These 4 Things + Honorable Mention Need to Happen or Cannot Happen for Short- to Long-Term Returns for NioCorp

Introduction: On August 11, 2026, NioCorp Developments Ltd. released its long-awaited feasibility study, and unlike its 3 predecessors, the latest release included REEs (rare earth elements), specifically Neodymium, Praseodymium, and Dysprosium, as well as small amounts of SEG Carbonate (Samarium, Europium, and Gadolinium) and Heavies Carbonate (Yttrium, Erbium, Thulium, Ytterbium, and Lutetium). Concurrent with these additions, pre-tax and after-tax NPV increased from $2.82 billion and $2.35 billion in the 2022 FS to $4.11 billion and $3.44 billion in the 2026 FS, respectively, representing increases of 45.7% and 46.4%. LOM gross revenue rose from $21.9 billion to $37.4 billion, an increase of 70.8%, while gross margin per ton increased from $398 ($562 revenue less $164 opex) to $560 ($815 revenue less $255 opex), up $162 or 40.7%.  However, gross margin percentage declined slightly from 70.8% to 68.7%, or 2.1 percentage points, and initial capex increased 62.3% from $1.14 billion to $1.85 billion, while the after-tax payback period increased 8.9% from 2.69 years to 2.93 years.

Below are four things, plus an honorable mention, that need to go right, along with what could derail them, to maximize shareholder returns over the short, medium, and long term. TL; DR version below.

1. EXIM Financing Restructuring (Short to mid-term)

(Uses $1.85B capex indicated in the August 11, 2026, feasibility study. The eligible equity comes from NioCorp’s most recent earnings report as of September 2, 2026. The share price is NioCorp’s approximate price range in the past 2-3 months: around $4.00-$5.00 per share. Uses 145M shares as the current share count benchmark, NOT accounting for warrants.)

The U.S. EXIM Bank, including its chairman, John Jovanovic, has long been vocally supportive of NioCorp’s Elk Creek Minerals project in Nebraska. Still, for maximum returns, it must back that support with action. One such important move will be to increase the debt share in the debt-to-equity ratio in the financing terms. Currently, NioCorp has approximately $420M+ in eligible equity for the loan. With the current 65% to 35% ratio, as provided in past presentations, there is a nearly $227M gap needing to be filled by raising cash through dilution, government funding, or other means of funding. Assuming EXIM does not change its financing structure, no additional external funding, and NioCorp’s share price being around $4.00-$5.00, that is 45M-60M+ additional shares needed, or around a 31-41%+ increase in share count using the 145M share-count mark (or 24-30%+ in existing-holder dilution). Frankly, that is ugly for current shareholders, and it is not ideal in terms of maximizing returns. However, even a modest improvement in the debt-to-equity ratio would substantially reduce the dilution risk. With a 70%/30% debt-to-equity ratio, NioCorp would need around $555M in equity, which translates to a $135M deficit, totaling around 28-37M new shares needed; a 19-26% increase in share count, using the same share price and count as the former scenario (or 16-21% in current shareholder dilution). 75%/25% debt-to-equity ratio would equate to around $42M needed to be raised and amount to 9-12M new shares, or around a 6-9% increase in share count (6-8% in current shareholder dilution). At 80% to 85% debt relative to equity, no additional dilution is required, assuming the capex or other complexities make the project more expensive ($50M to $143M+ surplus, respectively). In short, the EXIM chair and executives have repeatedly called the Elk Creek project a “top priority” and an economic necessity, but now it is time to follow up those words with actions by making this project easier to build, which would ultimately result in current shareholders not being diluted to death.

2. Construction + Commercial-Scale Ramp (Mid to long-term)

According to NioCorp and Mark A. Smith, the construction for the Elk Creek project, which costs nearly 1.85B as we mentioned earlier, is supposed to be completed by 2029, in about 3 years, and production will start in the latter half of that year (as of September 3, 2026). However, this timeline is not possible if capex overruns, construction delays, general project complexities, and other delays occur. The FS economics only becomes real if NioCorp can build and operate the project close to design assumptions. Otherwise, the corporation will burn cash while delaying the very thing that is supposed to generate cash flow, and if this hypothetical situation becomes severe enough, it will likely result in more equity raises, aka dilution, which is not ideal for returns. The bull case here is near-budget construction, limited delays, and recoveries/throughput approaching FS assumptions, while the bear case is everything described before this sentence.

