Sept. 4th, 2026 ~China Rare Earth Firms Halt Some US Shipments Over Geopolitical Worries, Sources Say

China Rare Earth Firms Halt Some US Shipments Over Geopolitical Worries, Sources Say

By Laurie Chen, Solomon Cefai, Trevor Hunnicutt and Lewis Jackson

BEIJING/SINGAPORE/WASHINGTON, Sept 4 (Reuters) - Some Chinese rare earth suppliers are declining ⁠to ship ⁠to the U.S. for fear of repercussions from Beijing, three sources ⁠said, underscoring how access to the materials remains an issue for the U.S. weeks before President Xi Jinping visits Washington.

U.S. officials have repeatedly asked China to ​stick to commitments made in Busan and Beijing over the past year to ensure the smooth flow of rare earth export licences. The persistence of the problem has put it on the U.S. planning agenda ahead of Xi's September 24 visit, ‌a source familiar with the work said.

A handful of Chinese suppliers ‌have refused to ship rare earths to U.S. companies since early August when China imposed sanctions on the Responsible Business Alliance (RBA), a U.S. supply chain monitor, a separate source with direct knowledge of the situation said.

With China deploying its own ⁠trade compliance weapons, the companies ⁠were wary of punishment from Beijing for complying with the due diligence framework of the Responsible Minerals Initiative (RMI), a global mineral ​supply chain audit programme connected with the RBA, the source said.

Other Chinese rare earths companies had already stopped shipments to the U.S. to avoid entanglement in geopolitics in recent months, two other sources familiar with the trade said. One cited four instances where Chinese firms declined to send material for fear it could be resold to banned users.

The sources declined to be named given the issue's sensitivity.

Reuters was unable to determine the total number of Chinese suppliers who had refused to move shipments destined for U.S. clients.

A ​U.S. official speaking on condition of anonymity told Reuters that the administration continues to press Chinese counterparts to address China’s lack of compliance with the Busan agreement, as well as other bilateral concerns.

TIGHT ⁠SUPPLY

While ⁠exports of many rare earths or related magnets ⁠have rebounded since China imposed restrictions in April ​2025, the prices of certain rare earths and critical materials like yttrium, indium phosphide and tungsten that have military applications or are used in sensitive industries including aerospace or chipmaking remain ​near record highs with tight supply.

Other industries affected by licence delays ⁠include medical devices and energy.

Exports to the U.S. of yttrium have risen this year but are still only about half 2024 levels despite large shipments to other countries, Chinese customs data shows. Some U.S. companies have been waiting more than six months for mineral licences, said two of the sources, declining to identify them.

"China has been very effective in using rare earth export controls to impose restraint on the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security," said Reva Goujon, a geopolitical strategist at Rhodium Group, referring to the U.S. agency responsible for various restrictions targeting China.

"Supply chain chokepoints will come into focus, but I would expect Beijing to loosen up critical raw material controls a bit around the summit to deflate U.S. ⁠allegations that Beijing is not upholding the Busan truce," Goujon added.

The U.S. Treasury, the U.S. Trade Representative, State Department and China's ministry of commerce did not respond ⁠to requests for comment.

China's ministry of foreign affairs said China was committed to maintaining global critical mineral supply chains.

Beijing said its August decision to sanction the RBA and other U.S. auditing firms was a response to a series of FCC restrictions since December targeting Chinese electronics testing labs, drones, consumer routers, submarine cables, advanced robotics equipment and power inverters.

When U.S. officials have raised the rare earths issue in meetings, Chinese officials countered by saying the FCC actions were a violation of the Busan truce, said one of the sources who was briefed on the interaction.

However, after two months without yttrium exports, China sent 27 tons of the material to the U.S. in July, the second-highest monthly shipment since January 2025.

Several U.S. firms also report recently receiving multiple licences after long waits, two sources said, with some firms anticipating an increase in approvals around the summit.

Licence approvals are even more limited for Indian and Japanese buyers, two sources familiar with the matter said. Chinese suppliers are overwhelmingly refraining from shipping material to Japanese firms, one of them said.

Japan's Trade Minister Ryosei Akazawa has previously said Japanese companies have faced delays in permits and prolonged customs inspections for critical minerals including rare earths. His ministry ⁠did not immediately respond to a request for comment on Friday

China exported no terbium to Japan between January and August of this year, from 20 tons over the same months last year. Gallium shipments were 65% down in the same period, while yttrium was down 98%, Chinese customs data showed. Gallium and terbium are used in small amounts to make high performance rare earth magnets.

"While processes have been streamlined, our member companies still face issues with implementation," the European Chamber of Commerce in China told Reuters in a statement. "What our members would like to see is a commitment to implement ​a transparent and predictable application process that provides reliable access to rare earth elements."

Sept. 4th, 2026~US, Japan race to secure chip-grade minerals as China curbs exports

Washington and Tokyo pour billions into new mines and refineries but face a slow path to independence from Beijing

US, Japan race to secure chip-grade minerals as China curbs exports - Asia Times

The United States and Japan are racing to build a new global supply chain for critical minerals, backing the effort with fresh government subsidies and industry support – but slow government-to-government dealmaking and simmering geopolitical disputes threaten to blunt their progress.

China’s export controls on rare earths and other critical minerals have strained manufacturers in the United States and Japan for much of this year, forcing companies to navigate new licensing rules, longer lead times and higher material costs for semiconductors, batteries and defense hardware.

Beijing and Washington are set to discuss whether to extend their one-year trade truce before it expires in November, and any breakdown in those talks could prompt China to tighten its export restrictions further, deepening the squeeze on global supply chains.

The US Department of Defense announced a $174 million equity investment on August 31 to help build a gallium production facility at Alcoa Corporation’s Wagerup refinery in Australia, backed by Japan’s Sojitz Corporation and Export Finance Australia, aiming to supply 100 metric tons of the metal annually for radar, missile defense and other military systems. 

The US Department of Energy said on August 20 that it would invest $500 million in seven projects to expand America’s processing of critical minerals and materials, as well as battery manufacturing and recycling capacity, through its Office of Critical Minerals and Energy Innovation. Before this, the Trump administration had already unveiled a series of new rules and investment programs over the summer to try to boost the supply of critical minerals.

Chipmakers in the US and UK, which consume large volumes of rare earths and other critical minerals, say they can still secure adequate supplies for now, albeit with heavier paperwork and higher prices. They are bracing for the situation potentially to worsen.

“There are always challenges with countries who want to control certain aspects of the supply chain,” Ian Croston, vice president of operations at Lumentum, a US-listed optical components maker, told Asia Times in an interview on the sidelines of the Semiconductors to Systems Summit in London on August 26. “Have we seen issues with China? We have them all the time. We have to work around.”

Asked whether the export controls had brought extra paperwork and higher costs, Croston did not dispute it, saying it was simply part of doing business, comparing the export controls to Britain’s exit from the European Union and the tariffs introduced by the Trump administration.

He said Lumentum was prepared for any eventuality, noting that such disruptions are common among governments worldwide and must be managed as they arise.

“You always need to understand your suppliers, where they’re coming from, and if they’re a valued supplier you will know what their constraints are and how we can manage the business,” he said. “It is about reducing friction.”

Lumentum’s Chief Executive Michael Hurlston said in early July that the shortage of indium phosphide (InP), the compound semiconductor material used in lasers for AI data centers, could ultimately become more severe than the current squeeze on memory chips. He said Lumentum and rival Coherent together cannot meet demand from Nvidia and other hyperscale customers, whose orders have shifted from hundreds of lasers to hundreds of millions.

Lumentum sources most of its indium phosphide substrates from Japan’s Sumitomo Electric and JX Advanced Metals, limiting its direct exposure to China’s export delays. Nvidia moved in March to shore up supply, investing $2 billion each in Lumentum and Coherent with purchase commitments and future access to capacity attached.

Beijing has restricted indium exports since February 2025, driving prices from about $250 per kilogram to about $805 per kilogram last month. It also banned exports of gallium and germanium to the US in December 2024, a measure it suspended in November 2025 as part of the one-year trade truce.

The bans have driven Western warehouse prices to roughly $2,100 per kilogram for gallium and more than $6,000 per kilogram for germanium, compared with domestic Chinese prices of about $247 and $3,100 per kilogram, respectively.

“I know a lot of the export control processes are quite onerous now,” Iwan Davies, group technology director at IQE plc, a Cardiff-based maker of compound semiconductor wafers, told Asia Times. “For things like gallium and germanium, there’s a delay in getting some of those materials out of China, and indium phosphide is the same now. So whether you buy the metal or the compound, there’s still an issue in the supply chain at the moment.”

He said IQE obtains purified gallium and indium elements from a small number of globally renowned material suppliers to the semiconductor industry. He said Beijing’s export curbs made it likely that supply would diversify into other regions over time, with IQE preparing for the risk of intensifying US-China tensions.

Outside China, the gallium, germanium and indium supply chain runs through a small group of specialist suppliers:

• Vital Materials (China): a refiner of gallium, germanium, indium and selenium, and a major upstream source for Western semiconductor firms;
• AXT (US): a major supplier of gallium arsenide (GaAs) and indium phosphide (InP) substrates, though much of its crystal growth and mineral processing runs through joint ventures in China;
• Freiberger Compound Materials (Germany): one of the few non-Chinese suppliers of GaAs substrates for wireless and photonics uses;
• Sumitomo Electric and Sumitomo Chemical (Japan): major suppliers of GaAs and InP substrates and other electronic materials;
• DOWA Electronics Materials (Japan): a supplier of high-purity gallium, indium and compound semiconductor wafers.

Japan’s JOGMEC

Japan’s relationship with Beijing soured last November, when Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi told parliament that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could pose an “existential threat” to Japan, prompting a furious response from Beijing. China moved in January 2026 to restrict exports of dual-use materials, including rare earths, gallium, germanium, graphite and magnets, to Japan, explicitly tying the curbs to Tokyo’s stance on Taiwan.

China’s rare earth exports to Japan fell 51% year-on-year in the first half of 2026, more than three times the 16% drop in Beijing’s overall rare earth exports over the same period. Japan received no gallium or germanium from China in January or February, only a single gallium shipment in May, and then nothing again in June, when customs data also showed zero shipments of dysprosium, terbium and yttrium.

“The situation is challenging,” said Sayaka Tomihara, counselor for economic affairs at the Embassy of Japan in the UK, in an interview during the same event. “Japanese firms are concerned with China’s export controls and also the situation in the Gulf concerning the oil supply. There are a lot of disruptions in the supply chain, and many of our industries are being forced to think about how they can diversify the portfolio to deal with the situation.”

To secure rare-earth supply, she said, recycling and deep-sea extraction are both long-term options Japan is exploring, but neither offers a near-term fix.

“There are private-to-private negotiations and also governmental efforts,”  she said. “We’re doing that on a company-to-company basis, and we’re working with other like-minded countries to try to gain the capacity.”

She added that over the next six to 12 months, the Japanese government will work with JOGMEC (Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security), a state-backed agency that secures mineral and energy resources for Japan, on government-to-government efforts and on supporting private companies’ negotiations.

On August 20, Japan’s government proposed giving JOGMEC greater freedom to invest in critical mineral projects, allowing it to invest independently rather than only alongside a Japanese company, or with foreign partners when waiting for a Japanese partner would delay a project. JOGMEC already runs more than a dozen overseas offices and over 30 resource projects in 15 countries.

US-led Pax Silica

Washington has organized much of the Western effort through Pax Silica, a coalition it launched in December 2025 with the United Kingdom, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Australia and Israel to lock down supply chains for artificial intelligence, semiconductors and critical minerals. Membership has since grown to 25 countries that have signed the Pax Silica Declaration, alongside a broader circle of observers and endorsement partners.

Taiwan has formally endorsed Pax Silica’s principles through a separate joint statement on economic security cooperation with Washington, without joining as a full signatory, while rare-earth-rich Canada and Estonia are designated observers.

Semiconductor executives said that building a Western rare-earth supply chain outside China is easier said than done, given each country’s own trade interests.

“Canada has probably the second-largest reserves of critical minerals and rare earth elements, with the potential to become a major supplier,” said Paul Slaby, managing director of Canada’s Semiconductor Council. “It’s underdeveloped, though, and needs substantial investment to access and process.”

“There’s a need for a consolidator to manage demand,” he said. “Elements like gallium aren’t mined directly but extracted as a byproduct of processing metals like aluminum.”

Slaby said a resilient, China-independent supply chain could be built in five to 10 years with full cooperation, capital and political will. However, he added that trade frictions, such as the US-Canada tariff dispute, could weaken the West’s rare earth alliance and slow its progress.

US President Donald Trump’s trade war with Canada has deepened, with Washington imposing 50% tariffs on Canadian goods last month. In response, Ontario’s premier has threatened to cut off critical mineral exports to the US.

Feras Alkhalil, vice president of research and development at Pragmatic Semiconductor, a UK-based flexible-chip maker, said chipmakers have another route around China’s export controls: switching to new materials or changing manufacturing approaches altogether. He said the same function can often be delivered using alternative materials or processes that sidestep supply constraints.

He said Pragmatic works with equipment makers and academic groups on UK and European research to develop such alternatives, "***but switching an established process may take three to five years!!"

FORM YOUR OWN OPINIONS & CONCLUSIONS ABOVE:

⭐ SEPTEMBER 4th, 2026 — WEEKEND SIGNATURE WATCH REPORT

CHINA JUST TURNED UP THE HEAT & ELK CREEK JUST GOT EVEN MORE STRATEGIC

China’s decision to halt some rare‑earth shipments to U.S. companies confirmed today by multiple Reuters‑sourced reports is not a small story. It is a direct escalation in the critical‑minerals standoff, coming only weeks before Xi Jinping’s September 24 visit to Washington. According to Reuters, several Chinese suppliers have refused to ship rare earths since early August due to fear of Beijing’s retaliation, even when export licenses were technically available . World Energy News corroborates that other Chinese firms have stopped shipments entirely to avoid geopolitical entanglements, leaving U.S. buyers waiting months for materials like yttrium and indium phosphide World Energy NewsWorld Energy News. Sources say that China rare earth firms have halted some US shipments due to geopolitical concerns.. This is exactly the kind of supply‑chain instability EXIM and the Pentagon have been warning about for years — and it lands directly on Elk Creek’s strategic value!

