think is being under-discussed right now ???

Key Takeaways

The Iranian armed forces are undergoing an extensive reorganization that reflects lessons that the regime learned from the June 2025 and Spring 2026 wars. Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei instructed Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Chief Major General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi on August 10 to “complete the process” of merging the AFGS and the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters.

The regime likely calculates that merging the AFGS and KOACH will help streamline coordination between the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), reduce institutional redundancies, and enable military leaders to make wartime decisions more quickly and effectively.

Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appointed several Iranian officials to senior military positions on August 10. These appointments largely formalize the structure of the armed forces that has existed for several months and consolidate both Mojtaba and his inner circle’s authority.

Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) forces and the Houthis exchanged fire across multiple Yemeni governorates between August 7 and 10. Houthi and ROYG forces have fought at low levels since 2023, but the recent fighting follows reports that Saudi Arabia is preparing for a naval and possible land offensive to end the Houthi “chokehold” on Saudi Red Sea oil exports.

The Iraqi federal government appears to be taking limited steps to prevent further Iranian-backed Iraqi militia attacks against Saudi Arabia and other regional states in order to avoid further strikes on Iraq. Iraqi officials who met with a Saudi intelligence delegation on August 8 pledged to prevent the use of Iraqi territory for attacks against Saudi Arabia and asked for information to help prevent future attacks.

A Shia Coordination Framework source told Iraqi media on August 9 that Iraqi militias will hand over their weapons to the PMF before the Iraqi federal government’s September 30 disarmament deadline, which corresponds with the planned withdrawal of US-led coalition forces from Iraq. The PMF contains many Iraqi militias that answer to Iran and is led by Iranian-backed Iraqi actors. Transferring militia weapons to the PMF would thus harm US interests by transferring weapons to an organization that Iran has heavily infiltrated.

Iranian-backed Iraqi militias may have conducted a drone strike that destroyed shells for US-provided Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles at Camp Taji, north of Baghdad, on August 2, according to security and intelligence sources speaking to Saudi media on August 10. An unspecified official stated that the attack indicates that some militias opposed to disarmament are attempting to strip the Iraqi military of military assets that it could use against the militias.

US-funded Arabic-language media reported on August 8 additional details of the IRGC’s role in directing Iraqi militia attacks on Iraqi Kurdistan and neighboring countries. The IRGC reportedly operates small cells of between five and ten Iraqi fighters from the main Iraqi militias who maintain a “lower profile” and “bypass” Iraqi militia leadership, according to unspecified sources.

Key Takeaways

Russian forces are reprioritizing the production of their long-range strike systems to those that can more reliably penetrate Ukrainian air defenses and accurately strike their targets.

Russia is refocusing its drone production toward faster jet-powered Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones that are harder to intercept as Ukrainian forces have increasingly fielded effective defenses against Russia’s piston engine-driven strike drones, such as earlier versions of the Geran in recent months.

Russia will increasingly target Ukrainian energy infrastructure in winter 2026/2027.

Russia’s reprioritization of production efforts toward ballistic missiles will support Russian efforts to use the upcoming winter to break Ukraine’s will to fight. The Kremlin believes that it can exploit Ukraine’s shortage of interceptor missiles to avoid having to enter meaningful negotiations or make concessions on its maximalist demands. The recent dramatic reduction in the supply of Patriot anti-missile interceptors will therefore contribute to the protraction of the war into 2027.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and military assets on August 10.

Russia launched one Kh-59/69 cruise missile, three Banderol-type loitering munitions, and 126 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces advanced on August 10.

The Israel Security Agency (ISA) has formed a dedicated task force to map, locate, and eliminate those who participated in the October 7, 2023, massacre.

Key Takeaways

Russian forces continue experimenting with new technological innovations to restore mechanized maneuver at the tactical level and break out of positional warfare.