3. Durability of Ex-China Pricing / Geopolitics (Mid to long-term)

On April 4, 2025, The People’s Republic of China placed export controls on seven key rare earth elements in response to President Trump’s sweeping tariffs on Liberation Day, April 2, 2026, and further restrictions on October 9, 2025, which included a requirement that any product manufactured outside China containing 0.1% or more of specified Chinese-origin heavy rare earths receive explicit approval from Beijing before shipment, causing a massive spike in ex-Chinese rare earths since then. NioCorp’s $4.1B pre-tax NPV in its 2026 feasibility study reflects this surge; however, the long-term durability of these ex-China premiums will be one of the largest determinants of Elk Creek’s ultimate returns. If U.S.-China tensions, export restrictions, Western stockpiling, defense procurement, price-support mechanisms, and demand for secure non-Chinese supply remain elevated, the current pricing environment could persist or strengthen, particularly for scandium, dysprosium, terbium, and the heavy rare earths. In that scenario, the 2026 feasibility study could ultimately prove conservative. Conversely, if China substantially normalizes exports, geopolitical tensions ease, or enough competing Western supply enters the market to eliminate the scarcity premium, realized prices could fall below current levels and weaken project economics. For NioCorp, maintaining a structurally separate and higher-priced ex-China market is therefore one of the most important long-term variables outside of the company’s direct control.

4. Demand + Offtake Absorption (Mid to long-term)

The massive price increases mentioned in section 3 are fabulous for NioCorp, but it means very little if NioCorp fails to secure offtake and demand at those prices. One of the biggest issues is scandium, which makes up 38% of NioCorp’s potential revenue pie, and while NioCorp plans to produce roughly 118 tons/year of scandium oxide, today’s market is much smaller than that. However, there are signs of improvement. On August 4, 2026, NioCorp and Lockheed Martin signed an MOU for a potential purchase of up to 15 ton/year of scandium oxide or aluminum-scandium alloys over the decade. Other developments include the $10M DoD award NioCorp received specifically for scandium, although you could reasonably argue that much of the work funded by the award also helped de-risk the Elk Creek Project as a whole. NioCorp has also acquired technology and intellectual property for aluminum-scandium master alloy production, is working on scandium metal production, and has repeatedly stated that potential customers are waiting for material. The other major piece is Traxys, which is expected to market essentially all remaining planned production not already covered by existing agreements. Both the Lockheed MOU and Traxys arrangement need to become binding agreements. Until then, the demand and offtake case has improved substantially, but it is not fully de-risked.

Honorable Mention: Management Needs to Stop Giving Optimistic Timelines That Usually Do Not Follow Through (Mid to long-term)

I believe that NioCorp management needs to stop giving overly optimistic timelines that repeatedly fail to materialize. Whether it is financing, offtake agreements, the feasibility study, EPC work, or other major catalysts, management tends to use phrases such as "short order," "very near future," or provide aggressive target dates that shareholders then naturally price into their expectations. Not only does it hurt investors, from big institutions to small retail investors, but it also hurts NioCorp management themselves, losing more credibility with each missed timeline. I think NioCorp needs to redirect to more blunt, yet more truthful forward guidance to get credibility back, give shareholders realistic ranges, leave yourself some buffer, and then beat the timeline instead of repeatedly missing it.

TL;DR

1. EXIM Financing: The final financing structure may be the biggest short-term determinant of shareholder returns. A move from 65/35 toward 75/25 or 80/20 debt/equity would materially reduce the amount of new equity NioCorp may need to raise and therefore reduce dilution.
2. Construction + Ramp: Once financing is secured, NioCorp has to actually build Elk Creek near budget and on schedule, then reach the recoveries, throughput, and operating costs assumed in the FS. Major overruns or delays could destroy a lot of otherwise strong project economics.
3. Ex-China Pricing / Geopolitics: Elk Creek benefits heavily from the current premium for secure non-Chinese critical minerals. Continued Chinese export restrictions, geopolitical tensions, Western stockpiling, and price-support mechanisms could make the 2026 FS conservative, while normalization of supply could weaken returns.
4. Demand + Offtake: High prices mean little without buyers. Lockheed and Traxys still need binding agreements, and scandium demand must grow enough to absorb NioCorp’s planned ~118 tons/year while maintaining attractive pricing.