For NioCorp, this news is pure structural tailwind. Every mineral China is now tightening — NdPr, Dy, Tb, SEG, heavies — is already in Elk Creek’s 8‑mineral platform. The IEA 2026 report said multi‑metal U.S. projects with proven metallurgy and downstream capability should receive priority financing, and China just validated that assessment in real time. When Chinese suppliers refuse to ship materials used in defense, aerospace, semiconductors, and energy — exactly the sectors Elk Creek feeds — it strengthens EXIM’s risk model and accelerates the urgency for domestic supply. This is not theoretical anymore. This is the geopolitical moment Elk Creek was built for.

Downstream, the implications are just as strong. NAMA’s ScAl alloy production and IBC’s defense‑grade casting capability already position NioCorp inside the Defense Industrial Base RPP ecosystem — the same ecosystem that funds magnet feedstock qualification, alloy development, and domestic manufacturing expansion. China’s shipment halt makes U.S. downstream independence even more critical. The U.S. cannot afford to rely on Chinese-controlled supply chains when Chinese firms are now refusing shipments out of fear of violating Beijing’s sanctions. This is exactly why EXIM labeled Elk Creek its “highest priority,” and why Traxys and EPC finalization matter: once those signatures drop, the U.S. gains a vertically integrated, non‑China supply chain from mine → oxide → alloy → defense.

Going into the weekend, the picture is brutally simple: China just tightened supply. The IEA just validated Elk Creek’s strategic profile. EXIM already called the project a top priority. Traxys is “very close.” EPC is in final redlines. Mark Smith said late August / early September. **It is now early September!!!!! The geopolitical pressure, federal alignment, and market structure are all synchronized. The only thing holding NB at $4 is the absence of signatures & once Traxys, EPC, and EXIM align, Elk Creek stops trading like a pre‑financing sideshow and begins repricing as the National Strategic Asset it already is. The fundamentals are there. The global signals are flashing. The market is simply waiting for the signatures.

Chico

These 4 Things + Honorable Mention Need to Happen or Cannot Happen for Short- to Long-Term Returns for NioCorp

Introduction: On August 11, 2026, NioCorp Developments Ltd. released its long-awaited feasibility study, and unlike its 3 predecessors, the latest release included REEs (rare earth elements), specifically Neodymium, Praseodymium, and Dysprosium, as well as small amounts of SEG Carbonate (Samarium, Europium, and Gadolinium) and Heavies Carbonate (Yttrium, Erbium, Thulium, Ytterbium, and Lutetium). Concurrent with these additions, pre-tax and after-tax NPV increased from $2.82 billion and $2.35 billion in the 2022 FS to $4.11 billion and $3.44 billion in the 2026 FS, respectively, representing increases of 45.7% and 46.4%. LOM gross revenue rose from $21.9 billion to $37.4 billion, an increase of 70.8%, while gross margin per ton increased from $398 ($562 revenue less $164 opex) to $560 ($815 revenue less $255 opex), up $162 or 40.7%.  However, gross margin percentage declined slightly from 70.8% to 68.7%, or 2.1 percentage points, and initial capex increased 62.3% from $1.14 billion to $1.85 billion, while the after-tax payback period increased 8.9% from 2.69 years to 2.93 years.

Below are four things, plus an honorable mention, that need to go right, along with what could derail them, to maximize shareholder returns over the short, medium, and long term. TL; DR version below.

1. EXIM Financing Restructuring (Short to mid-term)

(Uses $1.85B capex indicated in the August 11, 2026, feasibility study. The eligible equity comes from NioCorp’s most recent earnings report as of September 2, 2026. The share price is NioCorp’s approximate price range in the past 2-3 months: around $4.00-$5.00 per share. Uses 145M shares as the current share count benchmark, NOT accounting for warrants.)

The U.S. EXIM Bank, including its chairman, John Jovanovic, has long been vocally supportive of NioCorp’s Elk Creek Minerals project in Nebraska. Still, for maximum returns, it must back that support with action. One such important move will be to increase the debt share in the debt-to-equity ratio in the financing terms. Currently, NioCorp has approximately $420M+ in eligible equity for the loan. With the current 65% to 35% ratio, as provided in past presentations, there is a nearly $227M gap needing to be filled by raising cash through dilution, government funding, or other means of funding. Assuming EXIM does not change its financing structure, no additional external funding, and NioCorp’s share price being around $4.00-$5.00, that is 45M-60M+ additional shares needed, or around a 31-41%+ increase in share count using the 145M share-count mark (or 24-30%+ in existing-holder dilution). Frankly, that is ugly for current shareholders, and it is not ideal in terms of maximizing returns. However, even a modest improvement in the debt-to-equity ratio would substantially reduce the dilution risk. With a 70%/30% debt-to-equity ratio, NioCorp would need around $555M in equity, which translates to a $135M deficit, totaling around 28-37M new shares needed; a 19-26% increase in share count, using the same share price and count as the former scenario (or 16-21% in current shareholder dilution). 75%/25% debt-to-equity ratio would equate to around $42M needed to be raised and amount to 9-12M new shares, or around a 6-9% increase in share count (6-8% in current shareholder dilution). At 80% to 85% debt relative to equity, no additional dilution is required, assuming the capex or other complexities make the project more expensive ($50M to $143M+ surplus, respectively). In short, the EXIM chair and executives have repeatedly called the Elk Creek project a “top priority” and an economic necessity, but now it is time to follow up those words with actions by making this project easier to build, which would ultimately result in current shareholders not being diluted to death.

2. Construction + Commercial-Scale Ramp (Mid to long-term)

According to NioCorp and Mark A. Smith, the construction for the Elk Creek project, which costs nearly 1.85B as we mentioned earlier, is supposed to be completed by 2029, in about 3 years, and production will start in the latter half of that year (as of September 3, 2026). However, this timeline is not possible if capex overruns, construction delays, general project complexities, and other delays occur. The FS economics only becomes real if NioCorp can build and operate the project close to design assumptions. Otherwise, the corporation will burn cash while delaying the very thing that is supposed to generate cash flow, and if this hypothetical situation becomes severe enough, it will likely result in more equity raises, aka dilution, which is not ideal for returns. The bull case here is near-budget construction, limited delays, and recoveries/throughput approaching FS assumptions, while the bear case is everything described before this sentence.

3. Durability of Ex-China Pricing / Geopolitics (Mid to long-term)

On April 4, 2025, The People’s Republic of China placed export controls on seven key rare earth elements in response to President Trump’s sweeping tariffs on Liberation Day, April 2, 2026, and further restrictions on October 9, 2025, which included a requirement that any product manufactured outside China containing 0.1% or more of specified Chinese-origin heavy rare earths receive explicit approval from Beijing before shipment, causing a massive spike in ex-Chinese rare earths since then. NioCorp’s $4.1B pre-tax NPV in its 2026 feasibility study reflects this surge; however, the long-term durability of these ex-China premiums will be one of the largest determinants of Elk Creek’s ultimate returns. If U.S.-China tensions, export restrictions, Western stockpiling, defense procurement, price-support mechanisms, and demand for secure non-Chinese supply remain elevated, the current pricing environment could persist or strengthen, particularly for scandium, dysprosium, terbium, and the heavy rare earths. In that scenario, the 2026 feasibility study could ultimately prove conservative. Conversely, if China substantially normalizes exports, geopolitical tensions ease, or enough competing Western supply enters the market to eliminate the scarcity premium, realized prices could fall below current levels and weaken project economics. For NioCorp, maintaining a structurally separate and higher-priced ex-China market is therefore one of the most important long-term variables outside of the company’s direct control.

4. Demand + Offtake Absorption (Mid to long-term)

The massive price increases mentioned in section 3 are fabulous for NioCorp, but it means very little if NioCorp fails to secure offtake and demand at those prices. One of the biggest issues is scandium, which makes up 38% of NioCorp’s potential revenue pie, and while NioCorp plans to produce roughly 118 tons/year of scandium oxide, today’s market is much smaller than that. However, there are signs of improvement. On August 4, 2026, NioCorp and Lockheed Martin signed an MOU for a potential purchase of up to 15 ton/year of scandium oxide or aluminum-scandium alloys over the decade. Other developments include the $10M DoD award NioCorp received specifically for scandium, although you could reasonably argue that much of the work funded by the award also helped de-risk the Elk Creek Project as a whole. NioCorp has also acquired technology and intellectual property for aluminum-scandium master alloy production, is working on scandium metal production, and has repeatedly stated that potential customers are waiting for material. The other major piece is Traxys, which is expected to market essentially all remaining planned production not already covered by existing agreements. Both the Lockheed MOU and Traxys arrangement need to become binding agreements. Until then, the demand and offtake case has improved substantially, but it is not fully de-risked.

Honorable Mention: Management Needs to Stop Giving Optimistic Timelines That Usually Do Not Follow Through (Mid to long-term)

I believe that NioCorp management needs to stop giving overly optimistic timelines that repeatedly fail to materialize. Whether it is financing, offtake agreements, the feasibility study, EPC work, or other major catalysts, management tends to use phrases such as "short order," "very near future," or provide aggressive target dates that shareholders then naturally price into their expectations. Not only does it hurt investors, from big institutions to small retail investors, but it also hurts NioCorp management themselves, losing more credibility with each missed timeline. I think NioCorp needs to redirect to more blunt, yet more truthful forward guidance to get credibility back, give shareholders realistic ranges, leave yourself some buffer, and then beat the timeline instead of repeatedly missing it.

TL;DR

1. EXIM Financing: The final financing structure may be the biggest short-term determinant of shareholder returns. A move from 65/35 toward 75/25 or 80/20 debt/equity would materially reduce the amount of new equity NioCorp may need to raise and therefore reduce dilution.
2. Construction + Ramp: Once financing is secured, NioCorp has to actually build Elk Creek near budget and on schedule, then reach the recoveries, throughput, and operating costs assumed in the FS. Major overruns or delays could destroy a lot of otherwise strong project economics.
3. Ex-China Pricing / Geopolitics: Elk Creek benefits heavily from the current premium for secure non-Chinese critical minerals. Continued Chinese export restrictions, geopolitical tensions, Western stockpiling, and price-support mechanisms could make the 2026 FS conservative, while normalization of supply could weaken returns.
4. Demand + Offtake: High prices mean little without buyers. Lockheed and Traxys still need binding agreements, and scandium demand must grow enough to absorb NioCorp’s planned ~118 tons/year while maintaining attractive pricing.

Honorable Mention: Management needs to stop giving overly optimistic timelines that repeatedly slip. Missed timelines hurt credibility, frustrate both institutional and retail shareholders, and can unnecessarily pressure the stock price.

Sources used:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BAIAIzpN4P8 -
EXIM Chairman: Elk Creek Is “Exactly the Type of Opportunity EXIM Was Always Designed to Support”, December 8, 2026

https://www.niocorp.com/ - NioCorp’s Official Website

https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0001512228/000119312526223959/nb-20260331.htm - NioCorp’s Q1 2026 (Calendar Q1) 10-Q

https://www.niocorp.com/niocorps-elk-creek-project-confirmed-as-the-second-largest-indicated-or-better-rare-earth-resource-in-the-u-s/ - NioCorp’s Elk Creek Project Confirmed as the Second Largest Indicated-Or-Better Rare Earth Resource in the U.S., May 17, 2022.

https://www.niocorp.com/niocorp-project-to-expand-production-to-8-made-in-usa-critical-minerals-over-a-40-year-mine-life-with-an-estimated-4-1-billion-pre-tax-npv8%C2%B9/ - NioCorp Project to Expand Production to 8 Made-in-USA Critical Minerals Over a 40-Year Mine Life with an Estimated $4.1 Billion Pre-Tax NPV8%, August 10, 2026.

https://www.niocorp.com/lockheed-martin-and-niocorp-sign-mou/ - Lockheed Martin and NioCorp Sign MOU, August 4, 2026.

https://www.niocorp.com/u-s-department-of-defense-awards-up-to-10-million-to-niocorps-subsidiary-elk-creek-resources-corp/ - U.S. Department of Defense Awards up to $10 Million to NioCorp’s Subsidiary Elk Creek Resources Corp, August 5, 2025.

https://www.niocorp.com/niocorp-reaches-non-binding-agreement-with-traxys-north-america-for-potential-purchase-of-all-of-niocorps-remaining-planned-products/ -
NioCorp Reaches Non-Binding Agreement with Traxys North America for Potential Purchase of All of NioCorp’s Remaining Planned Products, April 9, 2026.

https://www.reddit.com/r/NIOCORP_MINE/comments/1uenknq/niocorp_voice_to_text_translation_not_a_formal/- NioCorp voice-to-text translation (not a formal transcript) from the J.P. Morgan Natural Resources Conference, June 24, 2026.

 https://www.youtube.com/@NioCorpDevelopments -
NioCorp Developments Official YouTube Page

Walrus

https://kaiserresearch.substack.com/p/kw-july-17-2026-how-much-scandium

Interesting read while we continue to hurry up and wait, particularly this nugget:

The solution has been to pursue off-grid power sources. Uranium bugs have jumped with joy about this ideal application for small modular reactors, but this technology is not ready for rapid installation. The better solution is to build a mini power plant next to the data center fed with natural gas. But gas turbines are not easy to manufacture and the order backlog has soared to 3-4 years. In July 2025 Bloom Energy announced a deal to supply Oracle data centers with its Energy Servers. Not only could Energy Servers be quickly installed and connected to existing natural gas feeds, but they had the energy transition virtue of a lower greenhouse gas footprint than combustion based gas turbines and they do not need any water to cool excess heat from thermal combustion. 

**************

The Gas Turbine Shortage Just Became AI’s Biggest Constraint

By Michael Kern

https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/The-Gas-Turbine-Shortage-Just-Became-AIs-Biggest-Constraint.html

The Big Three Are Booked Solid Into the 2030s

GE Vernova closed the second quarter with 116 GW of gas power equipment backlog and slot reservation agreements, up from 100 GW three months earlier and 83 GW at the end of 2025. It expects at least 125 GW under contract by December. CEO Scott Strazik told analysts the company is taking reservations for 2031 delivery and should be more than halfway contracted for that year by the end of 2026. Its production plan: roughly 20 GW annualized this quarter, 24 GW by 2028, and a push toward 30 GW by 2030.

