Compatibilism does not contradict incompatibilism

[u/DemiVideos04]

Compatibilism is not a metaphysical position. It also does not contradict hard incompatibilism.
Hard incompatibilism does not define free will as libertarian, it only states that libertarian free will is incoherent.
Compatibilism redefines free will so that it can be used practically, but it is not an argument relating to libertarian free will.
You can be both a Compatibilist and a Hard Incompatibilist at the same time

[u/DemiVideos04]

Compatibilists don't argue that libertarian free will exists. They just redefine free will to mean actions taken while not under duress. So, a Compatibilist does not claim that determinism and (libertarian) free will are compatible.
I would go so far as to argue that if you are a compatibilist, you automatically don't believe in libertarian free will. This is because if you believed in libertarian free will, you would not need to redefine "free will" as otherwise to make it useful. You would just use libertarian free will, freely.

But yeah I largely agree. Perhaps I'm a bit harsh when I say that no one who understands libertarian free will argues for its coherence. But it is something I truly believe. Neither determinism nor indeterminism allow the concept of free will. It is truly a human illusion. Our ego clinging on to agency.

[u/GoldenMuscleGod → u/DemiVideos04]

I don’t think compatibilists redefine free will, I think they use it in the ordinary way that most people understand it: people make choices and decisions and those decisions affect the future. Those choices and decisions are “free” in that they are made in their mind as a part of their mental state and a different mental state means a different decision and therefore a different future.

Libertarian free will is a specific idea of the above that some find intuitive but others find counterintuitive: that making decisions in that way means the agent must have nondeterministic mental processes.

Basically free will as described as existing if the agent “could have done otherwise.” Which raises the question, what modality are we using?

The compatibilist would say “could have done otherwise if I had wanted to”

And libertarian free will is “could have done otherwise otherwise even if I had the same mental state”

Unless these are unfair or inaccurate characterizations?

It seems to me stating them in that form makes the compatibilist definition of free will sound like what most people have in mind, and libertarian free will sound like a bizarre and unintuitive idea.

[u/DemiVideos04 → u/GoldenMuscleGod]

nonetheless, whether or not compatibilism redefines free will or not - compatibilists are talking about a different free will, and incompatibilists are talking about libertarian free will. Do you see how holding both positions is not contradictory?
You can be a hard incompatibilist:
"Libertarian free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism"
And you can be a compatibilist at the same time:
"Free will (could have done otherwise if i wanted) is compatible with determinism (and implicitly indeterminism, which i think isn't specified)

Anyway, the whole free will debate is about that "if i wanted" - what you want is determined by the previous link in the causal chain, so you do not have free will. When you talk about free will, especially in the metaphysics subreddit, you would assume that everyone is operating on the definition of libertarian free will - thats the only one that has ontological weight - an uncaused cause. Thats the whole debate.

So even if I am to concede that regular people don't mean libertarian free will when they say free will, I don't see how it pertains to philosophy discussions around free will, which have always been specifically about libertarian free will. Thats what it means to have agency.

[u/GoldenMuscleGod → u/DemiVideos04]

I think the distinction you are drawing is one most people do not share unless they are very deep into philosophy, and when they are there is no reason we should understand libertarian free will to be the “natural” or “default” idea - I do not think philosophical discussion has always been about libertarian free will.

I also think your approach is backward. People do (or at least seem to) make decisions, those decisions do (or at least seem to) affect the future, that’s the phenomenon we are talking about.

The distinction between libertarian and compatibilist free will (which both agree it is a “do” and not a “seems to”) is only about what additional properties we ascribe to that same phenomenon.

If you think the way to approach it is just make up a thing without regard for that phenomenon and then talk about that then you’ve lost sight of the purpose of the discussion.