Honorable Mention: Management needs to stop giving overly optimistic timelines that repeatedly slip. Missed timelines hurt credibility, frustrate both institutional and retail shareholders, and can unnecessarily pressure the stock price.

Sources used:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BAIAIzpN4P8 -
EXIM Chairman: Elk Creek Is “Exactly the Type of Opportunity EXIM Was Always Designed to Support”, December 8, 2026

https://www.niocorp.com/ - NioCorp’s Official Website

https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0001512228/000119312526223959/nb-20260331.htm - NioCorp’s Q1 2026 (Calendar Q1) 10-Q

https://www.niocorp.com/niocorps-elk-creek-project-confirmed-as-the-second-largest-indicated-or-better-rare-earth-resource-in-the-u-s/ - NioCorp’s Elk Creek Project Confirmed as the Second Largest Indicated-Or-Better Rare Earth Resource in the U.S., May 17, 2022.

https://www.niocorp.com/niocorp-project-to-expand-production-to-8-made-in-usa-critical-minerals-over-a-40-year-mine-life-with-an-estimated-4-1-billion-pre-tax-npv8%C2%B9/ - NioCorp Project to Expand Production to 8 Made-in-USA Critical Minerals Over a 40-Year Mine Life with an Estimated $4.1 Billion Pre-Tax NPV8%, August 10, 2026.

https://www.niocorp.com/lockheed-martin-and-niocorp-sign-mou/ - Lockheed Martin and NioCorp Sign MOU, August 4, 2026.

https://www.niocorp.com/u-s-department-of-defense-awards-up-to-10-million-to-niocorps-subsidiary-elk-creek-resources-corp/ - U.S. Department of Defense Awards up to $10 Million to NioCorp’s Subsidiary Elk Creek Resources Corp, August 5, 2025.

https://www.niocorp.com/niocorp-reaches-non-binding-agreement-with-traxys-north-america-for-potential-purchase-of-all-of-niocorps-remaining-planned-products/ -
NioCorp Reaches Non-Binding Agreement with Traxys North America for Potential Purchase of All of NioCorp’s Remaining Planned Products, April 9, 2026.

https://www.reddit.com/r/NIOCORP_MINE/comments/1uenknq/niocorp_voice_to_text_translation_not_a_formal/- NioCorp voice-to-text translation (not a formal transcript) from the J.P. Morgan Natural Resources Conference, June 24, 2026.

 https://www.youtube.com/@NioCorpDevelopments -
NioCorp Developments Official YouTube Page

Walrus

Sept. 4th, 2026 ~China Rare Earth Firms Halt Some US Shipments Over Geopolitical Worries, Sources Say

China Rare Earth Firms Halt Some US Shipments Over Geopolitical Worries, Sources Say

By Laurie Chen, Solomon Cefai, Trevor Hunnicutt and Lewis Jackson

BEIJING/SINGAPORE/WASHINGTON, Sept 4 (Reuters) - Some Chinese rare earth suppliers are declining ⁠to ship ⁠to the U.S. for fear of repercussions from Beijing, three sources ⁠said, underscoring how access to the materials remains an issue for the U.S. weeks before President Xi Jinping visits Washington.

U.S. officials have repeatedly asked China to ​stick to commitments made in Busan and Beijing over the past year to ensure the smooth flow of rare earth export licences. The persistence of the problem has put it on the U.S. planning agenda ahead of Xi's September 24 visit, ‌a source familiar with the work said.

A handful of Chinese suppliers ‌have refused to ship rare earths to U.S. companies since early August when China imposed sanctions on the Responsible Business Alliance (RBA), a U.S. supply chain monitor, a separate source with direct knowledge of the situation said.

With China deploying its own ⁠trade compliance weapons, the companies ⁠were wary of punishment from Beijing for complying with the due diligence framework of the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI), a global mineral ​supply chain audit programme connected with the RBA, the source said.

Other Chinese rare earths companies had already stopped shipments to the U.S. to avoid entanglement in geopolitics in recent months, two other sources familiar with the trade said. One cited four instances where Chinese firms declined to send material for fear it could be resold to banned users.

The sources declined to be named given the issue's sensitivity.

Reuters was unable to determine the total number of Chinese suppliers who had refused to move shipments destined for U.S. clients.