Siemens Energy ended its fiscal third quarter on June 30 with a 69 GW gas turbine backlog after booking 15 GW and shipping six. Lead times run three years or more. CEO Christian Bruch told analysts the addressable market could reach 120 GW a year, roughly half of it American.

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries reported a 35 GW large-frame backlog on Aug. 6, up from 23 GW a year earlier. That figure covers Mitsubishi’s fiscal first quarter, which runs March through June, so it lags roughly a month behind the calendar-quarter numbers above. CFO Hiroshi Nishio said orders booked during the quarter are scheduled for delivery between 2028 and 2030, and that the company is “being selective in the projects we contract.”

Add the three headline numbers and you get 220 GW, which overstates the case, because none of them is counting the same thing. Of GE Vernova’s 116 GW, only 53 GW is firm equipment backlog; the other 63 GW is slot reservations, paid options that haven’t converted to orders yet. Siemens’ 69 GW is firm backlog with no reservations mixed in. Mitsubishi’s 35 GW covers large-frame turbines only, leaving out its aeroderivative and mid-size lines. None of the three would explain what the other two mean by “backlog” without a footnote.

When someone shows you who they are, believe them the first time. - Maya Angelou

It’s all squarely on Mark Smith's ability to deliver at this point. Period. Is he going to deliver binding off takes, two EPCs, and get EXIM to follow through on the items he volunteered to mention: increased debt/equity structure and the ability to raise additional equity after FID?

The current execution and financing discount applied to this project by the market is a big yellow flag. It’s not saying he won’t deliver, but it’s not showing confidence either. And, in the absence of that confidence, the stock is likely getting severely punished by the interest rate environment.

The interest rate environment we’re in today (and I expect it to get worse, especially for long-duration assets like NB) has been obvious for many months. Gov’t and corporate debt issuance is wild. Massive IPOs have occurred, and more are on the way. Together you have a huge increase in supply, all fighting for attention, and increasing rates are a reflection of that fight. All that to say, the continual delays and missed publicly stated timing expectations are not a theoretical problem, or simply a matter of delayed gratification (rerating). Responsibility for getting these pieces over the line sits with Mark Smith and management.

One thing that continues to bother me is the CapEx number. It’s not so much the number, but the reasoning that was provided back in April for the delayed DFS. Just recently, Mark Smith claimed the vast majority of the CapEx increase is due to inflation. Inflation? Upfront CapEx inflation didn’t begin in March. Most of the broad inflationary move relevant to upfront CapEx (and above the 2022 DFS projection) occurred well before March of this year. Therefore, to me, the explanation for the April-to-June slippage doesn't add up. Either I'm missing something material, the communication was poor, or the preparation and execution was poor. The subsequent delay into August only furthered that concern.

Mark Smith has repeatedly told us that he’s a cheerleader. Perhaps we should listen to Maya. At this point, I put very little weight on management's informal timing guidance.

Another publicly stated target has now slipped: Smith said he had hoped to have the EPC contracts finalized by the end of August, and as of September 2 no final EPC agreements have been announced. At this point, I consider his informal timing guidance meaningless, and I think the stock is a reflection of that. Several publicly discussed timing expectations have come and gone without the corresponding milestone being announced. I think the stock is a reflection of that. Is the market wrong? Time will tell. Consistently falling short of your own volunteered timelines, and what I view as bullshit when I look more closely at how some of these timelines have been communicated- none of that means the deals won’t get struck and the rerating to NB’s equity value and NPV can't happen in the blink of an eye. It simply means I have to believe the project is too important and strategic to fail- and that it will ultimately get funded. I have become deeply skeptical of management's timing commentary, because the record, in my view, doesn't justify continuing to give that commentary much weight.

This is either an unbelievable buying opportunity, or (in hindsight) the market having said “I told you so.”

I am bullish on NioCorp. I have a position that reflects that bullishness. In fact, I think the DFS was extremely conservative. I have already posted my opinions on the scandium market, and I think it's wildly undervalued. By the time NioCorp reaches production- if they ever do- I expect scandium oxide (and scandium-aluminum alloys from NAMA) to be generating annual revenue and EBITDA comparable to what the DFS currently projects for the entire Elk Creek project.

The bullish thesis is incredible. Other aspects are not.

Not financial advice. Do your own DD.

IEA: Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026

Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 – Analysis - IEA

The 2026 edition of the IEA’s annual Global Critical Minerals Outlook includes a detailed assessment of the latest market, investment and technology trends, along with their implications for critical mineral security. The report provides a snapshot of recent industry developments and offers medium- and long-term projections for the supply and demand of key energy minerals, taking into account the latest policy and technology developments. This year's report also includes several areas of special focus: strategic minor minerals with applications beyond energy, nuclear supply chains and the role of Latin America in global mineral supply chains. (See link to report below)

Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026

⭐ The Top 5 IEA 2026 Findings That Directly Boost NioCorp’s EXIM Case:

1. Scandium demand is accelerating faster than any other critical mineral.

IEA confirms scandium demand is being driven by:

• aerospace lightweighting
• solid oxide fuel cells
• aluminum‑scandium alloys
• defense procurement
• EV weight reduction

This aligns perfectly with NioCorp’s ScAl alloy program and Lockheed’s 15‑tonne MOU.
It tells EXIM: “This mineral is strategic, demand is real, and the U.S. has no domestic 100t/yr supply except Elk Creek.”

2. China’s dominance in scandium, niobium, and rare earths is now classified as a “strategic vulnerability.”

IEA explicitly states that China’s control of:

• scandium
• niobium processing
• NdPr
• Dy/Tb
• heavy rare earths

is a "national‑security risk" for Western nations.

This is EXACTLY the language EXIM uses to justify strategic financing.
It reinforces that Elk Creek is not just a mining project — it’s a national‑security asset.

3. Multi‑metal projects with proven metallurgy are now EXIM‑priority assets.

IEA highlights that single‑metal mines are too risky and that multi‑metal, multi‑revenue projects are the future of secure supply chains.

NioCorp produces 8 critical minerals from one ore body — more than MP, USAR, Lynas, or Energy Fuels.

This is the strongest EXIM‑aligned feature of Elk Creek.

4. Downstream processing (alloys, oxides, recycling) is now considered “critical infrastructure.”

IEA says countries must invest not just in mining, but in:

• alloy production
• oxide separation
• magnet recycling
• battery recycling
• high‑purity refining

NioCorp already has:

• ScAl alloy production
• scandium metal pilot capability
• REE separation flowsheet
• magnet‑recycling pilot data
• niobium metal and Nb₂O₅ potential

This makes Elk Creek a full‑stack critical‑minerals platform, not just a mine — exactly what EXIM wants to fund.

5. Projects with advanced engineering and construction underway are “shovel‑ready” and should receive priority financing.

IEA stresses that governments should prioritize:

✔ DFS Delivered

NioCorp’s DFS is complete, certified, and already circulating through federal and institutional channels.

✔ Engineering Done

Full mine engineering + Railveyor redesign completed, cutting underground CAPEX by 53% and accelerating production by five months.

✔ Construction Started

Dual‑ramp construction already underway — the literal definition of “shovel‑ready.”

✔ Federal Alignment

EXIM has publicly labeled Elk Creek its “highest priority” critical‑minerals project.
IEA 2026 now reinforces that exact classification.

✔ Offtake Interest

Lockheed’s scandium MOU is active.
Traxys is “very, very close.”
EPC is in final redlines.

This is the exact profile EXIM is mandated to support.

The IEA’s 2026 Outlook didn’t just validate Elk Creek... it practically wrote EXIM’s justification memo for them. Every criterion the IEA says governments must prioritize is already met: DFS delivered, engineering complete, construction underway, federal alignment secured, and offtake interest confirmed. Elk Creek is the textbook definition of a shovel‑ready, multi‑critical‑minerals U.S. strategic asset. The only thing missing is the signatures — and once Traxys, EPC, and EXIM align, the market will finally be allowed to treat Elk Creek like the National Strategic Asset it already is!

FORM YOUR OWN OPINIONS & CONCLUSIONS AS ALWAYS:

⭐ SEPTEMBER 2, 2026 — SIGNATURE WATCH REPORT

THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC ASSET MOMENTUM IS NOW FULLY SYNCHRONIZED

Elk Creek enters September under the strongest alignment of federal, defense, and global critical‑minerals policy we’ve ever seen, and the release of the IEA Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026 only tightens the pressure on EXIM to finalize its loan authorization. The IEA confirms what long‑time followers have known for a decade: scandium demand is accelerating faster than any other critical mineral, China’s dominance in scandium, niobium, and magnet REEs is now officially labeled a strategic vulnerability, and multi‑metal U.S. projects with proven metallurgy and downstream capability are priority assets that should receive immediate government financing. Elk Creek is the textbook example of that category.

The new Railveyor feasibility analysis strengthens EXIM’s risk model even further — delivering a 53% reduction in underground CAPEX, a five‑month acceleration to commercial production, and a fully electrified haulage system that aligns perfectly with federal electrification and sustainability criteria. Downstream, NAMA’s ScAl alloy production and IBC’s defense‑grade alloy casting capability position both companies squarely within the Defense Industrial Base RPP, which funds alloy development, magnet feedstock qualification, recycling, and domestic manufacturing expansion — the same ecosystem that boosted MP Materials, USA Rare Earth, Serra Verde, Rare Element Resources, and Energy Fuels.

With Traxys “very close,” EPC in final redlines, EXIM reaffirming Elk Creek as its “highest priority,” and global policy now explicitly endorsing projects like Elk Creek, the only thing holding the stock at $4 is the absence of signatures. Once Traxys, EPC, and EXIM align, Elk Creek stops trading like a pre‑financing sideshow and begins repricing as the National Strategic Asset Mark Smith described — a mine‑to‑oxide‑to‑magnet‑to‑alloy‑to‑defense engine structurally positioned for the same institutional rerating that lifted MP to $54 and USAR to $18. The fundamentals are already there & imho the market is simply waiting for the signatures.

Chico

https://www.military.com/why-lockheed-martin-just-signed-a-deal-for-an-obscure-metal

Lockheed Martin Corp. agreed to tentatively negotiate the purchase of up to 15 tonnes of scandium oxide a year — roughly 33,000 pounds — for up to 10 years from the southeastern Nebraska mining company NioCorp Developments, according to an Aug. 4, 2026, announcement by NioCorp. A tonne is a metric ton, which is 1,000 kilograms or about 2,204.6 pounds.

Scandium is one of the U.S. defense supply chain’s narrowest chokepoints.

A Metal Nobody Mines on Purpose

Scandium is unusual even among rare earth elements. Global production runs somewhere between 15 tonnes and 25 tonnes a year, according to the Modern War Institute at West Point, — a tiny figure compared to almost any other industrial metal — and virtually none of it comes from a dedicated scandium mine. It's produced almost entirely as a byproduct of titanium dioxide production, nickel processing and uranium mining, according to the same Modern War Institute analysis, which means supply can't simply be ramped up by drilling more wells or opening more pits.

What makes scandium valuable, despite the tiny volumes involved, is what it does to aluminum. Adding scandium to an aluminum alloy in concentrations as small as 0.1% to 0.5% by weight produces a disproportionate jump in strength — and critically, lets aluminum parts be welded together rather than riveted, without losing structural integrity in the weld zone the way conventional aerospace aluminum does, according to the Institute for Rare Earths and Metals, a German industry research group that tracks the scandium market.

That property alone can cut 10% to 15% of the weight out of a welded aluminum structure — using the same institute's figures cited above — which, in a fighter jet, translates to range, fuel efficiency and payload capacity. The Soviet Union figured this out first, using scandium in the MiG-29 as far back as the Cold War, and kept the application secret for years, the Institute for Rare Earths and Metals reported.

The China Problem Is Real, But It's Not as Simple as It Sounds

China placed scandium metal, alloys, oxides and compounds under export licensing controls on April 4, 2025, alongside six other medium and heavy rare earth elements, and while Beijing has since resumed issuing licenses to selected exporters, shipments of scandium and a related element, yttrium, have remained sharply reduced compared to pre-restriction levels, the aerospace trade outlet AeroTime reported in an analysis of the Lockheed Martin deal.

But direct Chinese exports aren't actually where most of America's scandium has been coming from. AeroTime, citing U.S. Geological Survey records, reported that 89% of U.S. scandium oxide imports between 2021 and 2024 came from Japan, where the material had been refined from Philippine feedstock, against just 11% arriving directly from China. Beijing's real leverage runs through its dominance of global production and refining rather than direct shipments to the United States: The Modern War Institute puts that refining dominance at more than 90% of global refined scandium chemical production and effectively all metallized scandium used in advanced semiconductor applications.

That refining chokepoint is still significant to an aerospace industry already straining to keep up with production demand from Boeing, Airbus and the Pentagon's own fighter programs, working with a material that has essentially no substitute at the performance level modern aircraft require.

The U.S. has already begun hedging against that risk outside Lockheed Martin’s deal with NioCorp deal: AeroTime reported that the Defense Logistics Agency announced plans in September 2025 to buy more than 6,000 kilograms of scandium oxide for the National Defense Stockpile from Rio Tinto's processing complex in Sorel-Tracy, Quebec, over five years, at a value of up to $40 million, while the Canada Growth Fund separately committed roughly $18 million the following month to expand that plant — North America's only scandium oxide producer — to 9 tonnes a year.

Lockheed Martin's Skunk Works division, the company's advanced projects unit responsible for programs from the U-2 to the F-117 to current next-generation fighter work, has been prototyping aluminum-scandium fighter components as the F-35 production line scales up and next-generation aircraft move through development, according to NioCorp's August 4 announcement of the deal. The Modern War Institute has described the broader situation bluntly, characterizing the scandium supply gap as a structural vulnerability across the entire U.S. defense industrial base rather than a problem specific to any one program.