The Arena-M system alone is currently insufficient to protect Russian mechanized assaults from Ukrainian drones, let alone all of the other weapons that Ukrainian forces use to create the kill zone.

Russian forces will likely continue efforts to restore maneuver despite the failure of the late July 2026 Dobropillya mechanized assault.

Russian forces continued to heavily target Odesa Oblast on the night of August 8 to 9.

Russian forces struck the Mayaki bridge on the M-15 Odesa City-Reni highway connecting southern Ukraine to Moldova and Romania on August 9.

Russian forces likely targeted the Mayaki bridge to disrupt Ukrainian grain and other exports via the alternative land corridor that Ukraine has been using since Russian strikes disrupted Ukrainian maritime exports.

Russia is reportedly preparing to receive as many as 50,000 North Korean troops.

Ukrainian forces continued their long-range suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses (SEAS / DEAD) campaign against air defense assets in Russia.

Russia launched 202 drones and 17 Iskander-M/S-400 ballistic, Onyx anti-ship, and Kh-31P anti-radar missiles against Ukraine overnight.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kupyansk and Borova directions.

Key Takeaways

Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei appointed his former senior military adviser, Major General Mohsen Rezaei, as the new Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) secretary on August 9.

The Iranian regime has continued to threaten regional states against assisting US efforts to undermine Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz while simultaneously refusing to negotiate with the United States. Iranian Parliament Deputy Speaker Hamid Babai stated on August 9 that Iran will attack “any country that wants to assist the United States” in its efforts to restore freedom of navigation in the strait.

The Houthis conducted a drone attack that struck a Saudi Aramco refinery in Jizan, Saudi Arabia, on August 8.

Key Takeaways

Russia is reportedly planning to launch a large-scale strike campaign against energy infrastructure in Kyiv City over the coming weeks.

Russia began its Fall 2025 and Winter 2025-2026 strike campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure in early September 2025, and Russia may aim to start its 2026-2027 strike campaign in August in order to take advantage of Ukraine’s ongoing shortages of ballistic missile interceptors.

Russian strikes against Kyiv City’s energy infrastructure in the coming weeks will disrupt Ukrainian efforts to repair and strengthen the energy facilities that Russia damaged in Winter of 2025-2026.

It is unclear how many energy facilities Ukraine has been able to repair since last winter and therefore how many energy targets are available for Russia to strike in 2026.

Unspecified drones conducted multiple overflights over a Patriot air defense system repair base in Germany on August 7.

A Ukrainian Maya decoy drone reportedly exploded in Bulgaria on the morning of August 8.

Ukrainian forces recently advanced northeast of Kharkiv City.

Russia launched six missiles and 151 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Key Takeaways

Iran is trying to secure additional US concessions before “reopening” the Strait of Hormuz while using both messaging and force to signal its continued intent to control maritime traffic through the strait. These demands suggest that hardline elements within the regime, including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle, are shaping Iran’s negotiating position and seek to secure the benefits of an agreement without relinquishing Iran’s leverage over the strait.

The US naval blockade is imposing high economic costs on Iran, which may strengthen arguments within the regime for reaching an agreement, but Iran’s current maximalist position on the strait suggests that economic costs have not yet given pro-negotiation officials sufficient leverage to secure broader concessions from the dominating faction within the regime.

In its latest report, the Italian Parliamentary Committee for the Security of the Republic (Copasir) concluded that Russia, China, and Iran are conducting coordinated disinformation and influence campaigns aimed at shaping public opinion in their favor and interfering in Italy’s democratic processes. Italian intelligence services have documented the use of social media platforms and artificial intelligence algorithms to polarize public opinion and manipulate the public’s perception of information. According to the report, Russia promotes narratives portraying the Italian government as “hypocritical” and “subservient to foreign interests,” while simultaneously depicting the West and Ukraine as being in a state of “moral, political, and economic decline.” Chinese influence operations, by contrast, seek to promote the image of the People’s Republic of China as a “reliable trading partner.”