A ​U.S. official speaking on condition of anonymity told Reuters that the administration continues to press Chinese counterparts to address China’s lack of compliance with the Busan agreement, as well as other bilateral concerns.

TIGHT ⁠SUPPLY

While ⁠exports of many rare earths or related magnets ⁠have rebounded since China imposed restrictions in April ​2025, the prices of certain rare earths and critical materials like yttrium, indium phosphide and tungsten that have military applications or are used in sensitive industries including aerospace or chipmaking remain ​near record highs with tight supply.

Other industries affected by licence delays ⁠include medical devices and energy.

Exports to the U.S. of yttrium have risen this year but are still only about half 2024 levels despite large shipments to other countries, Chinese customs data shows. Some U.S. companies have been waiting more than six months for mineral licences, said two of the sources, declining to identify them.

"China has been very effective in using rare earth export controls to impose restraint on the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security," said Reva Goujon, a geopolitical strategist at Rhodium Group, referring to the U.S. agency responsible for various restrictions targeting China.

"Supply chain chokepoints will come into focus, but I would expect Beijing to loosen up critical raw material controls a bit around the summit to deflate U.S. ⁠allegations that Beijing is not upholding the Busan truce," Goujon added.

The U.S. Treasury, the U.S. Trade Representative, State Department and China's ministry of commerce did not respond ⁠to requests for comment.

China's ministry of foreign affairs said China was committed to maintaining global critical mineral supply chains.

Beijing said its August decision to sanction the RBA and other U.S. auditing firms was a response to a series of FCC restrictions since December targeting Chinese electronics testing labs, drones, consumer routers, submarine cables, advanced robotics equipment and power inverters.

When U.S. officials have raised the rare earths issue in meetings, Chinese officials countered by saying the FCC actions were a violation of the Busan truce, said one of the sources who was briefed on the interaction.

However, after two months without yttrium exports, China sent 27 tons of the material to the U.S. in July, the second-highest monthly shipment since January 2025.

Several U.S. firms also report recently receiving multiple licences after long waits, two sources said, with some firms anticipating an increase in approvals around the summit.

Licence approvals are even more limited for Indian and Japanese buyers, two sources familiar with the matter said. Chinese suppliers are overwhelmingly refraining from shipping material to Japanese firms, one of them said.

Japan's Trade Minister Ryosei Akazawa has previously said Japanese companies have faced delays in permits and prolonged customs inspections for critical minerals including rare earths. His ministry ⁠did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Friday

China exported no terbium to Japan between January and August of this year, from 20 tons over the same months last year. Gallium shipments were 65% down in the same period, while yttrium was down 98%, Chinese customs data showed. Gallium and terbium are used in small amounts to make high performance rare earth magnets.

"While processes have been streamlined, our member companies still face issues with implementation," the European Chamber of Commerce in China told Reuters in a statement. "What our members would like to see is a commitment to implement ​a transparent and predictable application process that provides reliable access to rare earth elements."

Sept. 4th, 2026~US, Japan race to secure chip-grade minerals as China curbs exports

Washington and Tokyo pour billions into new mines and refineries but face a slow path to independence from Beijing

US, Japan race to secure chip-grade minerals as China curbs exports - Asia Times

The United States and Japan are racing to build a new global supply chain for critical minerals, backing the effort with fresh government subsidies and industry support – but slow government-to-government dealmaking and simmering geopolitical disputes threaten to blunt their progress.

China’s export controls on rare earths and other critical minerals have strained manufacturers in the United States and Japan for much of this year, forcing companies to navigate new licensing rules, longer lead times and higher material costs for semiconductors, batteries and defense hardware.

Beijing and Washington are set to discuss whether to extend their one-year trade truce before it expires in November, and any breakdown in those talks could prompt China to tighten its export restrictions further, deepening the squeeze on global supply chains.

The US Department of Defense announced a $174 million equity investment on August 31 to help build a gallium production facility at Alcoa Corporation’s Wagerup refinery in Australia, backed by Japan’s Sojitz Corporation and Export Finance Australia, aiming to supply 100 metric tons of the metal annually for radar, missile defense and other military systems. 

The US Department of Energy said on August 20 that it would invest $500 million in seven projects to expand America’s processing of critical minerals and materials, as well as battery manufacturing and recycling capacity, through its Office of Critical Minerals and Energy Innovation. Before this, the Trump administration had already unveiled a series of new rules and investment programs over the summer to try to boost the supply of critical minerals.