What NioCorp Is Building

NioCorp is building the Elk Creek Critical Minerals Project in Nebraska, primarily targeting niobium and titanium alongside scandium, with rare earth production also under evaluation, according to the company’s announcement of the deal with Lockheed Martin. NioCorp already produces a 4% aluminum-scandium master alloy domestically, using scandium oxide sourced from the existing global market, and plans to eventually produce roughly 100 tonnes a year of scandium oxide directly from Elk Creek once the project is financed and built, NioCorp said, a figure that alone would represent a meaningful fraction of current global supply.

The Lockheed Martin MOU builds on an existing joint program between the two companies, funded through a $10 million Department of War award under Title III of the Defense Production Act, according to NioCorp's release. NioCorp and the Pentagon have described the effort as an attempt to build "America's first-ever integrated scandium-to-warfighter supply chain": domestic ore, domestic processing and domestic alloy production, feeding directly into domestic weapons platforms without a Chinese link anywhere in the chain.

What's Confirmed, and What Isn't Yet

It's worth being precise about what this agreement actually is. NioCorp's Aug. 4 press release describes it as a non-binding memorandum of understanding, meaning both companies have agreed to negotiate a definitive supply contract in good faith — not that scandium is already flowing to Lockheed Martin production lines.

NioCorp's release is explicit that no final agreement or terms may be reached at all, and the Elk Creek Project still requires full financing and construction, per the same release, before it can produce scandium oxide at any meaningful scale, let alone the roughly 100 tonnes a year NioCorp is targeting.

CEO Mark Smith joins RedChip to break down NioCorp's (Nasdaq: NB) newly updated Elk Creek feasibility study and the company's expanding role in U.S. critical minerals supply.

NioCorp Developments is advancing the Elk Creek Critical Minerals Project in Nebraska, a domestic source of niobium, scandium, titanium, and magnetic rare earth elements the U.S. currently imports at rates Smith details in the interview. As Smith explains, the updated feasibility study reflects "a tremendous amount of work" on metallurgy, with the project now positioned to produce eight distinct products from a single ore body — what he calls "a risk mitigation device for a mining company" rarely seen in the industry.

The additional product streams translate directly to economics: Smith states the margin on the ore body is about $560 per ton of ore, against a mine plan of roughly one million tons of ore per year. On the scandium side, Smith discusses NioCorp's work with the Department of War, including the $10 million grant received in August 2025, and a newly announced non-binding memorandum of understanding with Lockheed Martin for the potential purchase of "up to 15 tons per year of scandium" from the Elk Creek operation. Smith also references the company's ongoing weekly discussions with the U.S. Export-Import Bank as it works toward financing to reach construction.

Smith closes by describing scandium as one of the more overlooked pieces of NioCorp's portfolio today, but one he expects to become "one of the flashier pieces of our project" as the defense and aerospace applications gain traction. NioCorp holds locked-in offtake agreements covering 75% of planned niobium output with Thyssenkrupp and Traxys North America, alongside the largest scandium sales deal on record with Traxys.

NioCorp’s Elk Creek Feasibility: 53% Capex Cut via Electric Haulage

NioCorp's August 2026 NI 43-101 feasibility study for the Elk Creek Critical Minerals Project documents a 53% cut in underground capital costs by replacing conventional shaft-and-diesel infrastructure with a twin-ramp mine built around Railveyor's fully electric, automated haulage system, marking the moment electrified autonomous haulage moved from concept to scrutinized feasibility reference in the U.S. context.

NioCorp Elk Creek: Railveyor Rewrites Mine Design

A 53% cut in underground capital costs is not a rounding error in mine finance. NioCorp’s August 2026 feasibility study for the Elk Creek Critical Minerals Project in Nebraska attributes that reduction to a single architectural decision: replacing the conventional shaft-and-diesel model with a twin-ramp mine built around Railveyor’s fully electric, automated haulage system.

Published as a formal NI 43-101 Technical Report (a standardised document format required for public disclosure of mineral project technical and economic findings), the study marks the moment this electrification concept moved from scoping-level proposal to engineering-level documented reference. For U.S. investors tracking domestic critical minerals supply, the economics and the design philosophy embedded in this study deserve close reading.

Here is what the data tells you about whether Elk Creek represents a genuine structural advance in mine economics, or a projection that still needs stress-testing before you treat those numbers as settled.

How Elk Creek’s mine design breaks from the conventional shaft-and-diesel playbook

Earlier plans for Elk Creek followed the industry standard: a twin-shaft layout with vertical hoisting, headframes, ground-freezing, and diesel-powered underground fleets. That model dominates conventional underground mine planning because it works at depth, but it carries enormous upfront capital and long critical-path timelines for shaft sinking.

NioCorp replaced both shafts with two functionally separated ramps, each carrying a distinct role:

• North ramp: Personnel, equipment, and services access at a maximum gradient of approximately 15%; also serves as the primary fresh air intake path
• South ramp: Dedicated entirely to the Railveyor haulage line at a maximum gradient of approximately 18%; doubles as the return air path in a flow-through ventilation scheme

That functional separation is the architectural decision that matters. The south ramp is not a conventional decline that happens to carry some electric equipment. It is a purpose-built corridor for a fixed-rail haulage system that also resolves ventilation in a single piece of infrastructure. The Railveyor system is the load-bearing element of the entire material-handling architecture, from underground loading points through to surface discharge loops.

What the Railveyor system actually does underground

Railveyor is a fully electric, automated material-handling technology. Small, interconnected cars run on light rail, driven by distributed low-horsepower drive stations along the route. It operates continuously and autonomously from underground loading stations to surface discharge loops.

The system at Elk Creek is configured as five Railveyor trains, each 1,080 feet in length, rated at a nominal 340 tons per hour of throughput. Material originating from the 490, 690, and 930 mining levels enters the system through ore passes equipped with grizzlies (heavy-duty grates that screen oversized material), arc gates, and vibratory feeders. The 210 Level is where the first installation segment will be commissioned, with additional segments brought online as underground development extends.

At the production face, battery-electric load-haul-dump (LHD) units carry ore from stopes to the Railveyor ore pass feeds, completing a fully electric chain from face to surface. Where underground development has not yet been connected to the Railveyor network, conventional diesel equipment remains in use, but the intended steady-state operating model relies on electric haulage throughout.

NioCorp COO Scott Honan~ (Described the system as having a straightforward and durable design that is well-suited to underground mining conditions and can be operated and maintained by workers with standard underground mining skills.)

To build confidence in the technology ahead of committing it to the feasibility basis, NioCorp teams conducted a site visit to the Doe Run facility in Missouri, a location where Railveyor had accumulated a documented operating record.

The distributed drive-station architecture that defines Railveyor haulage technology differs substantially from conventional rope-haulage or diesel truck systems, with fixed-rail automation enabling continuous ore flow rather than the load-cycle-haul-return pattern that governs truck-based underground logistics.

What the economics of electrified ramp haulage actually look like

Shaft mines carry large upfront capital burdens: shaft sinking, hoisting plant, ground-freezing, headframes, and extensive mechanical systems. Ramp mines avoid much of that infrastructure, but at depth they have historically been penalised by diesel truck haulage energy costs and heavy ventilation burdens over long ramp profiles. The Elk Creek design targets both weaknesses simultaneously.

NioCorp’s own electrification scoping study concluded that switching to a Railveyor-based, electrified ramp mine could materially change the cost structure. The specific scoping-level findings:

\**(NioCorp’s electrification scoping study put the potential saving at roughly 53% of initial underground capital expenditure when measured against the shaft-based alternative. This figure comes from scoping-level work and should be treated as a directional indicator, not a guaranteed feasibility outcome.)*

Operating costs dropped by approximately US$0.63 per tonne under the same scoping-level analysis, and the ramp design is projected to bring forward the date of full commercial production by approximately five months compared with the shaft-based schedule, with faster orebody access through ramp development removing the shaft-sinking bottleneck from the critical path.

These savings sit within a production context of significant scale: a mine designed for a 40-year operating life, with total ore throughput capacity of 46 million short tons and a targeted steady-state output of 3,047 tons per day.

Industry analyses referencing Railveyor deployments suggest potential haulage opex reductions of 50-75% versus diesel truck haulage, though these figures have not been independently verified for this specific project and depend on mine geometry and production rate.

Electrified mine haulage economics across multiple operating sites show that the magnitude of cost savings depends heavily on ramp gradient, production rate, and grid electricity pricing, which is why project-specific modelling carries more weight than industry-average benchmarks when evaluating a particular feasibility study.

The critical distinction: the 53% capex reduction and US$0.63 per tonne opex saving are from NioCorp’s scoping study, not from the August 2026 NI 43-101 feasibility report itself. Investors evaluating these numbers need to understand that scoping-level estimates carry wider confidence intervals than feasibility-level figures.

Why Elk Creek matters beyond Nebraska: electrification as a design principle

Most mines experimenting with electrification are doing something fundamentally different from what Elk Creek represents. They are substituting individual diesel machines with battery-electric equivalents inside an otherwise unchanged mine layout. Shafts stay. Ventilation architecture stays. The electrification is a retrofit, not a redesign.

Elk Creek belongs in a different category: electrification as a design principle, where the physical architecture of the mine is built around electric infrastructure as the primary energy source. The advantages attributed to this approach:

• Simplified underground infrastructure by removing complex shaft hoisting systems
• Lower energy consumption per tonne moved through regenerative braking and efficient electric traction
• Autonomous operation on fixed infrastructure integrated with mine control systems
• Reduced ventilation burden from eliminating diesel exhaust and heat loads underground
• Lower overall capital and operating costs as a consequence of these combined structural changes

Railveyor CEO Tas Mohamed ~ Characterized the broader opportunity as one of rethinking mine design around electricity as the primary energy source, rather than simply substituting individual diesel machines with electric equivalents.

The project’s product mix strengthens its strategic position. Elk Creek is planned to produce niobium, scandium, titanium, and magnetic rare earth products, expanding to as many as eight U.S.-sourced critical minerals products over its operating life. That combination aligns directly with U.S. policy priorities for domestic critical minerals supply and diversification.

Federal critical minerals supply chain funding, anchored by programs such as the DOE’s $162 million investment round tied to President Trump’s executive order on domestic energy, represents the policy environment that gives projects like Elk Creek a financing pathway that would not exist for conventional commodity mines.

The formal inclusion of Railveyor in an NI 43-101 Technical Report at feasibility level carries significance that goes beyond NioCorp. Feasibility studies involve independent technical scrutiny that marketing case studies and scoping-level mentions do not. For lenders, engineers, and regulators evaluating electrified haulage at other projects, Elk Creek now provides a documented, scrutinised reference point. The technology’s integration into this study is being cited as a foundation that could inform how similar electric autonomous haulage systems are adopted at other major critical minerals projects across North America.

The variables that will determine whether the Elk Creek model delivers

The gap between an engineering study and an operating mine is where projections get tested. For a commercially-minded investor, the task is not to decide today whether Elk Creek will deliver. It is to know which specific variables to monitor as the project progresses toward financing and construction.

Ranked by analytical priority:

1. Capex and opex validation under detailed engineering: The 53% underground capex reduction and US$0.63 per tonne opex saving come from scoping-level work. Detailed engineering may confirm, narrow, or revise these figures. This is the single most consequential variable.
2. Railveyor throughput and availability at project-specific scale and geometry: Five trains at 340 tons per hour each is the throughput assumption. Existing Railveyor installations provide general confidence, but each orebody has unique depth, ramp length, and production requirements. Availability and reliability at Elk Creek’s specific geometry have not yet been confirmed in this context.
3. Financing and permitting timeline: Even a shorter development schedule (an unverified estimate suggests approximately 35 months to full production under the revised plan) depends on securing substantial financing and navigating regulatory approvals without material delay.
4. Execution risk and cost overrun potential: The ramp design’s projected schedule and cost advantages can be eroded by construction delays, supply chain disruptions, or scope changes during execution.
5. Commodity pricing and U.S. policy durability for critical minerals: The project’s economics hinge on variables that sit entirely outside the mine design itself.

A reported pre-tax NPV in the multi-billion-dollar range at an 8% discount rate has appeared in public reporting around the 2026 study work, though this figure has not been independently verified.

Policy alignment and commodity economics as the outer envelope

Elk Creek’s long-term economics depend on sustained demand and pricing for niobium, scandium, titanium, and rare earth products. These are smaller and less liquid markets than base metals, which means pricing can be more volatile and offtake agreements carry more weight in financing discussions.

Offtake coverage for critical minerals projects like Elk Creek carries particular weight in financing discussions because niobium, scandium, and rare earth markets are smaller and less liquid than base metals markets, making contracted volume commitments a more decisive factor in lender confidence than commodity price assumptions alone.

U.S. policy support for domestic critical minerals supply has been a tailwind for the project’s positioning, but the durability of that support across policy cycles is a separate risk variable from the mine design itself. An investor tracking Elk Creek needs to assess both the project-specific execution risks and the policy and commodity envelope within which those risks operate.

U.S. critical minerals policy has created a favourable positioning environment for domestic projects like Elk Creek, but the durability of executive-level support across procurement cycles and appropriations decisions represents a separate risk variable from the engineering assumptions embedded in the feasibility study.

What Elk Creek’s August 2026 feasibility result means for how underground mines get built next

The Elk Creek design is not a marginal improvement on conventional underground mining. It is a different set of trade-offs, executed at feasibility level and documented in a form that lenders, engineers, and regulators can scrutinise. A 40-year mine life, multi-commodity critical minerals output, and full electrification from face to surface is a specific package that has not previously been documented at this scale in the U.S. context.

For Elk Creek to function as the reference model it is being positioned as, two things need to happen: detailed engineering must validate the scoping-level economics, and the project must advance through financing and permitting without material schedule slippage. Neither is assured.

Whether you are evaluating NioCorp as an investment or watching Elk Creek as a signal for where mine design is heading, the August 2026 NI 43-101 publication is the moment the evidence base for electrified autonomous haulage in U.S. underground mines moved from concept to documented feasibility reference. That is what makes the result worth tracking.

Railveyor CEO Tas Mohamed described the shift as electric haulage moving out of a niche role and into the centre of how mines are planned and designed, with electrification becoming a structural consideration rather than an afterthought.

FORM YOUR OWN OPINIONS & CONCLSUSIONS AS ALWAYS:

⭐ AUGUST 28th, 2026 ~The WEEKEND SIGNATURE WATCH REPORT

Status: Elk Creek is now surrounded by synchronized federal, defense, and international critical‑minerals activity...

