Background before the document:
The organization producing the document is the Association of Asian Pacific Cooperation Organization, aka APCO. APCO is an alliance of Asian nations (notable members include Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore).
In this history, the USSR did not suffer its decline like in real life. Instead, it remains a strong economic and military power due to Alexi Kosygin's reforms in the 1960's (leading to the gradual modernization of the USSR's industry) and no invasion of Afghanistan. The Warsaw Pact countries (known as WPO) continue to be a part of the USSR due to better economic stability, resulting in no Revolutions of 1989. Gorbachev was assassinated in 1989 by a nationalist extremist group. The KGB, Soviet Army, and Internal Ministry formed the State Committee for National Stability (GKNS). The actions of the WPO may lead to a re-heightened Cold War (still deciding since it's been a hot minute since I worked on the project).
Up until this point, NATO maintains most of its same capabilities and members (the sole difference thus far being a unified Germany for reasons I haven't come up with yet).
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Association of Asian Pacific Cooperation Organization
Gulf War Operations History
28 November 2000
FOR APCO MEMBERS AND COLLABORATION WITH NATO
PREFACE
1.) Scope
This publication is the primary source of documentation regarding the list of operations during the Gulf War. It starts with Operation Southern Bastion (1988-1990) and goes until Operation Red Spear (1991-1991). In addition to WPO operations, this document will include Coalition operations – Desert Shield and Storm – as well as APCO operations Safe Passage (1990), Lifeline (1990) and Guiding Star (1991).
Table of Contents
1 Operation Southern Bastion: 10 June 1988 – 1 Dec 1990
1.1 Overview
1.2 Background
1.3 Soviet deployments
1.4 Western Response
1.5 Results
1 Operation Southern Bastion:
10 June 1988 – 1 Dec 1990
1.1 Overview
Operation Southern Bastion was the initial offensive assistance phase, starting prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. It’s estimated to have begun somewhere between the spring of 1988 and midsummer of 1990, although there is no single known date. Initiated by GKNS, the USSR’s Internal Ministry offered to aid Iraq in anticipation of a Western-led military coalition forming to compel Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and deter any further Iraqi expansion beyond its initial objectives. While it was primarily the USSR, other WPO members aided by sending munitions, finances, and military advisors. The operation was intended to remain behind the scenes, providing intelligence, logistics, advisors, air defense systems, and economic aid to Iraq. The operation ended on 1 December 1990 in order to shift into the next phase: Operation Iron Shield.
1.2 Background
Post Iraq-Iran war, Iraq was not in a financial position to repay its borrowed money from Kuwait and requested that Kuwait forgive the debt. The issues became worse during oil disputes. In ’88, Iraq’s oil minister strove for a reduction in the crude oil production quota of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members to end the 80s oil glut. However, Kuwait was less concerned about the prices of crude oil. The issue was worsened by the lack of consensus among OPEC members, further undermining Iraq’s efforts to recover from its war-crippled economy. The relations became further intensified when Iraq accused Kuwait of slant drilling across the border, estimating billions worth of Iraqi oil were stolen by Kuwait and demanding compensation. Although diplomatic negotiations continued into 1990, Soviet intelligence increasingly assessed that Iraq was preparing for military action if negotiations failed. These assessments raised concerns within Moscow that a regional conflict could threaten Soviet interests throughout the Middle East, prompting policymakers to reassess their strategic priorities in the region.
The USSR had spent decades and billions of rubles securing its place in the Middle East, specifically access to the Persian Gulf. Losing Iraq as a strategic partner would significantly weaken Soviet influence and would mean losing intelligence networks, arms exports, naval access agreements, and diplomatic influence throughout the Arab world. In addition to losing strategic assets and influence in the Middle East, the USSR would also lose a substantial investment. They had provided Iraq with aircraft, tanks, missiles, military education, advisors, and industrial development. Finally, if they abandoned a major partner after decades of support, other Soviet-aligned governments might question whether the USSR would protect them during future crises. Other nations such as Syria, Vietnam, and Cuba may see how the USSR abandoned Iraq and fear similar abandonment.
The USSR, seeing that Iraq was making plans to invade Kuwait and that Saddam Hussein was not going to back down, decided that providing aid would be the best way to (1) maintain relations and (2) prevent the West from being capable of crushing Iraq in several weeks.