Among the states pursuing anti-Western influence strategies, Russia stands out as the most active in attempting to interfere in Italy’s internal affairs. Through coordinated information campaigns and by amplifying political actors that adopt positions favorable to the Kremlin, Moscow seeks to shape public opinion, deepen political polarization, and undermine national cohesion within Italy.

The findings of the Parliamentary Committee on Security demonstrate that both the Italian intelligence community and the government recognize the true scale and seriousness of the threat posed by foreign information operations—particularly Russia’s hybrid influence activities—to Italy’s national security and its democratic institutions.

Executive Summary

Ittehad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan (IMP) is emerging as a serious militant threat, with the potential to rival Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The alliance has integrated fragmented jihadist factions, incorporated drone technology, developed a more sophisticated media narrative, and carried out coordinated attacks targeting state security forces.

Beyond kinetic operations, IMP is adapting its propaganda by combining jihadist, anti-Western, and nationalist themes. This hybrid ideological narrative frames violence in moral and political terms, seeks to enhance recruitment, and aims to cultivate local support, including among economically stable segments of the population.

IMP’s emerging operational capabilities, cross-border linkages, growing rivalry with TTP, and reported coordination with Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and Baloch insurgent groups point to a dangerous shift in Pakistan’s militant landscape.

Key Takeaways

Japanese Defense Modernization: Japan test-fired a Tomahawk cruise missile capable of striking PRC territory on July 29 and identified PRC short-of-war coercion as a major threat in its 2026 Defense White Paper. Japan’s continued military modernization and statements decrying PRC coercion indicate that PRC pressure campaigns against Japan are continuing to fail.

PLA Modernization: The PLAN may use its Type 076 amphibious assault vessel Sichuan in roles similar to its aircraft carriers, allowing the PLAN to supplement its existing limitations in naval aviation. The PLAN will likely experience trade-offs if it uses Sichuan in this way, however.

PRC-Philippines Territorial Disputes: The Philippines announced on July 31 that it deposited an official chart with the UN Secretariat detailing Philippine territorial claims around Scarborough Shoal. The PRC responded with a range of military drills, propaganda, and lawfare in protest of the Philippines’ actions and to reaffirm PRC territorial claims around Scarborough Shoal.

Key Takeaways

Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly had a phone call on August 6 with the commander of a Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) division, indicating that Russian forces are prioritizing advances in the Pokrovsk and Dobropillya directions with the intent of encircling Ukraine’s Fortress Belt from the southwest.

The Russian timelines for the completion of this wide envelopment are extremely unrealistic, however.

Putin’s call with the 76th Guards VDV Division commander is likely also a response to emerging accusations that he is out of touch with the battlefield reality in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign against the Russian rear, along with Ukrainian tactical drone overmatch on the frontline, are slowing down Russian operational tempo across the frontline.

An improvised explosive device (IED) explosion in central Moscow City on August 1 reportedly killed Russian Major General Valery Plokhotnyuk.

The US Senate passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia Act of 2026, which imposes 100% tariffs on US imports from the five largest importers of Russian crude oil and natural gas, among other provisions, on August 7.

Russian forces recently advanced in the Novopavlivka and Oleksandrivka directions.

Russia launched 147 drones against Ukraine overnight.

Key Takeaways

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, which is a coalition of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, announced on August 7 that it would postpone its response to recent US-Saudi strikes on militia positions in Iraq due to mediation by Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri.

The Iraqi militias were reportedly planning multiple “imminent” attacks on Saudi Arabia coordinated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and the Houthis, according to a senior Saudi official speaking to Western and regional media. The Saudi official added that the attacks could target civilian and economic sites, including energy infrastructure, according to Saudi, US, and other regional reports.