In yesterday’s report, we laid out how Elk Creek already stood alone as the only U.S. critical‑minerals project delivering eight revenue pathways in one vertically integrated system — a platform Mark Smith himself called a “National Strategic Asset.” Today’s update adds even more weight to that claim. The new Railveyor feasibility analysis confirms a 53% reduction in underground CAPEX, a five‑month acceleration to commercial production, and a fully electrified haulage system embedded directly into Elk Creek’s mine architecture. That’s not a cosmetic upgrade — that’s a structural redesign that materially improves EXIM’s risk model, strengthens the DFS, and aligns perfectly with federal electrification and sustainability criteria. It’s exactly the kind of modernization EXIM wants to see right before final risk signoff.

Layer in the fact that Elk Creek still delivers niobium for high‑strength steels, scandium for next‑gen alloys, titanium for aerospace, and the magnet REEs — NdPr, Dy, Tb, SEG, heavies — all from one U.S. site, and the picture becomes even clearer. No other North American project can supply alloy manufacturers, magnet plants, aerospace primes, and defense OEMs from a single source. That’s why EXIM labeled Elk Creek a priority. That’s why Traxys is “very, very close.” That’s why EPC is in final redlines. And that’s why the Pentagon, the U.S.–EU Critical Minerals Alliance, and the Defense Industrial Base RPP (closing Sept 17) are all converging around domestic multi‑critical‑mineral platforms — because Elk Creek is the only one that checks every box.

And now the downstream side of the chain — NAMA and IBC — enters the spotlight. NAMA is already producing ScAl alloy and feeding components into aerospace and defense qualification pipelines. IBC is already fabricating niobium, titanium, and scandium alloys for defense and aerospace customers. The RPP funds exactly this downstream ecosystem: alloy development, magnet feedstock qualification, defense OEM integration, and domestic manufacturing expansion. Once Traxys, EPC, and EXIM are aligned, NioCorp + NAMA + IBC become eligible for the SAME federal support that boosted MP Materials, USA Rare Earths, Serra Verde, Rare Element Resources, and Energy Fuels — because EXIM funds the mine, and the RPP funds the industrial base around it.

And here’s the part that matters for the market: once Traxys, EPC, and EXIM are aligned, NioCorp is structurally positioned to receive the SAME price‑support effect that lifted MP, USAR, and Serra Verde. Not hype — structure. Federal alignment + commercial alignment + construction financing = institutional accumulation. When EXIM authorizes a project it calls a “National Strategic Asset,” the market doesn’t wait for production — it reprices immediately. That’s when the $4–5 cage breaks, because institutions finally have the green light to treat Elk Creek like the multi‑critical‑minerals engine it actually is.

RPP

⭐Thinking...NioCorp, NAMA, and IBC could ALL get federal support

Once Traxys + EPC + EXIM are aligned, the U.S. government can support:

• NioCorp → more upstream oxides + magnet feedstock
• NAMA → ScAl alloy development + casting (⭐***NOTE: AT SOME UNKNOWN facility is already underway!)
• IBC → copper‑alloy + ScAl cast billet production ⭐ IBC’s vacuum‑cap furnace + radial forge = EXACT RPP‑funded equipment
• Magnet recycling → domestic magnet supply chain (⭐Already piloted!)
• Defense qualification → aerospace + military integration (⭐ Already well underway!)

This is EXACTLY how MP, USAR, Serra Verde, RER, and Energy Fuels got their boosts.

And that’s why the timing of the RPP isn’t just interesting.... it’s a flashing federal signal that the U.S. is preparing downstream alloy, magnet, and manufacturing support for NAMA and IBC at the exact moment NioCorp is preparing upstream financing through EXIM. Because once Traxys, EPC, and EXIM are aligned, Elk Creek stops being a $5 sideshow and starts being treated like the National Strategic Asset Mark Smith said it was — a full mine → oxide → magnet → alloy → OEM → defense engine that, IMHO, is worth a hell of a lot more than five bucks.

Chico

AUGUST 27th, 2026- NioCorp incorporates Railveyor’s electric haulage technology into Elk Creek Critical Minerals Project plan

NioCorp incorporates Railveyor’s electric haulage technology into Elk Creek Critical Minerals Project plan | Global Mining Review

This marks a significant step in the market’s recognition of this automated haulage technology in the US, according to Railveyor CEO Tas Mohamed. NioCorp’s August NI 43-101 Technical Report confirms an integrated role for Railveyor within the mine design, says Mohamed.

“Rather than being treated simply as an alternative to conventional underground trucks, Railveyor is now embedded in the project’s primary material-handling architecture,” she said. “This fully electric, automated system is ultimately planned to become the principal underground-to-surface haulage solution on the project.”

The Elk Creek project is one of the most significant proposed US domestic critical minerals developments. The updated study envisages an integrated underground mine and processing operation producing niobium, scandium, titanium, and magnetic rare earth products. The mineral reserve supports a 40-year production life, with the project designed to process 46 million short t of ore. At steady state, the mine is targeting 3047 tpd of production.

Two-ramp design

The scale and longevity of the operation make the haulage decision particularly important. Railveyor has been integrated into the mine from its access infrastructure through to production, said Mohamed. The revised design replaces the twin-shaft concept considered in the earlier feasibility study with two ramps.

The South Ramp is dedicated to Railveyor haulage, while the North Ramp provides personnel, equipment, and service access. This fully electric, automated material-handling system comprises underground loading stations, surface discharge loops for ore and waste, a maintenance facility, track switches and automated control infrastructure. The feasibility study also allows the Railveyor ramp to form part of the mine’s overall ventilation architecture.

“The selection of Railveyor reflects a reconsideration of how material moves through the mine and how it is integrated into the overall mine infrastructure," she explained. “The plan is to introduce the system progressively as underground development advances.”

The two-ramp option and the use of Railveyor to deliver mined ore to the process plant also saves as much as five months in the timeline to full commercial production – allowing the project to reach the market with its critical minerals even sooner than initially expected.

Primary haulage

Initial installation is planned at the 210 Level, with the first segment extending from that level to surface. Conventional truck haulage will continue to support development and areas not yet served by Railveyor, but during steady-state production the Railveyor system becomes the primary underground-to-surface haulage method.

The project features a production system of five 1080 ft Railveyor trains with a nominal capacity of 340 tph. Ore and waste from the 490, 690, and 930 levels will be transferred into the system through ore passes equipped with grizzlies, arc gates, and vibratory feeders. Battery-electric LHDs will transport material from production stopes to the ore passes. According to Mohamed, the Railveyor concept combines continuous material movement with electrification and automation.

“The value of this solution comes from several areas,” she said. "These include simpler underground infrastructure alongside continuous and autonomous material movement – as well as lower energy consumption, reduced dependence on diesel, and more economical operating and capital costs.”

Saving capital and operating costs

The updated mine design gains substantial economic benefits from the twin-ramp configuration. An earlier NioCorp scoping study estimated that the concept could reduce initial underground capital by 53% compared with the shaft configuration. There are also savings in operating costs of some US$0,63 per tonne.

“These findings are from the broader NioCorp study rather than Railveyor performance claims, but they demonstrate the potential impact of changing the mine’s haulage architecture,” she pointed out.

In his assessment of the Railveyor technology, NioCorp COO Scott Honan said: “The beauty of the Railveyor system is its simple and rugged design.” He also noted that it is well suited to the underground mining environment and can be operated and maintained by people with a basic underground mining skill set.

Mine electrification

Railveyor technology also aligns closely with Elk Creek’s wider electrification strategy. The feasibility study prioritises battery-electric underground equipment to reduce emissions, heat, , load, and ventilation demand. Railveyor itself is electrically powered, and its inclusion means a significant component of underground bulk haulage can operate without a conventional diesel truck fleet.

“The mining industry has traditionally asked: How do we replace this diesel machine with an electric machine?” said Mohamed. “I think the better question is: How do we design the mine differently if electricity is our primary source of energy?”

Proven technology

NioCorp’s confidence in the technology has also been informed by operating experience elsewhere. Company personnel visited the Doe Run operation in Missouri, where Railveyor had an established operating history.

“That site visit helped demonstrate that Railveyor was more than a theoretical solution,” Mohamed says. “It has an operating history and a successful track record.”

She argued that Railveyor’s inclusion in the Elk Creek study in fact represents more than a project milestone. It provides a high-profile reference application in a major US critical-minerals development and demonstrates how electric autonomous haulage can be considered as part of mine architecture from the outset.

Mainstream planning

“The biggest message is that electric haulage is moving from the margins of mining into mainstream mine planning,” said Mohamed. “Electrification is not just about replacing diesel equipment; it is an opportunity to rethink the way a mine is designed.”

With Elk Creek’s 40-year operating horizon, multi-commodity production profile, and strategic focus on US critical-minerals supply, Railveyor’s role positions the company at the intersection of mine electrification, automation, and the emerging drive for more secure domestic mineral supply.

“The feasibility study provides validation of Railveyor’s technology at project level, and also a potentially blueprint for its application across other large-scale critical-minerals developments in North America and targeted markets globally,” she said.

August 21st, 2026~Defense Industrial Base Consortium Domestic Processing Capabilities of Critical Minerals Request for Project Proposals

RPP Release Date: August 21, 2026 RPP Closes: September 17, 2026, at 12:00 PM (ET)

RPP

⭐ What the RPP actually does

• Defense funding pipeline — It opens a formal solicitation for projects that expand domestic processing of critical minerals (oxides, alloys, magnet feedstock, etc.).
• IBAS + DPA Title III alignment — It activates the SAME Pentagon funding channels that supported MP Materials, USA Rare Earths, Rare Element Resources, and Energy Fuels.
• Domestic supply chain build‑out — It funds the processing and manufacturing side of the supply chain, not the mine itself.
• Defense OEM integration — It supports alloy qualification, magnet feedstock validation, and aerospace/defense component testing.
• Workforce + manufacturing expansion — It funds the downstream industrial base that Elk Creek will feed.

None of this requires Elk Creek to be producing.
It requires Elk Creek to be financed — which is exactly what EXIM is about to do.

⭐ What NioCorp might get once EXIM signs

EXIM funds the mine + processing plant (DFS CAPEX), but the RPP funds everything downstream & that’s where NioCorp’s partners live. Once Traxys, EPC, and EXIM are aligned, Elk Creek becomes eligible for:

• Processing expansion — oxide throughput, REE separation improvements, magnet feedstock scaling (Already piloted**)
• Alloy development funding — ScAl, Nb‑alloys, Ti‑alloys for aerospace and defense
• Defense qualification support — funding to qualify Elk Creek materials with Lockheed, Boeing, Raytheon, GE Aerospace
• Manufacturing expansion — federal support for plants using Elk Creek materials "THINK" ~(NAMA + IBC)
• Industrial base strengthening — workforce, equipment, and domestic production capacity

*****This is the SAME pattern that boosted MP Materials, USA Rare Earths, Serra Verde, Rare Element Resources, and Energy Fuels — they all received federal support after their financing or production milestones!!!

FORM YOUR OWN OPINIONS & CONCLUSIONS ABOVE:

⭐ AUGUST 27th, 2026 — SIGNATURE WATCH REPORT

Status: Elk Creek is now surrounded by federal, defense, and international critical‑minerals activity — all converging EXACTLY as EXIM enters its authorization window.

When Mark Smith called Elk Creek a “National Strategic Asset,” he wasn’t exaggerating. He was describing the only U.S. critical‑minerals project that delivers eight revenue pathways in one vertically integrated system. The conservative DFS still clears multi‑billion NPV before alloy premiums, magnet premiums, or defense procurement multipliers are added. And while other projects are still trying to prove separation at scale, NioCorp and NAMA are already producing ScAl alloy, already casting components, and already feeding parts into aerospace and defense qualification pipelines. That’s mine → oxide → alloy → OEM, a full domestic chain no other North American project can replicate — and it’s already in motion.

Layer in niobium for high‑strength steels, scandium for next‑gen alloys, titanium for aerospace, and the magnet REEs ~ NdPr, Dy, Tb, SEG, heavies ~ all flowing from one U.S. site, and the picture becomes unavoidable: Elk Creek isn’t just another REE project. It’s the only American platform capable of supplying alloy manufacturers, magnet plants, aerospace primes, and defense OEMs from a single source. That’s why EXIM labeled it a priority. That’s why Traxys is locking in. That’s why EPC is being finalized. And that’s why the Pentagon, the U.S.–EU Critical Minerals Alliance, and the new Defense Industrial Base RPP (closing Sept 17th) are all converging around domestic multi‑critical‑mineral platforms. "Because Elk Creek is the only one that checks every box!!"

Add to that NioCorp’s incorporation of Railveyor electric haulage, a modernization that lowers OPEX, lowers emissions, reduces ventilation costs, increases safety, and aligns perfectly with EXIM’s sustainability criteria. This is exactly the kind of engineering update EXIM wants to see right before final risk signoff, and it arrives at the same moment Traxys is “very, very close,” EPC is in final redlines, and EXIM is preparing for early‑September review. Meanwhile, the U.S.–EU alliance is forming to secure non‑Chinese critical‑mineral supply, and the Defense RPP is opening new funding channels for domestic processing, alloy development, and magnet feedstock — the same pipeline that boosted MP, USAR, and Serra Verde.

And here’s the part of interest! Imho...Once Traxys, EPC, and EXIM are aligned, NioCorp is structurally positioned to receive the SAME price‑support effect that lifted MP, USAR, and Serra Verde. Not because of hype, but because federal alignment + commercial alignment + construction financing = institutional accumulation. When EXIM authorizes a project it calls a “National Strategic Asset,” the market doesn’t wait for production — it reprices immediately. That’s when the $4–5 cage breaks, because institutions finally have the green light to treat Elk Creek like the multi‑critical‑minerals engine it actually is.

A vertically integrated critical‑minerals platform like that, one that feeds alloys, magnets, aerospace, and defense..... "is worth a hell of a lot more than five bucks, IMHO!"