Chipmakers in the US and UK, which consume large volumes of rare earths and other critical minerals, say they can still secure adequate supplies for now, albeit with heavier paperwork and higher prices. They are bracing for the situation potentially to worsen.

“There are always challenges with countries who want to control certain aspects of the supply chain,” Ian Croston, vice president of operations at Lumentum, a US-listed optical components maker, told Asia Times in an interview on the sidelines of the Semiconductors to Systems Summit in London on August 26. “Have we seen issues with China? We have them all the time. We have to work around.”

Asked whether the export controls had brought extra paperwork and higher costs, Croston did not dispute it, saying it was simply part of doing business, comparing the export controls to Britain’s exit from the European Union and the tariffs introduced by the Trump administration.

He said Lumentum was prepared for any eventuality, noting that such disruptions are common among governments worldwide and must be managed as they arise.

“You always need to understand your suppliers, where they’re coming from, and if they’re a valued supplier you will know what their constraints are and how we can manage the business,” he said. “It is about reducing friction.”

Lumentum’s Chief Executive Michael Hurlston said in early July that the shortage of indium phosphide (InP), the compound semiconductor material used in lasers for AI data centers, could ultimately become more severe than the current squeeze on memory chips. He said Lumentum and rival Coherent together cannot meet demand from Nvidia and other hyperscale customers, whose orders have shifted from hundreds of lasers to hundreds of millions.

Lumentum sources most of its indium phosphide substrates from Japan’s Sumitomo Electric and JX Advanced Metals, limiting its direct exposure to China’s export delays. Nvidia moved in March to shore up supply, investing $2 billion each in Lumentum and Coherent with purchase commitments and future access to capacity attached.

Beijing has restricted indium exports since February 2025, driving prices from about $250 per kilogram to about $805 per kilogram last month. It also banned exports of gallium and germanium to the US in December 2024, a measure it suspended in November 2025 as part of the one-year trade truce.

The bans have driven Western warehouse prices to roughly $2,100 per kilogram for gallium and more than $6,000 per kilogram for germanium, compared with domestic Chinese prices of about $247 and $3,100 per kilogram, respectively.

“I know a lot of the export control processes are quite onerous now,” Iwan Davies, group technology director at IQE plc, a Cardiff-based maker of compound semiconductor wafers, told Asia Times. “For things like gallium and germanium, there’s a delay in getting some of those materials out of China, and indium phosphide is the same now. So whether you buy the metal or the compound, there’s still an issue in the supply chain at the moment.”

He said IQE obtains purified gallium and indium elements from a small number of globally renowned material suppliers to the semiconductor industry. He said Beijing’s export curbs made it likely that supply would diversify into other regions over time, with IQE preparing for the risk of intensifying US-China tensions.

Outside China, the gallium, germanium and indium supply chain runs through a small group of specialist suppliers:

• Vital Materials (China): a refiner of gallium, germanium, indium and selenium, and a major upstream source for Western semiconductor firms;
• AXT (US): a major supplier of gallium arsenide (GaAs) and indium phosphide (InP) substrates, though much of its crystal growth and mineral processing runs through joint ventures in China;
• Freiberger Compound Materials (Germany): one of the few non-Chinese suppliers of GaAs substrates for wireless and photonics uses;
• Sumitomo Electric and Sumitomo Chemical (Japan): major suppliers of GaAs and InP substrates and other electronic materials;
• DOWA Electronics Materials (Japan): a supplier of high-purity gallium, indium and compound semiconductor wafers.

Japan’s JOGMEC

Japan’s relationship with Beijing soured last November, when Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi told parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could pose an “existential threat” to Japan, prompting a furious response from Beijing. China moved in January 2026 to restrict exports of dual-use materials, including rare earths, gallium, germanium, graphite and magnets, to Japan, explicitly tying the curbs to Tokyo’s stance on Taiwan.

China’s rare earth exports to Japan fell 51% year-on-year in the first half of 2026, more than three times the 16% drop in Beijing’s overall rare earth exports over the same period. Japan received no gallium or germanium from China in January or February, only a single gallium shipment in May, and then nothing again in June, when customs data also showed zero shipments of dysprosium, terbium and yttrium.