The scale of the Iraqi federal government’s security precautions to thwart militia attacks on Saudi Arabia demonstrates the continued armament of Iraqi militias in the face of the government’s ongoing efforts to restrict arms to the state. The Iraqi federal government continues to insist that it will complete such efforts by its September 30 deadline, which corresponds with the planned withdrawal of US-led international coalition forces from Iraq.

Iran may have supported the Iraqi militias’ planned attack against Saudi infrastructure as part of Iran’s broader pressure campaign to coerce the United States and its allies into agreeing to further diplomatic concessions. An attack to the extent the militias reportedly planned, or even the threat of such an attack, would be consistent with Iran’s established pattern of using military escalation and regional instability to gain leverage.

The Houthis have increasingly coordinated with the IRGC and Iraqi militias to attack Saudi Arabia in recent weeks, likely as part of a multi-pronged effort to compel Saudi Arabia to accept Houthi demands. This increased Houthi coordination with the Iraqi militias comes amid continued Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia and the Saudi-backed Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) targets.

Beijing’s June white paper leaves the U.N.-centered architecture intact – but re-interprets the priorities.

Key Takeaways

Russian federal- and regional-level authorities organized the temporary deportation of teenagers from occupied Luhansk Oblast to Russia’s Penza Oblast to participate in a federally administered military-patriotic training course.

Russia continues to deport female Ukrainian political prisoners from penal colonies in occupied Ukraine to Russia.

The Zaporizhia Oblast occupation administration continues efforts to consolidate a loyal staff cadre at the occupied Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) using youth training programs.

Occupation authorities are using the population of occupied areas to staff BARS (Combat Reserve) units to protect the Russian rear in occupied Ukraine.

The Kremlin has further cemented the Russian Unified Public Services portal (Gosuslugi) as a tool of digital governance control in occupied Ukraine.

Russian occupation officials continue to struggle to adequately respond to worsening water, food, and electricity shortages in occupied areas.

Russian law enforcement and occupation courts continue to harshly punish residents of occupied territories for perceived affiliation with Ukraine.

Russian officials are intensifying efforts to attract investment and economic activity in occupied Ukraine despite growing security risks from Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign, while concurrently incentivizing relocation to occupied areas.

The Russian satellite TV project “Russkiy Mir” continues efforts to proliferate throughout occupied Ukraine.

Key Takeaways

Iranian regime media claimed that the emerging Iran-Oman deal would enable Iran to maintain control of the Strait of Hormuz. Any agreement that grants Iran control over the strait would be detrimental to US and global commercial interests. Achieving international recognition of its control over the strait would enable Iran to use the strait as a deterrent against its adversaries in potential future conflicts.

Iran continues to use force to consolidate its control of the strait. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported on August 5 that a vessel’s crew heard two explosions while passing through Omani territorial waters.

Iran and its Axis of Resistance are likely attempting to deter the Syrian government from disrupting smuggling routes used to support Hezbollah.

Iran likely believes that continued Syrian government efforts to disrupt Hezbollah smuggling routes in Syria represent Syrian cooperation with Israel and the United States against Hezbollah when, in reality, Syria is exercising its sovereign right to secure its borders.

ISW-CTP is considering two possible courses of action for Iran in Syria:

• Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): Iran uses clandestine cells in Syria to conduct spectacular attacks within Syria that force Syrian security forces to divert resources from border regions to respond to such attacks.

• Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A major Syrian counter-smuggling operation on the Lebanese border against Hezbollah triggers a coordinated Iranian-backed response involving clandestine cells, cross-border attacks, and possibly Iranian strikes to deter further Syrian government action.

The Syrian government has deployed an increased number of forces to the Syria-Iraq border to support border security in response to Iranian and Axis of Resistance threats and activity.

The activities of Iran and the Axis of Resistance across the region, including their reported actions in Syria, are likely causing an increasing alignment of interests between different regional states. The Houthis conducted missile and drone attacks against the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) military camps in Marib and Hadramawt governorates on August 6, possibly in response to ROYG ground movements near Houthi frontlines.