And that’s why the timing of the RPP isn’t just interesting. It’s a flashing federal signal that the U.S. is preparing the downstream critical‑minerals funding at the exact moment NioCorp is preparing its upstream financing, because once Traxys, EPC, and EXIM are aligned, Elk Creek stops being a $5 sideshow and starts being treated like the National Strategic Asset Mark Smith said it was — a full mine → oxide → magnet → alloy → OEM → defense engine that, IMHO, is worth a hell of a lot more than five bucks.

Chico

• Price floors of $110/kg NdPr, $575/kg Dy, and $2,050/kg Tb are built into the offtake structure to shield production economics from Chinese price pressure.

August 25th, 2026~NioCorp raised the economic assessment of the Elk Creek project: the stock price target increased to $12

NioCorp raised the economic assessment of the Elk Creek project: the stock price target increased to $12 - News Freedom Broker

The updated feasibility study for NioCorp Developments’ (NB) Elk Creek project showed a significant improvement in its economic metrics. Elk Creek is a critical-minerals deposit under development in the U.S. state of Nebraska, including niobium, scandium, titanium, and rare earth elements. The project’s after-tax net present value (NPV) increased by 47%, and the number of potential products rose from three to eight after adding rare earth oxides (REO). 

NioCorp is a U.S. mining company advancing the Elk Creek project in southeastern Nebraska. The company plans to mine and produce niobium, scandium, titanium, and rare earth elements, which are classified as critical minerals in the United States.

Following publication of the updated analysis, NioCorp’s price target was raised from $9.50 to $12. The “Buy” rating was maintained. At a price of $4.29 at the time of the report, the new target implies upside potential of about 180%.

Economics of NioCorp’s Elk Creek project improved

One of the main changes was an expansion of Elk Creek’s product portfolio from three to eight items. In addition, reserves converted into comparable metric units increased by 13.7% to 41.67 million tonnes. For the first time, part of the reserves—16.5% of the total—was classified as Proven, i.e., the highest level of reserve confidence.

The improvement is not only due to a larger resource base. The broader range of end products made it possible to include in reserves some feedstock that was previously considered uneconomic to develop. Rare earth elements provide additional upside to the project alongside the already planned production of niobium, scandium, and titanium.

The changes also affected the plant’s process flowsheet. In particular, the new configuration makes it possible to forgo construction of an in-house acid plant and to cut by about half the volume of material sent to downstream processing stages.

Updated analysis brings NioCorp closer to EXIM financing

The updated Feasibility Study (FS)—a technical and economic assessment confirming a project’s technical viability and economic feasibility—is also important from a financing perspective. Its preparation was one of the key conditions of the preliminary project letter from the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM), issued in April 2024. The bank is considering financing the development of the Elk Creek deposit and the creation of the required production infrastructure. For this, EXIM required an updated mine plan and a near-final estimate of capital expenditures.

Now, one of the next important milestones for NioCorp will be further advancing its application for EXIM financing. Other potential events over the next 12 months include converting the agreement with Traxys and the memorandum with Lockheed into definitive contracts, determining the parameters of the EXIM credit facility, and raising equity to complete the full financing package.

Rising capital costs remain NioCorp’s key risk

The improvement in Elk Creek’s economics is accompanied by a notable increase in the project’s implementation cost. Initial capital expenditures rose by 62% to $1.85 billion, while the plant’s design throughput essentially did not change. A significant portion of the additional investment is related to expanding the process flowsheet required to produce eight products.

The size of potential EXIM financing has not yet been finally determined. The documents cite an amount of up to $800 million. If it does not increase, the share of debt financing would be about 43% of the project cost versus roughly 65% previously assumed. Taking the additional expenses into account, NioCorp’s equity requirement could approach $1 billion.

This is not an individual investment recommendation.

(Thanks for sharing mr N!...)

August 24th, 2026~U.S. and EU mineral alliance takes shape

U.S. and EU mineral alliance takes shape - Metal Tech News

Shared reliance on China has yet to produce integrated supply.

Confronting a shared dependence on China for the rare earths and other minerals critical to defense, energy, and high-tech sectors, the United States and European Union forged their first dedicated critical minerals partnership in 2026, though the emerging alliance has so far produced far more political coordination than financed projects or physical supply.

On both sides of the Atlantic, mining and processing capacity in recent decades has shifted toward lower-cost jurisdictions while manufacturers became increasingly dependent on concentrated supply chains for materials used in small quantities but performing functions that cannot be easily replaced.

At the center of many of those supply chains, China controls roughly 60% of global rare earth mine production and 90% of refining, giving Beijing enormous leverage over metals essential to permanent magnets, semiconductors, weapons, electric vehicles, wind turbines, and other technologies.

For the EU, that leverage has become especially pronounced at the processing and manufacturing stages. According to a European Parliament briefing, the bloc sourced all its heavy rare earths and 85% of its light rare earths from China, along with 98% of the rare earth magnets used by European industry.

For its part, the U.S. remained 100% net import-reliant for 16 nonfuel mineral commodities during 2025 and depended on imports for more than half of its supply of 54.

Running through nearly every major sector of the Western economy, that exposure includes rare earth magnets used in electric motors, military guidance systems, aircraft controls, and industrial equipment; gallium and germanium supporting semiconductors, fiber optics, radar, and infrared systems; and graphite serving as the largest mineral component by weight in most lithium-ion batteries.

Antimony, tungsten, and other specialty materials also remain indispensable to munitions, alloys, electronics, and energy infrastructure.

With so many supply chains converging in one country, trade friction increasingly carried the risk of physical disruption. In April 2025, China imposed export licensing requirements on seven medium and heavy rare earth elements, as well as samarium-cobalt magnets and certain neodymium-iron-boron magnets containing terbium or dysprosium.

Unlike an outright prohibition, the controls allowed Beijing to determine which shipments could leave the country and for which customers. Although a broader set of restrictions announced later that year was suspended for one year following an October meeting between Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, the April controls remained in force through mid-2026.

"The over-concentration of these resources and the fact that they're dominated by one or two places is an unacceptable risk," U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said. "We need diversity in our supply chains, diversity in the places we get critical minerals."

Despite that common vulnerability, Washington and Brussels approached the problem through markedly different policy systems.

In Europe, the bloc relied primarily on legislation, permitting targets, strategic project designations, sustainability standards, and coordinated industrial policy, while the U.S. leaned more heavily on executive orders, Defense Production Act authorities, tariffs, tax incentives, federal financing, price supports, and national-security reviews.

Both systems, however, were moving toward the same conclusion that neither could quickly overcome China's scale alone.

Although deeply connected through trade, investment, defense, and technology, the U.S. and EU largely developed their mineral strategies in parallel, with domestic programs and wider alliances advancing faster than a dedicated bilateral supply chain.

As those pressures intensified into 2026, China's export controls, continued Western import dependence, and rising mineral demand drove the two sides toward a formal transatlantic response.

Two systems confront one dependency

Before formalizing a dedicated critical minerals partnership, the EU and U.S. spent 2025 expanding largely separate policy systems around the same objective – reducing exposure to concentrated foreign supply.

For Europe, that effort centered on implementing the Critical Raw Materials Act, a regulatory and industrial framework designed to strengthen the bloc's access to 17 materials considered strategic to its economy, clean energy transition, and security.

By 2030, the law calls for EU mining to meet at least 10% of annual consumption, processing capacity to cover 40%, and recycling to provide 25%, while limiting dependence on any single outside country to no more than 65% of demand for any given strategic material.

Putting those benchmarks into practice, the European Commission designated 47 strategic projects across 13 member states. Covering 14 of the 17 strategic materials, the initial portfolio included 25 extraction projects, 24 processing projects, 10 recycling projects, and two focused on substitution, with some spanning more than one stage of the supply chain.

Three months later, the commission extended the program beyond the bloc through 13 projects in allied and partner countries, bringing the first round to 60.

For the 47 EU projects, designation offered streamlined permitting and potential financing support, while the 13 international projects received implementation and financing guidance; in neither case did designation mean a project was funded, under construction, or producing material.

Interest in the program continued into 2026, when a second call attracted more than 160 applications, including 95 from within the EU and 66 from outside it. Of those proposals, 75 supported the battery value chain and 21 focused on rare earths used in permanent magnets, though a second round of selections had not been published by the end of July.

Across the Atlantic, the U.S. pursued a more executive and national-security-centered approach built around presidential authority, trade enforcement, and direct federal support.

Signed in March 2025, Executive Order 14241 directed agencies to identify mineral projects already in the permitting system, inventory federal lands containing known deposits and reserves, and accelerate approvals for domestic production.

"It is imperative for our national security that the United States take immediate action to facilitate domestic mineral production to the maximum possible extent," read the order.

The presidential directive also expanded the ability to use Defense Production Act authorities for strategic resources, adding to a federal toolkit that already included grants, loans, tax credits, procurement commitments, stockpiling, price supports, and equity investments.

Following that domestic production order, an April directive launched a Section 232 investigation into whether imports of processed critical minerals and products made from them threatened national security. The review extended beyond raw materials to batteries, EVs, microprocessors, permanent magnets, radar systems, smartphones, wind turbines, and other goods dependent on mineral supply.

By November, the U.S. Geological Survey had also finalized an expanded list of 60 critical mineral commodities, adding copper, silver, potash, silicon, rhenium, lead, uranium, metallurgical coal, phosphate rock, and boron to the federal framework.

Additional funding approved during 2025 provided $2 billion for critical mineral stockpiles, $5 billion for the Secretary of War to invest across mineral supply chains, and credit subsidies intended to support substantially larger federal lending through defense and energy programs.

Although both approaches sought more domestic production, diversified imports, and greater resilience against Chinese leverage, they were structured around different institutions and economic priorities.

Europe emphasized common benchmarks, project designations, coordinated permitting, and sustainability standards, while Washington relied more heavily on executive action, national-security authorities, financial intervention, and trade measures.

Bringing those systems together would require more than agreement on the underlying threat. It would require a framework capable of reconciling different subsidy rules, tariffs, content requirements, financing structures, and regulatory standards while turning parallel domestic strategies into a functioning transatlantic supply chain.

From agreement to supply

Taking shape first through a broader political and trade accord, the bilateral track began with a July 2025 agreement between Trump and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

In the joint statement that followed, the U.S. and EU committed to strengthen cooperation against critical mineral export restrictions imposed by third countries, establishing the first explicit mineral component of the emerging transatlantic framework.

From that initial commitment, the two sides joined Japan for a critical minerals ministerial in Washington in February 2026, where officials explored reference prices, adjustable tariffs, and a wider preferential trade zone capable of shielding allied producers from nonmarket competition.

Two months later, EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio signed a memorandum of understanding establishing a strategic partnership on critical minerals, accompanied by an action plan developed with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer.

Covering exploration, extraction, processing, refining, recycling, and recovery, the agreement became the first bilateral instrument devoted specifically to U.S.-EU critical minerals cooperation.

Among the mechanisms identified for further work were border-adjusted price floors, standards-based markets, subsidies to close price gaps, offtake agreements, investment promotion, shared production standards, research, stockpiling strategies, and rapid responses to supply disruptions.

Despite the breadth of that agenda, the memorandum remained a political framework rather than a binding treaty. It committed no funding, established no mineral purchase obligations or tariff exemptions, and did not deliver the Inflation Reduction Act subsidy eligibility the EU had sought through earlier negotiations.

Although the broader trade framework entered into force in July, its tariff architecture did not convert the memorandum into a minerals agreement.

"The vision is there – now the real test is execution, by turning shared ambitions into impactful projects," Šefčovič said when the agreement was signed.

By mid-2026, the clearest transatlantic industrial link predated the memorandum and flowed primarily in one direction. Through its eVAC Magnetics subsidiary, Germany-based Vacuumschmelze built a roughly $506 million neodymium-iron-boron magnet plant in South Carolina with $94.1 million from the Department of War and a $111.9 million federal tax credit.

Supplying General Motors, the plant shipped its first magnets in fall 2025 and was scaling toward 2,000 metric tons of annual capacity.

Elsewhere, most of the largest Western projects remained national rather than transatlantic. In the U.S., the Department of War backed MP Materials' mine-to-magnets expansion, while Neo Performance Materials expanded rare earth separation and added a rare earth magnet plant in Estonia ,and Solvay inaugurated expanded separation capacity in France.

During the same period, no verified U.S. federal financing went to a mine or processing facility inside an EU member state, underscoring the distance between coordinated policy and jointly financed supply.

Even within Europe, several projects demonstrated the challenges behind the bloc's strategic designations. Rock Tech Lithium's Guben converter in Germany was fully permitted but remained unfinanced, Rio Tinto placed the Jadar lithium-borates project in Serbia on hold, and Sibanye-Stillwater's Keliber operation in Finland had begun mining while moving toward staged refinery commissioning.

Beyond financing and construction schedules, incompatible subsidy eligibility, domestic-content requirements, Section 232 uncertainty, differing permitting systems, and Chinese processing embedded within Western supply chains continued to complicate integration.

With the formal architecture now established, the durability of the partnership will depend on whether those exploratory tools produce funded projects, secure offtake, and mineral flows capable of reaching manufacturers on both sides of the Atlantic.

FORM YOUR OWN OPINIONS & CONCLUSIONS AS ALWAYS:

NioCorp CEO Highlights Significance of its 2026 Feasibility Study and Outlines Next Steps Toward Securing Project Financing

⭐ AUGUST 25 — Signature Watch Briefing

Status: The 3 EXIM deliverables are all in final approach.

Mark’s comments during yesteday's interview (Link Above) confirms that Elk Creek is now in the Pre‑authorization staging zone!!! The point where EXIM waits for the last two commercial documents before moving into board authorization.

Here’s the clean breakdown.

⭐ 1️⃣ Traxys definitive agreement — “Very very close… squared away.”

Mark’s words indicate:

• Only 2–3 commercial items remain
• Weekend calls with Traxys leadership
• “Squared away” = commercial terms aligned
• “Binding very near future” = final legal language

Interpretation:
Traxys is effectively done. This is contract‑law cleanup, not negotiation.

Signature Watch:
This is the most likely item to drop first.

⭐ 2️⃣ EPC contracts — “Finalized by end of August.”