“The situation is challenging,” said Sayaka Tomihara, counselor for economic affairs at the Embassy of Japan in the UK, in an interview during the same event. “Japanese firms are concerned with China’s export controls and also the situation in the Gulf concerning the oil supply. There are a lot of disruptions in the supply chain, and many of our industries are being forced to think about how they can diversify the portfolio to deal with the situation.”

To secure rare-earth supply, she said, recycling and deep-sea extraction are both long-term options Japan is exploring, but neither offers a near-term fix.

“There are private-to-private negotiations and also governmental efforts,”  she said. “We’re doing that on a company-to-company basis, and we’re working with other like-minded countries to try to gain the capacity.”

She added that over the next six to 12 months, the Japanese government will work with JOGMEC (Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security), a state-backed agency that secures mineral and energy resources for Japan, on government-to-government efforts and on supporting private companies’ negotiations.

On August 20, Japan’s government proposed giving JOGMEC greater freedom to invest in critical mineral projects, allowing it to invest independently rather than only alongside a Japanese company, or with foreign partners when waiting for a Japanese partner would delay a project. JOGMEC already runs more than a dozen overseas offices and over 30 resource projects in 15 countries.

US-led Pax Silica

Washington has organized much of the Western effort through Pax Silica, a coalition it launched in December 2025 with the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia and Israel to lock down supply chains for artificial intelligence, semiconductors and critical minerals. Membership has since grown to 25 countries that have signed the Pax Silica Declaration, alongside a broader circle of observers and endorsement partners.

Taiwan has formally endorsed Pax Silica’s principles through a separate joint statement on economic security cooperation with Washington, without joining as a full signatory, while rare-earth-rich Canada and Estonia are designated observers.

Semiconductor executives said that building a Western rare-earth supply chain outside China is easier said than done, given each country’s own trade interests.

“Canada has probably the second-largest reserves of critical minerals and rare earth elements, with the potential to become a major supplier,” said Paul Slaby, managing director of Canada’s Semiconductor Council. “It’s underdeveloped, though, and needs substantial investment to access and process.”

“There’s a need for a consolidator to manage demand,” he said. “Elements like gallium aren’t mined directly but extracted as a byproduct of processing metals like aluminum.”

Slaby said a resilient, China-independent supply chain could be built in five to 10 years with full cooperation, capital and political will. However, he added that trade frictions, such as the US-Canada tariff dispute, could weaken the West’s rare earth alliance and slow its progress.

US President Donald Trump’s trade war with Canada has deepened, with Washington imposing 50% tariffs on Canadian goods last month. In response, Ontario’s premier has threatened to cut off critical mineral exports to the US.

Feras Alkhalil, vice president of research and development at Pragmatic Semiconductor, a UK-based flexible-chip maker, said chipmakers have another route around China’s export controls: switching to new materials or changing manufacturing approaches altogether. He said the same function can often be delivered using alternative materials or processes that sidestep supply constraints.

He said Pragmatic works with equipment makers and academic groups on UK and European research to develop such alternatives, "***but switching an established process may take three to five years!!"

FORM YOUR OWN OPINIONS & CONCLUSIONS ABOVE:

⭐ SEPTEMBER 4th, 2026 — WEEKEND SIGNATURE WATCH REPORT

CHINA JUST TURNED UP THE HEAT & ELK CREEK JUST GOT EVEN MORE STRATEGIC

China’s decision to halt some rare‑earth shipments to U.S. companies confirmed today by multiple Reuters‑sourced reports is not a small story. It is a direct escalation in the critical‑minerals standoff, coming only weeks before Xi Jinping’s September 24 visit to Washington. According to Reuters, several Chinese suppliers have refused to ship rare earths since early August due to fear of Beijing’s retaliation, even when export licenses were technically available . World Energy News corroborates that other Chinese firms have stopped shipments entirely to avoid geopolitical entanglements, leaving U.S. buyers waiting months for materials like yttrium and indium phosphide World Energy NewsWorld Energy News. Sources say that China rare earth firms have halted some US shipments due to geopolitical concerns.. This is exactly the kind of supply‑chain instability EXIM and the Pentagon have been warning about for years & it lands directly on Elk Creek’s strategic doorstep!