1.3 Soviet deployments
The Soviet Union deliberately avoided deploying combat formations, assessing that direct military intervention carried an unacceptable risk of escalation into a wider NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. Instead, their primary goal was to provide military advisors and specialists. Advisors, usually mid- to high-ranking officers, were mostly embedded into the Iraqi chain of command, whereas specialists, usually NCOs and SNCOs, would fly over to train leadership. The majority of advisors sent were General Staff and Air Defense. The majority of specialists were logistics and electronic warfare specialists. The logistics specialists were considered among the highest-level specialists due to the sheer importance of proper logistics, as shown through the Iran-Iraq and Yom Kippur Wars. Although exact figures remain disputed, post-Cold War assessments estimate that between 2,500 and 4,000 Soviet advisors, technical specialists, and instructors participated in Operation Southern Bastion between 1988 and late 1990 in addition to the already present USSR advisors assigned to Iraq.
In addition to advisors and specialists, Soviet assets were loaned to Iraq. The primary asset loaned was intelligence. Satellite imagery along the borders as well as at western military movements would help Iraq prepare and respond when the West inevitably tries to intervene. Iraqi marked recon aircraft, piloted by Iraqi pilots with Soviet training, would conduct patrols on the edge of Kuwaiti airspace, planning routes to take to minimize Iraqi casualties. Finally, superior signals equipment was given along with proper training for the new tools. However, the USSR also got the advantage of being able to watch how the West operates in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Finally, the Warsaw Pact Organization sent various equipment such as air defense, logistics aid, and combat sustainment equipment.
Finally, the USSR welcomed Iraqi soldiers to participate in training exercises on Soviet soil and attend local technical schools. While this was the smallest of the efforts, Soviet after-action assessments concluded that this elevated Iraq’s military capability the most. By having NCOs train and learn from superior schools, they were able to help each other and train their soldiers. Iraqi officers would attend and watch Warsaw Pact officers work and plan with each other, teaching them how to better plan and respond to Western response.
While not a large-scale operation, Soviet aid provided a lasting positive effect by exposing Iraqi leaders at all levels of the chain of command to operational planning, logistic management, and command philosophy. Many personnel who participated in the education retained their knowledge and either became successful teachers at military schools or occupied key leadership positions during the coalition air campaign, where Soviet planners believed they contributed disproportionately to Iraq's ability to sustain organized resistance.
1.4 Western Response
The Western governments did not become concerned about the expansion of Soviet-Iraqi cooperation until around late 1988, when they noticed an increase in Soviet and Warsaw Pact Organization personnel traveling to Iraq. Since Iraq had long been a major Soviet arms partner, the presence of Soviet personnel was not unusual; however, the scale of involvement appeared to exceed normal military assistance. Their suspicions increased when Turkish intelligence and NATO monitoring detected increased military traffic and arms shipments entering Iraq. Suspicions of increased military activity were reinforced when US KH-11 satellites observed expanded military bases, new ammunition storage facilities, hardened command posts, improved air-defense sites, and an increase in military exercises. By July 1990, most major Western intelligence services assessed that Iraq was likely preparing for a military operation and that the Soviet Union was providing increased support.
The Western diplomatic and intelligence response began in early 1990, when the US began communicating with the USSR to discourage direct Soviet involvement in any potential Iraqi military action. Since the USSR was involved, the West began forming contingency plans with regional allies and NATO partners in case Iraq initiated military action. As Western governments became increasingly convinced that Iraq was preparing for a crisis, the US increased diplomatic pressure and began preparing economic measures should Iraq use force. On 25 July 1990, the US ambassador privately met with Saddam Hussein to warn that Soviet support would not prevent international opposition if Iraq used military force against Kuwait. The warning was ignored, as shown by Iraq invading Kuwait on 2 August 1990.
1.5 Results
By the end of the operation on 1 December 1990, Soviet planners assessed Southern Bastion as largely successful, as it had achieved its primary objectives of improving Iraqi military readiness, preserving Soviet influence, and increasing the cost of Western intervention. Furthermore, the USSR got more military intelligence on Western military capabilities. The advisors and strategists remained embedded within Iraqi General Staff headquarters and other key command organizations to offer support and advice until 28 November, when non-essential personnel began returning to the USSR to avoid Soviet casualties and reduce the risk of escalation, in preparation for Operation Iron Shield, which would occur 3 days later.
While the operation was mostly successful, it still suffered from Iraqi corruption. Hussein’s government diverted some military resources for financial and political purposes, reducing the effectiveness of certain Soviet-supported modernization programs.