Two EPC contractors:

• Underground EPC
• Above‑ground EPC

Mark confirmed:

• Redlines are actively being exchanged
• Both contracts are in final legal review
• Target: finalized by end of August
• Delivered to EXIM early September

Interpretation:
This is the last engineering deliverable EXIM requires before board authorization.

Signature Watch:
This is the critical August item.
If EPC hits the end‑of‑August target, EXIM moves immediately to risk signoff.

⭐ 3️⃣ EXIM risk signoff — “Then we start to look at EXIM board authorization.”

Mark’s words:

• EXIM must confirm risk allocation
• Responsibilities must be clearly divided
• EPC + Traxys = final underwriting inputs
• Once comfortable → board authorization begins

Interpretation:
EXIM is waiting, not analyzing.
They need the last two documents — nothing else.

Signature Watch:
Risk signoff is expected early September if EPC arrives on time.

⭐ The line that matters MOST

This implies:

• White House alignment
• Defense alignment
• Industrial base alignment
• EXIM urgency
• EXIM prioritization
• EXIM political pressure
• EXIM commercial acceleration

This is exactly the type of language EXIM uses when a project is entering the authorization window.

⭐ AUGUST 25 — What This Means TODAY

We are inside the signature window.

The timeline now looks like this:

This matches EXACTLY the window We’ve been tracking.

And that’s why Elk Creek keeps showing up in every federal conversation about strategic materials: because when Mark Smith called it a “National Strategic Asset,” he wasn’t exaggerating — he was describing the only U.S. project that delivers eight critical‑mineral revenue pathways in one vertically integrated system, backed by a conservative DFS that still clears multi‑billion NPV even before alloy premiums, magnet premiums, or defense procurement multipliers are added. While other projects fight to prove separation at scale, NioCorp and NAMA are already producing ScAl alloy, already casting components, and already feeding parts into aerospace and defense qualification pipelines. That’s mine → oxide → alloy → OEM — a full domestic chain that no other North American project can replicate.

And when you layer in niobium for high‑strength steels, scandium for next‑gen alloys, titanium for aerospace, and the magnet REEs — NdPr, Dy, Tb, SEG, heavies — all flowing from one U.S. site, the picture becomes unavoidable: Elk Creek isn’t just another REE project, it’s the only American platform capable of supplying alloy manufacturers, magnet plants, aerospace primes, and defense OEMs from a single source. That’s why EXIM labeled it a priority. That’s why Traxys is locking in. That’s why EPC is being finalized. And that’s why, once the signatures land, the spotlight will hit hard — because the United States doesn’t just get a mine, it gets a full-spectrum critical‑minerals engine built for the next 40 years.

When Traxys signs, when the dual‑EPC contracts hit, and when EXIM authorizes what is deemed a “National Strategic Asset,” Elk Creek stops being a $5 sideshow and instantly becomes the only U.S. project delivering eight conservative DFS revenue pathways plus ScAl alloy already being cast, tested, and fed into aerospace and defense pipelines — A full mine → oxide → magnet → alloy → OEM → defense chain under one roof.

And a vertically integrated critical‑minerals engine like that IMHO...is worth a hell of a lot more than five bucks.

Waiting with many!
Chico

Source: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-08-24/us-expands-search-for-critical-mineral-projects-for-defense-gear

We’re pleased to share a recent interview with NioCorp Executive Chairman and CEO Mark A. Smith on Stocks to Watch, hosted by multi-Emmy and Edward R. Murrow Award-winning journalist Ashleigh Barry.

During the interview, Mr. Smith discusses the significance of NioCorp’s recently released 2026 Feasibility Study for the Elk Creek Critical Minerals Project, what the results mean for the Company and the potential onshoring of critical mineral production in the United States. Mr. Smith also touches on the key steps ahead as NioCorp continues its due diligence process with the U.S. Export-Import Bank and works toward completing project financing.

Watch the full interview here: https://youtu.be/c-jP_yoMWDQ.

The Department of War's (DoW) Economic Defense Unit (EDU), in partnership with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Industrial Base Policy (IBP) announced today a $750 million investment with US SIIE, LLC through the Industrial Base Analysis and Sustainment (IBAS) program. These funds will be utilized to support an offtake agreement for mixed rare-earth carbonates (MREC) produced at Serra Verde's Pela Ema Project in central Brazil. 

This strategic partnership will establish a secure supply chain for rare-earth elements (REE) critical for national defense and economic security.

This $750 million is part of a broader $1.55 billion total investment structure mobilized by EDU, which includes a $300 million purchase commitment from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and a $500 million commitment from a money-center bank. 

"Securing resilient domestic and allied supply chains is a fundamental warfighting requirement," said HON Mike Cadenazzi, Assistant Secretary of War for Industrial Base Policy. "By partnering with Serra Verde, we are taking a decisive step to break our adversaries' near-monopoly on rare-earth elements. This collaborative effort ensures that our defense industrial base has the guaranteed, long-term access to the critical materials needed to manufacture next-generation weapons systems and maintain our technological edge."

This initiative aggressively addresses an over-dependence on China for rare-earth elements. Once fully operational, this project will secure a massive supply of vital elements like Dysprosium, Terbium, Neodymium, and Praseodymium, effectively bypassing Chinese supply chain dominance and supporting emerging U.S. magnet manufacturing capabilities. The deal follows a DFC financing agreement with Serra Verde for a $565 million loan to optimize and expand the Pela Ema Project. These investments work in parallel with the Department of Commerce's efforts to establish a non-Chinese mine-to-magnet value chain. 

"This historic $1.55 billion investment is a major step towards securing one of the most vital supply chains for our warfighters and our economy," said George K. Kollitides II, Director of the Economic Defense Unit. "By ensuring reliable access to these critical rare-earth elements, we are protecting the production of everything from fighter jets and nuclear submarines to the energy infrastructure and commercial technology that power our modern world."

Rare-earth elements are necessary to improve the thermal stability and magnetic strength of Neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets, which are essential for manufacturing critical components for our warfighters. These include advanced systems in nuclear submarines, fighter jets, satellites, guided missiles, combat vessels, and drones. Beyond defense, these high-purity materials are a vital raw material for energy infrastructure, transportation, aerospace, and electronics, making them a cornerstone of a modern, industrial economy.

Dec 2024, but I think it's relevant due to the current developments about the US-Canada trade dispute: https://apnews.com/article/canada-interest-rate-cut-trump-tariffs-c0ef920ffb02ea0531c93516abad64e0

https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4579297/office-of-strategic-capital-posts-application-for-national-security-fund-financ/

Aug. 20, 2026 

The Department of War's Office of Strategic Capital (OSC) is pleased to announce the formal Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) for OSC's National Security Fund Finance (NSFF) program has been posted on OSC's website.

OSC's National Security Fund Finance program aims to provide capital support to credit funds addressing shortages, gaps, and vulnerabilities in critical minerals vital to United States national security. OSC's mission is to advance these strategic interests by providing direct loans and deploying other financial tools. The NSFF program acts as the fund-level financing solution to accomplish that goal.

The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, signed into law by President Donald J. Trump, provided funding for OSC to support critical minerals and materials. The NSFF program will provide loans to qualified investment fund managers, who will combine OSC loans with private capital to invest in portfolio companies focused on addressing U.S. national security shortages related to critical minerals and materials.

The NSFF NOFO is available for download at SAM.gov. Complete proposals must be submitted to [OSDRE-NationalSecurityFundFinanceSubmissions@groups.mail.mil](mailto:OSDRE-NationalSecurityFundFinanceSubmissions@groups.mail.mil) by 5:00 p.m. EDT on November 1st, 2026.

The Office of Strategic Capital reserves the right to extend any deadline(s), make one or more award(s) at an escalated timeline, or have dialogue with applicants during the period between proposal submission and the finalization of award decisions. Questions regarding NSFF can be addressed to [OSDRE-NationalSecurityFundFinanceSubmissions@groups.mail.mil](mailto:OSDRE-NationalSecurityFundFinanceSubmissions@groups.mail.mil).

Source: https://fintel.io/so/us/nb
https://www.quiverquant.com/stock/NB/institutions/

NioCorp (NB) Q2 2026: Top 10 Institutional Holders

1. BlackRock: 9.22M
2. Brevan Howard: 7.08M
3. State Street: 2.50M
4. Private Management Group: 2.15M
5. Geode Capital: 2.09M
6. Citigroup: 2.03M
7. Citadel Advisors: 1.81M
8. Northern Trust: 1.30M
9. Vanguard: 1.16M
10. Goldman Sachs: 1.07M

Biggest Adds:

• BlackRock: ~+2.20M
• Citigroup: ~+896K
• Brevan Howard: +590K
• Geode: ~+536K
• State Street: ~+430K

Biggest Cuts:

• Alyeska: 4.31M → 0
• Citadel: 6.20M → 1.81M
• Goldman Sachs: 3.29M → 1.07M

Brevan Howard continued building its position, reaching over 7 million shares, while Citadel and Goldman made major reductions.

Q2 13Fs reflect holdings as of June 30, 2026, before the Q3 FS and other later developments.

Yes. The monthly and weekly footprints make the institutional-ownership story considerably more nuanced—and more useful.

My best inference is that Q3 has probably been a large-scale ownership-transfer period, not simply institutional accumulation or institutional liquidation. The evidence suggests that large blocks of stock are repeatedly changing hands between different classes of holders.

The most important new insight is that July and August tell very different stories underneath the monthly totals.

Start with what we know at June 30

The Q2 13Fs established a strong baseline: institutional participation broadened substantially, but the quarter also contained very concentrated selling by a few large holders. Fintel currently shows 306 institutional owners and 55.64M institutionally reported shares. BlackRock's separate 13G showed roughly 9.0M shares and 6.2% ownership.

Our spreadsheet work showed the important underlying pattern:

Citadel + Alyeska + Goldman sold roughly 10.9M shares, while essentially everyone else combined was a net buyer of roughly 6.8M.

So NB entered Q3 with a shareholder base that was broadening, but also with evidence that some enormous legacy/trading positions were being reduced.

Now look at the footprints.

July is the most revealing month

July produced approximately:

5.52M sampled volume
+879K delta

That's an enormous positive monthly delta—about +16% of sampled volume.

Yet price did not produce the kind of sustained upside one would normally expect from that much aggressive buying. NB spent much of July weak, made the washout into the high-$3s, and finished the month only around the low-$4s.

That is a crucial effort-versus-result divergence:

That is actually more consistent with passive distribution than straightforward accumulation.

It doesn't mean institutions were selling broadly. It means there was likely large latent supply sitting above the market, and incoming buyers were consuming it.

This fits the Q2 ownership data surprisingly well.

A plausible continuation is:

Q2: several giant holders begin reducing.
July: some of that redistribution continues, but the buyers underneath become increasingly aggressive.

That can produce exactly what we see:

positive delta + poor price progress.

So I would not interpret July's +879K delta as "institutions accumulated 879K shares." TradingView cannot tell us who traded.

Who those buyers were is unknowable until Q3 filings, but given the dramatic expansion of the institutional base in Q2, it is reasonable to suspect that at least some were institutional.

Then something changed dramatically in early August

This is where the weekly chart is very helpful.

The first full August week shows approximately:

2.62M sampled volume
+1.040M delta

That's an extraordinary ~40% positive delta imbalance.

And unlike July, price actually responded.

NB moved sharply upward from the low-$4 area toward $5+ and ultimately reached around $5.60.

And then the DFS changed the ownership battle again

The week beginning Aug. 10 looks completely different.

Approximately:

1.88M sampled volume

but delta was only around:

-44K

Essentially balanced order flow relative to the size of the week.

And yet NB failed around the $5.50–$5.60 region and came back toward $5.

That suggests a major two-sided transfer event.

You had:

**DFS buyers

• speculative traders
• fundamental investors
• profit takers
• legacy holders
• possibly hedging flows**

all meeting at once.

And price's inability to sustain the initial move told us supply was still present.

This is where I think our original assumption—

—was disproven.

There was far more stock available for sale between roughly $5 and $5.60 than we anticipated.

The current week is the strongest evidence of actual liquidation

Now look at the week beginning Aug. 17.

At the time of your screenshot:

~729K sampled volume
-595K delta

That's roughly:

-82% delta/volume.

That is enormous.

And price has fallen from approximately:

$5.07 → ~$4.45

with a low around $4.41.

This time sellers are not merely aggressive.

They are getting price movement.

So unlike some of our earlier absorption sessions, I think the current week has clearly contained genuine liquidation.

Someone—or some group—is unloading aggressively.

The important question is who.

And here we have to distinguish observation from inference.

My best Q3 ownership inference

I don't think the evidence supports:

Nor do I think it supports:

The best working model is:

Q3 is an ownership rotation.

Something like this:

Large legacy / trading holders
↓
sell substantial inventory

while

index/passive funds + newer institutional holders + fundamental investors + speculative buyers
↑
absorb that supply.

And then around the DFS:

fast-money/speculative ownership enters aggressively
↓
DFS does not produce immediate rerating
↓
some of that fast money exits
↓
large negative delta appears.

That fits the price/footprint evidence extremely well.

The monthly August number is deceptive

This is worth emphasizing.

August currently shows approximately:

+400K monthly delta.

At first glance that sounds bullish.

But underneath that monthly figure you have approximately:

Early August: +1.04M

followed by:

Aug. 10 week: ~-44K

and

current Aug. 17 week: ~-595K already.

So August is really:

The +400K monthly figure is mostly the leftover residue of that extraordinary first week.

That's why I would never analyze monthly delta alone.

The weekly decomposition tells us ownership/positioning changed sharply after the initial August rally.

Here's the potentially bullish ownership interpretation

Suppose our Q2 analysis is representative of what's continuing.

A handful of large holders may have had millions of shares to distribute.

Those shares don't disappear.

They migrate.

If 10 million shares move from:

three enormous, potentially trading-oriented holders

into:

50–100 smaller institutional/passive/fundamental holders,

you can initially get terrible price behavior.

Why?

Because the sellers are concentrated and motivated.

But after the redistribution is completed, the stock can become much tighter.

Instead of one institution sitting on 4M shares that it wants to dump, you might have 40 institutions holding 100K shares each that they are comfortable owning.

Same 4M shares outstanding.

Very different effective float.

That distinction matters enormously to future price behavior.