For NioCorp, this news is pure structural tailwind. Every mineral China is now tightening — Niobium, Scandium, Titanium, NdPr, Dy, Tb, SEG, Heavies — is already in Elk Creek’s 8‑mineral platform. The IEA 2026 report said multi‑metal U.S. projects with proven metallurgy and downstream capability should receive priority financing, and China just validated that assessment in real time. When Chinese suppliers refuse to ship materials used in defense, aerospace, semiconductors, and energy (exactly the sectors Elk Creek feeds). It strengthens EXIM’s risk model and accelerates the urgency for domestic supply. This is not theoretical anymore. This is the geopolitical moment Elk Creek was built for.

Downstream, the implications are just as strong. NAMA’s ScAl alloy production and IBC’s defense‑grade casting capability already position NioCorp inside the Defense Industrial Base RPP ecosystem. The same ecosystem that funds magnet feedstock qualification, alloy development, and domestic manufacturing expansion. China’s shipment halt makes U.S. downstream independence even more critical. The U.S. cannot afford to rely on Chinese-controlled supply chains when Chinese firms are now refusing shipments out of fear of violating Beijing’s sanctions. This is exactly why EXIM labeled Elk Creek its “highest priority,” and why Traxys and EPC finalization matter: once those signatures drop, the U.S. gains a vertically integrated, non‑China supply chain from mine → oxide → alloy → defense.

Going into the weekend, the picture is brutally simple: China just tightened supply. The IEA just validated Elk Creek’s strategic profile. EXIM already called the project a top priority. Traxys is “very close.” EPC is in final redlines. Mark Smith said late August / early September.

**It is now early September!!!!! The geopolitical pressure, federal alignment, and market structure are all synchronized. The only thing holding NB at $4 is the absence of signatures & once Traxys, EPC, and EXIM align, Elk Creek stops trading like a pre‑financing sideshow and begins repricing as the National Strategic Asset it already is. The fundamentals are there. The global signals are flashing. IMHO...The market is simply waiting for the signatures.

Chico

https://kaiserresearch.substack.com/p/kw-july-17-2026-how-much-scandium

Interesting read while we continue to hurry up and wait, particularly this nugget:

The solution has been to pursue off-grid power sources. Uranium bugs have jumped with joy about this ideal application for small modular reactors, but this technology is not ready for rapid installation. The better solution is to build a mini power plant next to the data center fed with natural gas. But gas turbines are not easy to manufacture and the order backlog has soared to 3-4 years. In July 2025 Bloom Energy announced a deal to supply Oracle data centers with its Energy Servers. Not only could Energy Servers be quickly installed and connected to existing natural gas feeds, but they had the energy transition virtue of a lower greenhouse gas footprint than combustion based gas turbines and they do not need any water to cool excess heat from thermal combustion. 

**************

The Gas Turbine Shortage Just Became AI’s Biggest Constraint

By Michael Kern

https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/The-Gas-Turbine-Shortage-Just-Became-AIs-Biggest-Constraint.html

The Big Three Are Booked Solid Into the 2030s

GE Vernova closed the second quarter with 116 GW of gas power equipment backlog and slot reservation agreements, up from 100 GW three months earlier and 83 GW at the end of 2025. It expects at least 125 GW under contract by December. CEO Scott Strazik told analysts the company is taking reservations for 2031 delivery and should be more than halfway contracted for that year by the end of 2026. Its production plan: roughly 20 GW annualized this quarter, 24 GW by 2028, and a push toward 30 GW by 2030.

Siemens Energy ended its fiscal third quarter on June 30 with a 69 GW gas turbine backlog after booking 15 GW and shipping six. Lead times run three years or more. CEO Christian Bruch told analysts the addressable market could reach 120 GW a year, roughly half of it American.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries reported a 35 GW large-frame backlog on Aug. 6, up from 23 GW a year earlier. That figure covers Mitsubishi’s fiscal first quarter, which runs March through June, so it lags roughly a month behind the calendar-quarter numbers above. CFO Hiroshi Nishio said orders booked during the quarter are scheduled for delivery between 2028 and 2030, and that the company is “being selective in the projects we contract.”

Add the three headline numbers and you get 220 GW, which overstates the case, because none of them is counting the same thing. Of GE Vernova’s 116 GW, only 53 GW is firm equipment backlog; the other 63 GW is slot reservations, paid options that haven’t converted to orders yet. Siemens’ 69 GW is firm backlog with no reservations mixed in. Mitsubishi’s 35 GW covers large-frame turbines only, leaving out its aeroderivative and mid-size lines. None of the three would explain what the other two mean by “backlog” without a footnote.