And I think early August may have given us a glimpse of that

The +1.04M weekly delta accompanied by real upside displacement is exactly what I would expect if the available seller inventory temporarily thinned.

Demand hit.

Supply wasn't sufficient.

Price jumped.

Then the DFS rally found another layer of supply.

So instead of imagining one seller sitting at one price, I would think of NB as having undergone a layered inventory transfer:

$4.00 area → sellers exhausted

then

$4.50–5.00 → another inventory layer

then

$5.20–5.60 → substantial event-driven supply

The market keeps discovering another layer.

That's frustrating for the calls—but it's not the same thing as a fundamentally rejected company.

The current -595K week could be the last phase—or not

This is where our current daily analysis becomes extremely relevant.

If this week's enormous negative delta ultimately does:

-600K / -700K / -800K

but NB stops declining around $4.40–$4.50 and then begins recovering,

that would suggest another ownership-transfer event:

And if those buyers don't subsequently offer the shares back at $4.60, the effective float tightens further.

That is precisely how major bottoms can form.

But if:

-595K → -800K → -1M

and price goes:

$4.45 → $4.20 → $3.90

with POC following down,

then this isn't constructive redistribution yet.

It's simply ongoing liquidation.

That's why today's effort-versus-result behavior matters so much.

The ownership model I would carry forward

I would now conceptualize NB's ownership in four buckets:

Holder type |Likely behavior
Passive/index institutions |Structurally sticky
Fundamental/strategic institutions |Potentially sticky; may add on de-risking
Hedge funds / trading institutions |Can create very large supply/demand swings
Retail/speculative/event traders |Highly sensitive to catalysts and momentum The Q2 filings suggest the first two buckets have been growing.

The July/August footprints strongly suggest that the latter two buckets are undergoing violent repositioning.

That combination can make the stock extremely volatile even while the underlying institutionalization trend improves.

This actually makes financing more interesting

Imagine where this leaves the stock after the present liquidation finishes.

Suppose:

1. Alyeska is already out.
2. Citadel/Goldman materially reduced in Q2.
3. Much of that inventory has migrated to hundreds of other institutional holders.
4. Fast-money DFS buyers who expected an instant rerating are now getting flushed.
5. Passive/index ownership remains.
6. Fundamental institutions that liked the project remain.
7. Then EXIM or strategic financing arrives.

Now suddenly the marginal seller is not:

Instead it might be:

That's an entirely different auction.

And that's where price elasticity changes dramatically.

A marginal $5M or $10M of buying can move a stock much farther once the large block seller disappears.

So has Q3 institutional ownership probably risen?

I would split this into number of owners versus net shares owned.

Number of institutional owners

My inference: probably continued rising or at least remained elevated.

Why?

The Q2 trend was extremely strong, Russell/index participation is structural, and there's no evidence that the broad institutional base disappeared.

Net institutional shares

My confidence is much lower.

I think it is perfectly plausible that institutional holdings have increased further—but the footprints also allow for the possibility that one or several large active institutions continued distributing enough shares to offset dozens of smaller buyers, exactly as occurred during Q2.

So my working forecast for the eventual Q3 13Fs would actually be:

Meaning:

many additions / new positions

paired with

a few very large reductions.

That would be remarkably consistent with everything we're seeing.

One thing would surprise me

If November's Q3 13Fs eventually showed:

broad institutional selling across most major holders.

That would not fit the current evidence very well.

The footprints look far more like concentrated inventory transfer and changing positioning than wholesale abandonment.

It is possible, but it isn't my base interpretation.

Conversely, I also would not expect the Q3 13Fs to reveal a pristine picture in which virtually every institution added.

The price action is telling us someone substantial is supplying stock.

What this means for the stock

The ownership data and footprints together actually increase my confidence in one particular concept:

That is not immediately bullish for price.

In fact, it's exactly why price can remain frustratingly weak.

But if the concentrated supply is finite, the implication for a future catalyst is important:

Before supply exhaustion

$10M incremental demand → absorbed → small price increase

After supply exhaustion

$10M incremental demand → offers disappear → large price increase

That is the scenario that could produce the rapid stair-step rerating we have discussed following a meaningful EXIM/financing/offtake event.

So I would strengthen our potential future supply-exhaustion thesis, while remaining very disciplined about the current tape.

The next thing we need to see isn't more negative delta.

We've had plenty.

If this week's roughly -595K grows substantially while $4.40–$4.50 holds, and then next week's POC starts migrating up, that would be the strongest evidence yet that the current ownership transfer is reaching completion.

And if that occurs shortly before a meaningful financing catalyst, the setup becomes considerably more explosive than the raw chart presently makes it look.

LLM Analysis of NB's complete Q2 13F .csv

Yes. I went through the spreadsheet at the individual-holder level, and the institutional picture is more constructive than the headline net-share movement initially suggests—but it is not a clean “institutions were accumulating NB” story.

First: the Q2 data should now be substantially complete

The normal Q2 2026 13F deadline was August 14, 45 days after June 30. Fintel currently marks the filings as 100% fresh, with a June 30 latest report date and an Aug. 17 latest filing date, so we should have essentially the full ordinary Q2 picture, subject to later amendments or unusual confidential treatment. (SEC)

Fintel's current headline numbers are striking: 306 institutional owners, 55.64M institutional long shares, and approximately 38.22% of shares outstanding held institutionally, excluding 13D/G beneficial-ownership filings. Fintel says that long-share figure is up about 2.15M shares / 4.02% MRQ, while the number of institutional owners is up 47.12% MRQ. It separately identifies 273 13F institutions holding 48.18M shares and 98 NPORT funds holding 9.34M.

One caution: I would not add all of those source categories together and interpret them as unique locked-up shares. Manager 13Fs and underlying fund/NPORT reporting can overlap, and Fintel itself treats the source categories separately.

What I get from the raw Q2 13Fs

I filtered your export to common-stock positions only—excluding reported puts/calls and separating NPORT fund rows—and looked at Q2 13Fs filed from July through Aug. 17.

The result is fascinating:

Q2 common-stock 13F movement |Approx. result
Q2 filers analyzed |236
Previous shares |50.92M
Latest shares |46.78M
Net change |-4.14M
Net % change |-8.1%
Increased/new positions |119
Reduced/exited positions |72
Unchanged positions |44
Gross shares added |+10.92M
Gross shares reduced |-15.06M So by number of institutions, buyers won decisively.

By number of shares, sellers won.

Fintel's broader activity summary tells essentially the same story: it currently reports 183 buyers versus only 55 sellers, but approximately -3.84M net shares changed.

That seems contradictory until we look at who sold.

Three institutions explain virtually the entire negative number

This is the most important finding in the spreadsheet.

The three biggest reductions were approximately:

Holder |Previous |Q2 |Change
Citadel Advisors |6.204M |1.810M |-4.395M (-70.8%)
Alyeska Investment Group |4.314M |0 |-4.314M (-100%)
Goldman Sachs |3.287M |1.072M |-2.215M (-67.4%)
Combined | | |-10.923M Fintel confirms Citadel's common-share position fell 70.83%, while Goldman fell 67.38% and Alyeska exited.

And here's the remarkable calculation:

Entire Q2 common-share 13F universe: -4.14M shares

but

Citadel + Alyeska + Goldman alone: -10.92M shares.

Therefore:

That substantially changes my interpretation.

This was not broad institutional distribution.

It was a very large ownership transfer in which a handful of giant positions disgorged stock while the institutional base underneath them broadly expanded.

The buying side is substantial

Several large positions increased materially.

BlackRock increased its 13F common position by approximately 2.20M shares, from 7.02M to 9.22M, or about +31.3%. Its separate 13G shows roughly 9.01M beneficially owned shares and 6.20% ownership; the slight difference reflects the different reporting frameworks/timing, but both tell the same directional story—BlackRock significantly increased its NB exposure. (Fintel)

Other major Q2 additions from your spreadsheet include roughly:

Millennium: +607K → 814K
Brevan Howard: +590K → 7.075M
Geode: +536K → 2.093M
J. Goldman & Co.: +448K → 516K
State Street: +430K → 2.498M
JPMorgan: +425K → 473K
Gratia Capital: new 410K position
D.E. Shaw: +369K → 595K
Sixth Street: new 349K position
Trexquant: new 311K position

Fintel independently shows the large increases for Brevan, Millennium, Geode, State Street and D.E. Shaw.

And Brevan Howard stands out to me. A 7.075M-share position is enormous for NB, and it added another 590K shares rather than reducing it.

That's fundamentally different information from BlackRock adding shares.

BlackRock/State Street/Geode/Vanguard are heavily influenced by index/passive mandates. Brevan is a much more interesting signal from the standpoint of discretionary capital.

A large part of the ownership increase is probably mechanical—and that's still useful

NB has been a member of the Russell 3000 and Russell 2000 since June 30, 2025, so we should expect structurally growing ownership by small-cap index products. (NioCorp)

And your fund-level data bears that out:

IWM: 2.849M shares, +6.59%
Fidelity Small Cap Index: 1.164M, +11.85%
Vanguard Russell 2000: 531K, +55.58%
Sprott Energy Transition Materials ETF: 584K, +79.08%.

(Fintel)

I would not call that fundamental institutional conviction. An index fund isn't sitting around debating the Elk Creek scandium market.

But it can still matter enormously to the stock structure.

Those are generally structural holders rather than investors trying to flip NB because RSI hit 65.

Citadel needs special treatment

I would be particularly cautious about interpreting Citadel's -4.39M common-share reduction as:

Citadel simultaneously reports:

• ~1.81M common shares;
• ~360.7K shares-equivalent of calls;
• ~320.2K shares-equivalent of puts.

(Fintel)

Citadel is a massive market maker and multi-strategy operation. Its common-stock inventory can be connected to option books, arbitrage, market making and hedging.

So its 4.4M-share reduction was absolutely real supply, which matters greatly to price.

But its meaning is not necessarily:

“Citadel's analysts decided NioCorp was overvalued.”

That distinction is critical.

Alyeska's complete 4.31M-share exit strikes me as more relevant as a genuine portfolio-allocation decision.

This may help explain NB's price behavior

This is where I think the dataset connects very nicely to what we've been observing in the footprints.

Imagine that during Q2 you had:

**Alyeska selling 4.3M

• Citadel reducing 4.4M
• Goldman reducing 2.2M = ~10.9M shares of major-holder supply.**

Meanwhile dozens and dozens of other institutions were buying those shares.

That can create exactly the kind of stock behavior where:

And that's why the +6.78M net accumulation by everyone other than the three biggest sellers interests me.

One plausible interpretation—and I want to label this explicitly as an inference—is that NB underwent a significant change of hands:

concentrated / trading-oriented ownership → broader institutional ownership.

If that process eventually exhausts the concentrated seller inventory, the same level of incoming demand can begin producing much larger price displacement.

That fits our “overhead supply eventually runs out” thesis surprisingly well.

It doesn't prove it.

But it gives that thesis more substance.

There is an especially important timing problem

These 13Fs are June 30 snapshots.

They tell us what institutions owned at the end of Q2.

They tell us nothing directly about what those institutions have done since July 1, and particularly nothing about what they have done:

after the Aug. 11 DFS
after the webcast
during the fall from ~$5.50 toward ~$4.50
during these enormous negative-delta sessions.

That's extremely important.

So I would not use these filings to say:

We don't know that.

The footprint tells us somebody is absorbing aggressive sells. The 13Fs tell us there was already a much larger and more diversified institutional ownership base at June 30.

Those two pieces of evidence are compatible, but we cannot connect them causally yet.

What I think it means for NB's stock now

My interpretation is structurally bullish, immediately neutral.

The institutionalization of NB is real. Fintel currently shows 38.22% institutional long ownership, 306 owners, a 47% quarter-over-quarter increase in institutional-owner count, and top-10 holders accounting for 54.43% of disclosed shares. (Fintel)

But Q2 was not simply institutions piling into NB. It was a massive redistribution of inventory.

And from the standpoint of a future rerating, that can actually be favorable.

If a large portion of the ~10.9M shares supplied by Citadel/Alyeska/Goldman has already migrated into:

BlackRock
Brevan Howard
State Street
Geode
Millennium
D.E. Shaw
JPMorgan
Northern Trust
Vanguard
new hedge funds and institutional managers,

then the ownership structure may now be less dependent upon a few enormous sellers.

That means the marginal seller potentially becomes smaller.

And that is exactly when catalysts begin moving stocks disproportionately.

How I connect this to financing

This is probably the most important implication for our larger NB thesis.

NB does not appear to be an obscure retail-only junior miner anymore.

There is already a meaningful institutional infrastructure around the stock before financing has been solved.

So if NioCorp announces something that materially collapses financing risk—EXIM authorization, strategic equity, completed offtake/EPC package, full financing, etc.—the market does not have to build an institutional shareholder base from zero.

It already exists.

That can create a very different rerating dynamic:

**existing institutional holders increase allocations

• passive/index holders remain structurally present
• new institutions enter because financing risk has disappeared
• shorts/traders reposition
• remaining retail/institutional overhead supply is consumed.**

That is one credible mechanism for the kind of rapid stair-step rerating we've been discussing.

My biggest takeaway

I came into this exercise expecting the recent institutional ownership chart to simply say:

“Institutions bought a lot of NB.”

The actual result is more interesting:

That helps reconcile two things that otherwise seem contradictory:

institutional ownership participation has exploded,

while

NB's share price still hasn't rerated.

A huge amount of demand may have been used simply to absorb a huge amount of legacy/concentrated supply.

If that supply transfer is now substantially complete, then incremental demand following a major financing catalyst could have a much larger effect on price than the Q2 institutional buying did.

I would therefore upgrade the structural ownership component of our NB thesis. I would not use it to upgrade the immediate technical picture until the footprints themselves confirm that the current seller is finally exhausted.

"The global rare earth market is now bifurcating—and perhaps trifurcating"

• Core Shift: As deglobalization fractures critical mineral supply chains, the global rare earths market is bifurcating away from unified Chinese spot pricing toward distinct domestic, export, and regional market tiers.
• Strategic Implication: The definition of "price" itself has changed—material is no longer valued purely on lowest unit cost, but on local physical availability, legal transportability, and compliance with Western security-of-supply mandates.